https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/2086

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE EMPLOYMENT & LABOUR RELATIONS COURT** **AT NAIROBI** **ELRC CAUSE NO. E503 OF 2025** ***(Before Hon. Lady Justice Hellen Wasilwa, J)*** **ASIBWA EMANUEL BUCHICHI....…………………………..CLAIMANT** **VS** **UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI……………………………….RESPONDENT** **JUDGMENT** 1. The Claimant instituted this claim vide a Statement of Claim dated 3rd June 2025 praying for judgment against the Respondents as follows: - 2. *THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to declare that the purported termination of the Claimant's employment on 31st May 2025 was wrongful, unlawful, unconstitutional, null and void ab initio.* 3. *THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to quash and set aside the termination letter dated 29th May 2025.* 4. *THAT the Claimant be reinstated to his position as Personal Assistant to the Chairman of Council with full benefits, emoluments, and seniority preserved.* 5. *THAT in the alternative to prayer 3 above, the Respondent be ordered to pay the Claimant:* *One month's salary in lieu of notice: KSH 157,254* *Remainder of contractual period (7 months): KSH 1,100,778* *Unpaid meal allowance for the employment period* *Unpaid entertainment allowance for the employment period* *Unpaid acting allowance where applicable* *Gratuity (to be computed)* *Damages for wrongful termination equivalent to 12 months' salary: KSH 1,887,048* 1. *THAT the Respondent be ordered to pay the Claimant general damages for discrimination in the sum of KSH 1,000,000.* 2. *THAT the Respondent be ordered to pay the Claimant exemplary and punitive damages for breach of constitutional rights in the sum of KSH 1,000,000.* 3. *THAT the Respondent be ordered to pay interest on all sums awarded at commercial rates from the date of breach until full payment.* 4. *THAT the Respondent be ordered to pay the costs of this suit.* 5. *THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to grant any other relief(s) that it may deem fit and just.* **Claimant’s Case** 1. The Claimant avers that he was employed by the Respondent vide an appointment letter dated 16th January 2024 as Personal Assistant to the Chairman of Council at the level of Senior Administrative Assistant, Grade 11, for a fixed tenure of two years running from 16th January 2024 to 15th January 2026. 2. He avers that his terms of employment attracted a gross monthly salary of Kshs. 157,254 together with various allowances including meal, entertainment and acting allowances when applicable. 3. He further avers that as part of his employment benefits he was provided with university staff accommodation, as evidenced by the offer letter for university accommodation dated 14th January 2025 and the subsequent tenancy agreement. He had relocated his family from upcountry upon his appointment and enrolled his child at State House School for continuity of education. 4. The Claimant states that throughout his tenure he diligently performed his duties without any disciplinary issues, performance concerns or complaints from his supervisors. 5. He avers that on 20th May 2025 he was transferred, together with other staff members, from the Chairman of Council's office along Argwings Kodhek to the Chairman of Council's office at UON Tower, 19th Floor. 6. On 21st May 2025 the Registrar Administration directed the Claimant to proceed on leave, an instruction he complied with in good faith. He duly completed the online leave application process, which was approved by the Respondent, and executed a proper handing over letter dated 22nd May 2025. 7. It is the Claimant's case that while he was on authorized and approved leave, the Registrar, Mr. Harrison Akala, contacted him by telephone on 29th May 2025 and issued him with a letter of termination from 31st May 2025. 8. He contends that the said termination was wrongful, unlawful, unconstitutional and procedurally irregular. In this regard, he asserts that no valid reason or just cause was advanced for his termination, and that he had committed no misconduct or breach of contract. 9. It is the Claimant’s case that no proper notice was given as required under the Employment Act, 2007 and under his contract of employment, and that no opportunity was accorded to him to be heard or to respond to any allegations prior to termination, in breach of the rules of natural justice. 10. The Claimant further avers that his position in the office of the Chairman of Council was an institutional one and not a personal appointment tied to any individual Chairman, such that the exit of a sitting Chairman could not, on its own, affect his contract of employment. 11. The Claimant contends that it is the University of Nairobi Council, as the statutory employer, that was the proper authority to terminate his employment, and not the university management, and that the procedures prescribed under the university's human resource policies and under the Employment Act were not adhered to. 12. He avers that the timing of his termination, coming while he was on authorized leave, demonstrates bad faith and procedural impropriety. 13. The Claimant asserts that the termination of his employment was discriminatory in nature, in that other staff members serving in the same office of the Chairman of Council were retained notwithstanding the same circumstances. 14. On the question of damages, the Claimant avers that he has suffered substantial loss and damage as a consequence of the wrongful termination, including: loss of his monthly salary of Kshs. 157,254 and associated benefits, disruption to family life occasioned by his earlier relocation from upcountry, disruption to his child's education with attendant psychological distress to the minor, an imminent threat of eviction from university accommodation with the attendant risk of homelessness, mental anguish and emotional distress arising from the sudden and unexplained termination, damage to his professional reputation and diminished career prospects within the academic sector, an inability to meet family financial obligations undertaken on the strength of secure employment, and loss of unpaid allowances and benefits due to him under his contract. 15. In reply to the Respondent's Memorandum of Response, the Claimant contends that his contract was a fixed-term contract for a period of two years with the Respondent as the employer, and not a personal contract tied to the tenure of any individual office holder, and that the alleged resignation of the Chairman of Council, if at all, did not and could not operate in law to terminate his contract. 16. He avers that the doctrine of frustration is inapplicable to the circumstances of his case, in that the Respondent has failed to demonstrate any supervening event that rendered performance of the contract impossible. 17. The Claimant avers that, on the contrary, his role remained intact as an institutional position, and that other employees within the same office continued in service, thereby negating any claim of impossibility or automatic termination. 18. He contends that the Respondent's reliance on frustration is a mere afterthought and an attempt to sanitize what was otherwise an unlawful termination, and that the facts disclose a classic case of un-procedural termination and/or redundancy disguised as frustration, aimed at circumventing the statutory safeguards under the Employment Act. 19. Without prejudice to the foregoing, and in the alternative, the Claimant avers that if the Respondent's position is that his role became unnecessary following changes in the Chairman's office, then the same amounts to redundancy within the meaning of Section 2 of the Employment Act, obligating the Respondent to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 40 of the Act. He avers that the Respondent complied with none of these mandatory requirements, rendering the termination unlawful. 20. The Claimant further states that other employees within the office of the Chairman of Council, including secretaries, drivers and administrative staff, were retained in employment despite being in the same operational environment. 21. It is the Claimant’s case that his selective termination demonstrates that there was no genuine redundancy situation, and that he was subjected to unfair, discriminatory and arbitrary treatment contrary to Article 27 of the Constitution and Section 5 of the Employment Act. 22. He contends that the Respondent failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Sections 41, 43 and 45 of the Employment Act, in that no reason for termination was validly established, no disciplinary hearing was conducted, and he was not accorded any opportunity to be heard. **Respondent’s Case** 1. In opposition to the Claimant’s case, the Respondent filed a Memorandum of Response dated 9th March 2026. 2. The Respondent avers that the Claimant's contract of employment was frustrated by acts of unilateral resignation and revocation of appointment of the Chair of Council. Additionally, the termination notice, notice pay, accrued leave days, unpaid salaries, gratuity pay, and the claims of unfair labour practices, unlawful and unfair termination, certificate of service, remainder of contract, and compensation for unfair termination were all frustrated and automatically terminated by the said acts, rather than by any action on its part. 3. The Respondent avers that on or about 16th January 2024, Prof. Amukowa Anangwe, the Chairman of Council, identified and proposed the Claimant as his personal assistant to facilitate him in undertaking the duties and responsibilities of the Chairman's office. The Chairman had requested that the Claimant be appointed on contract for a period of two years, tied to the tenure of the Chair of Council. 4. It states that the Claimant was thereafter appointed directly as personal assistant to the Chairman; and his being a direct appointment, his contract was pegged to the tenure of the substantive Chair of Council. 5. It is the Respondent's case that on or about Friday, 21st February 2025, the tenure of the Chairman of Council to whom the Claimant was personal assistant was revoked with immediate effect vide Kenya Gazette Notice No. 1957, Vol. CXXVII, on account of a state of affairs adversely affecting governance of the University, including resignation of Council members, adverse publicity, and a dysfunctional Council unable to hold meetings. 6. On or about 23rd May 2025, the Chair of Council, in good faith and without prejudice, tendered his effective resignation to the Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Education. It is the Respondent’s case that this revocation of appointment, coupled with the Chair's resignation, effectively and immediately terminated the Claimant's appointment. 7. It contends that the unilateral resignation and revocation of appointment of the Chair of Council unilaterally terminated the employer-employee relationship within the University. 8. The Respondent states that on or about 26th June 2025 the University reviewed the Claimant's engagement and offered him one month's salary in lieu of notice, settlement of outstanding leave days, and continued stay in the University house until 31st December 2025, but the Claimant declined gratuity defrayment for rent and counter-proposed additional compensation vide the amended statement of claim dated 24th September 2025. 9. It reiterates that the Claimant's contract was frustrated by an unforeseen, supervening event not caused by either party, which rendered performance legally impossible or radically different from what was originally agreed. 10. The Respondent set out the particulars of frustration as: a supervening event beyond the control of either party; an unforeseen circumstance not contemplated at the time of contracting; a radical change rendering performance impossible rather than merely difficult or inconvenient; absence of self-inducement by any fault or negligence of the Respondent; automatic termination and release of both parties' obligations by operation of law; and consequently, no unfair or wrongful termination or resultant damages, since the contract ended by frustration and not by any act of the Respondent. 11. The Respondent avers that the entire claim is devoid of merit, scandalous, frivolous and vexatious, disclosing no reasonable cause of action, and maintains that the statement of claim is null and void ab initio and an abuse of the court process. 12. It further denies the jurisdiction of the Court and states that it shall raise an objection that the claim is a non-starter for want of jurisdiction and by reason of frustration of the subject matter. **Evidence in Court** 1. The Court admitted the parties consent to proceed by way of written submissions vide an order dated 14th May 2026. **Claimant’s Submissions** 1. The Claimant submitted on five issues: whether the Claimant's contract of employment was automatically terminated upon the resignation or revocation of appointment of the Chairman of Council; whether the doctrine of frustration applies to the Claimant's employment contract; whether the termination of the Claimant's employment, in the alternative, amounted to redundancy within the meaning of Section 2 of the Employment Act, 2007, and if so, whether Section 40 procedures were followed; whether the Claimant was entitled to a hearing, notice, and due process prior to termination; whether the Claimant's termination amounted to unfair and discriminatory treatment contrary to the Constitution and the Employment Act, 2007; and what remedies, if any, the Claimant is entitled to. 2. On the first issue, the Claimant submitted that his appointment letter dated 16th January 2024 identifies the University of Nairobi as the appointing and employing authority. The contract is expressly with the institution, not with any natural person holding the office of Chairman of Council. He argued that the Chairman of Council is an office and not a party to the contract of employment, thus, the departure of an office holder does not dissolve the institutional employer or its obligations. 3. It is the Claimant’s submission that the employer is the University of Nairobi and not the individual Chairman. The University Act and the University's own statutes provide for the continued existence and refilling of the office of Chairman of Council, such that the office subsists notwithstanding a change of occupant. 4. It was submitted that the Respondent's own conduct in retaining other staff in the Chairman's office, including secretaries, drivers and administrative staff, demonstrated that the office subsisted and that the selective termination of the Claimant alone was factually and legally incoherent. 5. The Claimant submitted that the time of purported termination on 31st May 2025, approximately seven (7) months of the contractual period remained unexpired. The Respondent had no contractual or legal basis to terminate a fixed-term contract before its natural expiry without just cause and due process. 6. He submitted that under Section 43(1) of the Employment Act, 2007, an employer bears the burden of proving the reason for termination and that it is valid and fair. The Respondent has offered no valid reason. The resignation of the Chairman of Council is not, in law or in equity, a reason for the termination of a contractual employee of the University. 7. On the second issue, the Claimant submitted that the Respondent's reliance on the doctrine of frustration is wholly misplaced, as frustration requires a supervening event beyond the control of either party that renders performance radically different or wholly impossible. The resignation of a Chairman of Council, being a governance event within the University's own regulatory framework, does not constitute a supervening event that renders the Claimant's performance impossible, as the office and its functions continued to exist. 8. It is the Claimant’s submission that the doctrine of frustration cannot be invoked as a substitute for proper termination procedures under the Employment Act. Frustration must be distinguished from a unilateral decision by one party to bring a contract to an end. 9. He submitted that the Respondent made a unilateral administrative decision to terminate him upon the exit of the Chairman of Council. This is a deliberate act, not an event of supervening impossibility, which the doctrine could not be invoked to immunise. 10. On the third issue, the Claimant submitted that without prejudice to his primary contention, that should the Respondent maintain that his position became unnecessary upon the Chairman's exit, then that position is, by definition, one of redundancy as contemplated under Section 2 of the Employment Act, 2007, which defines redundancy as the loss of employment through no fault of the employee where the employee's services have become superfluous. 11. It is the Claimant’s submission that the Respondent cannot dress up a redundancy as an "automatic extinction" in order to escape the statutory obligations that a redundancy imposes. Section 40 of the Employment Act sets out the mandatory procedures that must be followed before declaring an employee redundant. These are not procedural niceties but are substantive legal obligations. 12. He submitted that redundancy under Section 40 of the Act entails: notification to the employee and any trade union of the reasons for and extent of the redundancy, notification to the local Labour Officer, consultation on measures to avert or minimise the redundancy including redeployment, the application of fair and reasonable selection criteria, and payment of notice and severance pay. 13. It is the Claimant’s submission that none of these requirements were met: there was no prior notice of the impending termination, no notification to the Labour Officer, no consultation with him or his union, no consideration of redeployment within the wider University, no selection criteria applied, no severance paid, and only two days' notice given before the termination took effect on 31st May 2025, having been communicated on 29th May 2025. 14. The Claimant placed reliance was placed on [***The German School Society & another v Ohany & another [2023] KECA 894 (KLR)***](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2023/894/eng%402023-07-24), where the Court of Appeal held that where an employer fails to comply with the mandatory redundancy procedures, the purported redundancy is unlawful and the employee is entitled to compensation. He argued that the same principle applies here with full force. 15. It was further argued that even if the Court finds that a redundancy situation existed, the Claimant's singular selection for termination, while all other members of staff in the Chairman's office were retained, would in itself demonstrate that the selection process contravened Section 40(1)(g) of the Act, which requires that selection be based on criteria agreed with the trade union or the employee. This rendered the exercise arbitrary and discriminatory. 16. The Claimant submitted that he was singled out without explanation. Therefore, this is not redundancy but victimization masquerading as redundancy, which this Court cannot sanction. 17. On the fourth issue, the Claimant submitted that the Respondent remained bound to accord him procedural fairness under Sections 41(1) and 41(2) of the Employment Act, which require an employer to explain the reasons for a contemplated termination and to hear and consider any representations the employee may wish to make. 18. It was submitted that his right to be heard is not a matter of discretion but a statutory and constitutional guarantee, anchored in Article 47(1) and 50(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees fair administrative action and fair hearing. These constitutional rights apply with full vigour to employment relationships, particularly those with statutory corporations such as a public university. 19. It is the Claimant’s submission that he received no prior notice that his position was under review, was recalled by telephone while on approved leave solely to be handed a termination letter, was given no opportunity to respond, was furnished no written reasons, and was allowed only two days before the termination took effect. 20. On the fifth issue, the Claimant submitted that all other staff who served in the Office of the Chairman of Council in identical or comparable capacities were retained after the Chairman's departure, while he alone was terminated without explanation. 21. He submitted that Article 27 of the Constitution guarantees the right to equality and prohibits discrimination by any person, including employers, on grounds including employment status, social origin, and any other ground. Similarly, Section 5(3) of the Employment Act prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee in any employment decision. 22. It is the Claimant’s submission that his selective and unexplained termination, against the background of the retention of all other employees in the same office and same circumstances, gives rise to a legitimate and compelling inference of discrimination. This burden shifts to the Respondent to justify the differential treatment on objective and rational grounds which have not been and cannot be established on the available facts before court. 23. On remedies, the Claimant submitted that in the absence of any material challenge to his pleaded claims, he is entitled to the declaration that his termination was wrongful, unlawful and void ab initio. 24. He submitted that the claim for three months' salary in lieu of notice is founded on Clause 22(b) of the KUSU Collective Bargaining Agreement as the better term incorporated into his contract. He was a member of KUSU and union dues were being deducted from his salary, therefore, this amount should paid to him as a matter of right since the terms of the CBA were the better terms duly incorporated to his employment terms. 25. On the salary for 21 days worked in May 2025, the Claimant submitted that on 21st May 2025 he was tasked to proceed on leave, and while on leave, he was recalled on 29th May 2025 to collect his termination letter. He argued that he had worked these days and he ought to be paid his wages for the work done. 26. On leave travelling allowance, the Claimant submitted that under Clause 16.2(k) of the CBA provides for leave travelling allowance. He was appointed at the level of Senior Administrative Assistant I Grade 11 which under the CBA is entitled to Kshs. 11,697. 27. The Claimant submitted that under clauses 16.2 (r), (v) of the KUSU CBA provide for airtime, meal and entertainment allowance at Kshs, 100, 1500 and 7000 per month respectively. However, these allowances never reflected on his pay slips. Additionally, he was never paid baggage allowance upon his exit from service, despite its provision under clause 16.2(j) of the CBA. 28. On annual leave, the Claimant submitted that the letter sending him on leave indicates that he had not utilized his leave since appointment. Further, the termination letter confirms that he had earned annual leave days amounting to 30 days and the Respondent’s own witness statement under paragraph 14 acknowledges this he had 34 days. 29. It is the Claimant’s submission that an award of twelve months' salary is both proportionate and warranted on grounds and this will compensate him for his abrupt loss of employment and deter public employers from flouting statutory and constitutional obligations. 30. He submitted that being abruptly dismissed while on leave, without warning, hearing, or reason, stripped him of his livelihood, professional dignity, and sense of security. Being isolated as the sole employee removed from a functioning office inevitably carries a stigma of fault where none exists. Therefore, an award of Kshs 1,000,000 as general damages is reasonable and proportionate, vindicating the Claimant's rights and deterring a public institution from perpetuating such discriminatory conduct. 31. He further submitted that the Respondent's conduct goes beyond a contractual breach and constitutes a direct violation of Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution. The Claimant was terminated without notice, without a hearing, and without any disclosed reason, while on approved leave, an action that was arbitrary, procedurally unfair, and unbecoming of a public institution bound by constitutional discipline. Such conduct is not merely unlawful; it represents a deliberate disregard of the rule of law and the Claimant's fundamental rights. He argued that an award of Kshs 1,000,000 as exemplary and punitive damages for breach of constitutional rights, serves both to vindicate the Claimant's rights and to signal that public bodies cannot bypass constitutional safeguards with impunity. **Respondent’s Submissions** 1. It is the Respondent's case that the Claimant's contract of employment was not terminated but was frustrated by operation of law upon the unilateral resignation and revocation of appointment of the Chair of Council, to whom the Claimant had been personally attached as Personal Assistant. 2. The Respondent submitted that frustration is a common law doctrine by which a contract is discharged where performance is rendered impossible by a supervening event not caused by the fault of either party. Kenya has adopted the principles of frustration from English law as reflected in the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act of the United Kingdom, 1943, pursuant to Section 2 of the Law of Contract Act. 3. In support of this proposition, reliance was placed on [***Kenya Airways Limited v Satwant Singh Flora [2013] eKLR***](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2013/545/eng%402013-07-19)wherein the Court of Appeal held that an employment contract became unenforceable upon the expiry of the employee’s work permit, rendering continued employment illegal under the Immigration Act. The Respondent submitted that, similarly, the revocation and resignation of the Chairperson made the Claimant’s continued service untenable, since the contract was specifically tied to the office of the Chairperson. 4. The Respondent further submitted that the Claimant’s employment satisfied all the elements of frustration, namely that the resignation and revocation of the Chairperson constituted a supervening event beyond the control of both the employer and the employee; that the occurrence was unforeseen and not contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was entered into; that it rendered performance impossible rather than merely inconvenient; that neither party induced the occurrence of the event; and consequently, the contract terminated automatically by operation of law, thereby releasing both parties from any further contractual obligations. 5. It submitted that the automatic discharge of the contract negated any claim for unfair or wrongful termination, damages or other reliefs founded on termination by the employer. 6. It was submitted that the Claimant’s appointment arose from the personal recommendation of the former Chairperson and not through a competitive recruitment process. The Respondent argued that such an appointment could not override the mandatory statutory and institutional recruitment procedures nor confer a permanent or vested right to office. 7. The Respondent submitted that since the appointment was specifically attached to service under the former Chairperson, the cessation of that Chairperson’s tenure extinguished the basis upon which the appointment had been made. 8. It is the Respondent’s submission that the Claimant’s contention that the Office of the Chairperson is an institutional office did not create an automatic entitlement to remain in office where the appointment was personal to the outgoing officeholder and made outside the Respondent’s prevailing recruitment policies. 9. On whether the Claimant’s claim was founded on any legal or contractual basis, the Respondent submitted that the contract stood frustrated immediately upon the lawful revocation of the Chairperson’s appointment and his subsequent resignation. Reliance was placed on ***Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of NSW***[***[1982] HCA 24***](https://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1982/24.html)***, (1982) 149***[***CLR***](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commonwealth_Law_Reports)***337*** wherein it was held that an employment contract is frustrated where supervening circumstances render performance impossible or “radically different” from what the parties originally undertook. 10. It is the Respondent’s submission that the revocation and resignation of the Chairperson constituted the two catalysts of frustration which were neither foreseen nor foreseeable at the time the contract was executed and therefore brought the employment relationship to an end automatically by operation of law. 11. The Respondent further submitted that it communicated the frustration to the Claimant as soon as practicable and that the employment relationship came to an end on a "no fault" basis. 12. The Respondent submitted that once the contract was frustrated, no notice of termination or payment in lieu thereof was required since the contract had already terminated automatically by operation of law rather than by the unilateral act of either party. 13. It is the Respondent’s submission that the two catalyst of frustration were supervening events that rendered the continued and further performance of the contract impossible or a radically different thing from what was initially undertaken by the parties. A notice period and pay period were unnecessary because the contract had already become impossible to perform, the contract ended instantly without needing action from either party. 14. Relying on ***Croke V****.****VuPoint System Ltd****,****2024 ONCA 354***, the Respondent submitted that termination notice, notice pay, unfair labour practices, unlawful & unfair termination, remainder of contract, compensation for unfair termination and resultants redress were all frustrated and inapplicable. Therefore, the redress sought by the Claimant are untenable and unmerited. 15. It was further submitted that the cessation of the Claimant’s employment did not amount to redundancy under Section 40 of the Employment Act, 2007, since the contract came to an end through frustration by operation of law and not through redundancy initiated by the employer. 16. On the allegation of selective termination and discrimination, the Respondent submitted that the Claimant’s circumstances were distinguishable from those of other staff serving within the Office of the Chairperson. It was argued that whereas the Claimant had been single-sourced and appointed solely by the Chairperson, other members of staff, including secretaries, drivers and administrative personnel, had been competitively recruited into substantive positions within the University's establishment and were merely deployed to support the Office of the Chairperson. 17. The Respondent therefore submitted that the departure of the Chairperson only affected the Claimant’s specialized appointment and did not affect employees holding substantive appointments within the University. Accordingly, no issue of selective termination, discrimination or unfair labour practice arose. 18. The Respondent submitted that following the issuance of the termination letter dated 29th May 2025 and the filing of the suit, the parties engaged in an Alternative Dispute Resolution process on 28th July 2025 during which the Respondent offered, and the Claimant accepted vide his letter dated 23rd September 2025, payment of gratuity for the period worked, one month's salary in lieu of leave, payment for accrued leave days, continued occupation of University housing until 31st December 2025 to enable completion of his studies and allow his children to complete the academic year, together with payment of gratuity towards rent. It was submitted that the Respondent considered the matter settled and closed. 19. It is the Respondent’s submission that the Statement of Claim was null and void ab *initio*, scandalous, frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court process, as the Claimant’s employment contract had been frustrated by operation of law. 20. I have examined all the evidence and submissions of the parties herein. From the documents presented before this court, the claimant was appointed vide a letter dated 16/1/24 authored by the University’s Acting Registrar Administration. The appointment was as a Personal Assistant to the Chairman of Council (Senior Administrative Assistant 1 Grade 11 level). This appointment was for a fixed term of 2 years with effect from the date he accepted the appointment which was 16/1/24. 21. His place of work was the office of the VC located at the main campus or such other place as may be indicated to be his place of work. There was no other consideration to this appointment and there was no indication that it was pegged on the tenure of the sitting chair of council. 22. The insistence by the respondent that his term ended when the chairman to council resigned does not hold much weight and especially in view of the statement that his place of work was *“in the office of the VC located at main campus or such other place as may be indicated to be your place of work”* 23. It is not denied that the respondents terminated the claimant’s services abruptly vide a letter of 29/5/2025 on the wrong assumption that his tenure was pegged on the resignation of the chairman of council. The claimant was never taken through any disciplinary hearing and neither were there valid reasons warranting his termination. 24. Section 41 of the Employment Act 2007 states as follows: **41. (1). Subject to section 42 (1), an employer shall, before terminating the employment of an employee, on the grounds of misconduct, poor performance or physical incapacity explain to the employee, in a language the employee understands, the reason for which the employer is considering termination and the employee shall be entitled to have another employee or a shop floor union representative of his choice present during this explanation**. 1. Section 45(2) of the Employment Act 2007 on the other hand states as follows: **(2) A termination of employment by an** **employer is unfair if the employer fails to prove―** 1. **that the reason for the termination** **is valid;** 1. **that the reason for the termination is a fair reason―** 2. **related to the employees conduct, capacity or compatibility; or** 3. **based on the operational requirements of the employer; and** **(c) that the employment was terminated in accordance with fair procedure** 1. Because the claimant was terminated without due process and without valid reason, I return the verdict that his termination was unfair and unjustified. In terms of remedies, it is evident that the claimant was unfairly treated. He explained how his family was grossly disrupted after he moved his child from a school upcountry just to be abruptly terminated and thereafter he had to rethink what to do with a small child in school, no house and no job. In view of this injustice, I award him: 2. Compensation equivalent of 8 months’ salary= 8x160,025/-= Kshs 1,280,200/-. 3. I also award the claimant 1 months salary in lieu of notice = 160,025/-. 4. I also award the claimant damages for breach of contract at kshs 500,000/-. **TOTAL AWARDED** = **KSHS 1,940,225/-** less statutory deductions. 1. The respondents will also pay costs of this suit plus interest at court rates with effect from the date of this judgment. **Dated, Signed and Delivered virtually at Nairobi this 21st Day of July 2026.** **HELLEN WASILWA** **JUDGE**