https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12444

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT KISUMU** **CRIMINAL REVISION NO. E016 OF 2026** **BABUGUN KOKELLO……..……………………………………APPLICANT** **VERSUS** **REPUBLIC……………………………………………………….RESPONDENT** **RULING** 1. **THE APPLICANT’S NOTICE OF MOTION.** 2. The Applicant’s notice of motion is presented under *Articles 50, 159(2)(d), 165(6)* and *165(7)* of the *Constitution, Sections 362, 364* and *365* of the *Criminal Procedure Code* and all other enabling provisions of the law and seeks the following orders: 1. **[Spent].** 2. **The ruling of Hon. Maureen N. Olonyi delivered on the 1st day of July, 2026 in *Tamu MCCR/E267/2025* *Republic v Babugun Kokeloh* be and is hereby reviewed and the application dated the 26th day of November, 2025 be and is hereby allowed as prayed.** 3. **Any other orders this Honourable Court may deem fit and just to grant to uphold justice and the rule of law.** 3. The grounds upon which the motion is premised are that the Applicant contends that the criminal case in *Tamu MCCR/E267/2025, Republic v Babugun Kokeloh,* is scheduled for hearing and, unless the present application is heard and determined beforehand, the proceedings in the subordinate court will continue, thereby rendering the instant application nugatory and occasioning him substantial injustice. 1. The Applicant further avers that the trial court acknowledged that land parcel Kisumu/Fort Ternan/1457 was excised from Kisumu/Fort Ternan/422, which forms part of the estate of the late **Joram Okello Ngar,** of which the Applicant is the administrator, but nevertheless declined to allow the Applicant’s application dated 26th November, 2025 on what he terms as flimsy and untenable grounds. 2. The Applicant also asserts that, despite considering the judgement in *Tamu MCELC No. 2 of 2019,* which allegedly nullified the fraudulent transfers of the suit property belonging to the estate of the deceased, the trial court disregarded that decision and dismissed the Applicant’s application without according due weight to its findings. 3. It is further the Applicant’s case that although the trial court cited the decision in ***Araka & 2 Others v Republic [2023] KEHC 26783 (KLR)*,** for the proposition that a criminal court lacks jurisdiction to determine questions of title to land, it nonetheless assumed jurisdiction over a dispute which, according to the Applicant, is essentially a land ownership dispute. 4. The Applicant further contends that the trial court appreciated that conflicting determinations by the Environment and Land Court and the criminal court would create an untenable and embarrassing situation, yet proceeded to render a ruling that, in his view, gave rise to precisely such a conflict. 5. Lastly, the Applicant alleges that the trial court appears to have predetermined the outcome of the criminal proceedings and is intent on proceeding with the trial to his prejudice. He maintains that unless the orders sought are granted, he stands to suffer substantial prejudice by being subjected to a criminal prosecution despite being the administrator of the estate of the late **Joram Okello Ngar.** 6. **THE TRIAL COURT’S IMPUGNED RULING.** 7. In its impugned ruling rendered on 6th July, 2026, the trial court considered the Applicant’s application dated 26th November, 2025 in which he sought, *inter alia,* a declaration that the criminal proceedings were a matter falling within the jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court, dismissal of the criminal case, release of the Applicant, refund of the cash bail and costs against the complainant. 8. The trial court noted that the Applicant, who was charged with the offence of forcible detainer contrary to *Section 91* of the *Penal Code,* contended that he was the administrator of the estate of the late **Joram Okello Ngar,** the registered owner of land parcel Kisumu/Fort Ternan/22, and that the complainant’s claim over the subject property arose from alleged fraudulent subdivisions and transfers of the deceased’s estate. 9. The trial court further noted the Applicant’s contention that the subdivisions affecting the deceased’s land had previously been nullified in *Tamu ELC Case No. 2 of 2019,* and that the complainant had acquired an interest in the property through transactions involving one **Paul Owuor Okello,** who, according to the Applicant, had no lawful authority to deal with the estate property. 10. The court also considered the complainant’s response, in which she maintained that she did not know the Applicant and that she only encountered him on 23rd September, 2025 when she reported an alleged trespass onto her property known as Kisumu/Fort Ternan/1457, in respect of which she held a title deed. 11. The trial court examined the judgment in *Tamu ELC Case No. 2 of 2019* and found that the said proceedings related to parcels Kisumu/Fort Ternan/1174, 1175 and 1176, which were subdivisions arising from parcel Kisumu/Fort Ternan/22. The court further considered *Tamu ELC Case No. 7 of 2019,* which related to parcel Kisumu/Fort Ternan/22A, and found that the complainant’s claim in that matter arose from a transaction involving one acre to be hived from parcel Kisumu/Fort Ternan/422. 12. The trial court observed that the green card for parcel Kisumu/Fort Ternan/22 showed that the property remained registered in the name of the deceased as at 15th October, 2025, while the complainant’s transaction related to parcel 22A. The court held that, in the absence of evidence demonstrating that parcels 22 and 22A were one and the same property, the two parcels constituted distinct parcels of land. 13. The court further considered the ground report relied upon by the parties and found that although parcels Kisumu/Fort Ternan/22 and Kisumu/Fort Ternan/422 were both allocated to the deceased, the report indicated that parcel 22 was designated for agricultural use while parcel 422 was designated for residential use and was the location of the deceased’s traditional homestead. The court therefore found that the Applicant’s assertion that parcel 422 was a subdivision of parcel 22 was unsupported by the evidence before it. 14. The trial court further found that parcel Kisumu/Fort Ternan/1457, which was the subject of the criminal charge, arose from the subdivision of parcel 422, and not from parcel 22 as alleged by the Applicant. The court also noted that the Applicant had not provided documentary evidence demonstrating that ownership of parcel 1457 was the subject of the pending proceedings in *Tamu MCELC No. E039 of 2025.* 15. The court observed that the complainant had produced a green card for parcel Kisumu/Fort Ternan/1457, which showed that the property was initially registered in the name of **Paul Owuor Okello** before being transferred to the complainant. The court therefore found that the Applicant had not established that the ownership dispute concerning parcel 1457 was pending determination before another court. 16. The trial court considered the provisions of *Section 193A* of the *Criminal Procedure Code* on concurrent criminal and civil proceedings and acknowledged the Applicant’s argument that determination of ownership before conclusion of the criminal case would avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions. 17. The court also considered the decision in ***Araka & 2 Others v Republic*** (supra), where the court had stayed criminal proceedings pending determination of an ownership dispute before the Environment and Land Court. 18. The trial court, however, distinguished the circumstances before it from those in ***Araka,*** holding that in the present matter the subject properties in the criminal proceedings and the Environment and Land Court proceedings were different. The court therefore found that there was no basis for staying the criminal proceedings. 19. Consequently, the trial court dismissed the Applicant’s application dated 26th November, 2025 for lack of merit, made no order as to costs, and directed that the criminal case proceeds to trial. 20. **THE AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF THE APPLICATION.** 21. The application is supported by the Applicant’s affidavit sworn on 6th July, 2026 in which he deposes that he is the administrator of the estate of the late **Joram Okello Ngar** and is the accused person in *Tamu MCCR/E267/2025, Republic v Babugun Kokeloh,* where he faces a charge of forcible detainer contrary to *Section 91* of the *Penal Code* in respect of land parcel Kisumu/Fort Ternan/1457, which is alleged to belong to the complainant, **Rachel Wando Rajoro.** 22. He avers that he filed an application dated 26th November, 2025 challenging the criminal proceedings on the ground that the dispute concerns ownership and occupation of land belonging to the estate of the deceased and therefore falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court. 23. He further states that he instituted *Tamu MCELC No. E039 of 2025* against the complainant in his capacity as administrator of the estate, and contends that the criminal prosecution is being used to determine a civil land dispute. 24. The Applicant further deposes that although his application had been filed and served before the hearing date, the trial court awarded the complainant adjournment costs of Ksh.10,000/-, a course which he considers irregular in criminal proceedings. 25. He also complains that the court considered submissions filed out of time by both the complainant’s counsel and the prosecution, yet proceeded to dismiss his application on grounds which he believes are unsupported by law. 26. The Applicant contends that the trial court failed to properly evaluate the documentary evidence placed before it. In particular, he asserts that a ground report annexed to his affidavit demonstrated that parcel Kisumu/Fort Ternan/22A does not exist, and that parcels Kisumu/Fort Ternan/22 and Kisumu/Fort Ternan/422 were allocated to the **late Joram Okello Ngar** for agricultural and residential purposes respectively. 27. He further avers that parcel Kisumu/Fort Ternan/422 was subsequently and fraudulently subdivided into parcels 1456 and 1457 by one **Paul Owuor Okello,** who had allegedly obtained letters of administration unlawfully, before transferring parcel 1457 to the complainant. 28. The Applicant further deposes that, despite acknowledging these facts in its ruling, the trial court nonetheless dismissed his application and required him to stand trial for allegedly detaining property forming part of the estate which he lawfully administers. 29. He maintains that the existence of *Tamu MCELC No. E039 of 2025* was never disputed by either the prosecution or counsel watching brief for the complainant, yet the trial court failed to recognize or verify the existence of the suit despite both matters being before the same court station. 30. The Applicant also faults the trial court for allegedly disregarding documents filed in support of his application, including a mutation form which, according to him, demonstrated the fraudulent subdivision of the deceased’s land. 31. He further complains that the trial court, on its own motion, interpreted the documents in a manner favourable to the complainant and thereby formed an adverse opinion against him before the trial had commenced. 32. Lastly, the Applicant deposes that the impugned ruling violates his constitutional right to a fair trial under *Article 50(2)(a)* of the *Constitution* by undermining the presumption of innocence and effectively predetermining the outcome of the criminal proceedings. 33. He asserts that the ruling is inconsistent with the objectives of the criminal justice system, has eroded his confidence in the impartiality of the trial court, and urges this Court to allow the present application. 34. The application is further supported by the Applicant’s further affidavit sworn on 14th July, 2026 to which he has annexed as BK1 typed proceedings from the trial court. 35. In further support of the motion is the Applicant’s supplementary affidavit sworn on 27th July, 2026, in which he contends that the present application challenges the ruling delivered by the trial court on 6th July, 2026 in *Tamu Criminal Case No. MCCR/E267/2025*, by which the court dismissed his application dated 26th November, 2025 seeking a determination that the dispute fell within the jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court and directing that the criminal case proceed to hearing. 36. He deposes that, upon the filing of the present application, this Court issued directions for the filing of responses and submissions and, on 17th July, 2026, granted interim orders staying further proceedings before the trial court pending the hearing and determination of the application, the stay remaining in force until 28th July, 2026. 37. The Applicant further contends that notwithstanding the subsistence of the said stay orders, the trial court proceeded on 22nd July, 2026 to receive the evidence of the complainant, **Rachael Wando Rajoro,** as PW1. He avers that his advocate objected to the continuation of the proceedings, drew the trial court’s attention to the stay orders issued by this Court, withheld his consent to the proceedings, and sought the recusal of the trial Magistrate. 38. The Applicant deposes that, after hearing the objection, the trial court directed him to file a formal application for recusal within three days and fixed the matter for mention on 27th July, 2026. He states that he complied with those directions by filing and serving the recusal application within the stipulated period. 39. The Applicant further avers that the recusal application inadvertently bore the heading of the High Court instead of the Magistrate’s Court owing to a clerical error by his advocates. He contends that, despite seeking leave to rectify the error, the trial court declined to grant the request and instead fixed the criminal case for hearing on 10th August, 2026 notwithstanding the pendency of the recusal application. 40. Lastly, the Applicant deposes that the proceedings supplied to him by the trial court are incomplete and do not accurately reflect what transpired in court. He contends that the conduct of the trial court demonstrates a pattern of procedural impropriety, bias, and disregard of this Court’s orders, thereby occasioning prejudice to him and necessitating the intervention of this Court by allowing the present application. 41. **THE AFFIDAVIT IN RESPONSE TO THE APPLICATION.** 42. The application is opposed by the Respondent vide the replying affidavit of **Mercy Mutheu Muema,** Prosecution Counsel sworn on 19th July, 2026 in which the said deponent admits that the Applicant is indeed charged in *Tamu SPM Criminal Case No. E267 of 2025* with the offence of forcible detainer contrary to *Section 91* of the *Penal Code,* the allegation being that he unlawfully remained in possession of land parcel Kisumu/Fort-Ternan/1457 belonging to **Rachel Wando Rajoro** in circumstances likely to occasion a breach of the peace. 43. She further states that the Applicant pleaded not guilty on 6th October, 2025 and that the criminal proceedings have progressed before the trial court with the Applicant being represented by counsel throughout. 44. The deponent further states that, during the pendency of the criminal proceedings, the Applicant sought to stay the criminal case on the ground that the dispute concerned ownership of the suit property and was the subject of *Tamu MCELC No. E039 of 2025*. 45. She avers that, after hearing both parties, the trial court dismissed that application in a considered ruling delivered on 1st July, 2026 and directed that the criminal case proceed to hearing. 46. It is the Respondent’s position that the present application improperly seeks to challenge that ruling through the revisionary jurisdiction of this Court. The deponent contends that the jurisdiction conferred by Se*ction 362* of the *Criminal Procedure Code* and *Article 165(6)* and *(7)* of the *Constitution* is limited to examining the correctness, legality and propriety of subordinate court proceedings and does not extend to reconsidering the merits of a discretionary decision or substituting the High Court’s view for that of the trial court. 47. The deponent further avers that the trial court correctly applied *Section 193A* of the *Criminal Procedure Code* in declining to stay the criminal proceedings notwithstanding the pendency of the Environment and Land Court suit, since the existence of parallel civil proceedings does not bar or suspend criminal proceedings. 48. She therefore maintains that the impugned ruling discloses no error of law, illegality, impropriety or procedural irregularity warranting interference by this Court. 49. Lastly, the deponent states that the Applicant has failed to establish any proper basis for the exercise of this Court’s revisionary jurisdiction. She contends that the complainant and the prosecution witnesses are constitutionally entitled to have the criminal case heard and determined without unreasonable delay, that the Applicant remains at liberty to pursue his civil remedies and to raise his defence during the criminal trial, and that granting the orders sought would occasion unnecessary delay, prejudice the complainant, and undermine the public interest in the expeditious administration of criminal justice. 50. She accordingly urges the Court to dismiss the application and direct that the criminal case proceeds to hearing. 51. **THE APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS.** 52. The Applicant submits that this Court has jurisdiction under *Articles 165(6)* and *(7)* of the *Constitution* and *Sections 362, 364* and *365* of the *Criminal Procedure Code* to revise the ruling delivered on 1st July, 2026, contending that the impugned decision is incorrect in law, improper, and has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. He argues that unless the Court intervenes, the criminal proceedings will render the present revision application nugatory. 53. The Applicant further submits that the revisionary jurisdiction of this Court extends to correcting errors of law, illegality, impropriety and procedural irregularities apparent on the face of the record. He relies on the constitutional supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court and contends that the trial court acted outside the law by declining to halt the criminal proceedings notwithstanding the material placed before it. 54. The Applicant argues that the trial court failed to accord proper legal effect to documentary evidence demonstrating that land parcel Kisumu/Fort Ternan/1457 originated from parcel Kisumu/Fort Ternan/422, which forms part of the estate of the late **Joram Okello Ngar.** He submits that, having acknowledged those facts, the trial court ought to have concluded that the criminal proceedings concerned a dispute over ownership and occupation of land already pending before the Environment and Land Court. 55. The Applicant further contends that the trial court failed to appreciate the significance of the pending proceedings in *Tamu MCELC No. E039 of* *2025* and the earlier judgement in *Tamu MCELC No. 2 of 2019,* which allegedly nullified the impugned transfers of the suit property. 56. He submits that the criminal charge of forcible detainer necessarily depends upon the question of who has the superior right to possession of the land and that those issues properly fall within the jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court. 57. It is further submitted that, although the trial court cited ***Araka & 2 Others v Republic****,* which recognizes that criminal courts lack jurisdiction to determine questions of title to land, it nonetheless proceeded in a manner that required it to examine competing claims of ownership arising from succession proceedings, subdivision of land and alleged fraudulent transfers. 58. The Applicant contends that the trial court ought to have stayed the criminal proceedings to avoid usurping the jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court. 59. The Applicant also submits that permitting the criminal case to proceed creates a real risk of conflicting determinations between the criminal court and the Environment and Land Court. According to the Applicant, inconsistent findings regarding entitlement to possession of the suit property would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice and should therefore be avoided by preserving the *status quo* pending the determination of the civil proceedings. 60. The Applicant further argues that the continuation of the criminal proceedings infringes his constitutional right to a fair trial under *Article 50* of the *Constitution.* He submits that the criminal justice system should not be employed as a substitute for civil litigation or as a mechanism for resolving disputed proprietary rights, relying on ***Kuria & 3 Others v Attorney General [2002)*** and ***Commissioner of Police & Director of Criminal Investigations Department v Kenya Commercial Bank & Others [2013] eKLR*** in support of that proposition. 61. Lastly, the Applicant submits that the balance of justice favours the grant of the orders sought, contending that no prejudice would be occasioned to the Respondent if the criminal proceedings are stayed, whereas allowing the trial to proceed before the revision is determined would render the application academic, occasion a miscarriage of justice and result in unnecessary expenditure of judicial time and resources. 62. He accordingly urges the Court to revise the impugned ruling, allow the application dated 26th November, 2025, stay the criminal proceedings pending determination of the Environment and Land Court suit, and ultimately dismiss the criminal case. 63. **THE RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS.** 64. On its part, the Respondent submits that the present application invites this Court to interfere with a discretionary, merit-based decision of the trial court declining to stay the criminal proceedings pending determination of the Environment and Land Court matter, and that such an invitation falls outside the limited scope of the Court’s revisionary jurisdiction under *Section 362* of the *Criminal Procedure Code.* 65. The Respondent argues that the jurisdiction of this Court in revision is confined to satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of a finding, sentence or order of the subordinate court and the regularity of its proceedings. It submits that revision does not permit the Court to re-evaluate evidence, reconsider the merits of a decision or substitute its own view for that of the trial court. 66. The Respondent relies on the decision of this Court in ***Ogutu & Another v Republic (Miscellaneous Criminal Application E077 of 2024) [2025] KEHC 10888 (KLR),*** where I held that revisionary powers do not extend to the revision of merit decisions. 67. The Respondent submits that, as in ***Ogutu,*** the trial court’s decision in the present matter was reached after hearing both parties and exercising judicial discretion, and there is no basis for this Court to interfere with it in revision. 68. The Respondent further relies on ***Muriuki (130358) v Kiprotich (Criminal Revision E209 of 2022) [2022] KEHC 16208 (KLR),*** ***Rai & 5 Others v Republic (Criminal Revision E026 of 2024) [2024] KEHC 11363 (KLR)*** and ***Republic v Samuel Gathuo Kamau [2016] eKLR,*** for the proposition that a revision court cannot delve into the merits of a subordinate court’s decision or make a determination which ought properly to be made by the trial court or an appellate court. 69. The Respondent submits that the Applicant’s reliance on ***Araka & 2 Others v Republic*** (supra) and ***Commissioner of Police & Director of Criminal Investigations Department v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 4 Others*** (supra) is misplaced. It argues that both decisions were rendered in an appellate context where the courts were entitled to re-evaluate evidence and substitute their own findings, unlike the present application which invokes revisionary jurisdiction. 70. The Respondent contends that in ***Araka,*** the appellate court reached its conclusions after considering the entire evidentiary record and finding that the criminal process had been used to circumvent a civil dispute. It submits that no similar finding has been made in the present matter and that this Court cannot make such a determination on revision without impermissibly descending into the merits of the case. 71. The Respondent further distinguishes ***Commissioner of Police v Kenya Commercial Bank,*** submitting that the decision concerned a unique factual background involving a longstanding commercial dispute, numerous prior suits and a finding that criminal investigations had been misused as a means of advancing civil interests. It argues that no such circumstances have been demonstrated in the present case. 72. The Respondent submits that *Section 193A* of the *Criminal Procedure Code* expressly permits the concurrent existence of criminal and civil proceedings, even where the matters in issue overlap. It argues that the mere pendency of *Tamu MCELC No. E039 of 2025* does not constitute a basis for staying the criminal proceedings and that a stay can only arise where there is a clear demonstration of abuse of the criminal process, which the Applicant has failed to establish. 73. The Respondent further submits that the Applicant’s complaint that the trial court failed to properly evaluate documentary evidence relating to the ownership and subdivision of the suit property is, in essence, a challenge to the weight given to evidence and the exercise of judicial discretion. It argues that such matters fall outside the scope of revision under *Section 362* of the *Criminal Procedure Code.* 74. The Respondent contends that the existence of parallel proceedings before the criminal court and the Environment and Land Court does not create a risk of conflicting decisions as alleged by the Applicant. It submits that the criminal court is only concerned with the elements of the offence of forcible detainer, while the Environment and Land Court will determine questions of ownership and title based on the evidence and legal principles applicable to that jurisdiction. 75. Lastly, the Respondent submits that the fact that the criminal case was scheduled for hearing does not, by itself, justify interference with the trial court’s ruling. It argues that the Applicant has failed to demonstrate any incorrectness, illegality, impropriety or procedural irregularity in the impugned ruling and urges this Court to dismiss the application, uphold the decision of the trial court, and direct that the criminal proceedings proceed to hearing. 76. **ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION.** 77. Having considered the notice of motion, the affidavits sworn in support and in opposition thereto, the submissions by the respective parties and the record of the subordinate court, I am of the view that the following issues arise for determination: 78. Whether this Court has jurisdiction, in exercise of its revisionary powers under *Sections 362, 364* and *365 of the Criminal Procedure Code,* to interfere with the ruling of the trial court declining to stay the criminal proceedings pending determination of the Environment and Land Court proceedings. 79. Whether the Applicant has demonstrated any incorrectness, illegality, impropriety or irregularity in the impugned ruling or proceedings before the trial court to warrant the intervention of this Court. 80. Whether the Applicant is entitled to the orders sought. 81. **ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS.** 82. I will proceed to address the foregoing issues sequentially. 83. The first issue for me to address is whether this Court has powers, in exercise of its revisionary jurisdiction under *Sections 362, 364* and *365* of the *Criminal Procedure Code,* to interfere with the ruling of the trial court declining to stay the criminal proceedings pending determination of the Environment and Land Court proceedings. 84. The jurisdiction of this Court in revision is donated by *Article 165(6)* and *(7)* of the *Constitution* and *Sections 362, 364* and *365* of the *Criminal Procedure Code.* 85. *Article 165(6) of the Constitution* grants the High Court supervisory jurisdiction over subordinate courts and over any person, body or authority exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function. 86. *Article 165(7)* empowers this Court, in the exercise of that supervisory jurisdiction, to call for the record of proceedings before any subordinate court and make any order or give any direction it considers appropriate to ensure the fair administration of justice. 87. *Section 362* of the *Criminal Procedure Code* sets out the parameters within which the Court may exercise its revisionary jurisdiction. It provides as follows: **“The High Court may call for and examine the record of any criminal proceedings before any subordinate court for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of any such subordinate court.”** 1. It is therefore clear that the jurisdiction of this Court on revision is not an appellate jurisdiction. The Court does not sit as a second trial court, nor does it undertake a re-evaluation of the evidence placed before the subordinate court with a view to substituting its own decision for that of the trial court. The jurisdiction is supervisory and corrective in nature and is invoked where the record demonstrates an error of legality, correctness, propriety or regularity. 2. The distinction between revision and appeal is important. Whereas an appellate court is entitled to reconsider the evidence, examine the merits of the decision appealed against and arrive at its own conclusions, a revision court is confined to examining whether the subordinate court acted within the law and whether the proceedings or decision complained of disclose an illegality, impropriety or irregularity. 3. In ***Ogutu & Another v Republic (Miscellaneous Criminal Application E077 of 2024) [2025] KEHC 10888 (KLR),*** I had the opportunity of considering the scope of revisionary jurisdiction and I held that revision does not extend to the reconsideration of merit decisions. I observed that revision is limited to satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order or finding complained of and does not empower the High Court to substitute its own decision for that of the subordinate court where the latter has exercised judicial discretion. 4. Similarly, in ***Muriuki (130358) v Kiprotich (Criminal Revision E209 of 2022) [2022] KEHC 16208 (KLR),*** the Court held that a revision court ought not to delve into the detailed analysis of evidence presented before the trial court, as doing so risks placing the revision court in the position of determining issues that may subsequently fall for consideration on appeal. 5. In the present matter, the Applicant seeks the revision of the ruling of the learned trial Magistrate declining to stay the criminal proceedings pending the determination of *Tamu MCELC No. E039 of 2025.* The basis of the challenge is not that the trial court acted without jurisdiction, applied an incorrect legal provision or committed a procedural irregularity. Rather, the Applicant’s complaint is that the trial court failed to properly appreciate and give sufficient weight to the documentary evidence relating to the ownership, subdivision and transfer of land parcel Kisumu/Fort-Ternan/1457. 6. The Applicant invites this Court to re-examine the material that was placed before the trial court, including the judgements in the Environment and Land Court matters, the green cards, the mutation documents and the ground report, and to arrive at a different conclusion from that reached by the learned trial Magistrate. In essence, the Applicant challenges the correctness of the trial court’s assessment of the evidence and the manner in which it exercised its discretion. 7. In my view, that invitation goes beyond the permissible limits of revisionary jurisdiction. The question whether the evidence demonstrated that land parcel Kisumu/Fort-Ternan/1457 formed part of the estate of the late **Joram Okello Ngar;** whether parcels Kisumu/Fort-Ternan/22, 22A and 422 were related; whether the complainant acquired a valid interest in parcel 1457; and whether the criminal proceedings ought to await determination of the ELC proceedings were matters that the trial court considered and determined on their merits. 8. The fact that the Applicant disagrees with the conclusion reached by the trial court does not, without more, convert the decision into one amenable to revision. A court may only interfere in revision where it is demonstrated that the subordinate court acted illegally, irregularly, improperly or outside the bounds of its jurisdiction. It cannot interfere merely because it would have arrived at a different conclusion on the same material. 9. I therefore find that the impugned ruling was a merit-based decision made after hearing both parties and considering the material placed before the court. This Court, sitting in revision, lacks jurisdiction to re-open that determination or substitute its own assessment of the evidence for that of the trial court. 10. I now turn to the second issue for determination, which is whether the Applicant has demonstrated any incorrectness, illegality, impropriety or irregularity in the impugned ruling or proceedings before the trial court to warrant the intervention of this Court. 11. The Applicant contends that the trial court erred by failing to stay the criminal proceedings despite the existence of pending Environment and Land Court proceedings concerning the suit property. He argues that the criminal process is being used to determine a civil dispute and that proceeding with the criminal trial exposes the parties and the courts to conflicting decisions. 12. The Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the trial court properly exercised its discretion after considering the parties’ respective positions and correctly applied *Section 193A* of the *Criminal Procedure Code,* which expressly permits concurrent criminal and civil proceedings. 13. *Section 193A* of the *Criminal Procedure Code* provides: **“Notwithstanding the provisions of any other written law, the fact that any matter in issue in any criminal proceedings is also directly or substantially in issue in any pending civil proceedings shall not be a ground for any stay, prohibition or delay of the criminal proceedings.”** 1. The effect of that provision is that the mere existence of parallel civil proceedings does not, by itself, deprive the criminal court of jurisdiction or require the criminal proceedings to be stayed. Each court is required to determine the issues falling within its jurisdiction and in accordance with the applicable legal principles. 2. The Applicant relies heavily on ***Araka & 2 Others v Republic [2023] KEHC 26783 (KLR)*** in support of the proposition that criminal proceedings should be stayed where the determination of the criminal charge would necessarily involve the resolution of questions of title to land. However, I agree with the Respondent that that decision was rendered in an appellate context where the court was entitled to reconsider the record and substitute the decision of the trial court. 3. The present application is not an appeal. This Court is not called upon to determine whether the trial Magistrate correctly evaluated the evidence or whether this Court would have reached the same conclusion as the subordinate court. The only question is whether the decision complained of discloses an error falling within the scope of *Section 362* of the *Criminal Procedure Code.* 4. The trial court considered the Applicant’s argument, examined the documents placed before it and found that the subject matter of the criminal proceedings, namely land parcel Kisumu/Fort-Ternan/1457, had not been shown to be the subject matter of the pending Environment and Land Court proceedings. The court further found that the Applicant had not demonstrated that the circumstances before it were similar to those in ***Araka.*** 5. Whether that conclusion was right or wrong on the merits is not a matter for determination in revision. It is a matter that could properly arise in an appeal. 6. The Applicant further alleges that the trial Magistrate predetermined the criminal case and acted with bias. However, no evidence has been placed before this Court demonstrating that the trial Magistrate acted otherwise than judicially in considering the application before her. The mere fact that a court makes findings adverse to a party at an interlocutory stage does not, without more, demonstrate bias or pre-determination, absent evidence of the same. 7. I am therefore unable to find any illegality, impropriety or procedural irregularity in the impugned ruling. The trial court considered the relevant legal framework, addressed the parties’ respective arguments and exercised its discretion. The fact that the Applicant is dissatisfied with the outcome does not provide a basis for revision. 8. The third issue for determination, which is already largely resolved by the above findings on the preceding issues, is whether the Applicant is entitled to the orders sought. 9. Having found that the impugned ruling is a merit-based decision falling outside the permissible scope of revisionary jurisdiction, it follows that the Applicant is not entitled to the orders sought. 10. The criminal proceedings before the trial court involve allegations of forcible detainer contrary to *Section 91* of the *Penal Code.* The Applicant will have the opportunity to present his defence and raise all matters relating to ownership, possession and the circumstances surrounding the occupation of the property during the trial. Those issues remain within the province of the trial court for determination upon hearing the evidence of the parties. 11. The existence of the pending Environment and Land Court proceedings does not, without more, render the criminal proceedings unlawful or unconstitutional. The two proceedings may proceed concurrently, each court exercising its jurisdiction over the matters properly before it. 12. I also take note of the Applicant’s complaint that the continuation of the criminal proceedings would render this application nugatory. However, urgency cannot confer jurisdiction upon a court where none exists. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court must still be exercised within the confines of *Article 165* of the *Constitution* and the *Section 162* of the *Criminal Procedure Code.* 13. In the circumstances, I find that the Applicant has failed to demonstrate any basis upon which this Court may invoke its revisionary jurisdiction. 14. **DISPOSITION AND ORDERS.** 15. Being of the above inclination, I reach the ultimate finding that the application dated 6th July, 2026 is devoid of merit. Accordingly, I proceed to dismiss it. 16. The interim orders of stay issued by this Court pending determination of this application are hereby discharged. The trial court shall proceed with the hearing of *Tamu SPM Criminal Case No. E267 of 2025, Republic v Babugun Kokeloh,* in accordance with the law. 17. It is so ordered. 18. This file is hereby closed. DELIVERED (virtually), DATED & SIGNED this 28th day of July, 2026. **JOE M. OMIDO.** **JUDGE** FOR APPLICANT: **Ms. Wanza.** FOR RESPONDENT: **Ms. Muema.** COURT ASSISTANTS: **Mr. Ngoge** & **Mr. Juma.**