https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/6986

Awino & another v Katana & 7 others (Constitutional Petition E043 & E246 of 2025 (Consolidated)) [2026] KEHC 6986 (KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights) (20 May 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 6986 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Commercial Courts) Constitutional and Human Rights Constitutional Petition E043 & E246 of 2025 (Consolidated) B Mwamuye, J May 20, 2026 HCCHRPET/E246/2025 (FORMERLY NAKURU HCCHRPET/E006/2025) IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLES 2, 3(1), 10, 22, 23, 27, 47, 73, 162, 232, 258, AND 259 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA 2010 IN THE MATTER OF THE LEADERSHIP AND INTEGRITY ACT, NO. 19 OF 2012 IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE (VALUES AND PRINCIPLES) ACT IN THE MATTER OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC CRIMES ACT, 2003 Between Francis Awino 1st Petitioner Patrick Njuguna 2nd Petitioner and Hon Aisha Jumwa Katana 1st Respondent Kenya Roads Board 2nd Respondent The Attorney General 3rd Respondent and Institute of Engineers of Kenya 1st Interested Party Kenya Association of Manufacturers 2nd Interested Party Automobile Association of Kenya 3rd Interested Party Kenya Transport Association 4th Interested Party Institute of Certified Public Accountants 5th Interested Party Judgment Introduction 1.What is before this court for determination is the consolidated Petitions herein, instituted by the 1st Petitioner, Francis Awino, and the 2nd Petitioner, Patrick Njuguna, together with a pending Notice of Motion, challenging the constitutional and statutory validity of the appointment of Honourable Aisha Jumwa Katana as the Chairperson of the Kenya Roads Board through Gazette Notice No. 395 of 17th January 2025. The Petitioners, invoking Articles 22 and 258 of the Constitution, bring these proceedings in public interest, contending that the impugned appointment is unlawful, ultra vires the Kenya Roads Board Act, No. 7 of 1999, and in breach of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 2.The dispute arises within the statutory framework governing the composition and appointment of the Kenya Roads Board, established under section 7 of the Act, read together with the First Schedule. The Petitioners, supported in material respects by the 1st Interested Party, the Institution of Engineers of Kenya, contend that the Act establishes a mandatory and sequential appointment process requiring nomination by designated professional and stakeholder bodies, appointment of members from such nominations under section 7(1)(h), and thereafter appointment of the Chairperson by the President strictly from among those duly appointed members pursuant to section 7(1)(a). It is the Petitioners’ case that the Respondent was neither nominated by nor drawn from the statutorily recognised bodies, thereby rendering both her appointment as a Board member and subsequent elevation to Chairperson procedurally and substantively defective. 3.It is further alleged that the impugned appointment was undertaken in disregard of constitutional imperatives under Articles 10, 47, 73, and 232 of the Constitution, particularly the principles of transparency, public participation, meritocracy, fair administrative action, and adherence to the rule of law. The Petitioners maintain that the exclusion of the designated nominating bodies from the process, coupled with the absence of verifiable compliance with statutory procedure, vitiates the legality of the appointment ab initio. 4.The 1st Interested Party, the Institution of Engineers of Kenya, reinforces the Petitioners’ case, asserting that it is a statutory nominating body under the First Schedule to the Act whose participation in the appointment process was unlawfully excluded. It contends that no lawful nomination process was undertaken, that Gazette Notice No. 384 of 16th January 2025 unlawfully appointed the Respondent as a Board member absent nomination, and that the subsequent appointment as Chairperson was consequently void. The 1st Interested Party further invokes Articles 10, 47, and 232 of the Constitution, contending that the process was opaque, non-competitive, and in breach of mandatory statutory safeguards, and urges the Court to invalidate the impugned appointment and compel a fresh, lawful process. 5.The Respondents, on the other hand, defend the appointment as lawful and procedurally compliant, contending that the Respondent was duly nominated by the Kenya Transporters Association, appointed as a Board member under section 7(1)(h), and thereafter lawfully appointed Chairperson by the President under section 7(1)(a). They further dispute the alleged constitutional and statutory breaches, asserting that the Petitioners have failed to meet the threshold for constitutional litigation or discharge the burden of proof. 6.Accordingly, the central questions for determination before this Honourable Court concern the constitutionality and legality of the appointment process, compliance with the statutory nomination framework under the Kenya Roads Board Act, adherence to constitutional principles governing public appointments, and the appropriate remedies, if any, arising from the impugned Gazette Notices and related administrative actions. The Petitioners’ Case 7.The Petitioners’ case, as advanced in the consolidated Petitions is anchored on a challenge to the constitutional and statutory validity of the appointment of the 1st Respondent, Honourable Aisha Jumwa Katana, as Chairperson of the Kenya Roads Board through Gazette Notice No. 395 dated 17th January 2025. The Petitioners, acting in their asserted capacities as citizens and public interest litigants pursuant to Articles 22 and 258 of the Constitution, contend that the impugned appointment is constitutionally infirm, statutorily ultra vires, and void ab initio. 8.It is the Petitioners’ central position that the appointment was undertaken in flagrant disregard of the mandatory framework prescribed under section 7 of the Kenya Roads Board Act, No. 7 of 1999, read together with the First Schedule thereto. They submit that the statutory scheme establishes a structured and sequential process governing appointments to the Board, beginning with nomination by designated professional and stakeholder bodies, followed by appointment of members under section 7(1)(h) by the Cabinet Secretary, and culminating in the appointment of the Chairperson by the President strictly from among persons duly appointed as members under that provision. According to the Petitioners, this statutory architecture is not merely directory but mandatory, and any deviation therefrom renders the resultant appointment unlawful. 9.The Petitioners further contend that the First Schedule to the Act circumscribes the lawful nominating entities to specific professional and stakeholder bodies, namely the Institution of Engineers of Kenya, the Automobile Association of Kenya, the Kenya Association of Manufacturers, the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya, and the Kenya Transport Association. It is their case that the 1st Respondent neither belongs to nor was nominated by any of the said bodies, and therefore fell outside the statutory pool from which a Board member and, by extension, the Chairperson could lawfully be drawn. On this basis, they impugn both Gazette Notice No. 384 of 16th January 2025, appointing her as a Board member, and Gazette Notice No. 395 of 17th January 2025, appointing her as Chairperson. 10.In addition, the Petitioners allege that the statutory nomination process was wholly bypassed, with no evidence that the designated bodies were invited to submit nominees or that any competitive or consultative process was undertaken as contemplated under the Act. They argue that this omission constitutes a fundamental procedural defect that vitiates the entire appointment process. They further invoke the exclusion of the Institution of Engineers of Kenya as particularly significant, contending that it deprived the process of essential technical input required for an institution whose mandate is inherently technical in nature. 11.Substantively, the Petitioners submit that the Kenya Roads Board, by its statutory mandate, is entrusted with the oversight of road development, maintenance, and infrastructure management, functions which demand high-level technical competence and professional oversight. They therefore contend that the office of Chairperson ought, by necessity, to be occupied by a person with demonstrable expertise in engineering or related technical disciplines to ensure fidelity to professional standards and effective governance of public infrastructure systems. In support of this assertion, they rely on the position of the 1st Interested Party, which questions the suitability and technical competence of the 1st Respondent for the role. 12.The Petitioners further aver that the appointment process was undertaken in a manner that was opaque, exclusionary, and inconsistent with constitutional values, and was in any event politically motivated rather than merit-based. They contend that the process undermines the constitutional principles of transparency, accountability, integrity, and meritocracy in public appointments, and sets a dangerous precedent for disregard of statutory safeguards governing appointments to public office. 13.On the evidentiary plane, the 2nd Petitioner depones that the appointment was effected in two stages, first through Gazette Notice No. 384 appointing the 1st Respondent as a member of the Board, and subsequently through Gazette Notice No. 395 elevating her to Chairperson. He further avers that inquiries made of the relevant professional bodies revealed that the 1st Respondent was not a member of most of them, thereby casting doubt on her eligibility within the statutory framework. He also asserts that the exclusion of the statutory nominating bodies gave rise to a legitimate expectation of participation which was frustrated by the appointing authority. 14.On this foundation, the Petitioners submit that the impugned appointment violates multiple constitutional provisions, including Articles 1, 2, 3, 10, 21, 27, 47, 73, 159(2)(e), and 232 of the Constitution. They argue that the appointment offends the principles of constitutional supremacy, the rule of law, good governance, public participation, equality, fair administrative action, and merit-based public service. 15.In support of their case, the Petitioners place reliance on a body of jurisprudence emphasising strict adherence to statutory procedure and constitutional values in public appointments, including Speaker of the National Assembly v Karume, Communications Commission of Kenya v Royal Media Services, Republic v County Government of Mombasa ex parte Outdoor Advertising Association of Kenya, Judicial Service Commission v Mbalu Mutava, Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Attorney General, and Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance. They also invoke the principle in Macfoy v United Africa Co Ltd that a void act is incurably defective and incapable of legal validation. 16.Taken holistically, the Petitioners’ case is that the appointment process was fundamentally defective for want of compliance with a mandatory statutory framework, was undertaken in violation of constitutional norms governing public appointments, and is therefore incapable of legal sustenance. They accordingly urge the Court to intervene to nullify the impugned appointment and restore fidelity to the Constitution and the Kenya Roads Board Act through a fresh, lawful, and procedurally compliant appointment process. 17.On the basis of the foregoing, the Petitioners seek, inter alia:i.A declaration that the appointment of the 1st Respondent as Chairperson of the Kenya Roads Board is unconstitutional, illegal, null and void.ii.An order of certiorari quashing Gazette Notice No. 384 dated 16 January 2025 and Gazette Notice No. 395 dated 17 January 2025.iii.A declaration that any decisions made by the 1st Respondent in her capacity as Chairperson of the Kenya Roads Board are null and void.iv.An order prohibiting the 1st Respondent from assuming or exercising the powers and functions of the office of Chairperson of the Kenya Roads Board.v.An order directing the appointing authority to undertake a fresh appointment process in strict conformity with the Constitution and the Kenya Roads Board Act.vi.A declaration that the failure to adhere to the prescribed appointment process violates the Constitution and the statutory provisions governing public appointments.vii.Such further or other relief as the Court may deem just and appropriate, including costs of the Petitions. The 1st Respondent’s Case 18.The 1st Respondent, Honourable Aisha Jumwa Katana, opposes the consolidated Petitions and maintains that they are misconceived, vexatious, politically motivated, and amount to an abuse of the Court process. She further submits that the Petitions fail the constitutional threshold of precision in pleading as set out in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic, for want of reasonable particularity of the alleged constitutional violations and the manner in which they are said to have occurred. 19.It is the 1st Respondent’s position that her appointment as the non-executive Chairperson of the Kenya Roads Board was lawfully made by the President pursuant to Section 7(1)(a) of the Kenya Roads Board Act, following due appointment as a member of the Board under Section 7(1)(h) of the Act. 20.The 1st Respondent submits that the appointment process strictly complied with the statutory framework under Section 7 of the Kenya Roads Board Act and the First Schedule thereto. In particular, she was nominated by the Kenya Transport Association, a body listed in the First Schedule, and subsequently appointed as a member of the Board by the Cabinet Secretary before elevation to Chairperson by the President. 21.On statutory qualifications, the 1st Respondent submits that Section 7(3) of the Act prescribes only minimum qualifications for persons appointed under Section 7(1)(h), namely a Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education or equivalent qualification and at least ten years’ relevant practical experience. It is contended that the Act does not impose any requirement for engineering or profession-specific qualifications for appointment as Chairperson. 22.The 1st Respondent further submits that she meets the statutory threshold through her academic background and extensive public service experience in various leadership positions. It is contended that such experience constitutes “practical experience” within the meaning of the Act and adequately qualifies her for the office. 23.She further submits that the Kenya Roads Board Act establishes a multi-sectoral governance structure drawn from diverse stakeholder organisations under the First Schedule, and does not restrict eligibility for appointment as Chairperson to any particular professional discipline or body. 24.The 1st Respondent contends that the Petitioners have failed to establish any specific violation of the Constitution. The allegations are said to be generalised, unparticularised, and unsupported by evidence, and no breach of Articles 2, 3, 10, 21, 27, 47, 73, 159, 161, or 232 has been demonstrated. 25.It is further submitted that the Petitioners have not discharged the evidentiary burden in constitutional litigation and have failed to demonstrate illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety, or unreasonableness in the impugned appointment. 26.On reliefs, the 1st Respondent submits that the Court should exercise restraint in reviewing constitutionally and statutorily mandated executive appointments and avoid substituting its discretion for that of the appointing authority. 27.It is further submitted that the Petitioners have not established a prima facie case to warrant conservatory relief, and that the application is in any event overtaken by events. 28.The 1st Respondent therefore urges the Court to dismiss the consolidated Petitions and the interlocutory applications with costs. The 2nd Respondent’s Case 29.The 2nd Respondent, the Kenya Roads Board, opposes the consolidated Petitions through affidavits filed on its behalf, and maintains that the appointment of the 1st Respondent was lawful, procedural, and in strict compliance with the Constitution and the Kenya Roads Board Act. 30.The 2nd Respondent submits that the Board is established under Section 4 of the Act as a body corporate mandated to oversee, coordinate, and advise on the development and maintenance of the national road network. It further submits that Section 7(1)(a) vests the President with authority to appoint the non-executive Chairperson from among members appointed under Section 7(1)(h), while Section 7(1)(h) provides for appointment of members nominated by organisations listed in the First Schedule. The said organisations include the Institution of Engineers of Kenya, the Automobile Association of Kenya, the Kenya Association of Manufacturers, the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya, and the Kenya Transport Association. 31.The 2nd Respondent submits that the 1st Respondent was duly nominated by the Kenya Transport Association, appointed as a member of the Board by the Cabinet Secretary under Section 7(1)(h), and thereafter appointed as Chairperson by the President under Section 7(1)(a) through Gazette Notice No. 395 of 17 January 2025. 32.It is the 2nd Respondent’s case that the statutory process was fully complied with, and that the law does not require simultaneous consultation of all First Schedule organisations, but only that nominations be received from the designated bodies before appointment is made. 33.The 2nd Respondent further submits that the Kenya Roads Board Act does not impose any requirement that the Chairperson possess engineering or technical qualifications, nor that such office be drawn from any specific professional body. The statutory scheme is said to contemplate multi-sectoral representation rather than professional exclusivity. 34.It is further submitted that the 1st Respondent meets the statutory requirements under Section 7(3) of the Act, having the requisite academic qualifications and extensive public service experience spanning more than ten years in leadership positions at national level. 35.The 2nd Respondent challenges the evidentiary basis of the Petitioners’ allegations, particularly claims relating to membership status in professional bodies, which it submits are based on unverified and unauthenticated material. 36.It further submits that the consolidated Petitions fail to meet the constitutional threshold of precision as articulated in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic and Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance, as they contain generalized allegations without specific proof of constitutional violations or injury. 37.The 2nd Respondent submits that the application for conservatory relief has been overtaken by events, the 1st Respondent having already assumed office pursuant to the impugned Gazette Notice, and in any event no prima facie case has been established. 38.The 2nd Respondent further urges the Court to exercise restraint in interfering with statutory appointments undertaken by constitutionally mandated organs and cautions against granting orders that would amount to rewriting the statutory framework governing the Kenya Roads Board. 39.The 2nd Respondent thus prays that the consolidated Petitions be dismissed with costs. The 3rd Respondent’s Case 40.The 3rd Respondent opposes the consolidated Petitions and urges the Court to dismiss the same in their entirety for want of merit. It is its position that the impugned appointment of Honourable Aisha Jumwa Katana as Chairperson of the Kenya Roads Board was lawfully and validly undertaken by the President pursuant to Section 7(1)(a) of the Kenya Roads Board Act, and that the process was at all material times anchored in a proper statutory and constitutional framework. 41.The 3rd Respondent submits that the appointee was duly nominated and appointed within the meaning of Section 7(1)(h) and Section 7(3) of the Act. It contends that the statutory scheme only requires nomination by one of the organisations listed in the First Schedule, followed by appointment by the Cabinet Secretary as a member, and thereafter appointment by the President as Chairperson from among such members. It is further submitted that the Act does not impose any additional professional or technical qualifications beyond the express statutory threshold of possession of a Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education or its equivalent, together with at least ten years’ practical experience. On this basis, it is contended that the 1st Respondent satisfies the statutory criteria by virtue of her academic background and extensive public service experience, which properly constitutes “practical experience” within the meaning of the Act. 42.The 3rd Respondent further submits that the Petitioners have failed to demonstrate any violation of constitutional rights attributable to it, and that the pleadings do not meet the constitutional threshold of reasonable precision as articulated in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic and reaffirmed in Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance. It is argued that the Petition is founded on generalized and sweeping allegations devoid of specific factual particulars capable of sustaining constitutional scrutiny. It is further contended that the Petition offends Sections 107 and 109 of the Evidence Act, as the Petitioners have failed to discharge the evidentiary burden of proof, consistent with the principle in Lt. Col. Peter Ngari Kagume v Attorney General. 43.On constitutional interpretation, the 3rd Respondent relies on Attorney General v Law Society of Kenya & 4 Others to submit that presidential appointment powers under Article 132 of the Constitution are constitutionally sanctioned executive functions. It is further contended that the rights alleged to have been infringed are, in any event, not absolute and may be lawfully limited under Article 24 of the Constitution, and that no non-derogable rights under Article 25 have been implicated in the circumstances of this case. 44.The 3rd respondent further rejects the contention that engineering or technical qualifications constitute a legal prerequisite for appointment as Chairperson of the Kenya Roads Board. It submits that neither the Constitution nor the Kenya Roads Board Act imposes such a requirement, and that to import such conditions would amount to rewriting clear statutory provisions. It reiterates that the governing legal framework only requires nomination by designated bodies and satisfaction of the basic statutory academic and experiential thresholds. 45.On the question of reliefs, the 3rd Respondent submits that the Petitioners have failed to establish any constitutional or statutory breach capable of warranting judicial intervention. It contends that the allegations raised amount to unsubstantiated challenges to the merits of an executive appointment, rather than demonstrable violations of law or rights. Accordingly, it urges the Court to find that the Petitions lack both evidential and legal foundation, constitute an abuse of the court process, and ought to be dismissed with costs. It further submits that, being framed as public interest litigation, no basis has been laid for an adverse costs order against the 3rd Respondent. 46.The 3rd Respondent maintains that the impugned appointment was lawful, procedurally proper, and constitutionally compliant, and that the Petitioners have failed to discharge the burden of proof or establish any basis for the Court’s interference with the decision of the appointing authority. The 1st Interested Party’s Case 47.The institution of Engineers of Kenya (IEK), the 1st Interested Party, opposes the appointment of Hon. Aisha Jumwa Katana as the Non-Executive Chairperson of the Kenya Roads Board through Gazette Notice No. 395 of 17 January 2025, contending that the same is unconstitutional, unlawful, ultra vires the Kenya Roads Board Act, and therefore void ab initio. 48.IEK’s case is anchored on its status as one of the professional bodies expressly designated under the First Schedule to the Kenya Roads Board Act, 1999, which collectively constitute the statutory pool from which members of the Board are to be nominated under Section 7(1)(h) of the Act. It is its position that the statutory scheme establishes a mandatory and sequential appointment process comprising nomination by the designated bodies, appointment of members by the Cabinet Secretary, and thereafter appointment of the Chairperson by the President strictly from among such duly appointed members under Section 7(1)(a). 49.IEK contends that this statutory framework was fundamentally breached. It asserts that no lawful nomination process was undertaken or initiated by the designated bodies listed under the First Schedule, including itself, the Kenya Association of Manufacturers, the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya, and other stakeholder organisations. According to IEK, the exclusion of these bodies from the process amounts to a material procedural defect that vitiates the entire appointment process at its inception. 50.It is further IEK’s case that Gazette Notice No. 384 of 16 January 2025, which appointed the 1st Respondent as a member of the Board, was issued absent any valid nomination from a First Schedule body, and consequently, the subsequent appointment as Chairperson through Gazette Notice No. 395 of 17 January 2025 was anchored on an unlawful foundation. IEK maintains that the statutory precondition of lawful nomination was not satisfied, and the 1st Respondent therefore did not fall within the lawful pool of eligible persons contemplated under Section 7(1)(a) and (h) of the Act. 51.On the constitutional plane, IEK submits that the impugned appointment offends the national values and principles of governance under Article 10 of the Constitution, particularly public participation, inclusivity, transparency, accountability, and the rule of law. It further contends that the exclusion of statutory stakeholder bodies from the appointment process amounts to procedural unfairness in violation of Article 47 on fair administrative action, as the affected bodies were neither consulted nor afforded an opportunity to participate in a process in which they are expressly entrenched by statute. 52.IEK also invokes Article 232 of the Constitution, arguing that the appointment contravenes the principles of merit, fair competition, transparency, and representativeness in public appointments. It maintains that the process was opaque, non-competitive, and inconsistent with a constitutionally compliant selection mechanism for leadership of a public statutory body entrusted with significant infrastructural and financial responsibilities. 53.Substantively, IEK argues that the Kenya Roads Board, by its mandate under the Act, requires leadership with demonstrable technical competence in engineering and allied disciplines, given its oversight over national road infrastructure and the Road Maintenance Levy Fund. It contends that the statutory design of the Board, as reflected in the First Schedule, underscores the centrality of technical expertise, and that historical practice has consistently reflected such professional orientation in leadership appointments. 54.In support of its position, IEK relies on a line of judicial authority emphasizing strict compliance with statutory procedures and the consequences of deviation therefrom, including Judicial Service Commission v Gladys Boss Shollei [2014] eKLR, Communications Commission of Kenya v Royal Media Services [2014] eKLR, Meru County Government v Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission [2020] eKLR, and Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Attorney General [2012] eKLR. It also relies on Republic v Public Service Commission ex parte Geoffrey Mwangi [2015] eKLR for the proposition that exclusion of mandatory stakeholders and breach of prescribed procedure renders administrative action null and void. 55.On relief, IEK urges the Court to find that the appointment is a nullity for non-compliance with mandatory statutory and constitutional requirements. It seeks declaratory relief invalidating Gazette Notice No. 384 of 16 January 2025 and Gazette Notice No. 395 of 17 January 2025, orders of certiorari quashing the impugned appointments, and an order of prohibition restraining the 1st Respondent from assuming or continuing to hold office. IEK further prays for a mandatory order directing a fresh appointment process strictly compliant with the Constitution and the Kenya Roads Board Act, undertaken with full participation of all First schedule bodies. 56.In addition, IEK invokes the remedy of quo warranto under Article 23(3)(d) of the Constitution, contending that the 1st Respondent is unlawfully occupying a public office without lawful authority, and that IEK, as a statutory stakeholder and nominating body, has standing to challenge such occupation in the public interest. 57.The 1st Interested Party, IEK characterises the impugned appointment as a fundamental departure from the statutory architecture governing the Kenya Roads Board and a violation of constitutional governance standards. It therefore urges the Court to intervene to restore legality, uphold the rule of law, and safeguard the integrity of public appointments within the statutory framework. Analysis and Determination 58.Having carefully considered the pleadings, affidavits, rival submissions of counsel, and the applicable constitutional and statutory framework, together with the authorities cited by the parties, the Court is of the considered view that the dispute before it turns on four narrow but fundamental questions of law and fact which go to the legality and constitutional propriety of the impugned appointment. The issues, that commend themselves for determination as follows:i.Whether the consolidated Petition meets threshold question of constitutional pleadingsii.Whether the appointment of Honourable Aisha Jumwa Katana as Chairperson of the Kenya Roads Board complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 7 of the Kenya Roads Board Act, No. 7 of 1999.iii.Whether the said appointment, irrespective of its statutory compliance or otherwise, offended the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.iv.Whether the Petitioners are entitled to the reliefs sought in the consolidated Petitions, and if so, the nature and extent of such reliefs as may properly issue from this Court. Whether the consolidated Petition meets the threshold of constitutional pleadings 59.The Respondents contend that the consolidated Petition is fatally defective for want of precision. It is contended that the Petition offends the well-established doctrine in Anarita Karimi supra and Mumo Matemu supra, in that it merely cites a raft of constitutional provisions without setting out with reasonable precision the manner in which each alleged violation was committed, or the specific factual foundation linking the impugned appointment to the alleged constitutional infractions. On that basis, the Respondents urge the Court to strike out the Petition as constitutionally incompetent. 60.The legal standard is no longer in doubt. In Anarita Karimi Njeru, the Court expressed the principle that:“We would, however, again stress that if a person is seeking redress from the High Court on a matter which involves a reference to the Constitution, it is important that he should set out with reasonable degree of precision that of which he complains, the provisions said to be infringed, and the manner in which they are alleged to be infringed.” 61.This principle was reaffirmed and refined by the Court of Appeal in Mumo Matemu supra, where the Court emphasised that precision is not a mere procedural technicality but a substantive requirement of constitutional adjudication, stating:“The petition ought to disclose the nature of the constitutional violations with reasonable precision, and a mere citation of constitutional provisions is not sufficient.” 62.However, the constitutional landscape has since evolved under Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution, which obliges courts to administer justice without undue regard to procedural technicalities. The Supreme Court in Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 Others v Royal Media Services Ltd & 5 Others [2014] eKLR cautioned that constitutional interpretation must be purposive, observing that:“the Constitution is a living document, and courts must avoid unduly technical interpretations that defeat substantive justice.” 63.The tension between procedural precision and substantive justice is therefore not one of exclusion but of balance. The guiding question is whether the pleadings, read as a whole, sufficiently disclose a justiciable constitutional controversy capable of response and adjudication. 64.In the present case, although the Petition is not a model of elegant drafting, the Court is satisfied that it discloses with sufficient clarity the gravamen of the complaint. The Petitioners consistently anchor their grievance on a singular factual and legal matrix, that the appointment of the 1st Respondent as Chairperson of the Kenya Roads Board was undertaken in breach of the mandatory statutory framework under Section 7 of the Kenya Roads Board Act, and that such breach, in turn, offends constitutional principles of legality, transparency, accountability, fair administrative action, and merit in public appointments under Articles 10, 47, and 232 of the Constitution. 65.The Respondents were able to file detailed replying affidavits and comprehensive submissions traversing both law and fact, including justification of the nomination process, statutory interpretation of Section 7, and the qualifications of the appointee. This in itself demonstrates that no prejudice or procedural ambiguity arose from the pleadings. 66.Once the Petitioners placed before the Court a prima facie challenge to the legality of the impugned appointment, the evidential burden shifted to the Respondents, as the appointing authorities and custodians of the nomination and appointment records, to demonstrate strict compliance with the statutory and constitutional framework. 67.It is also significant that constitutional litigation under Article 22 is deliberately designed to be accessible, and courts have consistently cautioned against striking out petitions on technical grounds where the substance of the constitutional grievance is discernible. The Supreme Court in Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Attorney General & 2 Others [2012] eKLR underscored that constitutional interpretation must promote access to justice and substantive enforcement of rights. 68.The standard of proof in constitutional litigation, while on a balance of probabilities, is informed by the nature of the allegations, particularly where public law compliance is challenged. The Court must be satisfied that the Respondents have demonstrated legality affirmatively, not merely asserted it. 69.Accordingly, while the Court agrees that the Petition lacks the ideal degree of particularity contemplated in Anarita Karimi Njeru, it does not find the deficiency to be fatal. The constitutional issues are sufficiently identifiable, the factual foundation is adequately pleaded, and the Respondents have not demonstrated any prejudice occasioned by the alleged lack of precision. 70.The Court therefore finds and holds that the consolidated Petition meets the constitutional threshold of pleadings and is properly before this Court for determination on its merits. Whether the appointment of Honourable Aisha Jumwa Katana as Chairperson of the Kenya Roads Board complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 7 of the Kenya Roads Board Act, No. 7 of 1999 71.At the very heart of the consolidated Petitions lies the question whether the impugned appointment of the 1st Respondent as Chairperson of the Kenya Roads Board was undertaken in fidelity to the mandatory statutory framework enacted by Parliament under Section 7 of the Kenya Roads Board Act. Indeed, this issue constitutes the gravamen and juridical nucleus of the Petitioners’ case. The Petitioners do not merely challenge the merits of the appointment or the suitability of the appointee, rather, their complaint is fundamentally one of legality, namely, whether public power was exercised within the limits, sequence, and conditions expressly ordained by statute. 72.The dispute therefore implicates one of the foundational postulates of constitutional governance, that all public authority must derive legitimacy from the law and must be exercised strictly within the boundaries prescribed by law. The issue before the Court is not whether the appointing authorities possessed power in the abstract, but whether such power was exercised in the manner, sequence, and conditions stipulated by Parliament. In constitutional democracies governed by the rule of law, the legality of public action is measured not merely by the existence of power, but by faithful adherence to the process regulating its exercise. 73.The Petitioners contend that the appointment of the 1st Respondent as Chairperson of the Kenya Roads Board was undertaken in patent violation of the mandatory statutory framework established under Section 7 of the Kenya Roads Board Act, No. 7 of 1999. Their case is that Parliament deliberately created a structured, sequential, and conditional appointment regime intended to regulate both the composition of the Board and the legitimacy of its leadership. According to the Petitioners, the process contemplated under the Act was neither optional nor ceremonial, but jurisdictional in nature, and failure to comply with any constituent step rendered the resultant appointment incurably defective. 74.The 1st Interested Party, the Institution of Engineers of Kenya (IEK), substantially aligned itself with the Petitioners’ position and placed particular emphasis on the statutory role of the professional and sectoral bodies identified in the First Schedule to the Act. IEK argued that the statutory nomination framework was deliberately designed by Parliament to ensure participatory, sector-sensitive, and technically informed governance of the Kenya Roads Board. It was its contention that the exclusion or non-involvement of the statutory nominating bodies fundamentally undermined the legality of the process and deprived the appointment mechanism of the stakeholder participation expressly contemplated by statute. 75.IEK further contended that no evidence had been produced demonstrating that the statutory nominating bodies were invited to submit nominees or that a lawful nomination process capable of generating a statutory pool of eligible persons was ever undertaken. According to IEK, the appointment process was therefore opaque, exclusionary, and inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of Section 7 of the Act. It additionally argued that the impugned appointment failed to meet the standards of merit, transparency, and procedural propriety contemplated under Articles 10, 47, and 232 of the Constitution. 76.The 1st Respondent, for her part, maintains that her appointment was lawful and procedurally regular. She avers that she was duly nominated by the Kenya Transport Association, one of the bodies listed in the First Schedule to the Act, thereafter appointed as a member of the Board by the Cabinet Secretary for Roads and Transport through Gazette Notice No. 384 dated 16 January 2025 pursuant to Section 7(1)(h), and subsequently appointed by the President as non-executive Chairperson through Gazette Notice No. 395 dated 17 January 2025 pursuant to Section 7(1)(a). She further contends that she satisfies the academic and experiential qualifications prescribed under Section 7(3) of the Act and that no requirement exists for engineering or technical qualifications. 77.The 2nd and 3rd Respondents similarly urge that the impugned appointment complied with the statutory framework. Their position is that once nomination by a First Schedule body and appointment as a Board member occurred, the President was lawfully seized of the power to appoint the Chairperson under Section 7(1)(a). They further argue that the Court ought not to import into the statute additional procedural or professional requirements not expressly stipulated by Parliament. 78.The resolution of this issue must therefore begin with the text of the statute itself. Section 7(1)(a) of the Kenya Roads Board Act provides that the Board shall consist of:“a non-executive chairman to be appointed by the President from among the members appointed under paragraph (h).” 79.Section 7(1)(h) in turn provides for:“five other members appointed by the Minister from among persons nominated by the organizations specified in the First Schedule.” 80.The First Schedule identifies the relevant organisations as the Institution of Engineers of Kenya, the Automobile Association of Kenya, the Kenya Association of Manufacturers, the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya, and the Kenya Transport Association. 81.Section 7(3) further provides that:“A person shall not be qualified for appointment under subsection (1)(h) unless such person holds a minimum qualification of Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education or its equivalent and has had at least ten years’ practical experience in the relevant field.” 82.A plain reading of the foregoing provisions reveals that Parliament did not create an unfettered presidential discretion. The appointing power donated under Section 7(1)(a) is expressly conditional and derivative. The President may only appoint a Chairperson “from among the members appointed under paragraph (h).” In turn, paragraph (h) only contemplates persons validly nominated by the designated statutory bodies and thereafter lawfully appointed as members by the Cabinet Secretary. 83.In interpreting Section 7 of the Kenya Roads Board Act, the Court is enjoined by Article 259 of the Constitution to adopt a construction that promotes the purpose, values, and principles of the Constitution. A purposive reading of Section 7 reveals that Parliament intended a structured, participatory, and sequential appointment framework, and not a unilateral executive discretion insulated from statutory preconditions. 84.The statutory architecture therefore establishes a deliberate legal sequence: nomination by designated statutory bodies → lawful appointment as Board member → eligibility for presidential appointment as Chairperson. The sequence is neither decorative nor directory, it is jurisdictional. This interpretation is further reinforced by the principle that where Parliament has expressly prescribed the manner of exercising public power, any deviation therefrom is impermissible unless clearly authorised by law. 85.The Respondents have urged the Court to accept that the mere existence of Gazette Notices conclusively establishes compliance with the law. With respect, that proposition is untenable both in principle and in precedent. 86.A Gazette Notice is merely evidentiary of an appointment, it is not constitutive of legality. It cannot sanitize a process undertaken contrary to statute nor cure antecedent jurisdictional defects. Legality is not conferred by publication alone, it derives from fidelity to the enabling law. 87.It is trite that publication in the Gazette is evidence of an administrative act, but it is not proof of legality where statutory preconditions have not been satisfied. The Gazette cannot operate as a curative instrument for jurisdictional defects in the appointment process. 88.The Respondents assert that the 1st Respondent was nominated by the Kenya Transport Association. However, beyond this assertion, no primary evidence was placed before the Court demonstrating the existence of a lawful nomination process in accordance with Section 7 and the First Schedule. In particular, no minutes, nomination records, internal resolutions, or documentary trail were produced to demonstrate compliance with the statutory scheme. The evidential burden resting upon the appointing authorities, in matters of public appointments, was therefore not discharged. 89.That omission is not trivial. Public appointments governed by statute are not validated by conclusory assertions of compliance. The burden rests upon the appointing authority to demonstrate strict adherence to the law. In Mumo Matemu supra the Court of Appeal emphasised that public appointments are subject to constitutional scrutiny and must demonstrably comply with the Constitution and the enabling statutory framework. The Court underscored that judicial review in such matters extends to examining whether the appointing process complied with constitutional and statutory requirements. 90.Similarly, in Republic v Public Appointments Committee of the County Assembly of Nairobi & Another ex parte Wainaina Kigathi Mungai [2018] eKLR, the Court held that where statutory qualifications and procedural requirements are challenged, the appointing authority bears the evidential burden of demonstrating compliance through verifiable material. 91.The law is now settled that where Parliament has prescribed a particular procedure for the exercise of statutory power, that procedure is neither optional nor decorative, it is mandatory and must be strictly complied with. In Speaker of the National Assembly v Karume, the Court of Appeal authoritatively stated:“Where there is a clear procedure for the redress of any particular grievance prescribed by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, that procedure should be strictly followed.” 92.The Supreme Court in Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 Others v Royal Media Services Ltd & 5 Others reaffirmed the centrality of procedural fidelity in the exercise of public power, emphasising that where the Constitution or statute prescribes a particular procedure, State organs and public authorities are bound to act strictly within that framework. The Court underscored that constitutionalism and the rule of law demand scrupulous adherence to legally prescribed processes, and that public bodies cannot act outside the procedural limits imposed by statute. 93.The jurisprudential foundation of that principle lies in the constitutional doctrine of legality embodied in Articles 2(2) and 10 of the Constitution. Article 2(2) expressly provides that: “No person may claim or exercise State authority except as authorised under this Constitution.” Public power is therefore never self-generating or at large, it exists only within the boundaries of the law creating it. The exercise of statutory authority must consequently remain tethered to the procedural and substantive conditions imposed by Parliament. 94.Expressio unius est exclusio alterius - where the law expressly prescribes the manner in which power is to be exercised, all other modes stand excluded. 95.Persuasive comparative jurisprudence reinforces the same constitutional principle. In President of the Republic of South Africa v Democratic Alliance, the Constitutional Court observed that the exercise of public power is constrained by the Constitution and the law, and that all decision-makers must act strictly within the powers lawfully conferred upon them. While not binding on this Court, that reasoning accords with the Kenyan constitutional order, whose foundational commitment to legality requires every exercise of public authority to find legitimacy in demonstrable compliance with both the Constitution and statute. 96.This Court finds that the Respondents approached the matter as though statutory qualification alone was sufficient. It is not. Possession of academic credentials or public service experience does not displace the mandatory procedural pathway established by Parliament. In public law, process is not subordinate to outcome. rather, lawful process is itself a substantive constitutional imperative. 97.Where a statute prescribes the procedure for exercise of public power, compliance with such procedure is not merely directory but jurisdictional. Any action taken outside that framework is a nullity ab initio, irrespective of the merits or qualifications of the appointee. 98.The Court therefore reaches the inescapable conclusion that the Respondents failed to demonstrate strict compliance with the statutory nomination and appointment framework established under Section 7 of the Kenya Roads Board Act. Consequently, the President’s exercise of power under Section 7(1)(a) lacked a demonstrably lawful statutory foundation. Since a derivative power cannot survive independently of its statutory preconditions, the impugned appointment was ultra vires the Act and legally unsustainable. 99.Accordingly, this Court finds and holds that the appointment of Honourable Aisha Jumwa Katana as Chairperson of the Kenya Roads Board did not comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 7 of the Kenya Roads Board Act, No. 7 of 1999.Whether the said appointment, irrespective of its statutory compliance or otherwise, offended the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 100.The inquiry before this Court does not end with the finding that the impugned appointment failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 7 of the Kenya Roads Board Act. In Kenya’s constitutional order, legality and constitutionality are inextricably intertwined. the Constitution is the normative foundation upon which all statutory power rests, and every exercise of public authority must therefore withstand not only statutory scrutiny, but constitutional scrutiny as well. Consequently, where public power is exercised in disregard of a mandatory statutory framework, the inquiry necessarily transcends the realm of statutory irregularity and enters the constitutional domain. 101.The Petitioners and the Interested Parties contend that the impugned appointment violated Articles 10, 47, and 232 of the Constitution by undermining the rule of law, transparency, accountability, procedural fairness, inclusivity, and merit-based public service. Their argument is that the statutory nomination framework under Section 7 of the Kenya Roads Board Act was itself enacted as a legislative manifestation of those constitutional values, and that disregard of the statutory process necessarily amounted to disregard of the constitutional principles underpinning it. 102.The Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that no constitutional violation has been demonstrated. They argue that the appointment was undertaken pursuant to express statutory authority and that the Petitioners merely seek to constitutionalise what is, at best, an ordinary disagreement over interpretation of the Act. It was further contended that no constitutional provision requires the Chairperson of the Kenya Roads Board to possess engineering qualifications or to emerge from a competitive recruitment process. 103.The Court is unable to agree with the Respondents’ position. the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 fundamentally transformed the architecture of public governance by subjecting every exercise of public power to constitutional discipline. Public authority is no longer exercised on the basis of unstructured discretion or executive preference, it is constrained by constitutional values, principles, and procedures. 104.Article 10(1) of the Constitution expressly binds all State organs, State officers, public officers, and all persons whenever they apply or interpret the Constitution, enact or apply law, or implement public policy decisions. Article 10(2) identifies among the national values and principles of governance the rule of law, participation of the people, transparency, accountability, integrity, and good governance. These are not abstract aspirations or political exhortations, they are binding constitutional commands with normative force. 105.Similarly, Article 47 guarantees every person the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair. The constitutionalisation of administrative justice under Article 47 marked a decisive shift from the narrow common law approach to administrative power. As the Court of Appeal observed in Judicial Service Commission v Mbalu Mutava & Another, Article 47 “is intended to subject administrative processes to constitutional discipline” and constitutes “a constitutional control of power.” 106.The right to fair administrative action under Article 47 is not limited to the outcome of administrative action but extends to the procedure by which such action is undertaken. Procedural fairness requires demonstrable adherence to prescribed statutory steps, transparency in the decision-making process, and accountability in the exercise of public power. 107.Article 232(1) further entrenches the values and principles governing public service, including high standards of professional ethics, efficient and economic use of resources, responsive and impartial service, accountability for administrative acts, transparency, fair competition, and merit as the basis of appointments and promotions. 108.The significance of these constitutional provisions is that public appointments are no longer insulated from constitutional interrogation merely because they originate from statutory authority. On the contrary, statute itself must now be understood as an instrument through which constitutional values are operationalised. Consequently, failure to comply with a mandatory statutory procedure regulating public appointments is not merely a statutory defect, it is, in appropriate circumstances, a constitutional infraction because the statute embodies and concretises constitutional governance norms. 109.The Supreme Court recognised this constitutional imperative in Mumo Matemu supra where it underscored that appointments to public office must satisfy constitutional standards of integrity, transparency, accountability, and procedural propriety. The constitutional legitimacy of a public appointment therefore depends not only on the legal authority to appoint, but equally on fidelity to the constitutional values informing the process itself. 110.In the present case, this Court has already found that the Respondents failed to demonstrate compliance with the mandatory nomination and appointment framework established under Section 7 of the Kenya Roads Board Act. The constitutional implications of that failure are profound. The statutory framework requiring participation of the designated First Schedule bodies was not enacted in vain. It was intended to secure sectoral representation, stakeholder participation, institutional accountability, and procedural legitimacy in the Constitution of the Kenya Roads Board. 111.The absence of demonstrable compliance with the prescribed statutory process rendered the impugned appointment opaque, exclusionary, and procedurally infirm. The Court is particularly persuaded by the submissions of the 1st Interested Party, the Institution of Engineers of Kenya, that the omission, exclusion, or non-participation of the statutory stakeholder bodies fundamentally undermined the participatory and representative governance structure deliberately designed by Parliament under the Kenya Roads Board Act. The statutory nomination framework was plainly intended to ensure that the Constitution of the Board would reflect broad sectoral participation, technical input, and institutional accountability from the identified stakeholder bodies. To disregard or circumvent that framework is to defeat both the letter and purpose of the statute. 112.Where Parliament deliberately creates participatory structures in the exercise of public power, those structures cannot be treated as ornamental or dispensable. Their observance is integral to the constitutional values of inclusivity, accountability, transparency, and the rule of law under Article 10 of the Constitution. Consequently, a public appointment undertaken in disregard of such mandatory participatory mechanisms ceases to be a mere procedural irregularity and instead assumes constitutional significance, for it erodes the legitimacy, openness, and accountability that the Constitution demands in the exercise of public authority. 113.The Respondents urged the Court to focus solely on the personal qualifications of the 1st Respondent. With respect, that argument fundamentally misconceives the nature of constitutional accountability in public appointments. Constitutional compliance is not satisfied merely because an appointee possesses academic credentials or public service experience. the Constitution demands procedural legitimacy as much as substantive qualification. In constitutional governance, process is not subordinate to outcome, lawful process is itself a substantive constitutional imperative. 114.The Court finds persuasive comparative guidance in Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health, where the Constitutional Court held that the exercise of public power outside the framework authorised by law is constitutionally invalid. Equally instructive is Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, where it was held that statutory discretion must be exercised consistently with the policy and purpose of the statute conferring it. Although not binding, these authorities resonate with Kenya’s constitutional commitment to legality, accountability, and structured governance. 115.The impugned appointment violated the Constitution in three interrelated respects. First, it contravened the principle of legality under Articles 2(2) and 10 by purporting to exercise public authority outside the framework of lawfully prescribed procedure. Second, it violated Article 47 by failing to demonstrate procedural fairness, transparency, and adherence to statutory safeguards governing public appointments. Third, it undermined Article 232 by departing from the constitutional values of accountability, merit, inclusivity, and transparent competition in public service appointments. 116.This Court therefore finds and holds that the appointment of Honourable Aisha Jumwa Katana as Chairperson of the Kenya Roads Board was not only ultra vires the Kenya Roads Board Act, but was equally inconsistent with and violative of Articles 10, 47, and 232 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. Whether the Petitioners are entitled to the reliefs sought 117.Having found that the impugned appointment was undertaken in contravention of both the Kenya Roads Board Act and the Constitution, the remaining question concerns the nature of the reliefs that ought properly to issue. Under Article 23(3) of the Constitution, this Court is vested with broad remedial authority to grant appropriate relief, including declarations, judicial review orders, conservatory orders, and any other relief necessary to vindicate the Constitution and uphold the rule of law. The remedial jurisdiction of a constitutional court is not ornamental, it exists to provide effective redress where public power has been exercised unlawfully or unconstitutionally. 118.In determining the appropriate reliefs, the Court is guided by the principle of proportionality, requiring that the remedy granted be effective, necessary, and least intrusive while still vindicating the Constitution. 119.The jurisprudence of the superior courts has consistently affirmed that where an administrative or statutory decision is shown to have been made without jurisdiction, in excess of statutory authority, or in violation of constitutional requirements, the Court is duty-bound to intervene. In Kenya National Examinations Council v Republic ex parte Geoffrey Gathenji Njoroge [1997] eKLR, the Court of Appeal explained that an order of certiorari issues to quash a decision already made where the decision-maker acted without jurisdiction, exceeded jurisdiction, or failed to comply with the rules of natural justice. The remedy exists to invalidate unlawful exercises of public power and restore legality within administrative governance. 120.The Supreme Court in Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v Kenya Airports Authority & 2 Others [2021] eKLR further underscored that constitutional remedies must be effective, meaningful, and responsive to the nature of the constitutional violation established before the Court. The Court emphasised that constitutional adjudication demands remedies capable not merely of recognising violations, but of restoring constitutional order and securing future compliance with the Constitution. 121.In the present case, the Court has found that the appointment of the 1st Respondent as Chairperson of the Kenya Roads Board was undertaken without demonstrable compliance with the mandatory statutory framework established under Section 7 of the Kenya Roads Board Act and in violation of Articles 10, 47, and 232 of the Constitution. The resultant appointment was therefore ultra vires, procedurally infirm, and constitutionally unsustainable. In those circumstances, declaratory relief is plainly warranted to formally pronounce the legal invalidity of the impugned appointment and affirm the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law in the exercise of public authority. 122.The Court is equally satisfied that an order of certiorari must issue to quash Gazette Notice No. 384 dated 16 January 2025 and Gazette Notice No. 395 dated 17 January 2025, insofar as they relate to the appointment of the 1st Respondent. Although Gazette Notices are formal instruments of state action, they cannot stand where the process giving rise to them is tainted by illegality. As earlier observed, publication in the Gazette does not confer legality upon an appointment undertaken contrary to statute, legality flows from fidelity to the Constitution and the enabling law. 123.Once illegality and unconstitutionality are established, certiorari is not discretionary in the abstract, it becomes the necessary judicial instrument for removing from the legal order a decision that is void ab initio and incapable of producing lawful consequences. 124.However, it would not be reasonable or proportionate to quash all actions and decisions undertaken by the 1st Respondent, without knowing the nature and scope of those actions and decisions. The public interest would not be served by imprecise judicial orders that may very well undo decisions and actions that have served and continue to serve the nation well. 125.Further, and in order to restore constitutional compliance within the statutory governance framework of the Kenya Roads Board, this Court considers it necessary to recommend that any fresh appointment process be undertaken strictly in accordance with Section 7 of the Kenya Roads Board Act, the First Schedule thereto, and the constitutional principles governing public appointments. Such process must demonstrably adhere to the statutory nomination architecture contemplated by Parliament and the constitutional imperatives of legality, transparency, accountability, inclusivity, and procedural fairness. 126.The Court is mindful that the dispute before it concerns the legality of a public appointment process and raises substantial questions of constitutional governance and public administration. In that regard, and considering that the issues raised were not only of genuine public interest but also sought to clarify the proper constitutional and statutory architecture governing public appointments, the Court is of the considered view that this is an appropriate matter for each party to bear its own costs. Conclusion 127.For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds and holds that the appointment of Hon. Aisha Jumwa Katana as Chairperson of the Kenya Roads Board was undertaken without demonstrable compliance with the mandatory statutory framework prescribed under Section 7 of the Kenya Roads Board Act, No. 7 of 1999. The failure to adhere to the prescribed nomination and appointment sequence rendered the impugned appointment ultra vires the Act and constitutionally infirm, as it was inconsistent with and in violation of the values and principles enshrined under Articles 10, 47, and 232 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 128.Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions succeed and the Court makes the following orders:a.A declaration is hereby issued that the appointment of Hon. Aisha Jumwa Katana as Chairperson of the Kenya Roads Board is unconstitutional, unlawful, null and void ab initio.b.An order of certiorari is hereby issued quashing Gazette Notice No. 384 dated 16 January 2025 and Gazette Notice No. 395 dated 17 January 2025 insofar as they relate to the appointment of the 1st Respondent only.c.Each party shall bear its own costs of the Petition.Orders accordingly. File closed accordingly. DATED, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY THIS 20TH DAY OF MAY 2026.……………………………BAHATI MWAMUYE MBSJUDGEIn the presence of:1st Petitioner – Mr. Francis AwinoCounsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents -Ms. Kalimi h/b Ms. MogireCounsel for the 3rd Respondent – Ms. RukiyahCourt Assistants – Mr. Martin Mwenda and Mr. Austin