https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12371

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI** **ANTI-CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC CRIMES DIVISION** **ACEC CIVIL SUIT NO. E003 OF 2025** **BETWEEN** | | | --- | | **ASSETS RECOVERY AGENCY………………………………………………..** **APPLICANT** | | **VERSUS** | | **ADAN BISHAR MOHAMMED………………………………………….** **1ST RESPONDENT** | | **AL-SIDDIQUE MOTORS LIMITED……………………………………** **2ND RESPONDENT** | | **AND** | | **PREMIER BANK KENYA LIMITED** **(Formerly First Community Bank Limited)....................** **1ST INTERESTED PARTY** | | **NATIONAL TRANSPORT AND SAFETY AUTHORITY…...** **2ND INTERESTED PARTY** | | **DIRECTOR OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS…………..** **3RD INTERESTED PARTY** | **RULING** 1. Before this court are two applications arising from the judgment delivered on 27th February 2026 in respect of motor vehicle registration numbers KDB 296Q (Mitsubishi Fuso lorry) and KDN 851P (Toyota Noah). 2. The first is the Assets Recovery Agency’s (ARA) Notice of Motion dated 20th April 2026. The second is the 1st Interested Party’s Notice of Motion dated 15th April 2026. ARA’s application is brought under sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 42 rule 6 and Order 51 rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules. It seeks the following substantive orders: 3. **Spent** 4. **Pending the inter parties hearing, stay of execution of the ruling delivered on 8th April 2026 by Muya Martin Mati J;** 5. **Pending the hearing and determination of the application, setting aside of the ruling and orders delivered on 8th April 2026;** 6. **Pending the hearing and determination of the appeal, stay of execution of the judgment delivered on 27th February 2026; and** 7. **Costs of the application.** 8. The application is supported by the affidavit of Zacharia Lekishon, sworn on 20th April 2026, and a supplementary affidavit sworn after the respondents and the 1st Interested Party filed their responses. ARA’S application seeks to set aside the orders made on 8th April 2026 during the court vacation. Those orders arose from the 2nd Respondent’s application dated 7th April 2026 and directed the immediate and unconditional release of KDN 851P, together with its original logbook, and the removal of the caveat registered against it. 9. The 1st Interested Party’s Notice of Motion, dated 15th April 2026, is brought under sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 51 rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, and section 89(1) of POCAMLA. It seeks an order directing ARA and the Director of Criminal Investigations, through the Officer Commanding Station, Muthangari Police Station, to release KDB 296Q unconditionally to the 1st Interested Party within seven days; an order directing the National Transport and Safety Authority to remove any caveat, lien, restriction or encumbrance registered against the vehicle; such other orders as may be necessary to give effect to the release; and costs. **BACKGROUND** 1. On 27th August 2024, the Nairobi High Court issued preservation and seizure orders in ACEC Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. E042 of 2024 for vehicle registration numbers KDB 296Q and KDN 851P. The vehicles were intercepted on 7th February 2024 at a roadblock in Laisamis Sub-County. ARA’s case in the forfeiture proceedings was that eighteen Eritrean nationals were found concealed in a modified compartment in KDB 296Q, and seven others were found in KDN 851P. The drivers and co-drivers were arrested and charged. 2. ARA thereafter filed the Originating Motion dated 30th January 2025, which was filed on 31st January 2025, under sections 90 and 92 of POCAMLA. It sought declarations that the two vehicles were proceeds of crime and orders forfeiting them to the Government. KDB 296Q was registered jointly in the names of the 1st Respondent and the 1st Interested Party. KDN 851P was registered in the name of the 2nd Respondent, which stated that it had sold the vehicle to the 1st Respondent but had not transferred title because the purchase price had not been paid in full. 3. In the judgment delivered on 27th February 2026, Justice Njuguna found that the evidence before the court supported the conclusion that the two vehicles were proceeds of crime. However, the court accepted the submission that the preservation orders issued on 27th August 2024 had expired on 27th November 2024 and had not been extended. As the forfeiture application was filed on 31st January 2025, after the preservation orders had expired, the court held that the suit offended section 90(1) of POCAMLA, found it fatally defective, and dismissed it with no order as to costs. 4. ARA filed a Notice of Appeal dated 5th March 2026, stating that the appeal is Civil Appeal No. E313 of 2026. Before the appeal was determined, the 2nd Respondent moved the vacation court by application dated 7th April 2026. On 8th April 2026, Muya Martin Mati J certified the application as urgent and ordered the immediate and unconditional release of KDN 851P and the removal of the caveat or restriction registered against it. ARA states that it was not served with the application dated 7th April 2026 and was not heard before the final release orders were made. It filed the present application on 20th April 2026. On 21st April 2026, this court certified the application as urgent, directed service and responses, and ordered that KDB 296Q and KDN 851P should not be released pending the inter partes hearing. **ARA’S case** 1. Zacharia Lekishon, in his affidavit, states that the judgment made a substantive finding that the vehicles were proceeds of crime, even though the forfeiture suit was dismissed on what ARA describes as a technical defect. ARA is aggrieved by the dismissal and contends that the release of the vehicles before the appeal is determined will defeat the appeal, as they may be transferred, concealed, altered, or otherwise placed beyond recovery. 2. ARA relies on section 97 of POCAMLA. It argues that the section provides an automatic stay pending an appeal from a decision to make a forfeiture order. It further argues that the public interest in preserving property found to be proceeds of crime outweighs the private commercial interests asserted by the 2nd Respondent and the 1st Interested Party. 3. ARA further states that the 2nd Respondent and the 1st Interested Party are, in effect, seeking to enforce commercial arrangements in the forfeiture court. It argues that each has an alternative remedy against the 1st Respondent to recover any unpaid purchase price or outstanding loan. In the supplementary affidavit, ARA relies on **Assets Recovery Agency v Wairimu; Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited (Interested Party)** to support the proposition that a financier’s commercial interest does not automatically outweigh the public interest in depriving criminals of the proceeds and instrumentalities of crime. 4. On the order of 8th April 2026, ARA submits that the 2nd Respondent obtained final and mandatory orders ex parte, without service and without informing the court that a notice of appeal had been filed. It seeks that the court set aside those orders, restore the position that prevailed before 8th April 2026, and preserve both vehicles until the appeal is heard. **THE 2ND RESPONDENT’S CASE** 1. Ali Bin Ijiaz, a director of the 2nd Respondent, opposed the ARA’s application. He states that the 2nd Respondent is a motor vehicle dealer and was the registered owner of KDN 851P. The 2nd Respondent sold the vehicle to the 1st Respondent under a written sale agreement. According to him, the purchaser defaulted, and an outstanding balance of Kshs.1,376,500.00 remains due. 2. The 2nd Respondent avers that the judgment dated 27th February 2026 dismissed the forfeiture proceedings and did not direct any party to perform or refrain from any act, or to pay money. It therefore characterises the judgment as a negative order, which cannot be stayed under Order 42 Rule 6. 3. It is further averred that section 97 of POCAMLA cannot assist the Agency because the section only continues an order which was in force at the time of the forfeiture decision. The judgment expressly found that the preservation orders expired on 27th November 2024. In its view, section 97 cannot revive an order which had ceased to exist more than one year before judgment. 4. The 2nd Respondent also argues that ARA has not demonstrated substantial loss, has not offered security and is attempting to obtain, through a stay application, preservation orders which it did not obtain before instituting the forfeiture suit. It contends that continued detention of a depreciating commercial asset in the absence of a preservation or forfeiture order violates Article 40 of the Constitution. **THE 1ST INTERESTED PARTY’S CASE** 1. The 1st Interested Party opposed ARA’s application by filing a replying affidavit of Claris Ogombo and grounds of opposition dated 18th May 2026. In its application dated 15th April 2026, it seeks the release of KDB 296Q. The bank states that it advanced Kshs.8,320,000.00 to the 1st Respondent and that KDB 296Q was registered jointly in the names of the 1st Respondent and the bank as collateral. It holds the original logbook. Following default, the outstanding amount was stated to be Kshs.3,145,583.46, exclusive of further contractual charges. The bank seeks to recover the debt through its statutory and contractual remedies. 2. The bank avers that the vehicle has remained immobilised at Muthangari Police Station for a prolonged period and continues to deteriorate. It argues that detention after the preservation order lapsed and after the forfeiture suit was dismissed is unsupported by a court order, exposes it to irreparable commercial loss, and prevents it from realising its security. 3. Like the 2nd Respondent, the bank contends that section 97 only applies where a preservation, seizure or ancillary order was in force at the time of the forfeiture decision. It argues that the section cannot operate where the judgment itself found that the preservation order had lapsed before the forfeiture application was filed. It also contends that the court cannot stay a negative order of dismissal. The rest of the affidavit details applications which have been before the court and orders issued. **SUBMISSIONS** 1. The applications came up before this court on 3rd June 2026. The 1st Respondent did not participate. Parties filed written submissions. 2. Miss Amadi submitted that AKA seeks to set aside the orders of 8th April 2026 and to preserve the two vehicles pending appeal. She argued that the trial court found the vehicles to be proceeds of crime and that their release would render the appeal academic. Counsel submitted that the dispute concerns the public interest and the statutory objective of depriving criminals of proceeds of crime, rather than an ordinary dispute over private contracts. 3. The 2nd Respondent relied on its reply affidavit and skeletal submissions. It submitted that ARA’s application is misconceived because no preservation order was in force, the judgment was a negative order (see Kenya Commercial Bank Limited vs Tamarind Meadows Limited & 7 Others [2016 & Sc Pet.- Application No, E004 OF 2023 as consolidated with No. E002 of 2023 Kenya Tea Growers Association Anor. Vs NSSF Board of Trustees 13 Others]), and that section 97 cannot operate on an expired order. It was further submitted that the applicant had failed to satisfy the conditions of Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010. The applicant has not demonstrated any substantial loss, as the judgment merely dismissed defective forfeiture proceedings and did not confer any executable benefit upon the 2nd Respondent. No security has been provided to either the 2nd Respondent or the 1st Interested Party. It was further submitted that the Agency may seek appropriate relief before the Court of Appeal but cannot ask this court to contradict or undo the judgment through an interlocutory application. 4. The 1st interested party relied on the bank’s replying affidavit, grounds of opposition and written submissions. It was submitted that the statutory ninety-day preservation period expired, the forfeiture suit was dismissed, and there was no positive order capable of execution. Counsel argued that if section 97 operated automatically, there would have been no need for the present application. He urged the court to dismiss the ARA’s motion and order the release of KDB 296Q. It was submitted that the ARA failed to satisfy the three-fold conditions of Order 42 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules , 2010. **ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION** 1. I have considered the Notice of Motion dated 20th April 2026, the Notice of Motion dated 15th April 2026, the 2nd Respondent’s application dated 7th April 2026, the affidavits filed in support and in opposition, the documents attached to them, the oral and written submissions, the judgment delivered on 27th February 2026 and the applicable law. The issues for determination are as follows: 2. **whether the ex parte Ruling and orders made on 8th April 2026 should be set aside;** 3. **The meaning and effect of section 97 of POCAMLA in the circumstances of this case;** 4. **whether the judgment delivered on 27th February 2026 is capable of being stayed under Order 42 Rule 6, and, if so, whether the Agency has satisfied the requirements for a stay;** 5. **Whether KDB 296Q and KDN 851P should be released and to whom they should be released; and** 6. **What orders should be issued, including the timing of release and costs.** **Whether the orders of 8th April 2026 should be set aside** 1. The orders of 8th April 2026 were made ex parte during the court vacation, upon consideration of the 2nd Respondent’s application dated 7th April 2026. They did not preserve the position for a short period pending service. They directed the immediate and unconditional release of KDN 851P, the delivery of its original logbook, and the removal of the caveat registered against it. The orders were therefore final and mandatory in their effect. 2. Order 51 rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Rules provides: ***“The court may set aside an order made ex parte.”*** 1. The discretion under that rule is intended to prevent injustice and must be exercised on just terms. In **Shah v Mbogo [1967] EA 116,** the former Court of Appeal for East Africa stated that the discretion is intended to avoid injustice or hardship arising from accident, inadvertence, or excusable mistake or error, and is not designed to assist a person who has deliberately sought to obstruct or delay the course of justice. 2. In Kiai Mbaki & 2 others v Gichuhi Macharia & another [2005] KECA 143 (KLR), the Court of Appeal stated: ***“The right to be heard is a valued right. It would offend all notions of justice if the rights of a party were prejudiced without a hearing.”*** 1. ARA was the party in possession of the vehicles pursuant to the preservation and seizure process. It had filed a Notice of Appeal against the judgment of 27th February 2026. The order for release directly affected the subject matter of the intended appeal and the statutory duties asserted by ARA. ARA was neither served nor heard before final relief was granted. 2. An order commanding the immediate delivery of property and the removal of a statutory restriction is in the nature of a mandatory order. The Court of Appeal in **Kenya Breweries Limited v Washington O. Okeyo [2002] 1 EA 109** held that an interlocutory mandatory injunction is granted only in special circumstances and in a clear case. The application before the vacation court required consideration of the judgment, the Notice of Appeal, sections 84, 89, 90 and 97 of POCAMLA, and the competing proprietary claims. 3. I do not find it necessary to determine whether the 2nd Respondent deliberately withheld material facts. It is sufficient that final orders were made against a party that had not been heard on a contested statutory question. Saying that the same conclusion may ultimately be reached after hearing the parties would not cure that defect. The process must first be fair. 4. I therefore set aside the ruling and orders dated 8th April 2026. The effect is that the application dated 7th April 2026 is restored for determination. The 2nd Respondent has responded to the ARA’s submissions and has fully argued for the release of KDN 851P. ARA and the 1st Interested Party have also addressed that question. No party will therefore suffer prejudice if the release prayer is determined in this ruling. **The meaning and effect of section 97 of POCAMLA** 1. ARA’S case turns on section 97 of POCAMLA. The section cannot be read in isolation. It forms part of a sequence by which property is identified, preserved, subjected to forfeiture proceedings, and, where appropriate, kept intact during an appeal. 2. Under section 82, the Agency’s Director may apply ex parte for a preservation order. The court may make the order where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the property has been used or is intended to be used in the commission of an offence, or that it is proceeds of crime. When a preservation order is made, the court may authorise seizure and make ancillary orders necessary for its proper, fair and effective execution. 3. Section 84 provides for the duration of a preservation order. It provides; ***“A preservation order shall expire ninety days after the date on which notice of the making of the order is published in the Gazette, unless— (a) there is an application for a forfeiture order pending before the court in respect of the property subject to the preservation order; (b) there is an unsatisfied forfeiture order in force in relation to the property subject to the preservation order; or (c) the order is rescinded before the expiry of that period.”[emphasis mine]*** 4. Section 90(1) then provides: ***“If a preservation order is in force, the Agency Director may apply to the High Court for an order forfeiting to the Government all, or any of the property that is subject to the preservation order.”*** 1. Section 97 provides: ***“Any preservation order and any order authorizing the seizure of the property concerned or other ancillary order which is in force at the time of any decision regarding the making of a forfeiture order under section 92(1) shall remain in force pending the outcome of any appeal against the decision concerned.”*** 1. My understanding of the above-mentioned section is as follows: Firstly, section 97 applies to a preservation order, an order authorising seizure or another ancillary order. Secondly, the order must be in force at the time of the decision regarding forfeiture. Thirdly, the continuation is automatic once the statutory conditions exist. Fourthly, the order continues until the appeal is determined. The section preserves an existing restraint. It does not create a new one. 2. The words “any decision regarding the making of a forfeiture order” are sufficiently broad to include a decision granting forfeiture, refusing it, or dismissing the forfeiture application. The object is to prevent the subject matter from disappearing before the appellate court can determine whether the forfeiture decision was correct. However, the scope of the word “decision” does not remove the express condition that the preservation, seizure or ancillary order must have been in force when that decision was made. 3. The Court of Appeal considered section 97 in Assets Recovery Agency v Eis Afrika Group Ltd (Civil Appeal (Application) E511 of 2025) [2026] KECA 1253 (KLR). The Court recognised section 97 as a statutory stay that preserves property pending appeal. That decision is binding on this court. It confirms that where a preservation or related order subsists at the time of the forfeiture decision, neither an application under section 89 nor a general application for release may defeat the continuation directed by section 97. 4. Section 97 is therefore distinct from Order 42 rule 6. When Section 97 applies, continuation does not depend on proof of substantial loss, provision of security, or the exercise of discretion under the Civil Procedure Rules. The property remains preserved because the relevant order was in force when the forfeiture decision was made and an appeal is pending. 5. The same approach was taken in **Assets Recovery Agency v Njuguna; Interdunia Mombasa Limited (Interested Party) [2025] KEHC 12851 (KLR) and Assets Recovery Agency v Mwangi; Darson Trading Limited (Interested Party) [2026] KEHC 598 (KLR)**. In each case, the property remained subject to a subsisting preservation regime at the time of the decision. Neither decision held that an expired order is revived by an appeal. 6. Section 89(1)(b), which requires rescission when the proceedings are concluded, must be read together with section 97. Where an appeal has been filed and the order was in force at the material time, the proceedings have not reached finality for the purpose of releasing the property, and section 97 applies. Where no order was in force, there is nothing for section 97 to continue, and section 89 does not confer a new power of detention. 7. The judgment delivered on 27th February 2026 made a specific finding that the preservation orders issued on 27th August 2024 expired on 27th November 2024, were not extended, and were not in force when the forfeiture application was filed on 31st January 2025. The court consequently held that the Originating Motion contravened section 90(1), was fatally defective, and dismissed it. 8. ARA has appealed against that decision. The correctness of the finding on expiry and the consequence attached to it are matters for the Court of Appeal. This court is not sitting on appeal from the judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction. It cannot, in an interlocutory application, proceed on the basis that the judgment is wrong and reconstruct the statutory foundation which the judgment held to be absent. 9. In **Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 others [2012] KESC 8 (KLR),** the Supreme Court held that a court’s jurisdiction derives from the Constitution or legislation, and that a court cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that conferred by law. The inherent power under section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act is intended to prevent abuse and to facilitate justice. It cannot be used to issue, after judgment, a preservation order for which POCAMLA has prescribed a distinct procedure and threshold. 10. The phrase **“which is in force at the time”** must be given effect. A continuation provision keeps an existing order alive; it does not revive an order whose legal life had ended. 11. ARA is correct that the vehicles are movable assets and may be transferred, altered, or placed beyond reach. It is also correct that civil forfeiture serves an important public purpose. The State’s power to interfere with property must be exercised firmly where the statutory conditions are met, and it ends when the statutory authority for the interference is absent. 12. Article 40(6) of the Constitution provides that the rights under Article 40 do not extend to property found to have been unlawfully acquired. The provision prevents the Constitution from being used as a shield for proceeds of crime. It does not, in itself, constitute a preservation or seizure order. The finding in the reasons for the judgment that the evidence linked the vehicles to unlawful conduct was not followed by a forfeiture, vesting or continuing preservation order. There was no order authorising indefinite detention. 13. I therefore find that section 97 does not continue the preservation and seizure orders in this matter. No preservation, seizure or ancillary order was in force on 27th February 2026. The Notice of Appeal could continue an order that was in force. **Whether the judgment is capable of stay** 1. ARA also invokes Order 42 rule 6. Rule 6(2) provides: ***“No order for stay of execution shall be made under sub rule (1) unless— (a) the court is satisfied that substantial loss may result to the applicant unless the order is made and that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and (b) such security as the court orders for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding on him has been given by the applicant.”*** 1. Before those requirements are considered, there must be a decree or order capable of execution. The final order made on 27th February 2026 dismissed the forfeiture suit with no order as to costs. It did not order the Agency to release the vehicles. It also did not forfeit the vehicles, vest them in the Government, or continue their preservation. 2. In Western College of Arts and Applied Sciences v E.P. Oranga & others [1976] KECA 15 (KLR), the Court of Appeal stated: ***“There is nothing arising out of a dismissal that can be stayed since it does not grant any positive relief.”*** 1. The Court of Appeal repeated the principle in **Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited v Banking Insurance & Finance Union (Kenya) [2016] KECA 97 (KLR)**: ***“A negative order is incapable of being stayed as there is nothing to be executed.”*** 1. ARA relies on the finding that the evidence supported the conclusion that the vehicles were proceeds of crime. That finding is important to the intended appeal. It did not result in a declaration of forfeiture or any positive order capable of being stayed. This court cannot separate the finding from the order dismissing the suit and enforce it as though the forfeiture application had succeeded. 2. ARA moved the court promptly after the order of 8th April 2026. The risk of dissipation is real, and had there been a subsisting preservation order or a positive decree, it would have been a material consideration. The principle in Butt v Rent Restriction Tribunal [1979] KECA 22 (KLR) is that the discretion to grant a stay should be exercised so that an appeal is not rendered nugatory. The principle does not authorise the High Court to create an order that the judgment did not make. The proper forum for an injunction or other protective relief directed at preserving the intended appeal is the Court of Appeal. 3. I find that the judgment delivered on 27th February 2026 is a negative order incapable of stayable. The prayer for a stay of that judgment and for continued detention of the vehicles pending appeal therefore fails. **Whether the motor vehicles should be released** 1. Preservation and seizure under POCAMLA are lawful and necessary restrictions on property, provided they are supported by a subsisting court order. They are not administrative powers of indefinite duration. Once the legal order supporting detention has expired or been discharged, continued detention must be justified by another identifiable provision of law or by a subsisting order of a competent court. 2. ARA and the Director of Criminal Investigations were parties to the matter. The record shows that the vehicles were intercepted in circumstances that led to criminal charges against the drivers and co-drivers. No separate criminal-court exhibit order, seizure warrant, or other subsisting order authorising continued detention was placed before this court. This ruling is confined to the preservation and seizure orders made under POCAMLA. It will not overrule another lawful order if one exists and is produced. 3. KDB 296Q is jointly registered in the names of the 1st Respondent and Premier Bank Kenya Limited. The bank states that it advanced Kshs.8,320,000.00, holds the original logbook, and is owed Kshs.3,145,583.46, exclusive of further contractual charges. It has established a direct registered and financial interest in the vehicle. The vehicle has remained immobilised at Muthangari Police Station and continues to depreciate. 4. The release of KDB 296Q to the bank does not determine the final amount due, validate any contractual charge, or authorise recovery other than in accordance with the financing documents and the law. It restores possession to a joint registered proprietor and secured creditor after the statutory basis for continued detention has lapsed. Any dispute between the bank and the 1st Respondent over the loan, repossession, or realisation of the security remains for determination in the proper forum. 5. KDN 851P remains registered in the name of Al-Siddique Motors Limited. The 2nd Respondent produced a sale agreement and states that the 1st Respondent defaulted, leaving Kshs.1,376,500.00 outstanding. No forfeiture order was made, and there is no subsisting preservation order before this court. ARA’s argument that the 2nd Respondent may pursue the debt against the 1st Respondent does not provide a legal basis for the State to continue holding the vehicle. 6. Upon setting aside the ex parte orders, the application dated 7th April 2026 stood for determination, and the parties were heard. For the same reasons that apply to KDB 296Q, KDN 851P has to be released to its registered owner. That release does not finally determine the rights and liabilities arising from the sale agreement between the 1st and 2nd Respondents. 7. My view is that the court cannot permit a commercial arrangement to defeat a valid preservation or forfeiture order merely because a financier or seller asserts title. Nor can it preserve property after the statutory order has ceased to exist. 8. KDB 296Q and KDN 851P shall therefore be released. The handover shall be documented by an inventory recording the condition of each vehicle, the keys and documents delivered, and an acknowledgement signed by the recipient. The National Transport and Safety Authority shall remove restrictions entered solely pursuant to the preservation orders unless a certified copy of another subsisting lawful order is produced. 9. I will, however, suspend the release and removal orders for fourteen days. This is not a revival or continuation of the expired preservation orders under section 97. It is a brief suspension of the orders made in this ruling, intended solely to permit the Agency to approach the Court of Appeal. **Costs** 1. ARA has succeeded in setting aside the ex parte orders because it was not heard before final relief was granted. It has failed on the substantive prayer for a stay and continued detention. The bank has succeeded in its application, and the 2nd Respondent has succeeded on the reconsidered prayer for release. The applications also raised an important question about the scope of section 97. In those circumstances, the just order is that each party bears its own costs. 2. Accordingly, I make the following orders: 3. Assets Recovery Agency’s Notice of Motion dated 20th April 2026 is allowed only to the extent that the ex parte ruling and orders made on 8th April 2026 in respect of motor vehicle registration number KDN 851P are set aside. 4. The prayers for a stay of execution of the judgment delivered on 27th February 2026 and for the continued preservation or detention of motor vehicle registration numbers KDB 296Q and KDN 851P pending appeal are dismissed. 5. The 1st Interested Party’s Notice of Motion dated 15th April 2026 is allowed. 6. The 2nd Respondent’s Notice of Motion dated 7th April 2026, reconsidered inter parties, following the setting aside of the orders of 8th April 2026, is allowed. 7. Asset Recovery Agency and the Director of Criminal Investigations, through the Officer Commanding Station, Muthangari Police Station, shall release the motor vehicle registration number KDB 296Q, a Mitsubishi Fuso, together with its keys and all documents held with it, to Premier Bank Kenya Limited or its duly authorised agent. 8. Asset Recovery Agency and the Director of Criminal Investigations, through the Officer Commanding Station, Muthangari Police Station, shall release the motor vehicle registration number KDN 851P, a Toyota Noah, together with its keys, original logbook and all documents held with it, to Al-Siddique Motors Limited or its duly authorised agent. 9. At the time of each release, ARA, the Officer Commanding Station and the recipient shall sign an inventory recording the condition of the vehicle and the keys and documents delivered. 10. The Director-General of the National Transport and Safety Authority shall remove every caveat, restriction or encumbrance registered pursuant to the preservation orders in respect of KDB 296Q and KDN 851P, unless the restriction is supported by another subsisting lawful order. 11. If ARA or the Director of Criminal Investigations relies on another subsisting order authorising the continued detention of either vehicle, a certified copy shall be served on the person entitled to release and filed in this court within fourteen (14) days. In the absence of such an order, release shall not be withheld. 12. Orders (e), (f), (g) and (h) shall take effect fourteen (14) days from the date of delivery of this ruling, unless the Court of Appeal issues a contrary order within fourteen (14) days. 13. The interim orders issued by this Court on 21st April 2026 shall remain in force only for the fourteen-day period specified in order (j) and shall thereafter stand discharged automatically. 14. Release of the vehicles shall not extinguish or determine any contractual claim between the 1st Respondent, the 2nd Respondent and the 1st Interested Party. Those claims may be pursued in the proper forum. 15. Each party shall bear its own costs of the applications. It is so ordered. **Dated, Signed and Delivered virtually at Nairobi this 28th DAY of JULY 2026.** **R. E. OUGO** **JUDGE** **In the presence of:** **Miss Amadi - For the Applicant** **Miss Kivuva - For the 2nd Respondent** **1st Respondent - Absent** **Mr. Muyove - For the 1st Interested Party** **2nd & 3rd Interested Parties - Absent** **Adan/ Minah - C/A**