Ndolo v Director of Public Prosecution (Criminal Appeal E049 of 2024) [2026] KEHC 5169 (KLR) (24 April 2026) (Judgment)

Ndolo v Director of Public Prosecution (Criminal Appeal E049 of 2024) [2026] KEHC 5169 (KLR) (24 April 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 5169 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Murang'a Criminal Appeal E049 of 2024 S Mbungi, J April 24, 2026 Between William Mwanzia Ndolo Appellant and Director of Public Prosecution Respondent (Being an appeal from the judgment delivered on 26th July 2019 by Honorable. J. Iruru – SPM at Kigumo in Criminal Case S.O No. 50 of 2019) Judgment 1.The appellant, WILLIAM MWANZIA NDOLO, was charged with the offence of defilement contrary to Section 8(1) as read with Section 8(3) of the Sexual Offences Act, No. 3 of 2006. The particulars were that on the 29th day of December 2018 at [particulars withheld] village, in Murang’a South Subcounty, within Murang’a County, the appellant intentionally caused his penis to penetrate the vagina of JWK, a child aged 15 years. 2.He was also charged with an alternative charge of committing an indecent act with a child contrary to Section 11(1) of the Sexual Offences Act No. 3 of 2006. The particulars were that on the 29th day of December 2018 at [particulars withheld] village, in Murang’a South Subcounty, within Murang’a County, the appellant intentionally touched the vagina of JWK, a child aged 15 years with his penis. Facts at trial 3.The Appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges and the case went to full trial. The prosecution set out to prove its case and called four witnesses. 4.PW1 was JWK, the complainant. She gave sworn evidence and stated that she was born on 28th May 2004 and was therefore aged 15 years at the material time. She testified that on 29th December 2018 at about 9.00 p.m., after returning from visiting her sister, she went to greet the appellant, who was her grandfather, with whom they resided in the same compound. She found him alone in the house. That she greeted him and after a short while, he locked the door and pulled her inside the bedroom. She stated that she struggled with him but was overpowered by him. That she was wearing a skirt and the accused tore her clothes. That she did not scream because she did not believe that the accused could rape him. She stated that she did not tell her mother of the ordeal when she went back home and later found out that she was pregnant. That upon inquiring about her pregnancy in July 2019, she told her mother what had transpired with the accused. That she later gave birth in September. Her mother reported the matter and the accused was arrested. She stated that she was taken to hospital and produced the P3 form, treatment notes, and lab results in court. 5.On cross examination, she affirmed that the accused was alone in his house and that one Jane Wanjugu was living with their aunt during the said period. That she did not scream when the accused closed the door since she was unaware that he intended to defile her. On re-examination, she stated that she was afraid of telling her mother what had happened since she feared she would beat her. 6.PW2 was Rahab Muthoni, a clinical officer at Maragua Sub-County Hospital. She testified that the complainant was brought to hospital by her mother on 9th July 2019 having noted that she was pregnant. She stated that PW1’s mother informed her that the complainant had sex with a man known to her on an unknown date in 2018. Upon examination, PW2 found that the complainant, then aged 15 years, was about eight months pregnant with a live foetus. She observed that the external genitalia were normal and that there were no visible injuries. She produced the P3 form, treatment notes and ultrasound report. 7.PW3, Martha Wanjiku Maina, the complainant’s mother, testified that the complainant was her daughter and confirmed her date of birth as 28th May 2004. She stated that in June 2019 she noticed that the complainant was pregnant. On inquiring from her, the complainant disclosed that the accused, who was her grandfather, had defiled her in December 2018 when she had gone to greet him. PW3 testified that the complainant told her she had kept quiet because the accused had threatened her. That she left and went to Mung’etho where she was born. She stated that they attempted to have a meeting regarding the incident but she could not attend as she was unwell. She testified that they then called his elder son the following day and started beating him. She then proceeded to Maragua and reported the matter to the police. 8.In cross-examination, PW3 reiterated that she did not attend the meeting because she was unwell. Further, the complainant did not disclose that the accused had defiled her since he threatened her. At the time of the incident, the accused’s wife was not home. 9.PW4, PC Mohamed Alow of Maragua Police Station, testified on behalf of the original investigating officer, who had since been transferred. He testified that on 6th July 2019, the complainant and her mother reported an incident of defilement. According to the report, on 29th December 2018 at around 9:00 p.m., the complainant went to her grandfather’s (the accused) house. Upon greeting him, the accused pulled her by the hand, led her into his bedroom, and locked the door. When the complainant screamed, he covered her mouth, removed her skirt and pant, and pushed her onto the bed, where he proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. Afterward, the complainant put her skirt back on and disposed of her pant in the toilet. The complainant was unaware she had become pregnant until her mother discovered the pregnancy on 30th June 2019. When questioned, the complainant disclosed that her grandfather had defiled her. Themother and complainant then reported the matter at Maragua Police Station. They later proceeded to the hospital, where the P3 and PRC forms were duly completed. That on 9th July 2019, the accused was arrested and subsequently charged. PW4 further testified that he obtained a court order to escort the accused and the complainant for DNA testing, the results of which were still pending at the time of his testimony. He confirmed that the complainant was aged 15 years at the time of the defilement and produced her birth certificate, indicating she was born on 28th May 2004. After investigations were concluded, the accused was arrested and charged accordingly. 10.Upon considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the trial magistrate ruled that a prima facie case had been established against the accused and accordingly placed him on his defence. Defence Case 11.DW1 was William Mwanzia Ndolo, the accused. In his defence, he gave an unsworn statement and stated that he was a farmer from Maragua Ridge. That the complainant had fabricated lies before the court. He further stated that he had been taken for DNA testing on two occasions, but no DNA report had been availed to date and deemed that the case was framed against him. 12.DW2 was Jane Wanjugu Mwanzia, from Maragua ridge. She stated that she lived with the accused and that he had no cases of indiscipline or bad behaviors. She testified that she was home with the accused person at the time it was alleged that he had defiled the complainant. She further stated that the complainant was going to school and nothing was said about her being defiled. 13.On cross-examination, he stated that PW1 was her granddaughter. That after the alleged incident, PW3 left with PW1 and her other children. That it was the complainant’s mother who said that her daughter had been defiled and that at the time of the incident, they were at home together with the other children. 14.DW3 was Samuel Mutinda Mwanzia, a farmer from Maragua Ridge. He testified that on 29th December, he had a get together at his home, which is approximately 1 meter away from the accused person’s house (his father). That he would have heard if the accused had defiled the complainant since they were all outside until midnight. His mother had gone to get medicine and returned later on. On cross-examination, he stated that PW1 was a daughter to his brother. That there were people and guests in his home, including PW1’s father. 15.The trial court, having considered all the evidence adduced, convicted and sentenced the accused to an imprisonment term of ten (10) years. The Appeal. 16.Having been dissatisfied by both the conviction and sentence by the trial court, the appellant lodged this appeal vide a petition of appeal dated 10th July 2024, citing the following five grounds of appeal:a.That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact by convicting the appellant on what was clearly inconsistent and contradictory prosecution evidence.b.That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact in exhibiting bias and placing undue weight to uncorroborated prosecution evidence and totally ignored circumstances and evidence that favored and exonerated the appellant.c.That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact in her shifting of the burden of prove to the accused which was against the law.d.That the Learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact in convicting the accused against weak and contradictory medium evidence.e.That the learned trial magistrate erred in land and fact in overlooking and totally ignoring the importance and relevancy of DNA testing in the matter and failed to resolve the issue thereof in favor of the accused. 17.Consequently, the appellant prayed that the conviction and sentence of the trial court be set aside. 18.The appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions. On record are submissions filed by the appellant dated 29th October 2025 and filed in court on 24th November 2025, and submissions dated 24th December 2025 filed by the respondent; both of which this court has carefully considered. Appellant’s Case. 19.The appellant submitted that the conviction was unsafe because it was founded on inconsistent, contradictory, and incredible prosecution evidence. He argued that the complainant’s account of the alleged defilement was improbable, particularly because although she stated that her clothes, including her inner wear, were torn, she did not explain when she disposed of them in the toilet, nor did she scream or immediately report the incident to anyone. In the appellant’s view, that conduct rendered her account doubtful. 20.He further submitted that the PW1 was fifteen years old at the time of the alleged incident, whereas the appellant was an old and sickly man, and that in the circumstances she could easily have resisted had the incident occurred as alleged. Counsel contended that, given the serious and traumatic nature of the alleged offence, the complainant would reasonably have informed family members either immediately or soon thereafter, but failed to do so. It was also submitted that the prosecution failed to retrieve the complainant’s clothes or beddings for forensic examination, which, according to the appellant, would have yielded important corroborative evidence including possible DNA material. 21.On the issue of age, the appellant submitted that although the complainant stated her date of birth, she did not herself produce a birth certificate, notification of birth, or clinical card. It was contended that age is a material ingredient in an offence under the Sexual Offences Act and that the evidence on that element was not properly laid. He also argued that although the complainant stated in cross-examination that the appellant lived with one Jane Wanjugu, none of the family members were called to corroborate that aspect of the evidence, and the prosecution left unanswered the question as to the specific bedroom or bed where the alleged defilement took place. 22.The appellant placed particular emphasis on the DNA evidence. He submitted that the complainant had given birth to a child and that the prosecution had sought and obtained a court order for DNA sampling involving the appellant, the complainant, and the child. According to him, the entire case ultimately turned on whether the child born was proved to be the appellant’s child, yet despite the centrality of that issue, the DNA report was never produced in court. 23.It was further submitted that the prosecution never explained what became of the initial DNA samples and report, and that its silence suggested either that the testing was never done or that the results were unfavorable to its case. The appellant contended that fairness required the prosecution to come out clean on the fate of the first DNA process, but instead it sought a second DNA exercise while both the prosecution and the court remained indifferent to the absence of the earlier report. He argued that the trial court failed in its duty to protect his right to a fair trial by proceeding without first insisting on the production of the DNA report. 24.The appellant also challenged the evidence of PW2, PW3 and PW4. He submitted that the clinical officer’s evidence showed that the complainant could not give the specific date of the alleged defilement and only referred generally to the year 2018, yet there were contradictions suggesting she also referred to 2019. He further argued that the evidence on the duration of pregnancy and expected delivery date introduced further doubt in the prosecution’s chronology. 25.As regards PW3 and PW4, the appellant submitted that the complainant’s mother’s evidence was purely hearsay because she neither witnessed the alleged offence nor received the account from an eye witness, and that the investigating officer’s evidence similarly consisted largely of what he had been told by the complainant and her mother. He argued that the complaint was made nearly eight months after the alleged incident, that the officer conducted no credible investigations, did not visit the scene, did not recover exhibits, and improperly produced a birth certificate that had not first been marked and identified by the proper witness. 26.Lastly, the appellant submitted that the prosecution closed its case without producing the DNA report even after indicating that it would be availed, and that the trial court nonetheless ruled that there was a case to answer in a brief and unreasoned ruling. He contended that the court ought to have drawn an adverse evidential presumption that the withheld DNA report would have favored the defence. He therefore maintained that the trial court acted with bias, shifted the burden of proof to the accused, and convicted on weak and insufficient evidence. In support of the appeal, the appellant referred the court to the following authorities: VOK v Republic, Muthama v Republic, Raphael Wambua Mulwa v Republic, and Gaileth Mubarak Elkana v Republic, and prayed for the court to allow the appeal and acquit him. Respondent’s Case 27.The respondent opposed the appeal in its entirety and submitted that the charge against the appellant was proved beyond reasonable doubt. It was argued that the evidence tendered before the trial court was sufficient to sustain both the conviction and sentence, and that the appellant had failed to demonstrate any error of law or fact on the part of the learned trial magistrate. 28.On the complaint that the prosecution evidence was inconsistent and contradictory, the respondent submitted that the ground was devoid of merit, as the appellant had not demonstrated any contradictions going to the root of the case. Counsel contended that not every inconsistency is fatal to the prosecution case, and that only material contradictions that create doubt as to the guilt of an accused person can vitiate a conviction. In the respondent’s view, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses remained consistent on the essential ingredients of the offence, particularly penetration and the identity of the appellant as the perpetrator. 29.The respondent further submitted that the age of the complainant was proved by the birth certificate produced in evidence, and that this evidence was never challenged by the appellant. It was also submitted that the complainant gave a clear and coherent account of how she went to the appellant’s house, found him alone, and was thereafter pulled into the bedroom where he tore her undergarments and defiled her. According to the respondent, the complainant’s evidence sufficiently established the offence and the role played by the appellant. 30.On corroboration, the respondent submitted that the complainant’s testimony was supported by the medical evidence of PW2, who examined her and found that she was pregnant. It was argued that the medical evidence, including the ultrasound and P3 form, confirmed penetration and therefore materially supported the complainant’s account. In any event, counsel submitted that under Section 124 of the Evidence Act, a court may convict on the sole evidence of a complainant in a sexual offence if it believes the complainant and records the reasons for that belief. Reliance was placed on Mohamed v Republic [2006] 2 KLR 138 for the proposition that courts are no longer hamstrung by the strict requirement for corroboration in sexual offences involving minors, so long as the child is found to be truthful. 31.The respondent also submitted that this was a case of recognition, and not mere visual identification, since the complainant knew the appellant well as her grandfather. It was argued that the complainant’s presence at the appellant’s house on the material night was not disputed, and that the identity of the appellant as the offender was therefore established with certainty. 32.In answer to the appellant’s complaint that his defence had been ignored, the respondent submitted that the learned trial magistrate duly considered the defence and properly rejected it as a mere denial that did not displace the prosecution case. Similarly, on the allegation that the burden of proof had been shifted, it was contended that there was nothing on the record to suggest that the appellant had been required to prove his innocence. According to the respondent, the trial court merely discharged its duty of weighing the defence against the evidence tendered by the prosecution. 33.With regard to the DNA issue, the respondent submitted that DNA evidence is not a mandatory requirement in defilement cases, but is to the discretion of the court as provided under Section 36 of the Sexual Offences Act. Further that the absence of a DNA report does not of itself render a conviction unsafe where there is other credible evidence proving the offence. It was further submitted that DNA evidence would only go to the question of paternity and not to the proof of defilement, which is established by evidence of penetration. The respondent maintained that although DNA testing had been ordered and the results were not availed by the time of judgment, no actual prejudice was occasioned to the appellant. Analysis and Determination. 34.This being the first appellate court, it is guided by principles set out by the court of appeal in the case of David Njuguna Wairimu vs Republic [2010] eKLR where the court stated as follows:“The duty of the first appellate court is to analyze and re-evaluate the evidence which was before the trial court and itself come to its own conclusions on that evidence without overlooking the conclusions of the trial court. There are instances where the first appellate court may, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, come to the same conclusions as those of the lower court. It may rehash those conclusions. We do not think there is anything objectionable in doing so, provided that it is clear that the court has considered the evidence on the basis of the law and the evidence to satisfy itself on the correctness of the decisions.” 35.I have looked at the grounds of appeal, the submissions filed by the parties, the lower court proceedings and the trial court’s judgment. 36.To me, the main issues for determination are:i.Whether the prosecution proved the offence of defilement beyond reasonable doubt;ii.Whether the trial court erred by relying on inconsistent, contradictory, and incredible evidenceiii.Issue iii: Whether the trial court exhibited bias and ignored evidence that favored the appellantiv.Whether the absence of the DNA report was fatal to the prosecution's case; andv.Whether the sentence meted by the trial court was lawful and appropriate. Issue i: Whether the prosecution proved the offence of defilement beyond reasonable doubt 37.Section 8(1) of the Sexual Offences Act provides that:-“a person who commits an act which causes penetration with a child is guilty of an offence termed defilement”.While 8(3) states:“A person who commits an offence of defilement with a child between the age of twelve and fifteen years is liable upon conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than twenty years.” 38.In the case of George Opondo Olunga v Republic (2016) eKLR the ingredients for the offence of defilement were set out as:a.Proof of the age of the victim;b.Proof of penetration or indecent act;c.Identification of the perpetrator. 39.The age of the complainant is a critical ingredient in defilement cases because it determines the sentence to be meted out. In Hillary Nyongesa v Republic [2010] eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that the age of the victim must be proved by way of credible evidence, which may include a birth certificate, the evidence of a parent or guardian, or medical evidence such as age assessment. 40.In the instant case, the complainant (PW1) testified that she was born on 28th May 2004. Her mother, PW3, confirmed that date of birth. Furthermore, PW4 produced the complainant's birth certificate, which indicated that she was born on 28th May 2004. The alleged defilement occurred on 29th December 2018. At that time, the complainant was 14 years and 7 months old. Although the charge sheet indicated that she was 15 years old, this minor discrepancy does not vitiate the charge, as the complainant was unquestionably a child within the meaning of Section 2 of the Sexual Offences Act, which defines a child as a person under the age of 18 years. 41.The appellant argued that the birth certificate was improperly produced by PW4, who was not the custodian of such records. This court finds no merit in that submission. Section 77 of the Evidence Act (Cap 80) provides for the production of public documents by a person who has custody thereof or who has been authorised to produce them. PW4, as a police officer who obtained the birth certificate in the course of investigations, was competent to produce it. I therefore find that the ingredient of age was sufficiently proved. 42.Regarding the second ingredient of penetration, the complainant (PW1) gave a detailed account of how the appellant pulled her into his bedroom, locked the door, tore her clothes, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She testified that she struggled but was overpowered. This direct evidence of penetration, if believed, is sufficient to establish that element of the offence. The medical evidence corroborated the complainant's account. PW2, a clinical officer, examined the complainant on 9th July 2019 and found her to be approximately eight months pregnant with a live foetus. The complainant subsequently gave birth in September 2019. The pregnancy, in itself is powerful circumstantial evidence of penetration. As the Court of Appeal stated in William Okoth v Republic [2018] eKLR:“In defilement cases, the presence of pregnancy arising from the act of penetration is strong corroborative evidence, especially where the accused is the only male person who had access to the complainant during the material period."I therefore find that the prosecution proved the element of penetration beyond reasonable doubt. 43.The central element that has been challenged is whether the appellant was the perpetrator? The complainant testified that the appellant was her grandfather, that they resided in the same compound, and that she went to his house on the evening of 29th December 2018. She found him alone. The incident occurred in his house. There was no other person present. This was not a case of identification of a stranger but of recognition of a close relative. 44.The appellant in his defence, through DW2 and DW3, was that he was with other family members and that nothing untoward happened. However, that defence did not create a reasonable doubt as to his identity as the perpetrator. The complainant was categorical that it was the appellant who defiled her. I find that the element of identification was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Issue ii: Whether the trial court erred by relying on inconsistent, contradictory, and incredible evidence 45.The appellant contended that the complainant's evidence was incredible because she did not scream, did not resist, did not report the incident immediately, and destroyed her clothes without explanation. He further argued that there were contradictions regarding the dates of the incident. 46.This court has carefully re-evaluated the complainant's testimony. She explained that she did not scream because she did not believe that her grandfather would rape her. She explained that she did not report the matter to her mother because she feared being beaten. These explanations are not inherently implausible. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that there is no standard template of behaviour for victims of sexual violence. In JWN v Republic [2015] eKLR, the court stated:“It is now well settled that victims of sexual offences react differently to trauma. Some scream, others freeze, others remain silent out of fear or shame. The absence of immediate complaint or physical resistance does not render a complainant's evidence incredible." 47.Regarding the alleged contradictions on dates, the complainant consistently stated that the incident occurred on 29th December 2018. The clinical officer's notes indicated that the history given was that the incident occurred in 2018. The fact that the complainant may have also referred to 2019 in some contexts does not constitute a material contradiction. Minor discrepancies in dates, especially where the incident occurred many months before the complaint was made, are not fatal to the prosecution's case. (See Erick Onyango Ondiek v Republic [2014] eKLR. 48.Section 124 of the Evidence Act provides that a conviction may be based on the uncorroborated evidence of a victim of a sexual offence if the court believes the victim and records its reasons for that belief. The trial magistrate, in her judgment, stated that she believed the complainant and found her to be truthful. This court, having re-evaluated the evidence, finds no reason to disturb that finding. The complainant's account was coherent, consistent, and unshaken under cross-examination. The appellant, in his defence stated that PW1 lied to the court and that the case was a mere frame up. However, from the record, I do not see any motive or malice that would warrant such fabrication by PW1. Issue iii: Whether the trial court exhibited bias and ignored evidence that favored the appellant 49.The appellant argued that the trial court ignored his alibi defence, particularly the evidence of DW2 that she was at home with the appellant at the alleged time of the offence and the evidence by DW3 that on 29th December 2018, there was a gathering at his house, which was approximately one metre from the appellant's house, and that they would have heard any disturbance. However, the alleged incident occurred at 9:00 p.m. inside the appellant's bedroom. It is entirely plausible that the act of defilement could have occurred without being heard by persons outside, even at a short distance. Moreover, DW2 and DW3 did not specifically account for the appellant's movements at the precise time of the incident. 50.I have carefully examined the trial court's judgment. The trial magistrate considered the defence case and stated that she found it unconvincing. At paragraph 16 of the trial court judgment, the trial court stated as follows: “...The defence evidence is that he was with his wife all the time hence he could not have defiled the complaint; however, from the evidence of his son DW3, he could not tell when the defilement took place and his mother had left for some time to look for medicine. Did that create an opportune time for the accused to commit the offence?...” 51.The fact that the court rejected the defence does not mean it was ignored.Moreover, as the Court of Appeal held in Victor Mwendwa Mulinge v Republic, an alibi defence must be specific and must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that it can be tested by those responsible for investigation and thereby prevent any suggestion that the defence was an afterthought. In this case, the alibi was not raised until the defence hearing. The court properly evaluated the evidence before it, placed the appellant on his defence after finding a prima facie case, and considered his defence before arriving at a conviction. This ground therefore fails. Issue IV: Whether the absence of the DNA report was fatal to the prosecution's case 52.The appellant placed great emphasis on the fact that DNA testing was ordered on two occasions, yet no DNA report was ever produced in court. He argued that the absence of this evidence fatally weakened the prosecution's case and that the trial court ought to have drawn an adverse inference against the prosecution. 53.This court has carefully considered this issue. Section 36(1) of the Sexual Offences Act provides as follows:“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 26 of the Evidence Act (Cap. 80), a court may, upon an application by a party to the proceedings, order that a sample be taken from the accused person for the purpose of DNA testing, subject to such terms and conditions as the court may deem necessary." 54.The provision uses the word ‘may’, which indicates that DNA testing is discretionary, not mandatory. In the case of Kagunya v Republic [2024] KEHC 5394 (KLR), the court held as follows: “It is trite law that in cases of defilement, what must be proved by the prosecution is the age of the complainant, the identity of the perpetrator and penetration which is proved by medical evidence.“Medical examination of the perpetrator is not a mandatory requirement to prove defilement save in appropriate cases which may render it necessary depending on the circumstances of the case. Such a case similarly, DNA Tests are not necessary to prove defilement. The law on sexual offences requires proof by evidence tendered by the prosecution and is not dependent on the examination of the perpetrator. Evidence of the victim is key in sexual offences and the only crucial medical examination is that of the victim to corroborate the fact of defilement.”(emphasis mine) 55.In the present case, the prosecution proved penetration through the complainant's direct testimony and the medical evidence of pregnancy. The identity of the appellant as the perpetrator was established by recognition. The complainant knew the appellant as her grandfather, and the incident occurred in his house. The DNA report, had it been produced, would have shed light on the paternity of the child born to the complainant. However, even without it, the prosecution's case was sufficiently cogent to sustain a conviction. I therefore find this ground of appeal unmeritorious. Issue V: Whether the sentence of ten (10) years' imprisonment was lawful and appropriate 56.The complainant was aged 15 years at the time of the defilement. The prescribed minimum sentence under Section 8(3) is twenty (20) years. In this case the trial court sentenced the appellant to ten (10) years in prison, which is less than the minimum sentence provided by law, but gave reasons in its ruling that it took note of the mitigation and age of the accused, having been guided by the mitigation circumstances under Sentencing Policy Guidelines. In the circumstances, I shall not interfere with the sentence, which was the discretion of the trial court. Disposition 57.Consequently, the appeal is dismissed. The trial court conviction and sentence is upheld. 58.Right of appeal 14 days explained. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED ONLINE AT KAKAMEGA THIS 24TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026.S.N MBUNGIJUDGEIn the Presence of:-CA: VelmaMwakio for DPP present online.Appellant present online.