https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/4658

AOO & 6 others v Trustee, Nakuru Golf Club & 3 others (Environment and Land Petition E013 of 2025) [2026] KEELC 4658 (KLR) (22 July 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELC 4658 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Environment and Land Court at Nakuru Environment and Land Petition E013 of 2025 MAO Odeny, J July 22, 2026 AOO.................................1ST PETITIONER/APPLICANT TNW..........................2ND PETITIONER/APPLICANT JNO (a minor suing by TNW her mother and next friend) ..............................3RD PETITIONER/APPLICANT AOO (a minor suing by TNW his mother and next friend)................................4TH PETITIONER/APPLICANT JANE NJERI JAMES......................................5TH PETITIONER/APPLICANT PATRICK MAINA WACHIRA.........................6TH PETITIONER/APPLICANT JAMES MURIITH KIBUKU............................7TH PETITIONER/APPLICANT VERSUS THE TRUSTEE, NAKURU GOLF CLUB...........................................................................1ST RESPONDENT ERIC NDERITU, STEPHEN MUCHERU, PAUL MUHIA, WESLEY ROTICH (Sued as the chairman, vice chairman, secretary and treasurer of Nakuru Golf Club).....................................2ND RESPONDENT NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY.........................................3RD RESPONDENT COUNTY GOVERNMENT OF NAKURU.......................... .................................................2ND RESPONDENT Between AOO 1st Petitioner TNW 2nd Petitioner JNO (A minor suing by TNW Her Mother And Next Friend) 3rd Petitioner AOO (A mnor suing by TNW His Mother And Next Friend) 4th Petitioner Jane Njeri James 5th Petitioner Patrick Maina Wachira 6th Petitioner James Muriith Kibuku 7th Petitioner and The Trustee, Nakuru Golf Club 1st Respondent Eric Nderitu, Stephen Mucheru, Paul Muhia, Wesley Rotich (Sued And Treasurer Of Nakuru Golf Club) 2nd Respondent National Environment Management Authority 3rd Respondent County Government Of Nakuru 4th Respondent Ruling 1.This ruling is in respect of the application dated 5th December, 2025 by the Petitioners/Applicants seeking the following orders:1)Spent.2)Spent.3)That this Honourable court be pleased to issue a conservatory order restraining the 1st and 2nd Respondents whether by themselves, their employees, servants, agents or otherwise howsoever from playing and streaming loud music through amplified artificial sound systems within their premises comprised in Nakuru event emitting noise and vibrations at levels that are harmful to the environment or doing any acts within their premises that are prejudicial to the rights of the petitioners and other residents of Milimani Estate in Nakuru pending the hearing and determination of this petition.4)That the cost of this application be provided for. 2.The application is grounded on the supporting affidavit of AOO the 1st Petitioner, who deponed that his family resides on the suit property known as [particulars withheld] owned by the 5th Petitioner, which property is situated directly adjacent to the Nakuru Golf Club. 3.The Applicant further deponed that on 22nd November, 2025, the Petitioners hosted a family gathering which started at 1:00 PM and at 2:00 PM, the Golf Club also hosted an event of their own, playing extremely loud music through an amplified artificial sound system. 4.It was his disposition that the noise and vibrations from the Golf Club were so severe that it made the Petitioners’ premises uninhabitable forcing their uncomfortable guests to leave by 4:00 PM. He added that the music continued until about 6:00 AM the following morning, preventing the family including minors from sleeping. 5.The 1st Petitioner/Applicant deponed that he used an audio noise spectrum analyzer application on his phone to measure the noise levels and the recorded readings of 71 dB-A at 10:27 PM, 69 dB-A at 1:05 AM, and 83 dB-A at 2:12 AM which were above the permitted decibels. 6.It was the Applicant’s further disposition that their advocate, sent a demand letter to the Golf Club on 25th November, 2025, but the 1st and 2nd Respondents responded vide a letter dated 28th November, 2025, and further, the Nakuru Milimani Residents Association also formally complained about the noise on 24th November, 2025. 7.The Applicant also stated that despite the complaints, the 1st and 2nd Respondents still planned to host a similar noisy event on 6th December, 2025. He further deponed that the 3rd and 4th Respondents abdicated their statutory duties by licensing the events without enforcing environmental standards or monitoring the Club's compliance. 1St Respondent’s Response 8.The 1st Respondent, through its General Manager Sylvester Munywoki, filed a replying affidavit sworn on 19th January, 2026, where he averred that the Petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear nexus between the exact constitutional provisions allegedly breached, the rights threatened and the specific injuries suffered. 9.He averred that the Petitioners rushed to file a Constitutional Petition without first lodging a formal complaint with the 3rd Respondent. Further, that if the 3rd Respondent had been involved, they could have conducted a site visit and issued an Improvement Notice if loud noise was detected, hence this Petition is premature. It was his disposition that the 1st and 2nd Respondent are a private members’ club established in 1924, that occasionally hires out its grounds to raise revenue. He averred that it does not organize, manage, supervise, or control the events or the sound equipment used. 10.The Respondent questioned the credibility and legality of the evidence presented by the Petitioners, as they are not verifiable. He added that the decibel readings were generated from a mobile phone application and the Petitioners failed to provide the phone model, serial number, app developer credentials, proof of maintenance/updates, or evidence that the 3rd Respondent and the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) certified the app. 11.It was the Respondent’s further averment that the Petitioners lacked the technical expertise and authority to undertake the said exercise rendering their readings legally invalid. Further, the prayer of a permanent injunction sought by the Petitioner was a disproportionate remedy to a single extra sensitive family that would unfairly impact the broader population. 12.According to the Respondent, granting such an injunction would essentially shut down the Club's social functions, which it has relied upon since its early years, and urged the court to dismiss the application with costs. Petitioner’s Further Affidavit 13.In response, the 1st Petitioner filed a further affidavit sworn on 18th February, 2026, where he stated that the 1st and 2nd Respondent were statutorily and contractually responsible for ensuring that any entity operating on its property complied with the law and noise licensing requirements. 14.He stated that since they were not given prior notice of the extreme noise, they could not arrange for professional experts to be on standby but ended up using his mobile sound meter application on a smartphone to record the noise. The Applicant further averred that the application and printer from his phone functioned properly when generating the data. He added that the Respondents failed to provide any of their own noise level measurements to contradict the Petitioner’s reading, and in the absence of official noise measurements taken directly by the 3rd Respondent, the Petitioners are not precluded from seeking legal redress. Applicant’s Submissions 15.Counsel for the Petitioner filed submissions dated 18th February, 2026, and identified the following two issues for determination:a)Whether the Petition and Application is barred by the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and exhaustion.b)Whether the conservatory order prayed for should issue. 16.On the first issue, counsel submitted that this court has the proper jurisdiction to adjudicate this matter under Article 162 and Article 23 of the Constitution, since the Petition alleges a violation or threatened violation of fundamental rights. Counsel relied on the case of Exeter Pearl Apartments Management Ltd V Bar Next Door Ventures Limited [2025] KEELC 4115 (KLR), where the held that it had the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine similar Petitions. 17.Mr. Ratemo further submitted that Section 3(3) of the Environmental Management and Coordination Act (EMCA) and Section 13(3) of the Environment and Land Court Act, 2011 expressly allow the court to entertain applications for redress concerning the right to a clean and healthy environment. He argued that the doctrine of exhaustion was not absolute as the litigant cannot be compelled to approach an ineffective statutory forum, especially considering that the 3rd Respondent did not have the authority to grant the specific conservatory orders being sought. 18.On the second issue, counsel outlined several prerequisites that must be satisfied to grant such an order. He relied on the case of Board of Management of Uhuru Secondary School V City County Director of Education & 2 others [2015] eKLR. 19.On whether the Applicant has established a prima facie case with a probability of success, counsel submitted that the Petitioners have fulfilled this condition by showing that the noise levels from the Nakuru Golf Club reached 73dB, 69dB, and 83dB, exceeding permissible limits and violating Article 42 of the Constitution, a fact corroborated by the 3rd Respondent’s inspection report. Counsel relied on the cases of Centre for Rights Education and Awareness and 7 Others V The Attorney General [HCCP No. 16 of 2011] and Muslims for Human Rights [MUHURI] & Others V Attorney General & Others CP No. 7 of 2011. 20.It was counsel’s submission that the order will protect the right to a clean and healthy environment for vulnerable individuals such as the sick, the elderly and young children residing in the low-density Milimani Estate, and relied on the cases of Patrick Musimba V The National Land Commission & 4 Others [2015] eKLR and Satrose Ayuma & 11 Others V Registered Trustees of Kenya Railways [2011] eKLR. 21.Mr. Ratemo argued that the court must consider whether the Petition's substratum will be destroyed if the interim order is not granted, and further that the violation of their rights should not be allowed to continue during the pendency of the Petition. Counsel relied on the case of Martin Nyaga Wambora V Speaker of the County Assembly of Embu & 3 Others CP No. 7 of 2014. 22.According to counsel, the conservatory orders carried a public-law connotation and must be weighed against the public interest and cited the Supreme Court case of Gatirau Peter Munya v Dickson Mwenda Githinji & 2 Others [2014] eKLR and argued that the court’s intervention was necessary since the Respondents' actions affected all residents of Milimani Estate. Counsel urged the court to exercise its discretion and allow the application as prayed. 1St And 2Nd Respondent’s Submissions 23.Counsel filed his submissions dated 12th March, 2026, and identified the following issues for determination:a)Whether the Petition and Application are caught by the doctrines of constitutional avoidance and exhaustion of alternative remedies.b)Whether the Petitioners have established a prima facie case warranting conservatory orders.c)Whether the grant or denial of conservatory relief will enhance the constitutional values and objects of the specific right or freedom in the Bill of Rights.d)Whether the grant or denial of the conservatory relief will enhance the principle of public interest.e)Whether the petition will be rendered nugatory if the conservatory order is not granted. 24.On the first issue, as to whetherthe Petition and Application are caught by the doctrines of constitutional avoidance and exhaustion of alternative remedies, counsel submitted that the Petitioners failed to lodge a complaint with the 3rd Respondent prior to filing the suit, and cited the cases of Geoffrey Muthinja Kabiru & 2 Others V Samuel Munga Henry & 1756 Others [2015] eKLR and Speaker of National Assembly V Njenga Karume as cited in Republic V Kenya Revenue Authority Ex Parte Keycorp Real Advisory Limited [2019] eKLR. Counsel further submitted that NEMA is a specialized agency with the technical expertise, equipment, and mandate to investigate noise complaints, where it can conduct site visits, take calibrated measurements, and engage with both the complainant and the alleged polluter. 25.On the second issue, as to whether the Petitioners have established a prima facie case warranting conservatory orders, counsel submitted that the Petitioner used unverified mobile phone noise readings rather than expert calibrated measurements, and relied on the case of Exeter Pearl Apartments Management Ltd (supra), where the court held that for good measure, the demonstration that the noise being emitted from the 1st 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ premises exceeded the prescribed limit called upon the Applicant to place before the court evidence vide an expert report in the manner prescribed under Section 6 of the Regulations pertaining to noise and pollution . 26.Mr. Oduor submitted that even if the court were to find that the Petitioners have established a prima facie case, the Petitioners must still satisfy the other principles for grant of conservatory orders as was held in the case of Board of Management of Uhuru Secondary School V City County Director of Education &2 Others [2015] eKLR. 27.On the third and fourth issues, Counsel submitted that the Petitioners sought blanket injunction orders against hosting any events by the 1st and 2nd Respondents which if granted would have a grave impact on its constitutional rights under Article 40 of the Constitution, as the Club is entitled to the beneficial use and enjoyment of its land. Further, the court is required to balance competing rights and that the principle of proportionality demands that the remedy sought must be commensurate with the harm alleged, and cited the case of Munya V Kithinji & 2 others [2014] eKLR KESC 30 (KLR). 28.Counsel urged the court to dismiss the application with costs as the Petitioners have failed to demonstrate the threshold for grant of conservatory orders and that if the Petitioners are successful in the main Petition, they can be adequately compensated by way of damages. 3Rd Respondents Submissions 29.Counsel for the 3rd Respondent filed submissions dated 18th March 2026, and identified two issues for determination:a)Whether the Petition and the application for conservatory orders offend the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.b)Whether the Petition and the application for conservatory orders should be dismissed on the basis of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. 30.On the first issue, counsel submitted that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where a statute provides for alternative remedies or administrative processes, the same must be pursued before approaching the court, unless exceptional circumstances exist such as futility, bias, inordinate delay or where the remedy is inadequate or illusory. 31.Ms. Lisanza relied on the cases of Mbugua & 10 others v Attorney General & 54 others [2023] KEHC 1917 (KLR), and Njoroge & 19 others v County Government of Nakuru & another [2023] KEHC 24876 (KLR), where the Court held that the exhaustion doctrine arises when a litigant aggrieved by an agency's action seeks redress from a court, emphasizing postponement of judicial intervention to allow specialized administrative bodies to address grievances first. 32.Counsel further submitted that under EMCA (Cap 387) and the Environmental Management and Coordination (Noise and Excessive Vibration Pollution) (Control) Regulations, 2009, the 3rd Respondent (NEMA) was the primary authority for enforcing noise pollution standards. 33.It was counsel’s submission that the Petitioners lodged a complaint, prompting an inspection and recommendations by the 3rd Respondent, and there was no evidence that the Petitioners pursued further administrative steps available under EMCA before filing this Petition. Counsel added that the direct approach to court offended the doctrine of exhaustion and cited the case of Republic V Were & 2 others [2024] KEHC 8139 (KLR). 34.On the second issue, she relied on the cases of Ngotho & another V Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Education [2025] KEHC 12531 (KLR) and Mungai V Attorney General [2025] KEHC 8544 (KLR), and submitted that the Petitioners’ grievances arose from alleged noise pollution, fully governed by EMCA and the Noise Regulations, 2009 (including Regulation 16(2) on amplified sound restrictions), and that the 3rd Respondent’s inspection and recommendations showed that statutory remedies were available and have been activated. 35.Counsel urged the court to apply the doctrine of exhaustion and remit the matter to administrative processes under EMCA. Analysis And Determination 36.The issues for determination are as to whether the Petition offends the doctrine of exhaustion and whether the Applicants have met the threshold for grant of conservatory orders. 37.On the doctrine of exhaustion, the Court in the case of Ibrahim Wakhanyanga & 2 others v Chief Magistrate’s Court Kakamega & 2 others; Attorney General for Land Registrar Kakamega (Interested party) [2022] eKLR observed as follows:“17. One of the instances in which a constitutional court loses jurisdiction is through the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. Thus, where there exist ample statutory avenues for resolution of a dispute, the constitutional court will defer to the statutory options and decline to entertain such a dispute. A party seeking relief in a matter that can be addressed through interpretation of statutes and rules made thereunder must seek relief through an ordinary suit as opposed to a constitutional petition. In that regard, the Court of Appeal stated in Sumayya Athmani Hassan v Paul Masinde Simidi & another [2019] eKLR as follows:… where a legislation has been enacted to give effect to a constitutional right, it is not permissible for a litigant to found a cause of action directly on the Constitution without challenging the legislation in question. That principle has been reinforced by the Supreme Court in Communications Commission case (supra).[17] In conclusion, we find that the alleged unlawful interdiction and termination of a contract of employment was not a constitutional issue and thus the petition did not disclose a cause of action anchored on the Constitution. Accordingly, the petition being incompetent, the court acted in excess of jurisdiction and erred in law in determining the petition. ….18. Similarly, the same court stated in Gabriel Mutava & 2 others v Managing Director Kenya Ports Authority & another [2016] eKLR thus:Time and again it has been said that where there exists other sufficient and adequate avenue to resolve a dispute, a party ought not to trivialize the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court by bringing actions that could very well and effectively be dealt with in that other forum. Such party ought to seek redress under such other legal regime rather than trivialize constitutional litigation.…A corollary to the foregoing is the principle of constitutional avoidance. The principle holds that where it is possible to decide a case without reaching a constitutional issue that should be done.” 38.The Applicants sought conservatory orders stopping the 1st and 2nd Respondents from playing and streaming loud music through amplified artificial sound systems within the Club which is located adjacent to the Applicants suit property. 39.The 1st and 2nd Respondents on the other hand contend that being a private members’ club, it occasionally hires out its grounds to raise revenue but it did not organize, manage, supervise, or control the events or the sound equipment used. It was their case that the credibility and legality of the evidence presented by the Petitioners were not verifiable. 40.The 3rd Respondent also stated that the Petitioners had not exhausted the alternative remedies and administrative processes prior to approaching this court. The Petitioners argued that the doctrine of exhaustion was not absolute since they could not be compelled to approach the statutory forum since the 3rd Respondent did not have the authority to grant the specific conservatory orders being sought. 41.It is trite law that a party is required to exhaust alternative dispute resolution mechanisms before approaching the Court. The Court of Appeal in the case of Geoffrey Muthinja Kabiru & 2 Others – vs – Samuel Munga Henry & 1756 Others [2015] eKLR observed as follows:“It is imperative that where a dispute resolution mechanism exists outside courts, the same be exhausted before the jurisdiction of the courts is invoked. Courts ought to be the fora of last resort and not the first port of call the moment a storm brews within churches, as is bound to happen. The exhaustion doctrine is a sound one and serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is first of all diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanisms in place for resolution outside of courts. This accords with Article 159 of the Constitution which commands Courts to encourage alternative means of dispute resolution.” 42.The court is also cognizant of the fact that the availability of an alternative remedy does not preclude a party from seeking constitutional relief as was held in the case of Nicholus V Attorney General & 7 others; National Environmental Complaints Committee & 5 0thers (Interested Parties) (Petition E007 of 2023) [2023] KESC 113 (KLR), as follows:“…the availability of an alternative remedy does not necessarily bar an individual from seeking constitutional relief. This is because the act of seeking constitutional relief is contingent upon the adequacy of an existing alternative means of redress. If the alternative remedy is deemed inadequate in addressing the issue at hand, then the court is not restrained from providing constitutional relief. But there is also a need to emphasize the need for the court to scrutinize the purpose for which a party is seeking relief, in determining whether the granting of such constitutional reliefs is appropriate in the given circumstances. This means that a nuanced approach to the relationship between constitutional reliefs for violation of rights and alternative means of redress, while also considering the specific circumstances of each case to determine the appropriateness of seeking such constitutional reliefs, is a necessary prerequisite on the part of any superior court.” 43.The alternative forum or Tribunal may not have the requisite jurisdiction to grant some of the orders sought which are of a constitutional nature especially violation of rights under the Bill of Rights. This is not to encourage parties to couch their pleadings by throwing in a few articles of the Constitution to look like violation of rights to avoid the alternative forums. The court is vigilant of such cases and if detected, the court would not hesitate to apply the brakes and enforce the doctrine of exhaustion. 44.The Environment and Land Court’s jurisdiction is set out in Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution as follows:“(2) Parliament shall establish courts with the status of the High Court to hear and determine disputes relating to:(a)employment and labour relations; and(b)the environment and the use and occupation of, and title to, land.” 45.Parliament enacted the Environment and Land Court Act 2011, pursuant to the said Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution. Section 13 of the Act sets out in detail, the extent of the jurisdiction of the court in the following terms:“ (1)The Court shall have original and appellate jurisdiction to hear and determine all disputes in accordance with Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and with the provisions of this Act or any other law applicable in Kenya relating to environment and land. (2)In exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution, the Court shall have power to hear and determine disputes;(a)relating to environmental planning and protection, climate issues, land use planning, title, tenure, boundaries, rates, rents, valuations, mining, minerals and other natural resources;(b)relating to compulsory acquisition of land;(c)relating to land administration and management;(d)relating to public, private and community land and contracts, choses in action or other instruments granting any enforceable interests in land; and(e)any other dispute relating to environment and land. (3)Nothing in this Act shall preclude the Court from hearing and determining applications for redress of a denial, violation or infringement of, or threat to, rights or fundamental freedom relating to a clean and healthy environment under Articles 42, 69 and 70 of the Constitution. (4)In addition to the matters referred to in subsections (1) and (2), the Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of subordinate courts or local tribunals in respect of matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Court. (5)Deleted by Act No. 12 of 2012, Sch. (6)Deleted by Act No. 12 of 2012, Sch. (7)In exercise of its jurisdiction under this Act, the Court shall have power to make any order and grant any relief as the Court deems fit and just, including;(a)interim or permanent preservation orders including injunctions;(b)prerogative orders;(c)award of damages;(d)compensation;(e)specific performance;(g)restitution;(h)declaration; or(i)costs” 46.I have considered the submission by counsel and find that this court has the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine this Petition. 47.On the second limb as to whether the Applicant has met the threshold for grant of conservatory orders, it is trite law that an Applicant seeking conservatory orders must demonstrate that:a)He has a prima facie case.b)Unless the conservatory or interim order is granted, he is likely to suffer prejudice or injury as a result of violation or threatened violation of his constitutional rights or the constitution.c)It would be in the public interest to grant the order. 48.In the case of Board of Management of Uhuru Secondary School V City County Director of Education & 2 others [2015] eKLR, the court held as follows:“Foremost, the applicant ought to demonstrate a prima facie case with a likelihood of success and that in the absence of the conservatory orders he is likely to suffer prejudice. As was stated by Musinga J (as he then was) in the case of Centre for Rights Education and Awareness and 7 Others –Versus- The Attorney General [HCCP No. 16 of 2011]:“[Arguments] in this ruling relate to the prayer for a conservatory order in terms of prayer 3 of the Petitioner’s application and not the Petition. I will therefore not delve into a detailed analysis of facts and law. At this stage, a party seeking a conservatory order only requires to demonstrate that he has a prima facie case with a likelihood of success and that unless the court grants the conservatory order, there is real danger that he will suffer prejudice as a result of the violation or threatened violation of the Constitution”.It is in my view not enough to merely establish a prima facie case and show that it is potentially arguable. Potential arguability is not enough to justify a conservatory order but rather there must also be evident a likelihood of success. The prima facie case ought to be beyond a speculative basis. In these respects, I would quickly make reference to M. Ibrahim J (as he then was) in the case of Muslims for Human Rights [MUHURI] & Others – Versus - Attorney General & Others CP No. 7 of 2011, who whilst agreeing with Musinga J’s statement in Centre for Rights Education and Awareness [CREAW] and 7 Others – Versus - The Attorney General (Supra) stated as follows:-“I would agree with my brother that an applicant seeking conservatory orders in a Constitutional case must demonstrate that he has a prima facie case with a likelihood of success” 49.In this case, the Applicant must demonstrate that the noise being emitted from the 1st and 2nd Respondents premises exceeded the prescribed limit. The 3rd Respondent under the Environmental Management and Coordination (Noise and Excessive Vibration Pollution) (Control) Regulations, 2009, the 3rd Respondent is bestowed with the mandate of enforcing noise pollution standards. 50.Section 6 of the Regulation makes provision for the measurement and control of noise as follows:(1)No person shall cause noise from any source which exceeds any sound level as set out in the applicable column in the First Schedule to these Regulations.(2)Measurements shall be taken by the relevant lead agency.(3)In any cases where there is no relevant lead agency to take the measurements, or where the lead agency has failed to take action after being given reasonable notice by the Authority, the measurement shall be taken by a person dully authorized by the Authority, who is knowledgeable in the proper use of the measuring equipment.(4)The Authority in consultation with the relevant lead agency may issue guidelines for the measurement of noise and excessive vibration.(5)Any person who makes noise in excess of the prescribed levels commits an offence.” 51.The Applicant stated that the recordings of the noise levels at the time when the cause of action arose were measured using the 1st Petitioner/Applicant’s personal phone and not the 3rd Respondent. I have perused the court record and not seen any noise assessment report by the 3rd Respondent who has the mandate of establishing the level of noise pollution guided under the Environmental Management and Coordination (Noise and Excessive Vibration Pollution) (Control) Regulations, 2009. 52.The Applicant did not approach the 3rd Respondent to offer their expertise in the measurements of the noise pollution to show whether it exceeded the permissible limits provided. The 3rd Respondent stated that the 1st Petitioner later made a claim with them regarding the noise pollution but did not allow the process to take its course. 53.I therefore find that the Applicant has not met the threshold for the grant of conservatory orders. Consequently, the Applicant’s application is hereby dismissed with costs in the cause. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAKURU THIS 22ND DAY OF JULY 2026.M. A. ODENYJUDGE