https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/1322

Odoyo v Universities Academic Staff Union (UASU); Registrar of Trade Unions (Interested Party); Mulwa & another (Applicant) (Petition E013 of 2025) [2026] KEELRC 1322 (KLR) (14 May 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELRC 1322 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Employment and Labour Relations Court at Eldoret Petition E013 of 2025 MA Onyango, J May 14, 2026 Between Reuben Odhiambo Oyamo Odoyo Appellant and Universities Academic Staff Union (UASU) Respondent and The Registrar of Trade Unions Interested Party and Bendibbie Munyao Mulwa Applicant Richard Bosire Applicant Ruling 1.There are two applications before this Court for determination. The first application is dated 28th January 2026 and is brought pursuant to Order 10 Rule 11, Order 1 Rule 10(2), and Order 51 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Articles 41 and 159 of the Constitution, and all other enabling provisions of the law. The Applicants seek the following orders:-i.Spent.ii.That this Honourable Court be pleased to suspend the implementation of the Judgment dated 22nd December 2025 by this court pending the hearing and determination of the application.iii.That this Honourable Court be pleased to set aside the Judgment dated 22nd December 2025 by this courtiv.That this Honourable Court be pleased to enjoin the Applicants herein as Interested Parties thereofv.That this Honourable Court be pleased to issue such further directions and orders as it may deem fit in the interests of justice hereofvi.That the costs of the application be in the cause. 2.The application is premised on the grounds appearing on its face, to wit; that this Court delivered Judgment on 22nd December 2025 in favour of the Petitioner; that the Applicants are branch leaders of the Respondent and therefore have a direct and identifiable interest in the Petition; that the impugned Judgment has gravely prejudiced both the Applicants and members of the Respondents. 3.The Applicants further contend that the Petition constituted an abuse of the court process and that the Judgment was obtained through concealment of material facts, particularly because the substratum of the dispute was allegedly the subject of other pending petitions before this Court which were scheduled for judgment on 5th February 2026. 4.According to the Applicants, the Petitioner thereby misled the Court and engaged in forum shopping and a fishing expedition as the matters concerning the Respondent’s Constitution were already pending before Court awaiting determination, yet the parties herein failed to disclose this fact to the Court. 5.It is contended that the unilateral expunging of certain constitutional clauses without participation of union members violated members’ constitutional rights and that term limits are not unlawful and do not contravene either the Constitution or the Labour Relations Act. 6.The Applicants aver that the Respondent’s Constitution clearly stipulates that amendments to the Constitution may only be effected through voting by the National Delegates Conference and approval by a two-thirds majority and that as such, any amendment to the Constitution ought to comply with the internal democratic procedures. 7.The Applicants further depose that members of UASU, during a Special National Delegates Conference, voted on the proposed amendments but failed to attain the threshold required for constitutional amendments. They maintain that they have a right to be heard in a dispute that substantially affects them and the union membership generally, and that they are ready and willing to tender evidence challenging the Petitioner’s case in the interests of justice. 8.It is also averred that no prejudice will be suffered by the Petitioner and the Respondent should the application be allowed. 9.The application is supported by the affidavit of Bendibbie Munyao Mulwa, the 1st Applicant, sworn on 28th January 2026, which reiterates the grounds set out on the face of the application. 10.The application is opposed by the Petitioner through a Replying Affidavit sworn on 13th February 2026. He deposes that this Court heard and determined the matter on its merits after affording all parties a full opportunity to present their respective cases and thereafter delivered a final Judgment on 22nd December 2025. According to the Petitioner, the Judgment conclusively determined all issues in controversy between the parties, thereby rendering the Court functus officio. 11.The Petitioner avers that the doctrine of functus officio bars a court from revisiting, reconsidering, varying or setting aside its own final Judgment save in strictly limited circumstances recognized by law, none of which arise in the present case. On this basis, the Petitioner contends that the Applicants are improperly inviting this Court to sit on appeal over its own Judgment, which the Court has no jurisdiction to do. It is averred that permitting such an application would undermine the principle of finality of litigation, encourage endless disputes and erode public confidence in the administration of justice. 12.It is the Petitioner’s case that the Applicants’ proper recourse, if aggrieved by the Judgment, lies in lodging an appeal before a superior court within the prescribed timelines. He avers that the present application is a deliberate attempt to circumvent the appellate process and improperly reopen issues already conclusively determined. 13.The Petitioner further submits that the Applicants, if joined at all, can only participate as Interested Parties and not as principal litigants. He maintains that an Interested Party has only a peripheral and ancillary role in proceedings and cannot assume control of the litigation or seek substantive reliefs that effectively reopen the dispute between the principal parties. 14.The Petitioner contends that the Applicants lack the requisite locus standi to seek the setting aside, review or variation of the final Judgment and that the application is fundamentally misconceived, legally incompetent and an abuse of the court process. 15.The second application before the Court is dated 3rd March 2026 and is filed by the Petitioner pursuant to Articles 22, 23, 41 and 159 of the Constitution of Kenya, Rules 4(1), 8(1) and 9(1) of the Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, Section 12 and 27 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, Articles 14 and 23 of the UASU Constitution 2014 and all other enabling provisions of the law. The Petitioner seeks orders that: -i.Spentii.This Honourable Court determine whether Articles 14 and 23 of the Respondent Constitution, 2014 are applicable to amendments directed by the Court.iii.This Honourable Court be pleased to determine whether Section 27 of the Labour Relations Act is applicable in circumstances where the Court has already issued orders.iv.This Honourable Court issue an order directing the Interested Party to register the Amended Articles, which were formally adopted by the National Executive Committee on 11th February 2026 and thereafter unanimously approved and ratified by the Special Delegates Conference on 25th February 2026 as mandated by the Respondent.v.Consequent to the grant of the prayers above, the Honourable Court be pleased to issue such further directions and orders as may be necessary to give effect to the foregoing orders and/or favour the cause of justice.vi.Costs of the application. 16.The application is supported by the affidavit of the Petitioner in which it is deposed that on 22nd December 2025 this Court delivered Judgment directing amendments to Articles 6(d), 14(e), 14(g) and 14(h) of the UASU Constitution in order to remove ambiguities, clarify procedural matters and eliminate restrictive provisions that hindered democratic governance within the Union. 17.The Petitioner further deposes that the Respondent thereafter convened a Special Delegates Conference on 25th February 2026 to deliberate on the impugned Articles in compliance with the Court’s Judgment and that during the meeting, members were guided through each proposed amendment, afforded an opportunity to seek clarification and raise objections and ultimately unanimously approved the amendments without dissent. According to the Petitioner, the process was transparent, participatory and conducted in good faith. 18.The Petitioner states that uncertainty subsequently arose as to whether the resolutions passed by the Special Delegates Conference still required compliance with Articles 14 and 23 of the UASU Constitution and Section 27 of the Labour Relations Act through a formal secret ballot. On this basis, the Petitioner contends that authoritative guidance from the Court is necessary in order to determine whether unanimous approval by the delegates is legally sufficient or whether a further formal voting process is mandatory. 19.According to the Petitioner, clarification is necessary to avoid procedural disputes, ensure compliance with the law and preserve the integrity of the Union’s governance structures. 20.In support of the Petitioner’s application, the Respondent filed a Further Supporting Affidavit sworn on 9th April 2026 by Dr. Constantine Wasonga, its Secretary General. He avers that during the pendency of the Court ruling on interpretation of the Court Judgment of 22nd December 2025, the Interested Party proceeded to issue her decision dated 7th April 2026 declining to register the amendments of the Union Constitution as was directed by the Court, unanimously passed by the Union National Executive Committee and unanimously passed by the Union Special Delegates Conference. 21.He further avers that the reasons and justifications given by the Interested Party in declining to register the amendments created more ambiguity to the Union Constitution and contradicted her own decisions to proceed with registration of all the Union chapter elections which had now been held and conducted in accordance with the amendments. According to the Respondent all the Union chapters had held elections in strict compliance with the Court Judgment and the elections had since been registered by the Interested Party together with the list of new delegates and officials duly recognized. 22.It is the Respondent’s contention that it was inappropriate for the Interested Party to register the chapter election results using the amended Constitution and the Court Judgment while at the same time demanding that the amendments should not apply in respect of National Office elections yet it was one Union governed by the same Constitution. 23.The Respondent avers that upon receipt of the Court order and directions of the Interested Party, the Union officials convened a National Executive Committee meeting under Article 8 of the Constitution to interpret the import of the Court Judgment and unanimously passed the amendments to be subjected to the Special Delegates Conference for adoption. 24.According to Dr. Wasonga, Article 8 of the Union Constitution empowers the National Executive Committee to interpret the Union Constitution and other Union instruments on behalf of its members and such interpretation is binding on all members. 25.He further avers that the Interested Party declined to uphold this power of the National Executive Committee which had advised members that they could not subject a Court order to a vote for or against as a Court order, once made, is binding on all members whether voted for or against. He further states that the same position applied to the Special Delegates Conference which unanimously passed the amendments by consensus as no objections were raised by any member. 26.The Respondent maintain that the Interested Party was relying on an inapplicable Article 14 of the Constitution which requires voting by secret ballot and Article 23 which requires amendments to be passed by a two-thirds majority. According to him, Articles 14 and 23 of the Union Constitution only apply where an amendment is initiated by a member of the Union and do not contemplate amendments arising from a Court order which cannot be subjected to a vote for or against. 27.It is contended that the Interested Party in her decision dated 7th April 2026 required that the amendments be passed by secret ballot and by a two-thirds majority while at the same time stating that the Constitution must nevertheless be amended in conformity with the Court order. That the Interested Party failed to appreciate the ambiguity that would arise within the Union if the required two-thirds majority was not attained yet the amendments remained mandatory pursuant to the Court Judgment. 28.It was the Respondent’s position that a purposive interpretation of the Court order, the Union Constitution and the Labour Relations Act is that once the Court order was issued and the Union passed the amendments by consensus, Articles 14 and 23 ceased to apply so as to inhibit implementation of the Court order and that the Interested Party ought therefore to be directed to register the amendments as passed by the Union National Executive Committee and the Special Delegates Conference held on 25th February 2026. 29.The two applications were disposed of by way of written submissions. The Petitioner filed two sets of submissions, the submissions dated 28th March 2026 in opposition to the application dated 28th January 2026, and the submissions dated 24th March 2026 in support of the Application dated 3rd March 2026. The Respondent’s submissions are dated 30th March 2026. The Petitioner’s submissions in opposition to the application dated 28th January 2026 30.In his submissions, the Petitioner identified the following issues for determination:-i.Whether this Honourable Court is functus officio upon delivery of its final Judgment on 22nd December 2025.ii.Whether the application contravenes the principle that the Supreme Court’s principle that the most crucial interest in any case lies with the primary parties before the Court.iii.Whether the Court can grant the orders prayed for by the Applicants.iv.Who should bear the costs of the application. 31.On the first issue, the Petitioner submits that the application by the intended Interested Parties seeking to set aside the final Judgment delivered on 22nd December 2025 is not maintainable in law. That once a court renders a final and conclusive determination, it becomes functus officio and is barred from revisiting, varying, or setting aside its own Judgment except in strictly limited circumstances recognized by law. In support of this position, reliance was placed on the Court of Appeal decision in Middle East Bank Kenya Limited v Gabriel Muraya Ngunjiri, Civil Appeal No. E019 of 2023, which quoted the Supreme Court decision in Raila Odinga & 2 Others v Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission & 3 Others(2013)eKLR. 32.The Petitioner submitted that once this court delivered its final judgment, it became functus officio having exhausted its adjudicative mandate in respect of the matters and parties before it. 33.It is argued that the present application is legally incompetent and incapable of being entertained by the Court. 34.On the second issue, the Petitioner submits that the Judgment delivered on 22nd December 2025 conclusively determined the rights, obligations and legal positions of the principal litigants and that the intended Interested Parties do not possess a primary stake in the matter and cannot override the rights and interests of the main parties through collateral proceeding. 35.In this regard, the Petitioner submitted that permitting the Applicants to reopen the dispute would undermine the authority of the Court’s Judgment, dilute the rights of the principal parties and encourage repetitive and unnecessary litigation by parties lacking direct legal standing. The Petitioner maintained that such a course would erode public confidence in the administration of justice and compromise the efficient functioning of the courts. 36.The Petitioner thus submitted that the application by the intended Interested Parties is legally untenable and amounts to an improper attempt to circumvent the final judgment of the Court. 37.On whether the Court can grant the orders sought, the Petitioner submitted that the Applicants had failed to demonstrate any legally recognized basis for setting aside, varying or revisiting a final Judgment. It is the Petitioner’s submission that the law only permits such intervention in exceptional circumstances such as clerical errors, accidental slips, discovery of new evidence, or manifest miscarriage of justice, none of which had been established in the present case. 38.The Petitioner further submitted that the Applicants, being merely intended Interested Parties, have no standing to assume the role of principal litigants or to seek substantive reliefs that would effectively reopen the dispute. 39.He thus argued that the application is an abuse of the court process intended to relitigate matters already conclusively determined. 40.On costs, the Petitioner submitted that costs should follow the event and be borne by the Applicants having filed an incompetent and unmeritorious application which unnecessarily burdened the principal parties.The Petitioner’s submissions in support of the application dated 3rd March 2026 41.In support of the application dated 3rd March 2026, the Petitioner framed the issues for determination as follows:-i.Whether amendments to the UASU Constitution 2014 arising from a binding Court order are required to follow procedural requirement of Article 14 of the UASU Constitution, 2014.ii.Whether amendments to the UASU Constitution 2014 arising from a binding Court order are required to follow procedural requirement of Article 23(a) of the UASU Constitution, 2014.iii.Whether the amendments arising from a binding Court Order are required to follow the procedural requirements of section 27 of the Labour Relations Act,2007iv.Whether the amendments to the UASU Constitution, having been lawfully passed pursuant to the Court Order ought to be registered by the Interested Party.v.Whether this Honourable Court should take judicial notice of the branch elections that have been held pursuant to the Court judgment dated 22nd December 2025.vi.Who should bear the costs of the application. 42.On the first issue, the Petitioner submitted that Article 14(a) of the UASU Constitution requires that all Union decisions be determined by secret ballot. According to the Petitioner, this provision was intended to govern ordinary internal union processes and does not apply where amendments arise directly from a binding Court order. 43.The Petitioner submits that judicially mandated amendments are not discretionary decisions of the Union but constitute compulsory obligations arising from a lawful Judgment. It is submitted that once a Court issues binding directives, compliance is mandatory and cannot be subjected to further voting or internal approval mechanisms that may undermine the authority of the Court. In support of this position, the Petitioner relied on the case of Econet Wireless Kenya Ltd v Minister for Information & Communication of Kenya & Another (2005)1 KLR 828 44.In this regard, the Petitioner submitted that requiring compliance with Article 14(a) in the present circumstances would be redundant and could create a conflict between internal procedural norms and the authority of the Court, thereby delaying enforcement and undermining the Court’s authority. 45.The Petitioner therefore urged the Court to find that amendments arising from a binding Court order are exempt from the procedural requirements under Article 14(a) of the UASU Constitution. 46.On the second issue, the Petitioner submitted that Article 23(a) governs voluntary constitutional amendments initiated through the Union’s internal structures and that amendments directed by a Court stand on a different legal footing because they arise from judicial compulsion rather than internal initiative. 47.The Petitioner submitted that once the Court identified certain constitutional provisions as unlawful, ambiguous or restrictive, the Respondent became legally obligated to amend them. It is submitted that in those circumstances, subjecting such amendments to further voting or procedural hurdles would be inconsistent with the principle of judicial supremacy and would risk frustrating the implementation of lawful court orders. To buttress this position, reliance was placed on the decisions in Republic v Lucy Muthoni Gathari Judicial Review Miscelleaneous application No. 252 of 2015, Gulabchand Popatlal Shah & Another Civil Application No. 39 of 1990 and Hadkinson v Hadkinson (1952) 2 AII ER 567. 48.The Petitioner therefore urged the Court to hold that Article 23(a) does not apply to amendments arising directly from a binding Court Judgment. 49.On whether Section 27 of the Labour Relations Act applies in the present circumstances, the Petitioner submitted that the Interested Party was not justified in invoking the statutory objection process under Section 27(4) of the Labour Relations Act. According to the Petitioner, the provision contemplates voluntary constitutional amendments initiated by a trade union and not amendments arising from judicial directives. 50.The Petitioner argued that once amendments are mandated by a binding Court order, there exists no legitimate basis for objections under Section 27 of the Labour Relations Act because the amendments merely implement a legal obligation already determined by the Court. 51.The Petitioner thus submitted that permitting objections in such circumstances would amount to allowing administrative processes to frustrate the enforcement of a judicial decree. 52.The Petitioner further submitted that the amendments were lawfully formulated and unanimously adopted by the Union’s governing organs and the Special Delegates Conference. It was therefore argued that the Interested Party was under a legal obligation to register the amendments without delay. 53.On the issue whether the amended Articles ought to be registered, the Petitioner submitted the amendments to the UASU Constitution were lawfully formulated and adopted in strict compliance with the Court’s directives with full and transparent participation of the Union’s governing organs and as such, the interested party is legally obligated to register the amended articles. 54.The Petitioner argued that the registration of these amendments is not discretionary, but is a mandatory act required to give effect to a binding judicial order and to reflect accurately the Union’s governance structures. It was contended that refusal or delay in registration by the Interested Party would constitute an improper interference with the enforcement of a Court Order, undermine the authority of the judiciary and create unnecessary legal and unprocedural uncertainty within the union. 55.The Petitioner further submitted that following the Court Judgment, the Respondent had undertaken all necessary administrative and logistical measures to facilitate elections across its chapters in accordance with the amended Constitution. It was contended that the chapter elections had already been conducted and recognized by the Interested Party, thereby demonstrating compliance with the Court’s directives. 56.On whether the Court should take judicial notice of the branch elections conducted pursuant to the Judgment, the Petitioner submitted that the Court ought to recognize that the majority of the Union’s thirty-eight branches had already conducted elections in accordance with the amended constitutional framework. It was argued that the elections had been conducted transparently and in compliance with both the Court’s Judgment and the Interested Party’s directives. 57.The Petitioner contended that the Respondent undertook all necessary preparatory and administrative measures to ensure the elections were conducted in a transparent, free and fair manner, consistent with its governing instruments as a result of which majority branches are now duly constituted with elected officials as per this court’s judgment dated 22nd December 2025 and that the governance structures envisaged under the Court’s judgment are fully operational. 58.The Petitioner therefore urged the Court to compel the Interested Party to register the amended Articles. 59.On costs, the Petitioner submitted that the Interested Party ought to bear the costs of the application on the basis that the Respondent fully complied with its constitutional procedures and the court’s directives, while the Interested Party, by issuing a notice inviting objections despite clear compliance, occasioned unnecessary litigation. The Respondent’s submissions 60.In its submissions, the Respondent identified the following issues for determination: -i.Whether the amendments to Articles 6(d), 14(e), 14(g), and 14(h) of the Respondent’s Constitution are mandatory by virtue of the Judgment delivered on 22nd December 2025.ii.Whether the unanimous adoption of the said amendments by the National Executive Committee and the Special Delegates Conference constitutes substantial compliance with the law.iii.Whether the Interested Party is legally bound to register amendments arising from a Court order and ratified by the Respondent.iv.Whether the insistence on a secret ballot where no dissent exists is a procedural technicality contrary to Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution.v.Whether the failure to register the amendments threatens the Respondent’s democratic processes and members’ rights. 61.On the first issue, the Respondent submitted that the amendments to Articles 6(d), 14(e), 14(g), and 14(h) of its Constitution were not ordinary or voluntary internal amendments but were the direct consequence of a mandatory order issued by this Court in the Judgment delivered on 22nd December 2025. The Respondent submitted that the Court had expressly identified the impugned provisions as legally deficient, ambiguous and restrictive and had consequently directed that they be amended in order to align the Union’s governance structure with constitutional principles of transparency and democracy. 62.The Respondent submitted that under Section 12 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, this Court possesses wide remedial powers, including the authority to issue mandatory orders aimed at remedying unconstitutional or unlawful conduct. 63.According to the Respondent, once the Court issued the directive requiring amendment of the impugned provisions, the Respondent ceased to possess any discretion as to whether or not the amendments would be effected. It is argued that the Respondent’s obligation thereafter became one of strict compliance with the Judgment. 64.The Respondent further submitted that subjecting court-directed amendments to a secret ballot or further internal voting processes would amount to allowing a private entity to undermine or effectively overturn a judicial decree through administrative means. In this regard, the Respondent submitted that once a court of competent jurisdiction pronounces itself on the legality or constitutionality of particular provisions, such findings are binding upon the parties and cannot be subjected to approval or rejection through internal organizational procedures. In support of this proposition, reliance was placed on the decision in Republic v Registrar of Trade Unions ex parte Musalia Mudavadi & 2 Others (2013) eKLR 65.The Respondent submitted that it had substantially complied with the Judgment through the resolutions passed by the National Executive Committee on 11th February 2026 and the subsequent ratification by the Special Delegates Conference held on 25th February 2026. The Respondent thus contended that the amendments were adopted unanimously and without dissent, rendering the Interested Party’s insistence on a formal secret ballot unnecessary and purely technical. 66.On the issue whether the unanimous adoption of the amendments constituted substantial compliance with the law, the Respondent submitted that the Special Delegates Conference represented the highest constitutional organ of the Union and that unanimous approval by delegates constituted the clearest possible expression of the members’ democratic will. 67.According to the Respondent, where the core purpose of a procedural requirement has been fulfilled and no prejudice has been occasioned to any party, the process ought not to be invalidated merely on account of the absence of a particular procedural formality. 68.The Respondent further submitted that under Section 27(1) and (3) of the Labour Relations Act, alterations to a trade union constitution may be effected provided the union complies with its internal constitutional procedures and the provisions of the Act. It argued that the unanimous approval by the Special Delegates Conference satisfied both the constitutional and statutory requirements for member participation and ratification. 69.The Respondent maintained that insisting on a further secret ballot in circumstances where there existed no dissenting opinion elevated form over substance and offended the constitutional imperative under Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution, which requires courts and administrative bodies to administer justice without undue regard to procedural technicalities. Reliance was placed on the decision in Okiya Omtatah Okoiti & Another v Attorney General & 6 Others (2014) eKLR 70.With regard to the issue whether the Interested Party is legally bound to register the amendments, the Respondent submitted that the Interested Party holds a mandatory statutory and constitutional obligation to register the amendments to Articles 6(d), 14(e), 14(g) and 14(h) as these changes are not merely internal proposals but are the fruit of a final judgment issued on 22nd December 2025. 71.The Respondent submits that the Interested Party’s mandate under Section 27(3) of the Labour Relations Act is framed in mandatory terms and that the Interested Party’s role within the framework of a trade union is facilitative rather than obstructive. 72.The Respondent contends that the amendments were specifically ordered to align the Union Constitution with Articles 38 and 41 of the Constitution and that by delaying the registration of the judicially sanctioned amendments, the Interested Party is effectively perpetuating a legal state of ambiguity and restriction which this Honourable Court had already sought to extinguish. 73.It was contended that once the Court directed the amendments and the Union subsequently ratified them through its constitutional organs, the Interested Party was under a mandatory obligation to register them. 74.The Respondent argued that the Interested Party, being a statutory office, cannot exercise its administrative powers in a manner that frustrates the implementation of a valid Court Judgment. According to the Respondent, insisting on further procedural requirements such as a secret ballot amounted to subordinating the authority of the Judiciary to an administrative office, contrary to the principles of constitutional supremacy and the rule of law. 75.On whether the insistence on a secret ballot amounted to a procedural technicality contrary to Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution, the Respondent submitted that procedural rules are intended to facilitate justice and not impede it. It argued that the purpose of a secret ballot is to protect the integrity of decision-making where there exists contestation or disagreement among members. However, in the present case, the amendments were unanimously adopted and no objections were raised by delegates at the Special Delegates Conference. 76.The Respondent contended that requiring a formal ballot in circumstances where there was complete consensus would amount to elevating procedural form over substantive justice. Reliance was placed on the decision in Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 7 Others (2014) eKLR. 77.The Respondent submitted that it acted in good faith in satisfying the Judgment delivered on 22nd December 2025 by convening the Special Delegates Conference on 25th February 2026 and that the insistence on a ballot for amendments that had already been unanimously adopted without objection created an unnecessary administrative hindrance that served no protective purpose for the members. In support of this position, reliance was placed on the case of Raila Odinga & 5 Others v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 3 Others (2013) eKLR. 78.The Respondent further submitted that the Interested Party’s interpretation of Section 27 of the Labour Relations Act was overly rigid and failed to take into account the unique nature of court-ordered constitutional rectifications. According to the Respondent, the purpose of the Labour Relations Act is to facilitate organized and democratic labour relations and not to provide the Interested Party with a mechanism to stall the transition to a lawful constitutional regime. In support of this position, reliance was placed on the case of Stephen Oduor Oloo & Another v Registrar of Trade Unions & 2 Others (2015) eKLR. 79.The Respondent submitted that the unanimous adoption of the amendments to Articles 6(d), 14(e), 14(g) and 14(h) represented the highest form of substantive compliance and that there existed no mischief or dissent requiring resolution through a secret ballot. The Respondent contended that the Registrar’s insistence on a physical vote amounted to a procedural technicality which frustrated the timely implementation of a judicial decree and undermined the constitutional guarantee of substantive justice. The Respondent therefore urged the Court to strike down the procedural barrier and direct the immediate registration of the amended articles so as to enable the Union proceed with its lawful activities. 80.Lastly on the issue whether the failure to register the amendments threatens the respondent’s democratic processes and members’ rights, the Respondent submitted that the continued refusal by the Interested Party to register the amended Constitution had created uncertainty within the Union and threatened the conduct of lawful elections. 81.According to the Respondent, the amendments were specifically intended to remove restrictive provisions and expand democratic participation within the Union in line with Articles 38 and 41 of the Constitution. 82.The Respondent argued that failure to register the amendments had the practical effect of forcing the Union to operate under constitutional provisions that had already been declared defective and restrictive by this Court. It was submitted that this exposed the Union to the risk of further disputes, leadership paralysis, and challenges to the legitimacy of future elections. The case of James M. Lukalo v Registrar of Trade Unions (2014)eKLR was cited in support of this position. 83.The Respondent further submitted that the Interested Party’s failure to register the amendments constitutes a direct assault on the Respondent’s democratic processes as it creates a prejudicial situation in which the Respondent is prevented from holding lawful, inclusive, and transparent elections as envisioned by the Judgment delivered on 22nd December 2025. 84.The Respondent therefore urged the Court to intervene and direct the immediate registration of the amended constitutional provisions in order to safeguard the democratic integrity of the Union, facilitate lawful elections, and uphold the constitutional rights of its members. Determination 85.I have carefully considered the two applications before Court, the affidavits filed in support and in opposition thereto, the rival submissions by the parties and the authorities cited. The two applications, though related, seek distinct reliefs and I shall therefore deal with them separately. Application dated 28th January 2026 86.The application dated 28th January 2026 principally seeks two substantive orders. First, the Applicants seek to be enjoined in these proceedings as Interested Parties. Secondly, and more significantly, they seek the setting aside of the Judgment delivered by this Court on 22nd December 2025. 87.The Applicants’ case is that the Judgment prejudiced them and other members of the Respondent Union as it was obtained through concealment of material facts. They further contend that the amendments to the Respondent’s Constitution could not be effected without compliance with the internal constitutional procedures of the Union. 88.The Petitioner in opposition to the application argued that this Court became functus officio upon delivery of the Judgment on 22nd December 2025. The Petitioner further contend that the Applicants, if at all, can only come into the proceedings as Interested Parties and cannot under that guise, assume the position of principal litigants or seek to reopen a final judgment of the Court. 89.The doctrine of functus officio is founded on the principle that litigation must come to an end and that a court, once it has finally determined a dispute, cannot reopen the matter except as permitted by law. This principle has been aptly summarized further in Jersey Evening Post Limited v A1 Thani [2002] JLR 542 at 550:“A court is functus when it has performed all its duties in a particular case. The doctrine does not prevent the court from correcting clerical errors nor does it prevent a judicial change of mind even when a decision has been communicated to the parties. Proceedings are only fully concluded, and the court functus, when its judgment or order has been perfected. The purpose of the doctrine is to provide finality. Once proceedings are finally concluded, the court cannot review or alter its decision; any challenge to its ruling on adjudication must be taken to a higher court if that right is available” 90.In the present case, the Applicants seek to set aside the Judgment delivered on 22nd December 2025. The grounds advanced in support of that prayer go to the substance, legality and correctness of the Judgment. They are not complaints of clerical error, correction of an arithmetical mistake or any other limited matter which a court may revisit after delivery of Judgment. They are, in substance, grounds of appeal. 91.The Applicants have not demonstrated that they fall within any recognized exception to the doctrine of functus officio. They have not brought themselves within the legal threshold for review. They have also not demonstrated that the Court retained residual jurisdiction to reopen the merits of the dispute after rendering its final Judgment. 92.I am also not persuaded that the prayer for joinder can assist the Applicants at this stage. Joinder after Judgment is not to be used as a device to reopen concluded litigation. The role of an Interested Party is not to introduce a fresh cause of action, expand the dispute, or take over litigation between the principal parties. The Applicants have not merely sought participation to assist the Court on a limited question. They seek to reopen and set aside a final Judgment. That is not the proper office of joinder. Even if the Applicants felt aggrieved by the Judgment, their remedy lay in the appropriate appellate process and not in inviting this Court to sit on appeal over its own decision. 93.In the circumstances, I find that this Court became functus officio upon delivery of the Judgment dated 22nd December 2025. I further find that the Applicants have not established any proper legal basis for setting aside the said Judgment or for joinder after final determination of the dispute. The application dated 28th January 2026 is therefore without merit and is dismissed. Application dated 3rd March 2026 94.I now turn to the application dated 3rd March 2026. The application seeks the Court’s interpretation on whether Articles 14 and 23 of the Respondent’s Constitution and Section 27 of the Labour Relations Act apply to amendments arising from a binding Court order. 95.The Petitioner also seeks an order directing the Interested Party, the Registrar of Trade Unions, to register the amended Articles of the Respondent Union’s Constitution adopted by its National Executive Committee and ratified by the Special Delegates Conference. 96.It is common ground that in the Judgment delivered on 22nd December 2025, this Court directed amendments to Articles 6(d), 14(e), 14(g), and 14(h) of the Respondent’s Constitution. The purpose of the amendments was to remove ambiguity, clarify procedure and eliminate restrictive provisions affecting democratic governance within the Union. 97.The Petitioner and the Respondent contend that the amendments arose from a binding Judgment of this Court and were not voluntary amendments initiated by members under the ordinary amendment procedure. They therefore argue that Articles 14 and 23 of the Respondent’s Constitution, which require secret ballot and a two-thirds majority in ordinary constitutional amendment processes, do not apply to amendments made in obedience to a Court order. 98.The Interested Party, on the other hand, appears to have taken the view that notwithstanding the Judgment of this Court, the amendments still have to be subjected to the ordinary procedures under Articles 14 and 23 of the Respondent’s Constitution and Section 27 of the Labour Relations Act. 99.There is no doubt that Articles 14 and 23 of the Respondent’s Constitution serve an important democratic purpose. In ordinary circumstances, constitutional amendments within a trade union ought to be subjected to the internal democratic processes prescribed by the union constitution. Such processes safeguard member participation, accountability and legitimacy. However, the present case is not an ordinary internal amendment process. The amendments in issue were not initiated by members of the Union as a matter of internal preference. They arose from a Judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction. Once the Court directed that the impugned provisions be amended, the Respondent’s obligation was no longer discretionary or dependent on approval by its members through a ballot. It was an obligation to comply with the Judgment. Subjecting the amendments to the ballot would be tantamount to the members voting to review a decision of the court. 100.It is material that before the Constitution was registered the members passed the said provisions of the Constitution in the manner provided in Articles 14 and 23 of the Respondent’s Constitution and Section 27 of the Labour Relations Act. In the judgment of this court was thus in effect reviewing the constitution passed by members and admitted for registration by the Interested Party. The same procedure cannot be repeated after the court reviews the provisions and directs that they be amended as was done in the Judgement delivered on 22nd December, 2025. 101.Once the court made the decision, it must be obeyed and complied with. The law on obedience of court orders is clear. Courts have emphasized that it is essential for the maintenance of the rule of law that the authority and dignity of courts be upheld at all times and that court orders must be obeyed unless and until they are set aside. 102.The same principle is captured in Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] 2 All ER 567, where the court held that:“It is plain and unqualified obligation of every person against or in respect of, who an order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void.” 103.Similarly, in Gulabchand Popatlal Shah & Another Civil Application No. 39 Of 1990, (Unreported), the Court of Appeal Observed: -“…… It is essential for the maintenance of the Rule of Law and good order that the authority and dignity of our courts are upheld at all times. This court will not condone deliberate disobedience of its orders and will not shy away from its responsibility to deal firmly with proved contemnors ……” 104.A court order cannot be subjected to approval by some other non-judicial process. A court order cannot be subjected to a ballot. The procedure set out in Articles 14 and 23 of the Respondent’s Constitution apply to amendments initiated internally by members or organs of the Union, which need approval by members for legitimacy. A court order is legitimate and does not require further approval by members. The provisions for amendment of the Constitution cannot therefore apply to amendments directed by the court in the manner Articles 14 and 23 of the Respondent’s Constitution. 105.The same reasoning applies to Section 27 of the Labour Relations Act. The Registrar’s statutory mandate under Section 27 must be exercised in a manner that facilitates lawful trade union governance and compliance with court orders. The section cannot be interpreted in a manner that allows an administrative office to obstruct or defeat implementation of or review the Judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. 106.It is also material that the Respondent placed before the Court evidence that after delivery of the Judgment, the National Executive Committee met on 11th February 2026 and passed the amendments. Thereafter the Special Delegates Conference held on 25th February 2026 unanimously adopted the amendments. It was contended, and not controverted, that no objection was raised by any member during the adoption of the amendments. 107.In those circumstances, the insistence on a further secret ballot is redundant. 108.The court was further informed that the Interested Party registered chapter elections conducted under the amended framework, but has declined to register the amendments pursuant to which the said chapter elections were conducted. That position creates a contradiction. 109.Consequently, I find that the amendments to Articles 6(d), 14(e), 14(g), and 14(h) of the Respondent’s Constitution arose from a binding Judgment of this Court and were not voluntary internal amendments within the ordinary meaning of Articles 14 and 23 of the Respondent’s Constitution. 110.I further find that Section 27 of the Labour Relations Act is not applicable to amendments mandated by the Judgment of this Court. The Interested Party’s role in the circumstances was facilitative and administrative, not appellate or obstructive. 111.The upshot is that I find merit in the application dated 3rd March 2026. 112.In the end, the Court makes the following orders: -i.The application dated 28th January 2026 is dismissedii.It is hereby declared that Articles 14 and 23 of the Respondent’s Constitution and section 27 of the Labour Relations Act do not apply to the implementation of the court orders in the Judgment delivered on 22nd December 2025.iii.The Interested Party is directed to register the amendments to Articles 6(d), 14(e), 14(g), and 14(h) of the Respondent’s Constitution as adopted by the National Executive Committee and ratified by the Special Delegates Conference held on 25th February 2026.iv.Each party shall bear its own costs in the two applications. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY ON THIS 14TH DAY OF MAY 2026MAUREEN ONYANGOJUDGE