Assets Recovery Agency v Jepchirchir & 5 others (Civil Suit E035 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 10921 (KLR) (Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes) (16 July 2026) (Ruling)
The court held that the forfeiture proceedings under POCAMLA are distinct from the Environment and Land Court suit over contractual ownership and title, so the parallel land case did not create a risk of conflicting decisions sufficient to justify a stay. The 1st Interested Party had already been joined and could...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [2026] KEHC 10921 (KLR)
- Parties
- Applicant: Assets Recovery Agency; 1st Respondent: Judy Jepchirchir; 2nd Respondent: First Choice Recruitment and Consultancy Ltd; 1st Interested Party: Isaac Kipkemei Terer; 2nd Interested Party: Erdeman Property Limited; 3rd Interested Party: NCBA Bank Limited; 4th Interested Party: John Tioko Ekai
- Court
- High Court
- Jurisdiction
- Kenya
- Case Number
- Civil Suit E035 of 2025
- Procedural Posture
- Civil Forfeiture / Anti Corruption Proceedings / Ruling on Application for Stay of Proceedings
- Outcome
- Application for stay dismissed
- Judges
- ["REA Ougo"]
- Legal Topics
- Stay of Proceedings, Civil Forfeiture, Proceeds of Crime, Parallel Proceedings, Jurisdiction, Ownership Dispute, Public Interest, Article 40 Property Rights, Sections 90 and 92 POCAMLA
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Assets Recovery Agency
Applicant
Judy Jepchirchir
1st Respondent
First Choice Recruitment and Consultancy Ltd
2nd Respondent
Isaac Kipkemei Terer
1st Interested Party
Erdeman Property Limited
2nd Interested Party
NCBA Bank Limited
3rd Interested Party
John Tioko Ekai
4th Interested Party
Procedural Posture
Civil Forfeiture / Anti Corruption Proceedings / Ruling on Application for Stay of Proceedings
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the forfeiture proceedings should be stayed pending determination of Eldoret ELCLC No. E042 of 2024
- 2 Whether the existence of parallel land proceedings creates a risk of conflicting decisions sufficient to justify a stay
- 3 Whether the applicant satisfied the exceptional threshold for stay of proceedings under the court's discretion
Ratio Decidendi
The court held that the forfeiture proceedings under POCAMLA are distinct from the Environment and Land Court suit over contractual ownership and title, so the parallel land case did not create a risk of conflicting decisions sufficient to justify a stay. The 1st Interested Party had already been joined and could ventilate his claim in the forfeiture suit, no exceptional circumstances were shown, and public interest required the statutory forfeiture application to proceed without undue delay.
Court Disposition
Application for stay dismissed
Orders
- The Notice of Motion application dated 5th February 2026 is dismissed.
- Costs of the application shall abide the outcome of the main forfeiture proceedings.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
Assets Recovery Agency v Jepchirchir & 5 others (Civil Suit E035 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 10921 (KLR) (Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes) (16 July 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 10921 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts) Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Civil Suit E035 of 2025 REA Ougo, J July 16, 2026 Between Assets Recovery Agency Applicant and Judy Jepchirchir 1st Respondent First Choice Recruitment and Consultancy Ltd 2nd Respondent and Isaac Kipkemei Terer 1st Interested Party Erdeman Property Limited 2nd Interested Party NCBA Bank Limited 3rd Interested Party John Tioko Ekai 4th Interested Party Ruling 1.The 1st Interested Party filed a Notice of Motion application dated 5th February 2026 brought under Article 159 (2) (d) of the Constitution, Section 1A, 3 & 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 50 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, and all other relevant enabling provisions of the law. The application is supported by the affidavit of Isaack Kipkemei Terer dated 5.2.2026. 2.The 1st Interested Party seeks for the following orders: -1.Spent2.That this Honourable Court be pleased to Stay all Further Proceedings in this Matter Pending the Hearing and Final Determination of Eldoret ELCLC No. E042 of 2024 – Isaac Kipkemei Terer v Judy Jepchirchir & Another.3.That this Honourable Court be Pleased to Grant any Other or Further Order(s) it may deem Fit and Expedient in Best Interest of Justice.4.That the costs of this application be in the cause. 3.The 1st Interested Party seeks a stay of the forfeiture proceedings on the ground that he previously instituted Eldoret ELCLC No. E042 of 2024 against the Respondent, challenging the ownership and title of Eldoret Municipality Blocks 12/621 and 622, which are the same properties subject to the forfeiture proceedings. He states that the Environment and Land Court suit, filed on 25th June 2024, was commenced before the forfeiture proceedings and had reached the defence hearing stage. 4.The 1st Interested Party states that there was a genuine dispute over the ownership of the properties within the jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court, and that proceeding with the forfeiture application before the ownership dispute was determined would cause grave injustice, risk rendering the ELC proceedings nugatory, and expose the parties to conflicting decisions by courts of competent jurisdiction. 5.The 1st Interested Party further states that if the Environment and Land Court ultimately found him to be the lawful owner, any forfeiture orders would unjustly deprive him of his constitutional property rights. Accordingly, he urged the court to stay the forfeiture proceedings pending the determination of Eldoret ELCLC No. E042 of 2024, arguing that he would suffer irreparable loss unless the orders sought were granted. Responses 6.In their Reply Affidavit, sworn on 16th March 2026 by Mohamed Hussein, an investigator with the Assets Recovery Agency, the Applicant states that the Applicant filed a forfeiture application on 1st October 2025 seeking the forfeiture of Eldoret Municipality Blocks 12/621 and 12/622, registered in the 1st Respondent’s name. According to the investigations, the properties were purchased from the 1st Interested Party in July 2022 for Kshs. 27 million, with Kshs. 17.5 million paid as a deposit and Kshs. 10 million outstanding. He further deposed that one of the properties had a four-storey residential rental building under construction, valued at Kshs. 20.7 million, while the land itself was valued at Kshs. 5.5 million. 7.The deponent avers that investigations established that the funds used to acquire and develop the properties were proceeds of crime. He alleges that the 1st Respondent, as a director of the 2nd Respondent, benefited from funds fraudulently obtained from members of the public by false promises of study and employment opportunities abroad. These funds were subsequently laundered through cash withdrawals and multiple financial transactions before being traced to the acquisition of the suit properties. 8.The Applicant opposed the application for a stay dated 5th February 2026, contending that it lacked merit because the ownership dispute could be determined within the forfeiture proceedings, in which all interested parties were already before the court. It was further stated that the Applicant had already sought joinder and a stay of the related Environment and Land Court proceedings pending the determination of the forfeiture suit. The application was founded on contractual issues arising from the sale agreement, which could be addressed in the final judgment, and that the forfeiture proceedings, being matters of public interest, superseded private contractual claims. 9.The deponent further contends that the issues raised had already been addressed in the 1st Interested Party’s earlier reply affidavit, that the application contravened the Practice Directions for the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Division, and that it was intended merely to delay the determination of the forfeiture proceedings. The Applicant urged the court to dismiss the application with costs and to prioritise the hearing of the forfeiture application. 10.The Respondents, in their Replying Affidavit, sworn on 24th April 2026 by Judy Jepchirchir, the 1st Respondent, state that the application is frivolous, vexatious, an abuse of the court process, and a deliberate attempt by the 1st Interested Party to delay the proceedings and pressure her into conceding to his claims. 11.She depones that the application fails to meet the threshold for a stay of proceedings and seeks to undermine the public interest nature of the forfeiture proceedings. She states that the suit properties were lawfully registered in her name and notes that the 1st Interested Party had admitted before the Environment and Land Court that he had voluntarily transferred the properties to her. She further states that the dispute before the Environment and Land Court relates only to the outstanding balance of Kshs. 10 million under the sale agreement, a claim that could be adequately remedied by specific performance or a monetary award, as pleaded by the 1st Interested Party in the alternative. 12.The 1st Respondent further avers that her assets were already subject to preservation orders and that any further delay in determining the forfeiture proceedings would cause her substantial personal and business losses, as the frozen assets were essential to her daily operations. She stated that there was no justification for staying the forfeiture proceedings in favour of the Environment and Land Court case, particularly as applications seeking a stay of the land proceedings were already pending before that court. She maintained that the two courts exercised distinct jurisdictions and that their proceedings would not result in conflicting decisions. 13.According to the 1st Respondent, granting a stay would defeat the objectives of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, while the Environment and Land Court matter, which has been pending since 2024, was likely to take considerably longer to conclude than the forfeiture proceedings. She states that the 1st Interested Party would suffer no prejudice, as he has the opportunity to participate in and defend his interests in the forfeiture proceedings. She therefore urged the court to dismiss the application. 14.The 2nd Interested Party filed a Statement of Grounds in Support, dated 13th May 2026, in support of the 1st Interested Party’s application for a stay of proceedings pending the determination of Eldoret ELC Case No. E042 of 2024. They state that although the Assets Recovery Agency asserted that the 1st Respondent was the registered and beneficial owner of the suit properties, the 1st Interested Party disputed that claim, contending that the sale agreement had been rescinded and that the 1st Respondent held neither lawful nor beneficial ownership. They argue that the dispute herein raises questions of title and ownership that fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court under Articles 162(2)(b) and 165(5)(b) of the Constitution and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act. 15.The 2nd Interested Party further states that the ownership dispute was already pending before the Environment and Land Court in a suit filed in June 2024, well before the preservation and forfeiture proceedings. The issue of title should therefore be determined first, as the Environment and Land Court could find that the 1st Respondent had no lawful interest capable of forfeiture. They also maintain that the preservation orders already in force adequately protect the properties from disposal, meaning that the Applicant and the public interest would suffer no prejudice if the proceedings were stayed, whereas the 1st Interested Party risks losing his proprietary interest if forfeiture orders are issued before the ownership dispute is resolved. 16.The 2nd Interested Party urges the court to stay the forfeiture proceedings to avoid conflicting decisions and, relying on Amir Suleiman v Amboseli Resort Ltd & another (2005) eKLR, argues that a stay would best serve the interests of justice by allowing the ownership dispute to be determined first. Submissions 17.The 1st Interested Party, in submissions dated 12th May 2026, argued that the court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act to stay the forfeiture proceedings pending the determination of Eldoret ELCLC No. E042 of 2024, in the interests of justice and to prevent abuse of the court process. They further argued that the court should consider the existence of parallel proceedings involving the same properties, the risk of conflicting decisions, and whether the balance of convenience favored a stay. 18.The 1st Interested Party submitted that the Environment and Land Court suit, filed before the forfeiture proceedings, concerns the ownership of Eldoret Municipality Blocks 12/621 and 622, the same properties that are the subject of the forfeiture application. He argued that the Environment and Land Court has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes relating to the title and ownership of land under Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act. As the ownership dispute was already at the hearing stage, the court was urged not to proceed with the forfeiture application until the issue of ownership had been determined. 19.The 1st Interested Party further submitted that allowing both matters to proceed concurrently posed a real risk of inconsistent and conflicting decisions. It was contended that this court could order the forfeiture of the properties, while the Environment and Land Court could subsequently determine that the 1st Interested Party held valid proprietary rights in them, thereby creating irreconcilable outcomes and prejudicing the administration of justice. Reliance was placed on Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696 for the proposition that proceedings may be stayed where their continuation would occasion injustice or amount to an abuse of the court process. 20.On the balance of convenience, the 1st Interested Party argued that forfeiture is a drastic and irreversible remedy, as the properties could not be restored if the 1st Interested Party ultimately succeeded in the Environment and Land Court. It was submitted that, by contrast, the Respondents would suffer no prejudice from a temporary stay, as the properties would remain preserved. Reliance was also placed on Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358, which held that the court should grant protective relief where damages would not provide an adequate remedy. 21.The 1st Interested Party further submitted that proceeding with the forfeiture application before the ownership dispute was resolved would undermine the constitutional protection of property under Article 40 of the Constitution and offend Article 20(3)(a), which requires courts to interpret procedural law in a manner that promotes the Bill of Rights. It was also argued that the stay sought was limited, subsisting only until the determination of the Environment and Land Court case, which had already reached an advanced stage. The 1st Interested Party maintained that granting the stay would further the overriding objectives under Sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act by promoting the efficient and fair resolution of disputes and avoiding duplicity of proceedings. The court was therefore urged to stay the forfeiture proceedings pending the determination of Eldoret ELCLC No. E042 of 2024. 22.In their submissions dated 8th May 2026, the Applicant contended that the only issue for determination was whether the 1st Interested Party had established sufficient grounds for a stay of the forfeiture proceedings pending the determination of Eldoret ELC Case No. E042 of 2024. They argued that the application was incompetent for failing to invoke Section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act, the substantive provision governing stays of proceedings, and relied on Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 others (Civil Appeal 290 of 2012) [2013] KECA 445 (KLR) (26 July 2013) (Judgment) for the principle that pleadings must be precise and clearly identify the legal basis of the relief sought. 23.The Applicant further submitted that the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Division has exclusive jurisdiction, under the Practice Directions for the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Division and Sections 90 and 92 of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (POCAMLA), to determine civil forfeiture proceedings involving property suspected to be proceeds of crime. They argued that the present proceedings concern the recovery of assets allegedly acquired through fraud and money laundering, an issue falling outside the Environment and Land Court’s jurisdiction, whose mandate under Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act is confined to land and contractual disputes. According to the Applicant, the Eldoret ELC suit was founded on a sale agreement and sought to enforce contractual rights, whereas the forfeiture proceedings were public law proceedings aimed at recovering proceeds of crime. 24.The Applicant also contends that although the suit properties were registered in the 1st Respondent’s name, the 1st Interested Party's claim in the Environment and Land Court sought to cancel the 1st Respondent’s titles and revert ownership. The Applicant argued that granting such relief would undermine the forfeiture proceedings by altering the land register and frustrating the recovery of property believed to constitute proceeds of crime. The Applicant further submitted that the contractual claims raised by the 1st Interested Party could be adequately addressed within the forfeiture proceedings or through the alternative reliefs sought in the Environment and Land Court, including payment of the outstanding purchase price, damages, and interest. Consequently, the 1st Interested Party would suffer no prejudice if the forfeiture proceedings continued. 25.Relying on Kenya Wildlife Service v James Mutembei [2019] KEHC 10478 (KLR), which cited Halsbury’s Laws of England, the Applicant submitted that a stay of proceedings is an exceptional remedy that should be granted sparingly and only in the clearest cases, as it interrupts a party’s right to prosecute its claim. They maintained that the 1st Interested Party had failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances justifying the exercise of the court's discretion and therefore urged the court to dismiss the application with costs. Analysis and Determination 26.Having considered the Notice of Motion dated 5th February 2026, the affidavits filed in support thereof and in opposition thereto, the grounds filed by the 2nd Interested Party, and submissions, the issues for determination are:a.Whether this court should stay these forfeiture proceedings pending the hearing and determination of Eldoret ELCLC No. E042 of 2024b.What orders on costs should issue 27.The power to stay proceedings is discretionary and must be exercised judicially and only where the interests of justice demand it. The guiding principles for the stay of proceedings were set out by the Court of Appeal in Global Tours & Travels Limited, Nairobi HC Winding Up Cause No. 43 of 2000, where Ringera J. (as he then was) held that:“As I understand the law, whether or not to grant a stay of proceedings or further proceedings on a decree or order appealed from is a matter of judicial discretion to be exercised in the interest of Justice ... the sole question is whether it is in the interest of justice to order a stay of proceedings and if it is, on what terms it should be granted. In deciding whether to order a stay, the court should essentially weigh the pros and cons of granting or not granting the order. And in considering those matters, it should bear in mind such factors as the need for expeditious disposal of cases, the prima facie merits … the scarcity and optimum utilization of judicial time and whether the application has been brought expeditiously” 28.The principle was applied in Kenya Wildlife Service v James Mutembei [2019] KEHC 10478 (KLR), where the court reiterated that:See also illumination on the threshold for stay of proceedings in the following passages in Halsbury’s Law of England, 4th Edition. Vol. 37 page 330 and 332, that:“The stay of proceedings is a serious, grave and fundamental interruption in the right that a party has to conduct his litigation towards the trial on the basis of the substantive merits of his case, and therefore the court’s general practice is that a stay of proceedings should not be imposed unless the proceeding beyond all reasonable doubt ought not to be allowed to continue.”“This is a power which, it has been emphasized, ought to be exercised sparingly, and only in exceptional cases.” 29.The 1st Interested Party’s main argument is that the suit properties are the subject of Eldoret ELCLC No. E042 of 2024, filed before these forfeiture proceedings, and that the Environment and Land Court should first determine ownership before this court proceeds with the forfeiture application. 30.It is not disputed that the two proceedings relate to the same parcels of land, namely Eldoret Municipality Blocks 12/621 and 12/622. However, the mere existence of parallel proceedings over the same property does not automatically warrant a stay. The court must consider whether the issues for determination are substantially the same and whether continuing one proceeding would render the other nugatory. 31.The Environment and Land Court proceedings arise from a sale agreement between the 1st Interested Party and the 1st Respondent. On the basis of the material before this court, the dispute concerns the validity and consequences of that agreement, including whether the transfer should be rescinded and whether the balance of the purchase price remains payable. 32.These proceedings in this case have been instituted pursuant to Sections 90 and 92 of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (POCAMLA). The issue before this court is whether the suit properties constitute proceeds of crime liable to forfeiture to the State. Accordingly, this court's jurisdiction is statutory and distinct from that of the Environment and Land Court under Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act. 33.The Court of Appeal in Aboo v Assets Recovery Agency; Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (Interested Party) [2023] KECA 1658 (KLR) emphasized that: -“Civil forfeiture therefore denotes an action in rem, that is as against the property in contrast with in personam actions which are actions against individuals. This position was highlighted by the Supreme Court of India in Biswanath Bhattacharya v Union of India & Ors, AIR 2014 SC 1003, when it cited with approval an Article by Anthony Kennedy, ‘Justifying the Civil Recovery of Criminal Proceeds’ (2004), Journal of Financial Crime, where he conceptualized the civil forfeiture regime in the following words:“Civil forfeiture represents a move from a crime and punishment model of justice to a preventive model of justice. It seeks to take illegally obtained property out of the possession of organised crime figures so as to prevent them, first, from using it as working capital for future crimes and, secondly, from flaunting it in such a way as they become role models for others to follow into a lifestyle of acquisitive crime. Civil recovery is therefore not aimed at punishing behaviour but at removing the ‘trophies’ of past criminal behaviour and the means to commit future criminal behaviour. While it would clearly be more desirable if successful criminal proceedings could be instituted, the operative theory is that ‘half a loaf is better than no bread’.”From the foregoing, it is evident that ARA, the respondent, had the legal burden to prove a prima facie case on a balance of probability, either of the two elements under section 92 aforesaid; that, the appellant either had assets that have been used/are intended for use in the commission of an offence, or that the assets were proceeds of crime.” 34.In by Assets Recovery Agency v Rohan Anthony Fisher and others, Supreme Court of Jamaica, Claim No 2007 HCV003259, the court held that: -“Section 56 of the POCA states that: -(2)‘the powers conferred by Part IV are exercisable in relation to any property, whether or not any proceedings have been brought for an offence in connection with the property.’” 35.The 1st Interested Party contends that if the Environment and Land Court ultimately determines that he is the lawful owner, any forfeiture order issued by this court would result in conflicting decisions. I do not agree. 36.The issue before the Environment and Land Court is who, between the contracting parties, holds enforceable proprietary or contractual rights arising from the sale transaction. The issue before this court is fundamentally different, namely whether the property itself was acquired with proceeds of crime and is therefore liable to forfeiture under POCAMLA. These are distinct causes of action grounded in different legal principles. 37.Indeed, a finding by the Environment and Land Court on contractual ownership cannot determine whether property constitutes proceeds of crime. Likewise, a forfeiture order under POCAMLA does not amount to an adjudication of contractual rights arising from a sale agreement. The two jurisdictions therefore complement rather than contradict one another. 38.This court further notes that the 1st Interested Party has already been joined to these proceedings. Consequently, he has every opportunity to place before this court evidence demonstrating his alleged proprietary interest in the suit properties and to contest the Applicant’s assertion that the properties constitute proceeds of crime. 39.Section 92 of POCAMLA expressly contemplates participation by any person claiming an interest in property sought to be forfeited. The Act therefore provides adequate procedural safeguards to protect the interests of innocent third parties before any forfeiture order is made. 40.The argument that the 1st Interested Party will suffer irreparable prejudice is not persuasive. His pleadings before the Environment and Land Court, as exhibited to this court, show that, in addition to seeking cancellation of title, he has also sought alternative reliefs, including payment of the outstanding purchase price, together with damages and interest. This demonstrates that his claim is not solely dependent on the restoration of the suit properties. 41.This court is also mindful of the public interest in forfeiture proceedings. The object of POCAMLA is to deprive persons of the benefits of crime and to ensure that property suspected of constituting proceeds of crime is recovered expeditiously where the statutory threshold is met. Undue delay in determining forfeiture proceedings would undermine the legislative intent of the Act. 42.Anti-corruption and asset-recovery proceedings serve an important public interest that courts must safeguard while ensuring due process. The Supreme Court, in Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission v Tom Ojienda & Associates & 2 others [2020] KESC 56 (KLR), emphasised that:“It is not in doubt that the fight against corruption and economic crimes is a matter of great public importance. In the circumstances, in the interest of justice and to provide guidance, a clear and authoritative statement of this Court on the issues raised is imperative. Consequently, we allow this application and direct that pending the hearing and final determination of the applicant’s appeal-No. 30 of 2019, the effect of the High Court and Court of Appeal decisions in this matter is hereby stayed. Neither party to this appeal, nor any other person shall use, apply or in any way rely upon them until the said appeal is heard and determined.” 43.The circumstances before this court do not disclose exceptional circumstances. The 1st Interested Party has not demonstrated that he will be denied an opportunity to ventilate his proprietary claim before this court, or that continuing these proceedings would render the Environment and Land Court proceedings nugatory. On the contrary, staying these proceedings would unnecessarily delay the determination of a statutory forfeiture application alleging that the suit properties constitute proceeds of crime. 44.This court therefore finds that the Notice of Motion dated 5th February 2026 lacks merit. 45.Accordingly, this court makes the following orders: -a.The Notice of Motion application dated 5th February 2026 is hereby dismissed.b.The costs of the application shall abide the outcome of the main forfeiture proceedings.c.The main forfeiture application shall proceed to hearing on a priority basis. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY THIS 16TH DAY OF JULY 2026.R. E. OUGOJUDGEIn the presence of: -Mr. Githinji - For the ApplicantFor the Respondents1st & 2nd Interested Parties - AbsentMr. Glen Innocent - For the 3rd Interested PartyMiss Mutua h/b Miss Omamo - For the 4th Interested PartyAdan/Minah - C/A