https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1576

Muema v Denholm (Civil Appeal E011 of 2024) [2026] KECA 1576 (KLR) (31 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KECA 1576 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Court of Appeal at Mombasa Civil Appeal E011 of 2024 AK Murgor, KI Laibuta & GW Ngenye-Macharia, JJA July 31, 2026 Between Catherine Nduku Muema Appellant and Linn Alexander James Denholm Respondent (Being an appeal from the Judgment of the Environment and Land Court of Kenya at Mombasa (Naikuni, J.) delivered on 22nd November 2022) in Mombasa ELC No. E032 of 2022) Judgment 1.This second appeal emanates from the Judgement and Decree of the Environment and Land Court (the ELC) at Mombasa (Naikuni, J.) delivered on 22nd November 2022. The respondent, Linn Alexender James Denholm, commenced the suit before the Chief Magistrate’s Court at Mombasa in Environment and Land Case No. 158 of 2020 against the appellant, Catherine Nduku Muema. 2.In summary, the respondent, by a plaint dated 10th February 2020, alleged that he was in a relationship with the appellant, but which relationship did not lead to marriage; that, during their relationship, he purchased two motor vehicles registration numbers KBQ 985P and KBZ 285V; and that, in the year 2017, the appellant informed him of some properties being sold in Mtwapa area within Mombasa, in which he took a keen interest, and that by a sale agreement dated 29th June 2017, the respondent purchased Plot No. 11616/III/MN (the suit property) for a consideration of Kshs.2,500,000. The respondent pleaded that he solely contributed the consideration price, but that, in the sale agreement, he caused the appellant’s name to be written as a joint purchaser; and that, after the purchase, he took possession of the suit property and build a residential home thereon; and that, as soon as the house was built, the appellant broke their relationship. 3.The respondent further pleaded that, in June 2019, he travelled to Britain where he remained until November 2019 when he returned to Kenya; that, whilst in Britain, he left his personal items locked in the house; that, on return to Kenya, the appellant denied him access to the residential home; that he followed up with the Mombasa Land Registry, only to find out that the appellant had registered the suit property solely in her name, and had also changed the particulars of the consideration price as stated in the transfer forms to be Kshs.1,000,000 instead of Kshs.2,500,000. The respondent also averred that the appellant registered in her names the two motor vehicles he purchased, being KBQ 985P and KBZ 285V. 4.The respondent pleaded the particulars of illegalities by the appellant as:“(i)Understating the purchase price with the intent to defraud the Government of revenue.(ii)Causing the suit property to be registered in her name yet the purchase price was wholly contributed by the respondent.(iii)Changing and/or altering the first and last page of the transfer so as to deceive the land registrar that the transfer was to the appellant alone and that the consideration was Kshs.1,000,000.(vi)Obtaining money from the respondent by false pretences, to wit, that the appellant was in love with the respondent and that she wanted to get married to the respondent yet the appellant’s sole motive was to obtain the respondent’s properties.” 5.Further to the foregoing, the respondent particularised deceit and/or misrepresentation of the appellant as follows:“(i)Deceiving the respondent that they were going to get married so as to be in a position to get the respondent’s properties.(ii)Pretending to be a friend yet the appellant was transferring all the respondent’s properties to herself.(iii)Transferring the suit property to herself yet the appellant had not contributed even a penny towards the purchase of the same.” 6.The respondent therefore prayed for the following reliefs against the appellant:“i)A declaration that the appellant holds the suit property in trust for the respondent.ii)A declaration that the house standing on the suit property belongs to the respondent.iii)An order of mandatory injunction requiring the appellant to deliver to the respondent a Certificate of Title together with appropriate instrument of transfer in the respondent’s name within 7 days of the Court’s order and in default thereof, the Registrar of the Court be at liberty to execute the transfers in the respondent’s favour and the costs thereof be borne by the respondent.iv)General damages.v)A permanent injunction restraining the appellant and her agents from interfering with the respondent’s quiet and peaceful occupation of the suit property.vi)Costs of the suit.” 7.In a Statement of Defence dated 20th February 2020, the appellant denied the allegations raised by the respondent in his plaint. She stated that she was in an intimate relationship with the respondent which presumably would have resulted in a marriage, but that she found out that the respondent was involved with another woman, one Esther Wambui. 8.With respect to purchase of the suit property, the appellant averred that she paid Kshs.150,000 to the vendor on execution of the sale agreement while the respondent paid the second instalment of Kshs.1,000,000 and the 3rd instalment of Kshs.850,000, making a total of Kshs.2,000,000 from both parties; and that the balance of Kshs.500,000 was paid by the respondent. 9.The appellant averred that she solely constructed the house on the suit property without contribution from the respondent; that the suit property was bought for her as an apology from the respondent for allegedly deceiving her; that the respondent knew very well that he was not entitled to a claim of the suit property in the circumstances; and that, therefore, the suit did not disclose any reasonable cause of action against her, and she prayed that it be dismissed with costs. 10.At the hearing, the respondent testified as PW1. He testified that the suit property was to be registered in the joint names of himself and the appellant, more so because it was a freehold property; that he made payments towards the purchase of the suit property in instalments of Kshs.150,000, Kshs.1,000,000 and Kshs.850,000, and that the balance of Kshs.500,000 was to be paid after selling one of the vehicles; and that he also paid for the residential house structural plans before construction began. 11.The respondent further testified that, when he met the appellant, she was not employed; and that, when he tried to access the house after returning to Kenya from Britain, the appellant had already left the country for the USA. 12.Abqulaqim Shatry Ali (PW2), was the vendor of the suit property. He testified that the payments were made by the respondent directly into his account; that, when the balance was fully paid, the appellant requested that the title be transferred to her name since she paid for the suit property, but the fact was that it was to be registered in the joint names of both the appellant and the respondent. 13.The appellant testified as DW1. She reiterated that she was in a romantic relationship with the respondent before he moved to the UK; that she is the one who looked for the suit property whose purchase price was Kshs.2,500,000, out of which she paid Kshs.150,000 while the balance of Kshs.1,850,000 was paid by the respondent via money transfer; and that, when the respondent left for the UK, she applied for architectural designs and sourced for a contractor to build a house for her, during which time the respondent had now left for Uganda but returned in early 2019. 14.The appellant further testified that, after the respondent returned, he found that she had already built a house on the suit property; that the respondent started causing chaos, insisting that he wanted access to the house which forced her to make a report at Mtwapa Police Station; that she declined to allow him access into the house; that she paid for the title deed to be processed to the exclusion of the respondent upon payment of requisite charges at the Lands Registry; and that the house was then occupied by her daughter, a caretaker and her niece. 15.In a judgement dated 8th August 2022, the learned trial Magistrate (Hon. Mutuku, CM.) held that the parties were in an intimate relationship for 7 ½ years, and that they jointly executed the sale agreement, but that the suit property was registered in the appellant’s name; that a presumption of advancement arises where a man purchases property in the name of his wife, fiancée or girlfriend; and that the onus of proving that the property was to be held in trust lay with the respondent, more so to the extent that there was expectation that the property would revert to him. The learned Magistrate opined that, in this case, the respondent did not prove the existence of a resulting trust or implied trust, nor did he offer sufficient rebuttal to the presumption of advancement in respect to the properties he was claiming. 16.As to the argument that the only remedy available to the respondent was recovery of the monies he had expended, it was held that this would be possible only if the intention of payment of the money had not crystallized, being the purchase of the suit property. The trial court also held that allegations of fraud on the part of the appellant were not proved to the required standard and, accordingly, the suit was dismissed with costs to the appellant. 17.Aggrieved, the respondent filed an appeal to the ELC at Mombasa whereupon he faulted the learned Magistrate for: failing to find that the appellant was holding the suit property in trust for the respondent; failing to find that the suit property was illegally transferred to the appellant’s sole name without the respondent’s consent, and nor did he have such intention; finding that the conveyance of the suit property to the appellant was voluntary; making a decision that failed to take into account the provisions of Section 3 (2) of The Law of Contract Act, Cap. 23 and Section 38 of the Land Act, Cap.280; and in arriving at a decision that was against the weight of evidence, law and justice. 18.After reanalysing and re-evaluating the evidence adduced before the trial court, the learned Judge (Naikuni, J.), in a judgment dated 22nd November 2022, held that the appellant did not adduce any evidence that demonstrated that she was the sole financier of the construction of the house on the suit property; that, therefore, she could not have contributed to the purchase of the suit property; that fraud on the part of the appellant was proved by the fact that the appellant understated the purchase price so as to defraud the government of its revenue, obtained money by false pretences from the respondent and hurriedly transferred the suit property into her name despite not having made any financial contribution towards its purchase. 19.As to the presumption of trust, the learned Judge held that it cannot be said that the actions of the respondent were that of a person who intended to advance monies to the appellant and/or transfer the land willingly to her; that a resulting trust was created when the appellant transferred the suit property into her name, yet she did not contribute towards its purchase; and that the presumption of advancement cannot be inferred since the parties’ intention was tainted with irregularities of fraud on the appellant’s part. 20.In conclusion, judgement was entered in favour of the respondent against the appellant with the following orders:“i.That the appeal filed through Memorandum of Appeal dated 12th August 2021 and the Record of Appeal dated 30th August 2021 be and is hereby merited hence allowed in its entirety with costs.ii.That a declaration be and is hereby made that the respondent is solely entitled to the ownership and possession of the suit property, and that the appellant is holding the suit property in trust for the respondent.iii.That an order be and is hereby issued cancelling the transfer form dated 19th August 2019 and the Land Registrar, Malindi is directed to transfer the suit property into the name of the respondent.iv.That an order of permanent injunction is issued restraining the appellant by herself, agents, servants or anyone acting under her authority from interfering with the respondent’s quiet enjoyment and occupation of the suit property.v.That costs of this appeal be awarded to the respondent.” 21.The appellant was aggrieved by the Judgment of the ELC, as a result of which she has proffered the instant appeal. By a Memorandum of Appeal dated 18th January 2024, she has raised the following 11 grounds of appeal:“1)The learned Judge erred in law and in fact by failing to evaluated all material evidence and relevant matter that had been placed before him by the Appellant thereby arriving at a factual decision.2)The learned Judge erred in Law and in fact by allowing the Respondent’s Appeal by failing to take in account the evidence adduced by the Appellant at the trial Court.3)The learned Judge erred in Law and in fact by failing to consider that the Respondent had failed to prove his case on a Balance of probability.4)The learned Judge erred in Law and in fact by failing to consider that the Appellant’s Written Submissions and Authorities thereby arriving at wrong decision.5)The learned Judge erred in law and in fact to conclude that the Appellant was holding the suit property in trust for the Respondent and that the Respondent is solely entitled to the ownership of the said suit property.6)The learned Judge erred in Law and in fact by failing to consider that the Respondent failed to prove the particulars of fraud as against the Respondent.7)The learned Judge erred in law and in fact by failing to consider that in the proceedings the Respondent stated that being a foreigner he could not own a property the subject matter.8)The learned Judge erred in Law and in fact that if the Respondent paid for the construction of suit property then he was making such payment because of love or gift to the Appellant.9)The learned Judge erred in law and in fact by failing to consider that the suit property was registered in the names of the Respondent and Respondent did not object to the signing of the agreement.10)The learned Judge erred in law and in fact by failing to consider that the Respondent was not sincere about his marital status to the Appellant since he had also another wife in Uganda and because of the Respondent’s lies, he agreed to built the suit property for the Appellant.11)That the decision of the learned Judge delivered on the 22nd November 2023 was wrong in principle and unfair in effect and ought to be set aside and the Appeal filed on 12th August 2022 be dismissed with costs to the Respondent.” 22.The appellant prayed that the appeal be allowed and, consequently, the following orders do issue:i.That the appeal filed through the Memorandum of Appeal dated 12th August 2021 be dismissed with costs to the appellant.ii.A declaration that the house standing on the suit property belongs to the appellant.iii.Any other relief and/or orders this Court may deem fit to grant. 23.We heard this appeal on 17th February 2026. In attendance were learned counsel Mr. Boaz Adalla for the appellant and learned counsel Mr. Collins Odeng for the respondent. Each counsel highlighted their respective parties’ written submissions. Those of the appellant are dated 12th April 2025 while those of the respondent are dated 11th February 2026. 24.The appellant submitted that the evidence before the trial court was that the suit property was purchased jointly through contributions by both parties, but that she solely undertook the development thereon. Counsel for the appellant faulted the first appellate court for relying on evidence which was not before the trial court, being that it was the respondent who purchased the two motor vehicles registration numbers KBQ 985P and KBZ 285V. 25.It was contended that the learned Judge misapplied the doctrine of resulting trusts. The appellant referred to the decision of this Court in Mumo vs. Makau (2002) KECA 302 (KLR) where the Court dealt with the issue of whether land registered in one party’s name (where the other party had contributed), gave rise to a resulting trust; that this Court held, inter alia, that in close family relationships, especially between a husband and wife, a presumption of advancement may apply- that is to say that, the registration of one spouse’ name was presumed to be a gift unless there was clear evidence to rebut the presumption; that the purchase of the suit property having been a contribution from both parties, it was meant to be a gift for the appellant; and that, therefore, no resulting trust was established. 26.It was submitted that the 1st appellate court disregarded the respondent’s pleading that he intended the suit property to be registered in the joint names of the parties because the respondent intended to marry the appellant; and that, with such pleading, the learned Judge erred in imputing the existence of a resulting trust. In this regard, reliance was placed on the decision in Peter Ndungu Njenga vs. Sophia Watiri Ndungu (2000) eKLR where the Court held, inter alia, that: ‘…The courts will not imply a trust save in order to give effect to the intention of the parties. The intention of the parties to create a trust must be clearly determined before a trust is implied”; and that, a trust should only be implied in instances of absolute necessity, which did not obtain in the instant case. 27.The appellant also submitted that the learned Judge failed to distinguish between the land (the suit property) and the house constructed thereon; and that, when the appellant developed the suit property, the respondent was then living in Uganda with another woman. Hence, the first appellate court was wrong in treating the house and the suit property as one and the same thing, consequent to which he inferred that it is the respondent who purchased the suit property and also built the house, and that, as such, she (the appellant) held both in trust for the respondent; and that the particulars of fraud as pleaded were not proved to the required standard for the learned Judge to arrive at this conclusion. The decision of this Court in Kinyanjui Kamau vs. George Kamau (2015) eKLR was cited for the proposition that fraud must be pleaded and proved on a balance of probabilities. 28.On behalf of the respondent, counsel took issue with the appellant’s complaint which, according to him, only raised factual matters. He emphasised that, this being a second appeal, only matters of law fall for consideration as was held in the decision of this Court in Kirera vs. Kithinji (2025) KECA 178 (KLR) when referring to the decision of this Court in Charles Kipkoech Letting vs. Express (K) Ltd & Another (2018) KECA 187 (KLR). 29.According to the respondent, only the 1st of the grounds of appeal raises a legal matter faulting the learned Judge for not revaluating all the material evidence and relevant matters placed before him by the appellant; that, in contrast, the learned Judge had regard to his obligation as a first appellate court, whose duty is to reanalyse and re-evaluate all the evidence adduced before the trial court and come up with his conclusion as underpinned, among others, in the case of Selle & another vs. Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd others (1968) EA 123; and that the & rest of the grounds of appeal (Numbers 2 to 11) raised matters of fact for which the respondent needed not respond. 30.The respondent urged us to find and hold that the appellant committed serious fraud and breach of trust against the respondent; and that, consequently, we dismiss the appeal with costs. 31.On second appeal, our mandate is underpinned under Section 72(1) of the Civil Procedure Act as one of consideration of matters of law only. It states as follows:72.Second appeal from the High Court(1)Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal from every decree passed in appeal by the High Court, on any of the following grounds, namely—(a)the decision being contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law;(b)the decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law;(c)a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits. 32.This Court expounded on the duty of a first appellate court in M’bagine vs. Nyaga (2026) KECA 335 (KLR) as follows:"This being a second appeal, our jurisdiction is confined to matters of law. The settled position is that a second appellate court does not re- open concurrent findings of fact unless it is demonstrated that the findings were based on no evidence, were founded on a misapprehension of the evidence amounting to an error of law, or were reached through the application of wrong principles." 33.In the same vein, this Court held thus in Kenya Breweries Ltd v Godfrey Odoyo [2010] eKLR that:“In a second appeal however, such as this one before us, we have to resist the temptation of delving into matters of facts. This Court, on second appeal, confines itself to matters of law unless it is shown that the two courts below considered matters they should not have considered or failed to consider matters they should have considered or looking at the entire decision, it is perverse. In the case of Stephen Muriungi and another vs. Republic (1982-88) 1 KAR 360, Chesoni Acting JA (as he then was) said at page 366:'We would agree with the view expressed in the English case of Martin v Glywed Distributors Ltd (t/a MBS Fastenings) 1983 ICR 511 that where a right of appeal is confined to questions of law only, an appellate court has loyalty to accept the findings of fact of the lower court (s) and resist the temptation to treat findings of fact as holdings of law or mixed findings of fact and law, and, it should not interfere with the decisions of the trial or first appellate court unless it is apparent that, on the evidence, no reasonable tribunal could have reached that conclusion, which would be the same as holding the decision is bad in law.’” 34.We have considered the record of appeal, the submissions by both parties, the authorities cited therein and the law. In our view, this appeal principally turns on only one legal issue, namely whether there was a resulting trust in favour of the respondent over the suit property. 35.Trusts are created either expressly or by operation of law. In the matter before us, no express trust existed, which leaves us to determine whether there existed a trust created by operation of law. A trust created by operation of law can be either constructive or resulting trust. 36.The Black’s Law Dictionary does not specifically define the terms ‘Resulting Trust or Constructive Trust’ per se. ‘Instead, it refers the reader to the word ‘trust’, which in the context herein is defined as ‘The right, enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property to which another person holds the legal title’. It goes on to explain that, ‘a trust arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it.’ 37.In Hayatan & Another vs. Al-Heiy& 5 Others (2015) KECA 713 (KLR), this Court re-stated the law on trusts as follows:“According to the Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition; a trust is defined as“1.The right, enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property to which another holds legal title; a property interest held by one person (trustee) at the request of another (settlor) for the benefit of a third party (beneficiary).”Under the Trustee Act, “… the expressions “trust” and “trustee” extend to implied and constructive trust, and cases where the trustee has a beneficial interest in the trust property…”In the absence of an express trust, we have trusts created by operation of the law. These fall within two categories; constructive and resulting trusts. Given that the two are closely interlinked, it is perhaps pertinent to look at each of them in relation to the matter at hand. A constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed by the court against one who has acquired property by wrong doing. … It arises where the intention of the parties cannot be ascertained. If the circumstances of the case are such as would demand that equity treats the legal owner as a trustee, the law will impose a trust. A constructive trust will thus automatically arise where a person who is already a trustee takes advantage of his position for his own benefit (see Halsbury’sLaws of England supra at para 1453). As earlier stated, with constructive trusts, proof of parties’ intention is immaterial; for the trust will nonetheless be imposed by the law for the benefit of the settlor. Imposition of a constructive trust is thus meant to guard against unjust enrichment.…A resulting trust is a remedy imposed by equity where property is transferred under circumstances which suggest that the transferor did not intend to confer a beneficial interest upon the transferee ... This trust may arise either upon the unexpressed but presumed intention of the settlor or upon his informally expressed intention. (See Snell’s Equity 29th Edn, Sweet & Maxwell p.175). Therefore, unlike constructive trusts where unknown intentions maybe left unexplored, with resulting trusts, courts will readily look at the circumstances of the case and presume or infer the transferor’s intention. Most importantly, the general rule here is that a resulting trust will automatically arise in favour of the person who advances the purchase money. Whether or not the property is registered in his name or that of another, is immaterial (see Snell’s Equity at p.177) (supra).” 38.Therefore, a trust arises when one person holds a property on behalf of another person while he or she is not the beneficial owner. The presumption of trust, and for that matter, being an equitable remedy, the circumstances under which a court will find for the claimant depends on a case to case basis. 39.It is also not a remedy that courts will easily issue, for the reason that Trusts are not generally implied or presumed. They are to be presumed as a matter of absolute necessity. Further, for a trust to be presumed, there must be a clear intention by the parties to create the trust as was held by this Court in Peter Ndugu Njenga vs. Sophia Watiri Ndungu (2000) KECA 202 (KLR) that:"The concept of trust is not new. In case of absolute necessity, but only in case of absolute necessity, the court may presume a trust. But such presumption is not to be arrived at easily. The courts will not imply a trust save in order to give effect to the intention of the parties. The intention of the parties to create a trust must be clearly determined before a trust is implied.” 40.In MB vs. BBAM (2022) KECA 895 (KLR), this Court distinguished between a constructive trust and a resulting trust by holding that a constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed by the court while a resulting trust is rebuttable by evidence. This Court’s discourse on what constitutes a constructive trust was as follows:"In the absence of an express trust, we have trusts created by operation of law. These fall within two categories; constructive and resulting trusts. Given that the two are closely interlinked, it is perhaps pertinent to look at each of them in relation to the matter at hand. A constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed by the court against one who has acquired property by wrong doing. … It arises where the intention of the parties cannot be ascertained. If the circumstances of the case are such as would demand that equity treats the legal owner as a trustee, the law will impose a trust. A constructive trust will thus automatically arise where a person who is already a trustee takes advantage of his position for his own benefit (see Halsbury’s Laws of England supra at para1453). As earlier stated, with constructive trusts, proof of parties’ intention is immaterial; for the trust will nonetheless be imposed by the law for the benefit of the settlor. Imposition of a constructive trust is thus meant to guard against unjust enrichment. …” 41.As to what defines a resulting trust, this Court in MB vs. BBAM (supra) stated:“This is for the reason that the presumption of a resulting trust is rebuttable. Gary Watt’s text book on Trusts and Equity 3rd Edition at page 153; clearly states that much as there exists the presumption of a resulting trust, it should be recognised that the presumption “…is easily rebutted by evidence that the transferor intended the transfer to take effect in some other way. It may be that the transferor intended an outright gift, or that he intended the transfer of property by way of loan or some other contractual arrangement…In the case of Fowkes vs Pascoe (1875) LR 10 Ch App 343, the English Court of Appeal held that the presumption of a resulting trust had been rebutted by evidence that a gift had been intended.’’ 42.In the same vein, in Archer & another vs. Archer & 2 others (2023) KECA 298 (KLR), this Court held:“The two main requirements for a resulting trust to arise are firstly, the intention and contribution to the purchase of the property must be contemporaneous with the taking of legal title, as was held in Pettit vs Pettit (1970) AC 777 and in Gissing vs Gissing (1971) AC 886. The relevant timeframe for the existence of the required intention and contribution is therefore at the point of purchase of the land, which is the time the beneficial entitlement crystallises, and resulting trusts cannot in principle be founded on intentions, events or circumstances which arise after the date of purchase. Secondly, the clearest instances of resulting trust emerge from direct cash or other forms of financial contributions to the purchase of property at the point of purchase." 43.Therefore, a resulting trust focuses on monetary contribution towards the purchase of a property, and on the unilateral intention of the provider of the purchase money. 44.In this case, both parties acknowledge that they were in a romantic relationship, but that the relationship did not materialise into a marriage. During the subsistence of the relationship, the suit property was purchased. According to the appellant, her contribution towards the purchase of the suit property was in tranches of Kshs.150,000 and Kshs.500,000 respectively, while the respondent contributed Kshs.1,850,000. She further stated that she solely built the residential house on the suit property. The respondent, on the other hand, stated that he fully paid the purchase price of Kshs.2,500,000 directly to the vendor (PW2) without any assistance from the appellant. 45.Applying the foregoing principles to this appeal, the mere fact that the parties were once in a romantic relationship does not automatically presume that the properties acquired in their moments of bliss was to be shared between them. The presumption of constructive trust which the appellant is attempting to argue in the circumstances of this case, does not arise. This is clearly a case where the respondent claimed the suit property on account of having solely contributed to its purchase. Accordingly, only a resulting trust can be presumed, and which the appellant was obligated to rebut. 46.The question then is, what was the quantifiable contribution(s) of money made directly towards the purchase of the suit property by the respondent for a resulting trust to be said to have arisen? The evidence produced was that the suit property was sold for a consideration of Kshs.2,500,000. The vendor, PW2, acknowledged receipt of Kshs.1,850,000 from both parties herein. In the acknowledgment of 5th August 2017, the vendor stated that the outstanding balance was Kshs.500,000. In his testimony, the respondent stated that he paid the entire balance of Kshs.500,000 which the appellant, by evidence, did not rebut. This leaves an amount of Kshs.150,000, which the appellant maintained that she paid. 47.Unlike the respondent who produced bank statements to demonstrate his financial status and capability, there was none availed by the appellant. Indeed, she did not deny the allegations by the respondent that, at the material time of purchase of the suit property, she did not have any source of income. Even in her testimony, the appellant stated that she was then a student nurse in the USA. Arising from the circumstances of this case, it is clear that the suit property was purchased through the sole contribution of the respondent and, as such, the appellant did not acquire beneficial interest therein. 48.Furthermore, it is suspicious that the transfer documents of the suit property from the vendor to the appellant dated 16th July 2019 indicate that the consideration as Kshs.1,000,000. Again, the transfer document in respect of the suit property dated 16th June 2022 from the appellant to her brother indicates that the consideration price was Kshs.2,500,000/=. This evidence smacks of intentional fraud on the appellant’s part, of which was intended to disentitle the respondent of the suit property. If indeed the appellant contributed towards the purchase of the suit property, there would have been no harm for her to produce the relevant evidence instead of using other means to acquire the suit property to the exclusion of the respondent. 49.As to the allegation that the appellant solely constructed the residential home, no evidence of the amounts expended by her towards the construction was produced in court. As a consequence, there was nothing that demonstrated contribution towards the development of the residential house. 50.Upon re-evaluation of the evidence we are satisfied that the learned Judge rightly concluded that upon registration of the suit property in the appellant’s name without her having contributed to its purchase or development, a resulting trust in favour of the respondent had come into existence. 51.In conclusion, we find that this appeal is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed with costs to the respondent. Accordingly, we uphold the Judgment of the High Court of Kenya at Mombasa delivered by Naikuni, J. on 22nd November 2022.It is so ordered. DATED AND DELIVERED AT MOMBASA THIS 31ST DAY OF JULY, 2026.A. K. MURGOR...................................JUDGE OF APPEALDR. K. I. LAIBUTA CArb, FCIArb....................................JUDGE OF APPEALG. W. NGENYE-MACHARIA...................................JUDGE OF APPEALI certify that this is the true copy of the originalSignedDEPUTY REGISTRAR