https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/8072

Kuria v Director of Public Prosecution (Criminal Appeal E099 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 8072 (KLR) (8 May 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 8072 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Murang'a Criminal Appeal E099 of 2025 S Mbungi, J May 8, 2026 Between Apolo Pablo Kuria Appellant and Director Of Public Prosecution Respondent (Being an appeal against the conviction and sentence of Hon. M.K Mutegi – SPM delivered on 24{{^th}} September 2025 in Kangema Law Court Criminal Case No. E385 of 2024) Judgment 1.The appellant herein was charged with arson contrary to section 332(a) of the penal code. The particulars of the charge were that on 26th June 2024, at around 2345 hours, in Kaluti sublocation, Waithaga location, Kahuro subcounty within Murang’a County, the appellant willfully and unlawfullly set fire to a dwelling house valued at Kshs. 150,000/-, the property of David Kagika Kamau. 2.On the second count, he was charged with the offence of causing grievous harm contrary to section 234 of the penal code. The particulars of the charge were that on 26th June 2024, in Kaluti sublocation, Waithaga location, Kahuro subcounty within Murang’a County, the appellant did grievous harm to David Kagika Kamau. 3.On the third count, he was charged with assault contrary to section 251 of the penal code. The particulars were that on 26th June 2024 at around 0530 hrs, in Kaluti sublocation, Waithaga location, Kahuro subcounty within Murang’a County, the appellant willfully and unlawfully assaulted Kenneth Maingi Kamau thereby occasioning him actual bodily harm. 4.On the fourth count, the appellant was charged with the offence of resisting arrest by a police officer conrary to section 254 of the penal code. The particulars of the charge were that on 26th June 2024, at around 2300 hrs, in Kaluti sublocation, Waithaga location, Kahuro subcounty within Murang’a County, the appellant resisted arrest by No. 51397 CPL Joseph Tanui and No. 243374 PC Mwema, police officers who at the said time were acting in the due execution of their duties. 5.The appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges, and the matter proceeded to full trial. The prosecution called a total of six witnesses in support of its case. The appellant testified in his own defence and called no other witnesses. Facts at trial 6.PW1 was Kenneth Maingi Kamau. He testified that the appellant was his younger brother. That on 26th June 2024, he received information that the appellant had burnt down the house of their elder brother, Alfred Kagika Kamau. He contacted the OCS Kahuro, who in turn sent officers from Kirogo Police Station. By the time the officers arrived, the house had already been burnt to ashes. PW1 stated that the appellant, who was armed with a panga, chased away the police officers and had also threatened to burn their mother in her house, although she had left hospital after surgery. He further testified that the appellant wanted to burn his own house but was restrained by members of the public. Before he could be contained, the appellant cut PW1 on the head with a crude weapon, causing injuries for which he received eight stitches. He stated that he was treated at Mt. Kenya Kangema Hospital and produced treatment notes, a P3 form, a blood-stained shirt and vest, a coat, and photographs of the burnt house. On cross-examination, he stated that he had been called by his nephew, Livingstone Kamau, and that although he was not present when the house was burnt, he found the appellant violent and armed. He denied that the appellant had been assaulted and stated that he had in fact protected him from being lynched. 7.PW2, David Wilfred Kagika Kamau, testified that the appellant was his younger brother. He stated that on 26th June 2024, he woke up and assisted in milking their mother’s cows. He later noticed that the appellant had destroyed fruit plants and blocked his access road. In the evening, while waiting for their mother who was coming from hospital in Nairobi, he went to check on her house and later went to milk his mother’s cow. At about 8.00 pm, while with his son, he heard the son shouting. When he turned, the appellant hit him with a rungu. He fell and the appellant continued hitting him all over the body. PW2 stated that he sustained injuries on his head and body, received more than thirteen stitches on the hand, suffered a dislocation of the left hand, and broke his right hand. He was treated at Kahuti Police Post, Mt. Kenya Hospital Kangema, and later Murang’a Level V Hospital. He further testified that three days later he was informed that his house had been burnt down and that nothing was salvaged. He estimated the value of the house at over Kshs. 400,000/=. He produced medical documents including treatment notes, a P3 form and a radiology report. On cross-examination, he maintained that he saw the appellant, that the appellant was armed with a panga and sacks, and denied insulting him or having any grudge against him. 8.PW3 was Livingstone Kamau Kagika. He testified that the appellant was his uncle and that PW2 was his father. He stated that on 26th June 2024, he went to pick his grandmother who had been receiving treatment in Nairobi, and they returned to Murang’a the same day. At about 8.00 pm, while they were preparing to milk the cow, he saw the appellant approach slowly. He recognized him and noticed that he was armed with a rungu. Before he could warn his father, the appellant hit PW2 on the head and continued assaulting him. PW3 raised alarm and went to call his grandmother and neighbours. He later found his father lying down and the neighbours helped take him to the road, from where he was taken to Mt. Kenya Hospital. He called PW1 because his grandmother was in danger. PW3 further testified that the appellant later threatened to burn PW2’s house and that, the following morning, they discovered that the house had indeed been burnt. He also stated that during the process of arresting the appellant, the appellant hit PW1 on the head. On cross-examination, he stated that the incident occurred at about 8.00 pm, that his father did not defend himself, and that the area had security lighting. 9.PW4, Bernard Irungu Mundoro, testified that he was a farmer and a neighbour to the appellant. He recalled that on 26th June 2024 at about 8.00 pm, he heard Kamau calling for help, saying that they needed to rescue his father who was being killed. PW4 and another person went to rescue the injured person. He heard doors being banged at the appellant’s mother’s house. They found PW2 injured and took him to the road, from where he was taken by taxi to Mt. Kenya Hospital. PW4 further testified that PW1 later mobilized men who arrested the appellant and took him to the police station. PW2 was later taken to Murang’a Hospital for further treatment. 10.PW5 was Lawrence Njoroge, a Clinical Officer at Murang’a County Referral Hospital. He testified that he examined the medical records relating to Kenneth Maingi Kamau and Wilfred Kagika Kamau. In respect of Kenneth Maingi Kamau, he stated that he had been seen on 30th June 2024 after assault and had sustained deep cut wounds on the scalp. The wounds were stitched, and he assessed the probable weapon as sharp and classified the degree of injury as harm. He produced the P3 form. In respect of Wilfred Kagika Kamau, he stated that he had been seen on the same day at about 3.00 pm and had sustained fractures to the upper ribs and upper limbs consistent with assault trauma. The assault was said to have occurred on 27th June 2024 at Kahuti area. He stated that the probable weapon was blunt and classified the injuries as grievous harm. He produced the P3 form, treatment notes and radiology report. 11.PW6, No. 51397 Corporal Joseph Kiptanui, testified that he was attached to Kahuti Police Post. On 26th June 2024, while at the police post, he was informed by OCS Kirogo, C.I Tanui, to accompany him to the appellant’s house to arrest him because he had threatened his mother. He stated that he went to the home together with the OCS and other officers, but the appellant, who was armed with a panga, chased them away. PW6 stated that he fired in the air to scare the appellant, but the appellant did not heed the command and the officers returned to the police post for safety. That night, the appellant burnt the house of his brother, Kagika, and seriously injured him. PW6 testified that PW1 later came from Juja with members of the public and brought the appellant to the police post, where he arrested him and commenced investigations. He visited the scene, recovered the panga, observed that the complainant’s house had been razed down, and took photographs of the scene. He produced the photographs, a certificate under section 78 of the Evidence Act, blood-stained clothes, a wooden stick and the panga. On cross-examination, he stated that he was armed, fired in the air to scare the appellant, and that the appellant was recovered with the panga the following day. 12.That marked the close of the prosecution case. Having considered the evidence adduced, the trial court held that a prima facie case had been established against the accused person and he was accordingly put on his defence. Defence Case 13.DW1 was the appellant. He gave an unsworn statement of defence and stated that on 26th June 2025, he was found culpable but that at the material time he was suffering from mental illness. According to him, after undergoing mental assessment, he was found to be suffering from mental illness, was treated immediately, and was kept under medication until January. Thereafter, he was referred to Mathare Mental Hospital for three months. That he was not in his right mind when he committed the offence, but that he had since healed. 14.That marked the close of the defence case. Upon considering the entirety of the evidence on record, the trial court, in its judgment delivered on 24th found the appellant guilty on all counts and sentenced him to serve 40 years on the first and second count, and one year for the third and fourth count. The Appeal 15.Being dissatisfied with both conviction and sentence of the trial court, the appellant lodged a petition of appeal in this court, citing the following nine grounds:a.THAT the trial magistrate erred both in law and facts by not finding that the appellant was of unsound mind during the commission of the said offences which he paid a blind eye despite the fact he sent him to Mathari Mental hospital for treatment.b.That, the trial magistrate erred both in law and facts by convicting and sentencing the appellant on a trial which the appellant was never supplied with the witness statements.c.That, the trial magistrate erred both in law and facts by not considering the appellant’s plausible defence which was backed by watertight evidence.d.That trial magistrate erred both in law and fact by not considering the Appellant was not represented by counsel during trial, despite the seriousness of the charges and the gravity of the potential sentence thereby undermining his right to fair trial.e.That the trial magistrate erred both in law and fact when he failed to consider the Appellant’s mitigating circumstances, including; age, family responsibilities, remorse.f.That the trial magistrate erred both in law and fact by misapprehending the facts and evidence presented, and failed to properly evaluate contradictions in the prosecution’s case.g.That the trial magistrate erred both in law and facts by not considering the prosecution case was full of vendettas and was not proved beyond any reasonable ground.h.That the trial magistrate erred both in law and facts by not considering the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and harsh in the circumstances, and not proportionate to the weight of the evidence and the circumstances of the offences.i.That the Appellant was denied a fair trial as guaranteed under Article 50 of the Constitution of Kenya, including the right to legal representation and a fair hearing. 16.The appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions. On record are submissions dated 24th February 2026 filed by the appellant and submissions dated 29th January 2026, filed by the respondent; both of which this court has duly considered. Appellant’s Submissions 17.On conviction, the appellant submitted that the trial court failed to properly consider his defence of insanity under Section 12 of the Penal Code. He argued that the record showed that he had been subjected to psychiatric evaluation at Murang’a Level V Hospital, was later committed to Mathare Mental Hospital for treatment, and was thereafter declared fit to stand trial. According to him, his statement that he was suffering from mental illness at the time of the offence was not a casual assertion, but one supported by the medical and procedural history on record. He further submitted that where insanity is established, section 166 of the Criminal Procedure Code requires the court to enter a special verdict of “guilty but insane.” 18.The appellant further submitted that the trial court failed to evaluate the defence case alongside the prosecution evidence. He contended that the learned magistrate merely noted his unsworn defence but gave no sufficient reasons for rejecting it, particularly in view of the psychiatric evaluation and committal orders. He relied on Article 50(2)(c) and (k) of the Constitution and submitted that failure to consider his defence denied him the right to a fair trial. 19.The appellant further averred that the prosecution evidence was contradictory and inconsistent. He submitted that the witnesses gave varying accounts as to which house was burnt, the time of the incident, and the manner in which the complainants sustained injuries. He argued that PW1 alleged that the appellant had burnt Alfred’s house, PW2 referred to his own house, while PW3 spoke of a threat to burn the grandmother’s house. He further submitted that the alleged inconsistencies on the injuries sustained by PW1 and PW2 undermined the credibility of the prosecution case and ought to have been resolved in his favour. 20.On sentence, the appellant submitted that the sentence of forty years’ imprisonment on each of the first two counts was manifestly excessive, harsh and disproportionate. He argued that the trial court failed to apply the principles of proportionality, fairness and individualized sentencing. He stated that he was a first offender, aged 34 years, had family responsibilities, had shown remorse, and had a documented history of mental illness, which were relevant mitigating factors that ought to have attracted a lesser sentence. 21.The appellant also submitted that the sentence offended Article 28 of the Constitution on human dignity and Article 50(2)(q) on the right to benefit from the least severe punishment prescribed by law. He relied on sentencing principles that require punishment to be proportionate to the gravity of the offence, the circumstances of the offender, and the prospects of rehabilitation. Respondent’s Submissions. 22.The respondent opposed the appeal and submitted that the prosecution called sufficient evidence to prove the offences of arson, grievous harm, assault causing actual bodily harm and resisting arrest. The respondent relied on the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4, PW5 and PW6, and submitted that the witnesses placed the appellant at the scene and gave consistent evidence that he attacked the complainants, resisted arrest, and burnt the complainant’s house. 23.On the alleged contradictions in the prosecution case, the respondent submitted that there were no material contradictions capable of vitiating the conviction. It was argued that the evidence of PW1, PW2 and PW3 was corroborative on the events of the night in question, while the medical evidence confirmed the injuries sustained by PW1 and PW2. The respondent further submitted that the photographs, certificate, blood-stained clothes, wooden stick/rungu and panga produced in evidence corroborated the offences charged. 24.On identification, the respondent submitted that the appellant was well known to the prosecution witnesses, most of whom were his family members and neighbors. It was therefore submitted that this was a case of recognition rather than identification of a stranger. The respondent further pointed out that there was evidence of security lights from the appellant’s mother’s house, and that the appellant was seen and recognized during the incident. 25.On the defence of insanity, the respondent submitted that the appellant did not prove that he was of unsound mind at the time the offences were committed. It was argued that although the appellant was later taken for mental assessment and treatment, the relevant time for purposes of Section 12 of the Penal Code was the time of the commission of the offences, namely 26th and 27th June 2024. The respondent contended that the record only showed that the issue of mental status arose during the proceedings, and that the appellant was later treated and declared fit to stand trial. The respondent therefore maintained that the defence of insanity was not established. 26.Regarding the appellant’s complaint that he was not supplied with witness statements, the respondent submitted that the record did not show that the appellant was denied the necessary documents. It was submitted that when the matter came up for hearing, the prosecution indicated that it did not have photographs and a report/certificate accompanying the photographs, and the court adjourned the matter to allow the same to be supplied. The respondent argued that this demonstrated that the appellant was given adequate opportunity to prepare for trial. 27.On the complaint that the appellant was not represented by counsel, the respondent submitted that the right to legal representation at State expense under Article 50(2)(h) of the Constitution arises where substantial injustice would otherwise result. The respondent relied on David Njoroge Macharia v Republic [2011] eKLR, where the Court of Appeal observed that the right to legal representation at State expense is not automatic in every criminal trial and depends on whether substantial injustice would otherwise result. The respondent maintained that the appellant actively participated in the trial, cross-examined witnesses, and understood the proceedings. It was therefore submitted that no substantial injustice was demonstrated. 28.On mitigation and sentence, the respondent submitted that the trial court considered the appellant’s mitigation, including that he was a first offender and his prayer that the period spent in custody be considered. The respondent further submitted that the court called for a Victim Impact Assessment Report and a Probation Officer’s Pre-Sentence Report, both of which opposed a non-custodial sentence. It was therefore argued that the sentence was lawful and properly exercised. 29.Finally, the respondent submitted that the sentence was not excessive. It was argued that grievous harm under section 234 of the Penal Code carried a sentence of life imprisonment, while assault causing actual bodily harm under section 251 carried an imprisonment term for five years. The respondent therefore prayed for the court to find that the conviction was safe, the sentence lawful, and the appeal devoid of merit. Analysis and Determination 30.This being a first appeal, this Court has a duty to reconsider and re-evaluate the evidence adduced before the trial court and make its own independent conclusion. It should however give regard to the fact that it has neither heard nor seen the witnesses testify. See the cases of Pandya v R {1957} EA 336; Ruwalla v R {1957} EA 570 and Kisumu Criminal Appeal No. 28 of 2009 David Njuguna Wairimu v. Republic [2010] eKLR where the Court of Appeal held that: -“the duty of the first appellate court is to analyze and re-evaluate the evidence which was before the trial court and itself come to its own conclusion on that evidence without overlooking the conclusion of the trial court. There are instances where the first appellate court may depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, come to the same conclusion as those of the lower court. It may rehash those conclusions. We do not think there is anything objectionable in doing so, provided it is clear that the court has considered the evidence on the basis of the law and the evidence to satisfy itself on the correctness of the decisions.’’ 31.I have considered the lower court proceedings, the judgment of the trial court, the grounds of appeal, and the respective submissions by the parties. In my view, the following issues arise for determination:a.Whether the appellant’s defence of insanity or unsoundness of mind was properly considered by the trial court.b.Whether the conviction on the four counts was safe in the circumstances of the case.c.Whether the appellant’s right to a fair trial was violated.d.Whether the sentence imposed was lawful and/or excessive. 32.The first and central issue in this appeal is the appellant’s mental condition. The appellant’s main complaint is that the learned trial magistrate erred in failing to find that he was of unsound mind at the time of the commission of the offences. The appellant submitted that the record showed that he was subjected to psychiatric assessment, committed to Mathare Mental Hospital for treatment, and later declared fit to stand trial. The respondent’s position was that the mental illness was only established during the trial process and not at the time of the commission of the offences. 33.Section 12 of the Penal Code provides as follows:“A person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission if at the time of doing the act or making the omission he is through any disease affecting his mind incapable of understanding what he is doing, or of knowing that he ought not to do the act or make the omission; but a person may be criminally responsible for an act or omission, although his mind is affected by disease, if such disease does not in fact produce upon his mind one or other of the effects above mentioned in reference to that act or omission.” 34.The law therefore makes the time of commission of the offence the critical point of inquiry. The court is not merely concerned with whether an accused person was later found unfit to plead or unfit to continue with trial. The proper inquiry is whether, at the time of the act complained of, the accused was incapable of understanding what he was doing or of knowing that he ought not to do it. 35.In the present case, the record shows that the appellant’s mental state was not an afterthought raised only at the appellate stage. It arose during the trial itself. The trial court ordered the appellant to undergo psychiatric assessment. He was thereafter committed to Mathare Mental Hospital for treatment, where he was treated for a period before being declared fit to stand trial. In his defence, the appellant expressly stated that he was suffering from mental illness and that he was not in his right mind when he committed the offence. 36.Once that issue arose from the record, the trial court was under a duty to interrogate it fully. It was not enough to merely state that the appellant was later declared fit to stand trial. Fitness to stand trial and criminal responsibility at the time of the offence are distinct legal questions. A person may be fit to stand trial after treatment, yet still have been labouring under a disease of the mind at the time of the offence. The trial court was therefore required to consider whether the appellant’s subsequent psychiatric history, the court itself, ordered committal to Mathare, and the appellant’s defence raised a sufficient basis for a finding that his criminal responsibility was impaired at the material time. 37.The Court of Appeal in Wakesho v Republic [2021] KECA 223 (KLR) emphasized that insanity is a defence where the accused was labouring under a defect of reason caused by disease of the mind such that he did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he knew it, did not know that what he was doing was wrong. The Court further observed that the mental state of the accused is relevant at the time of the offence and that where the issue of insanity arises, the trial court must specifically inquire into and determine it. 38.The Court of Appeal in KOW v Republic [2025] KECA 14 (KLR) further considered the effect of section 12 of the Penal Code and stated that where mental illness incapacitates an accused person from understanding what he was doing, or from knowing that he ought not to do the act, such person cannot properly be held criminally responsible. The Court thus:“In this case, it is clear that the appellant’s mental illness incapacitated him from understanding what he was doing, or of knowing that he ought not to do the act he did.” 39.The Court of Appeal in the same decision also endorsed the reasoning in Wakesho v Republic that:“it is a legal paradox to find a person guilty but insane, in light of the requirements of criminal responsibility and culpability, which require that for a person to be criminally liable, it must be established beyond reasonable doubt that he or she committed the offence or omitted to act voluntarily and with a blameworthy mind.”The Court went further and stated that:“A finding of not guilty for reason of insanity would be more legally sound in circumstances where an accused person is suffering from a defect of reason caused by disease of the mind at the time of commission of an offence.” 40.Applying those principles to the present appeal, I find that the learned trial magistrate failed to properly evaluate the appellant’s mental condition in relation to the time of commission of the offences. The fact that the appellant was sent for psychiatric assessment, committed to Mathare Mental Hospital, treated for months, and later declared fit to stand trial was a material circumstance that required deeper analysis. The trial court was required to ask whether that history raised doubt as to whether the appellant possessed the necessary criminal responsibility at the time of the offences. Instead, the court treated the issue as having been resolved merely because the appellant was eventually declared fit to proceed with trial. In my view, that approach was erroneous. The issue of insanity went to the root of criminal responsibility. The court was required to reconcile the prosecution evidence with the appellant’s mental condition and make a proper legal finding on whether the appellant acted with a blameworthy mind. 41.Section 166(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that where it appears that the accused did the act charged but was insane at the time, the court shall make a special finding to that effect. It provides:“Where an act or omission is charged against a person as an offence, and it is given in evidence on the trial of that person for that offence that he was insane so as not to be responsible for his acts or omissions at the time when the act was done or the omission made, then if it appears to the court before which the person is tried that he did the act or made the omission charged but was insane at the time he did or made it, the court shall make a special finding to the effect that the accused was guilty of the act or omission charged but was insane when he did the act or made the omission.” 42.I am persuaded by the reasoning in KOW v Republic and Wakesho v Republic. In the present case, the appellant’s conduct, the court-ordered psychiatric assessment, his committal to Mathare Mental Hospital, and his defence of mental illness were not peripheral matters. They went directly to the question whether he had the mental capacity to form criminal responsibility. The trial court ought to have given that issue full and anxious consideration. The failure to do so rendered the conviction unsafe. 43.On the alleged contradictions in the prosecution case, I note that there were complaints regarding which house was burnt, the precise timing of the incidents, and the relationship between the several incidents forming the four counts. 44.On the complaint that the appellant was not supplied with witness statements, the record shows that the trial court granted adjournments where certain documents such as photographs and certificates were not ready. There is no sufficient basis on the material before me to find that the appellant was wholly denied pre-trial disclosure. However, the complaint on legal representation must be considered in the context of the seriousness of the charges and the appellant’s mental condition. 45.Article 50(2)(h) of the Constitution provides that every accused person has the right:“to have an advocate assigned to the accused person by the State and at State expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly.” 46.In David Njoroge Macharia v Republic [2011] eKLR, the Court of Appeal recognized that State-funded legal representation is required where substantial injustice would otherwise result. The High Court summary of that decision notes that Article 50(2)(h) requires legal representation at State expense in cases where “substantial injustice might otherwise result.” 47.In this case, the appellant faced serious charges, including arson and grievous harm, both of which attracted severe custodial sentences. He was ultimately sentenced to forty years’ imprisonment on the first and second counts. Further, his mental status had become an issue during the trial. Although lack of counsel does not automatically vitiate every trial, the combination of the seriousness of the charges, the severity of the possible sentence, and the appellant’s mental condition called for greater caution. The trial court ought to have satisfied itself that the appellant fully understood the proceedings and that substantial injustice would not result from proceeding without legal representation. 48.On sentence, the appellant was sentenced to forty years’ imprisonment on count I and forty years’ imprisonment on count II, and one year imprisonment on each of counts III and IV, the sentences to run concurrently. Ordinarily, sentence is a matter of discretion for the trial court. In Wanjema v Republic [1971] EA 493, the principle was stated thus:“An appellate court should not interfere with the discretion which a trial court has exercised as to the sentence unless it is evident that it overlooked some material factors, took into consideration some immaterial fact, acted on wrong principle or the sentence is manifestly excessive in the circumstances of the case.” 49.Had the conviction stood, this court would still have been called upon to consider whether the sentence imposed was proportionate, especially in view of the appellant’s mental health history and the fact that he was a first offender. However, having found that the conviction cannot safely stand because the trial court failed to properly determine the appellant’s criminal responsibility, the sentence imposed must equally fall. 50.In the result, I find that the appeal has merit. 51.Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The conviction entered against the appellant on counts I, II, III and IV is hereby quashed and the sentences imposed thereon set aside and replaced with a finding that the Appellant is guilty but insane. 52.Appellant shall be placed in probation for 3 years where he shall undergo counselling and have medical support. 53.Mention before the Deputy Registrar Muranga on 21.5.2026 for further directions on placement of the Appellant on probation. 54.Orders accordingly. 55.Right of appeal 14 days explained. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT KAKAMEGA ONLINE THIS 8TH DAY OF MAY, 2026.S.N MBUNGIJUDGEIn the presence of:-CA: Angog’a/VelmaAppellant present online.Mr. Ndege for the ODPP present online.