https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/4096

Boyambi ((Suing as the Administrator of the Estate of the late TERESIA BOYANI ERENE)) v Ngaira & 2 others (Environment and Land Case E017 of 2024) [2026] KEELC 4096 (KLR) (Environment and Land) (2 July 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELC 4096 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Environment and Land Court at Naivasha Environment and Land Environment and Land Case E017 of 2024 MC Oundo, J July 2, 2026 GENEVIEVE MALESI NGAIRA............................... PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT VERSUS JOSEPH ONYAMBU ONKOBA.......................1ST DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT ISAAC MANOTI BOYAMBI (Suing as the Administrator of the Estate of the Late TERESIA BOYANI ERENEO) .......................2ND DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT AND TITLE BY WAY OF COUNTERCLAIM Between Isaac Manoti Boyambi Plaintiff (Suing as the Administrator of the Estate of the late TERESIA BOYANI ERENE) and Genevieve Malesi Ngaira 1st Defendant David Akamais Lowuallan 2nd Defendant Eshter Nanyaiti 3rd Defendant (Being a Reference objecting to the Taxing Officer’s Ruling dated 12th February 2026 in respect of the 1st & 2nd Defendants’ Party and Party Bill of NAIVASHA ELCLC No. E017/2024 RULING Page 1 of 20 Costs dated 26th November 2025 and for stay of execution against any Certificate of Costs arising therefrom pending the hearing and determination of this Reference) Ruling 1.Before me for determination is a Chamber Summons dated 26th February, 2026, brought pursuant to the provisions of Articles 40, 50 and 159 of the Constitution, Rule 11(2) of the Advocates Remuneration Order, Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules 2010, the inherent powers of the Court and all other enabling provisions of the law, wherein the Plaintiff/Applicant has sought the following orders:i.Spentii.Spent.iii.That the decision of the Deputy Registrar in the Ruling dated 12th February 2026 be and is hereby set aside.iv.That the Defendant’s Party and Party Bill of Costs dated 26th November 2025 be and is hereby remitted for fresh taxation before another Taxing Officer on such terms as the Honourable Court deems just.v.That the costs of the application be provided for. 2.The Application is premised on its ground and the Supporting Affidavit of equal date, sworn by Genevieve Malesi Ngaira, the Plaintiff/Applicant herein, who deposed that the 1st and 2nd Defendants had filed a Party and Party Bill of Costs dated 26th November 2025, seeking a grand total of Kshs. 476,310/= wherein on 12th February 2026, the Honourable Taxing Master had delivered a Ruling, taxing the said Bill at Kshs. 476,310/= “as prayed” and “unopposed”. That thereafter, the Court had issued a Certificate of Taxation certifying the taxed costs at Kshs. 476,310/=. 3.That, nonetheless, she was gravely aggrieved because the taxation was not conducted judicially, as no item-by-item reasons had been given, contrary to the provisions of Rule 11(2) of the Advocate Remuneration Order, which requires the Taxing Master to record and forward reasons for the decision. That she was disputing each and every item (Items 1 to 36 and all disbursements) on the grounds of duplication, excessiveness, and lack of proof. 4.She contended that Items 1 and 5 (Instruction fees) were allowed at Kshs. 150,000/= each, resulting in double instruction fees for the same record and subject matter. She further argued that Items 23 and 26 (Getting up fees) were each claimed at Kshs. 50,000/= without regard for the structured framework in Schedule 6 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. She argued that Item 31 was facially defective, as 110 folios @ 50 were claimed as 900.00 (sic), thereby confirming the lack of judicial scrutiny. Furthermore, the disbursements had been allowed without inquiry into proof by receipts or vouchers, as required by Rule 74 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. 5.That the taxation herein was delivered on 12th February 2026, while the Notice of Objection was lodged on 24th February 2026, which was within the 14-day limit prescribed by Rule 11(1) of the Advocates Remuneration Order. That she was apprehensive that unless the Honourable Court grants a stay, the Defendants would proceed with execution, thus rendering the present Reference nugatory. 6.In response to and in opposition to the Plaintiff/Applicant’s Application, the Defendants/Respondents filed their Replying Affidavit, dated 13th March 2026, sworn by Isaac Manoti Boyambi, the 2nd Defendant herein, who first deposed that the Application is inept, bad in law and an abuse of the court. That upon filing their Defence and Counterclaim, the matter had been heard on merit and judgement delivered in favour of their counterclaim, with costs. 7.That they drew their bill of costs dated 26th November 2025 and sent the same to the Plaintiff’s advocate for consideration. There was no response, which prompted them to tax the same on 16th December 2025. On that day, the Applicant’s advocate successfully requested from the court time to respond to the Bill, and the matter was fixed for taxation on 29th January 2026. 8.On the said date, the Applicants had still not responded to the Bill and sought more time, wherein the taxation had been deferred to the 12th February 2026. That on the said 12th February 2026, the Applicant had still not responded to the said Bill, and since the same had been drawn to scale, the taxing officer proceeded to tax it as drawn. 9.He contended that their Bill was properly drawn and that the taxing officer had exercised his discretion properly to tax the same as drawn since the Applicant had not demonstrated any error either in principle or in law in the said taxation. That, despite the Applicant being aware of the Bill of Costs for over 4 months, she never raised any objection to any of the items as drawn; hence, she could not purport to dispute the same after taxation had been done. He thus argued that the present inference had been solely filed to deny them from enjoying the fruits of the judgement and was a waste of the court’s precious time. 10.He maintained that it was clear from the judgement that they had been awarded costs of the suit and the counterclaim, which are two different suits; thus, their claim for the instruction fee for both the suit and the counterclaim was well justified and proper, hence there were no double instruction fees. 11.That further, since they had been awarded the costs of the suit and counterclaim, their claim for getting up fees is justified, as they had prepared for the hearing of the main suit and their counterclaim separately. He argued that the objection to the disbursements was misplaced. The objection to the taxation of items 4, 8, 9 and 11 was also misplaced, as it did not meet the criteria laid down by the law. He contended that a Bill which was drawn to scale and allowed did not amount to any error in law or principle warranting a reference. That the Applicant was an indolent litigant who never responded to the Bill herein in any manner but was now purporting to have been aggrieved by the same after it had been allowed. 12.That in any event, the Applicant had not met the criteria for the grant of stay as she had not demonstrated any loss that she would incur, which could not be compensated. Furthermore, she had not offered any security for the stay of execution of the decree and certificate of costs; hence, she should not be granted any stay. He contended that the orders sought herein were untenable as the Court had only one taxing officer. 13.The Chamber Summons was disposed of by way of written submissions, which I shall proceed to summarise as hereinunder. Plaintiff /Applicants’ Submissions. 14.The Plaintiff/Applicant, vide her Submissions dated 23rd April 2026 contended that the Taxing Master’s ruling on 12th February 2026, which allowed a 36-item Bill of Costs at Kshs. 476,310/= wholesale merely because it was ‘’unopposed’’ was fatally defective and should be set aside due to a complete lack of judicial thought, procedural unfairness, and clear errors of principle. 15.She outlined her arguments across several main pillars to the effect that the ruling was a single-paragraph, three-sentence administrative disposal which failed to give itemized reasons, establish the value of the subject matter, or identify the applicable legal scale, thus violating the mandatory terms of Rule 11(2) of the Advocates Remuneration Order (ARO). 16.That the Taxing Officer improperly converted a routine mention date into a final taxation hearing without giving formal notice or a substantive hearing on the merits, hence violating the provisions of Articles 47 and 50(1) of the Constitution and the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015. 17.Further, the Taxing Officer entirely abdicated his independent statutory duty under Rule 16 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. The absence of opposition from the Applicant was not a legal substitute for the court's non-delegable duty to independently scrutinize a bill. 18.She pointed out specific errors of principle on the face of the bill to the effect that the court allowed two separate, undiscounted instruction fees of Kshs. 150,000/= each. Because the main suit and the Counterclaim arose from the same factual matrix, with overlapping pleadings and a consolidated record regarding the same plot of land, allowing both without a discount constituted an error of principle. Even by the Respondents' post-hoc property values (Kshs. 500,000 to Kshs. 900,000), the scale fee under Schedule 6(A)(1)(b) should only have ranged between Kshs. 75,000 and Kshs. 120,000. 19.That the court allowed two flat-rate lump sums of Kshs. 50,000/= each. Under Schedule 6(A)(2), getting-up fees ought to be dynamically derived as a strict percentage (one-third) of the justified instruction fee, not assigned as arbitrary flat sums. 20.Further, that on Items 4, 8, 9, 11, etc, the Bill claimed a flat, uniform rate of Kshs. 2,300/= for 9 simple mentions and 1 judgment attendance, which exceeded the legal caps under Schedule 6(A)(7), which prescribes lower rates of Kshs. 1,000 to Kshs. 1,100 for brief, non-contentious appearances. 21.Insofar as items No. 1-5 were concerned, the court allowed Kshs. 2,100/= in disbursements without demanding any supporting vouchers or receipts, violating Rule 74 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. 22.That Item 31 claimed 110 folios @ Kshs. 50, which mathematically equals Kshs. 5,500/=, but was recorded and allowed as only Kshs. 900/=, which proved that the Taxing Master did not conduct a basic arithmetical check. 23.The Applicant hence argued that because the Taxing Officer had already compromised his impartiality by rubber-stamping the bill, the matter must be remitted to a different Taxing Officer for a fresh, independent taxation on the merits. She anchored her arguments on the following constitutional, statutory, and judicial precedents:i.Rule 11(1), (2), (4) & Rule 16 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, which Confers appellate-type oversight onto a High Court Judge; establishes a mandatory, independent duty on the Taxing Officer to scrutinize bills and provide written itemized reasons.ii.Articles 47 & 50(1) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, that guarantee the right to lawful, reasonable, procedurally fair administrative action and the absolute right to a fair hearing.iii.Opportunity Kenya v Margaret Wanjala t/a Mako Auctioneers [2024] KEHC 3294 (KLR) that established that granting a bill of costs as a whole simply because it is ‘’unopposed’’ without giving individual reasons was a fatal error of law.iv.Strategic Urembo Sacco Society Limited v Meli [2024] KEELC 13904 (KLR), which reaffirmed that an ‘’unopposed’’ tag did not strip a party of their right to be heard or relieve the court of its duty to tax properly.v.Premchand Raichand Ltd v Quarry Services of E.A. Ltd (No. 3) [1972] EA 162, which set out the foundational principles governing when a High Court Judge can legally interfere with a Taxing Officer's exercise of discretion.vi.First American Bank of Kenya Ltd v Shah & Others [2002] 1 EA 6, which reaffirmed the Premchand boundaries regarding judicial intervention in taxation disputes.vii.Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 EA 92, which outlined how to legally calculate the value of a suit's subject matter, and established that an officer who had already misdirected themselves on a bill should not hear it a second time.viii.Kipkorir, Titoo & Kiara Advocates v Deposit Protection Fund Board [2005] eKLR, where it had been held that an error of principle could be legally inferred by a judge if the final amount awarded is manifestly excessive on its face.ix.Lucy Waithera & 2 Others v Edwin Njagi T/A E.K. Njagi & Co. Advocates [2017] eKLR that had held that a Taxing Officer must exercise discretion judiciously; failing to consider relevant factors (or weighing irrelevant ones) constituted an error of principle.x.Wilfred N. Konosi t/a Konosi & Co. Advocates v Flamco Limited [2017] (sic) which clarified that a Taxing Officer sits as a judicial officer and is therefore held to an enhanced obligation to supply clear, written legal reasons.xi.Riaroh & Another v Owino & Another [2024] KEHC 10103 (KLR), where it had been held that principles of natural justice and the appearance of impartiality require a reversed taxation file to be remitted to a fresh mind/different taxing officer. 24.She thus prayed that the Honourable Court be pleased to grant the Reference in terms of the Chamber Summons dated 26th February 2026, together with costs to the Objector. 1st and 2nd Respondent’s Submissions. 25.The Respondents, on the other hand vide their submissions dated 22nd April 2026 summarized the factual background of the matter and reiterated the contents of the Supporting and Replying Affidavits herein before framing two (2) issues for determination as follows;i.Whether the reference is merited.ii.Who should bear the costs of the Reference? 26.The Respondents contended that the Reference was entirely unmerited, describing the Applicant as an indolent litigant who failed to object to the Bill of Costs despite being granted multiple opportunities over four months. They maintained that the Taxing Master properly exercised his discretion to tax the Bill as drawn because it strictly adhered to the court's final judgment and the Advocates' Remuneration Order (ARO). 27.They argued that there was no error in principle or law as the reference merely challenged the amounts awarded, which falls strictly within the domain of the Taxing Officer. The Applicant failed to demonstrate any actual error in legal principle or law that would justify a Judge interfering with the taxation. 28.That because the Applicant failed to file any formal objection to the Bill prior to the taxation date, the Bill was fundamentally unopposed. Consequently, there was no active dispute to warrant detailed, item-by-item written reasons from the Taxing Master. 29.They emphasized that a Plaint and a Counterclaim were legally treated as two separate, independent suits requiring separate preparation and trial tracking. Because the final court judgment explicitly awarded them the costs of both the main suit and the Counterclaim, they were legally entitled to separate Instruction fees (Items 1 & 5) and separate Getting-Up fees (Items 23 & 26). 30.That the instruction fees of Kshs. 150,000/= was properly premised on the value of the suit land (Naivasha/Oljorai phase II/8573). The sale agreement filed by the Applicant showed a purchase price of Kshs. 500,000/= in 2019, and the Applicant's own witnesses testified during the trial that the land's value had risen to between Kshs. 800,000/= and Kshs. 900,000/=. 31.That charging a uniform flat rate of Kshs. 2,300/= per mention attendance on Items 4, 8, 9, 11, etc. was fully justified under Paragraph 7(d) of the Advocates' Remuneration Order scale for appearances lasting up to one hour. The Respondents explained that these mentions practically took an hour due to waiting for other cause-listed matters to be called. 32.That the court filing fees and disbursements on items 1–5 were automatically captured and reflected on the Judiciary's Court Case Management System (CTS), proving they were paid to secure entry into the court file. 33.They denied breaching the Applicant's right to a fair hearing, stating that they had served the Bill on 26th November 2025 and offered an out-of-court settlement, which was ignored. The court then granted the Applicant successive adjournments on 16th December 2025 and 29th January 2026 to file a response. Having squandered these opportunities, she could not claim a violation of her right under Article 50(1) of the Constitution. 34.That since the Reference was unmerited and forced by the Applicant's own inaction, it should be dismissed with costs. The Respondents grounded their opposition on the following precedents and legal status.i.Thomas James Arthur v Nyeri Electricity Undertaking [1961] EA 492 which established that a Judge will not interfere with a Taxing Officer’s decision on quantum unless an error of principle or a grave error of law is clearly shown.ii.Kipkorir, Titoo & Kiara Advocates v Deposit Protection Fund Board [2005] eKLR, which reaffirmed the strict boundaries of Thomas James Arthur that an appellate court must not interfere with a Taxing Master’s assessment unless it is manifestly wrong or based on an incorrect legal principle.iii.Kagwimi Kang'ethe & Co. Advocates v O-Kerai Nurseries Ltd, Agnes Kasyoka & Shedrack Munyalo Nzenge (sic), which held that questions of quantum are heavily discretionary and remain within the primary purview of the Taxing Officer.iv.Kenyariri & Associates Advocates v Salama Beach Hotel Ltd & 4 Others [2014] eKLR that accentuated that a Counterclaim is in all respects an independent suit brought by the Defendant, thereby entitling the advocate to independent instruction fees.v.Tom Rading Kuyoh v Joshua Nyiera & Nairobi City County Government [2021] eKLR, which confirmed that because a plaint and a counterclaim constitute two distinct suits, their respective costs must be assessed and taxed separately.vi.William Nembe Obora & 73 Others v Rift Valley Railways (Kenya) Limited [2018] eKLR where it had been held that a main suit is distinct from a counterclaim, and separate costs are fully payable if the court specifically grants them in its final decree.vii.Paragraph 7(d) of the Advocates (Remuneration) (Amendment) Order which prescribes the scaling rates for court attendances, allowing Kshs. 2,300/= on the ordinary scale for appearances lasting up to one hour. 35.They urged the court to dismiss the reference with costs, submitting that costs follow events, and that they had demonstrated that the reference herein is unmerited. Determination. 36.I have considered the Applicant’s Application dated 26th February, 2026, where she seeks to have the Taxing Master’s Ruling dated 12th February 2026 set aside so that the Defendant’s Party and Party Bill of Costs dated 26th November 2025 can be remitted for fresh taxation before another Taxing Officer on such terms as the Honourable Court deems just. 37.The Applicant’s argument for seeking the said orders is that the Taxing Master fundamentally abdicated his judicial duty by rubber-stamping the Bill of Costs instead of scrutinizing it. That he had allowed a 36-item Bill wholesale as a single-paragraph pronouncement simply because it was unopposed, thereby violating Rule 11(2) of the Advocates Remuneration Order (ARO), which strictly requires the Taxing Master to provide itemised legal reasons. 38.Secondly, the Taxing Master had summarily caught her off guard by improperly converting a routine mention date into a final taxation hearing without substantive argument, thereby violating her constitutional right to a fair hearing under Article 50(1) of the Constitution. 39.The Bill further contains clear, unexamined errors on its face that escaped judicial thought because it was never read and these include a full double charging on instruction fees and getting-up fees for the main suit and the counterclaim despite them sharing identical facts, witnesses, and a single consolidated court record. That there was an inflated attendance fee charged at an excessive flat rate for simple routine mentions; unproven disbursements were allowed without any actual receipts or vouchers; and a glaring mathematical error on Item 31 went completely unnoticed. She argued that because the Taxing Master completely failed to apply his mind to the Bill, the ruling was incurably defective and must be remitted to a fresh mind (a different Taxing Officer) to serve the ends of natural justice. 40.In response, the 1st and 2nd Defendants opposed the application for the reasons that the Bill of Costs strictly adhered to the final judgment and legal scales, wherein the Applicant is an indolent litigant attempting to escape a valid debt after wasting multiple opportunities to object. 41.They argued that the Applicant failed to file any formal objections prior to the taxation date, and the Bill was legally unopposed and therefore the Taxing Master was fully justified in exercising his discretion to tax it as drawn without needing to issue an itemized, written breakdown. That there was no violation of Fair Hearing, the Applicant having been given four months and three successive court dates (16th December 2025, 29th January 2026, and 12th February 2026) to file her responses or objections but consistently failed to do so. Having squandered these opportunities, she could not claim that she had been denied a right to be heard under Article 50(1) of the Constitution. 42.The Defendants further argued that a Plaint and a Counterclaim were legally two independent suits requiring separate preparation. Since the final court judgment explicitly awarded the Defendants the costs for both the main suit and the Counterclaim, charging separate instruction fees (Items 1 & 5) and separate getting-up fees (Items 23 & 26) was proper and did not constitute double-charging. 43.That the Kshs. 150,000/= instruction fee perfectly mirrored the value of the land, which trial testimonies placed at Kshs. 800,000/= to Kshs. 900,000/=. The Kshs. 2,300/= mention fees were also compliant with Paragraph 7(d) of the Advocates Remuneration Order for court appearances where advocates would wait up to an hour for their case to be called. The disbursements are automatically recorded in the Judiciary's online Court Case Management System (CTS), eliminating the need for additional physical proof. 44.That under established jurisprudence, a Judge would not interfere with a Taxing Master's decision on quantum unless there was a clear error of legal principle or a grave error of law, neither of which the Applicant had demonstrated. Ultimately, the Defendants maintained that the Reference was a meritless stalling tactic designed to prevent them from enjoying the fruits of their judgment, and it should be dismissed with costs. 45.From the above summary, I find the issues arising for my determination as being;i.Whether the Taxing Master Abdicated his statutory duty or breached the applicant’s constitutional right to a fair hearing.ii.Whether the allowance of separate instruction and getting-up fees for the main suit and the counterclaim constitutes an error of principle.iii.Whether the instruction fees and routine mention fees were computed in accordance with the prescribed legal scalesiv.Whether the taxing master erred in allowing unproved disbursements and failing to catch facial arithmetical errors. 46.On the first issue for determination as to whether the taxing master abdicated his statutory duty or breached the Applicant’s constitutional right to a fair hearing, whereas the Applicant argued that the Taxing Master delivered a naked, three-sentence administrative disposal that failed to offer any itemized analysis or record individual reasons, violating Rule 11(2) of the Advocates Remuneration Order and Article 47 of the Constitution, the Respondents counter that the Applicant was given three separate windows of adjournment over four months to file a response or a formal objection but remained indolent. They argue that an unopposed bill striped away the procedural requirement for itemized reasons. 47.This Court must clarify a foundational tenet of taxation jurisprudence: The absence of an opposition from a party does not transform a Taxing Master into a rubber stamp. Rule 16 of the Advocates Remuneration Order places an independent, non-delegable statutory duty of scrutiny upon the Taxing Officer to ensure that all charges are fair, reasonable, and in strict compliance with the scales. 48.As was established by the High Court in Opportunity Kenya v Margaret Wanjala t/a Mako Auctioneers [2024] KEHC 3294 (KLR):Clearly in this case the Taxing Master never gave reasons for the decision of granting the application as prayed being the hallmark of good administration of justice. Indeed, to meet reasons in any ruling or judgment threatens or infringes the fundamentals requirement of fairness. I consider reasons as the link between the decision and the mind of the decision maker. As stated in the case of Flannery V. Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd (2000) 1 W.L.R. 337 at 381, Henry LJ stated that “The duty is a function of due process, and therefore justice.” Constitutional justice imposes a requirement of procedural fairness and consequentially this necessitates a duty to give reasons in the very essence of arbitrariness as one’s status could be redefined without adequate explanation as to why this was done. Secrecy creates suspicion, justly or unjustly. This secrecy may also be described as the hallmark of inefficient and corrupt administration. Reasons must therefore be disclosed. Besides, the giving of good reasons would inevitably earn respect for the decision maker. Further in R. V Civil Service Appeal Board, exp.Cunningham (1991) 4 All E.R 310. “There is a principle of natural justice that a public law authority should always or even usually give reasons for decision. The giving of reasons is necessary to ensure fairness.” 49.The bill of costs is never read and granted as a whole without giving reasons for each of the items, the absence of opposition is not a license to abdicate the duty of judicial evaluation. By simply writing unopposed and granting the grand total of Kshs. 476,310/= as prayed, the Taxing Master did not conduct a taxation, but performed a clerical endorsement. 50.Rule 11(2) of the Advocates Remuneration Order provides as follows:(2)The Taxing Officer shall forthwith record and forward to the objector the reasons for his decision on those items and the objector may within fourteen days from the receipt of the reasons apply to a judge by chamber summons, which shall be served on all the parties concerned, setting out the grounds of his objection. 51.Sitting as a judicial officer, the Taxing Master is strictly bound by Article 47 of the Constitution and the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015, to supply written reasons. The wholesale allowance of a 36-item Bill without a single analytical line, I find, was a flagrant violation of Rule 11(2) of the Advocates Remuneration Order and a procedural breach of the Applicant’s right to administrative fairness. 52.On the second issue as to whether the allowance of separate instruction and getting-up fees for the main suit and the counterclaim constitutes an error of principle, it is to be noted that the Bill under review charged separate Instruction fees under Items 1 and 5 of Kshs. 150,000/= each and separate Getting-up fees under Items 23 and 26 of Kshs. 50,000/= each. The Respondents argued that this was perfectly legal because the main suit and Counterclaim are two independent suits, and the final trial decree explicitly awarded them the costs of both. 53.While it is true that a Plaint and Counterclaim constitute separate actions, yet the presence of a counterclaim in a suit, while essentially amounting to a cross-suit, does not give rise to a separate, stand-alone second judgment. A counterclaim never stands on its own and cannot be a pleading independent of a defence as was held by the court of Appeal in in Koross (Legal personal representative of Elijah CA Koross) v Komen & 4 others [2015] KECA 906 (KLR), it was therefore an error of principle to double-charge un-discounted scale fees when both actions arose out of identical facts, involved overlapping pleadings, and were tried on a single, consolidated record. 54.The dispute here centred on a single parcel of land being L.R. Naivasha/Ol Jorai Phase II/8573. The Counterclaim was effectively the mirror image of the main defence. A properly directed Taxing Master was legally bound to interrogate the material overlap between the actions. Simply stacking two maximum scale instruction fees and two flat getting-up fees without assessing this structural alignment, I find, constituted an error of principle. Furthermore, under Schedule 6(A)(2) of the Advocates Remuneration Order, a getting-up fee is a derivative mechanism, strictly calibrated at one-third of the allowed instruction fee. It cannot be arbitrarily awarded as a self-standing lump sum, divorced from the evaluated instruction base. 55.In relation to whether the instruction fees and routine mention fees were computed in accordance with the prescribed legal scales, the Applicant pointed out that the Taxing Master never quantified the value of the subject matter to anchor the Kshs. 150,000/= instruction fees. In response, the Respondents attempted to retroactively justify the amount by noting that the land's purchase price was Kshs. 500,000/= and trial testimony valued it near Kshs. 900,000/=. Under Schedule 6(A)(1)(b) of the Advocates Remuneration Order, a subject value of Kshs. 500,000/= shall have a basic scale fee of Kshs. 75,000/=, while that which has a maximum value of Kshs. 900,000/=, the basic scale fee is Kshs. 120,000/=. 56.There is no mathematical application of the Advocates Remuneration Order scale that yields a basic fee of Kshs. 150,000/= on these values. If the Taxing Master intended to grant an uplift/enhancement based on the complexity factors in Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] 1 EA 92, he was legally required to explicitly state his reasons. He did not. 57.Similarly, on Items 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 19, 25, and 30, the same were charged a uniform, flat rate of Kshs. 2,300/= for routine mentions, which the Respondents argue was valid under Paragraph 7(d) of the Advocates Remuneration Order because advocates routinely wait up to an hour for their matters to be called. This argument misinterprets the law because the Advocates Remuneration Order scales reflect the actual duration of active court engagement, not administrative waiting times in the gallery or the virtual queue. Routine mentions before the Deputy Registrar for directions or compliance confirmation typically consume minutes and should be scaled under Schedule 6(A)(7)(a) or (c), which provides as follows;(a)On any necessary application to or formal attendance on the registrar or deputy registrar Kshs 1,000(b)At offices of Court or registrar on routine Matters Kshs 500(c)At court in chambers on matters on a date fixed by the court for hearing when the case cannot be taken or by advocate for calling his lists Kshs 1,000 58.Passing of these inflated items wholesale, I find constituted a clear misdirection. 59.Lastly, on the fourth issue for determination as to whether the taxing master erred in allowing unproved disbursements and failing to catch facial arithmetical errors, under Rule 74 of the Advocates Remuneration Order, disbursements can only be legally allowed upon the production of real receipts or vouchers, save for standard court filing fees. The Respondents assert that because payments were processed via the Judiciary’s online Court Case Management System (CTS), physical vouchers were unnecessary. While the CTS digitizes record-tracking, it does not exempt a Taxing Officer from physically checking the electronic file system to confirm that payments were actually made. The record here shows that no such active verification occurred. 60.Most glaringly, Item 31 of the Bill explicitly sought costs for perusing written submissions, computed as 110 folios @ Kshs. 50 per folio. Basic arithmetic dictates that 110 times Kshs. 50/= would add up to Kshs. 5,500/=. Yet, the Bill inexplicably listed the claim as Kshs. 900/=, and the Taxing Master allowed it precisely as drawn. While this specific math error ironically favored the Applicant, it served as undeniable, facial proof that the Taxing Master did not read or calculate the Bill. It confirms the Applicant's core contention that the entire Bill passed through the Taxing Office completely untouched by judicial thought. 61.While it is trite, as submitted by counsel through the authorities cited, that this Court will rarely interfere with the quantitative discretion of a Taxing Master. However, where the record reveals a complete failure to exercise that discretion, a total absence of written legal reasons, and fundamental errors of principle across every major item, judicial intervention becomes an absolute necessity. 62.While the Respondents point out that this court station only has one Taxing Officer, rendering a transfer difficult, the principles of natural justice and the principle of impartiality dictate that the administrative layout of the station cannot override the requirements of a fair hearing. 63.The Court of Appeal in Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] KECA 153 (KLR) held as follows:Quite obviously, he erred. Besides, it is not really in the province of a judge to re-tax the bill. If the judge comes to the conclusion that the taxing master has erred in principle, he should refer the bill back for taxation by the same or another taxing officer with appropriate directions on how it should be done. It was stated by the predecessor of this Court in the case of Steel Construction & Petroleum Engineering (E.A.) Ltd vs. Uganda Sugar Factory Ltd (1970) E.A. 141 per spry JA at page 143:’’ 64.Consequently, the Chamber Summons dated 26th February 2026 is hereby allowed in the following terms:i.The Taxing Master's Ruling dated 12th February 2026 taxing the Respondents' Party and Party Bill of Costs at Kshs. 476,310/=, alongside the subsequent Certificate of Taxation, is hereby set aside in its entirety.ii.The Defendants’ Party and Party Bill of Costs dated 26th November 2025 is hereby remitted back for fresh taxation on its merits before a different Taxing Master.iii.The costs of this Reference application are hereby awarded to the Plaintiff/Applicant. DATED AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS AT NAIVASHA THIS 2ND DAY OF JULY 2026M.C. OUNDOENVIRONMENT & LAND COURT– JUDGE