https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/1953

Chacha v GA Insurance Ltd (Employment and Labour Relations Cause E022 of 2024) [2026] KEELRC 1953 (KLR) (30 June 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELRC 1953 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Employment and Labour Relations Court at Mombasa Employment and Labour Relations Cause E022 of 2024 K Ocharo, J June 30, 2026 Between John Mshenga Chacha Claimant and Ga Insurance Limited Respondent (Being a claim arising from termination of employment on account of redundancy) Judgment A. Introduction And Background 1.This cause was commenced by way of a Memorandum of Claim dated 9th February 2024, in which the Claimant, John Mshenga Chacha, sued the Respondent, GA Insurance Limited, contending that his employment was unfairly and unlawfully terminated under the guise of redundancy, and seeking declarations to that effect together with consequential monetary reliefs. 2.The Respondent entered appearance and filed a Memorandum of Response dated 19th November 2024, denying liability in its entirety and asserting that the Claimant's employment was terminated lawfully and fairly, on account of a genuine redundancy occasioned by a staff-streamlining and restructuring exercise which resulted in the elimination and/or modification of positions and roles within the Respondent's marketing departments. 3.The matter proceeded to full hearing. The Claimant testified on his own behalf as PW1 and adopted his witness statement dated 9th February 2024, together with the documents filed in his list and bundles of documents, as his evidence-in-chief. The Respondent, on its part, called a single witness, Mr. Simon K. Lariak, an Assistant Manager in the Respondent's Legal Department, who testified as RW1 and adopted his witness statement dated 20th December 2024. Both witnesses were cross-examined at length by opposing counsel. 4.At the close of oral evidence, both parties closed their respective cases and were directed to file and exchange written submissions, which they duly did. This Judgment is accordingly rendered on the basis of the pleadings on record, the oral testimony tendered before this Court, the documentary evidence produced, the rival written submissions, and the applicable law. B. The Claimant's Case 5.By a Letter of Appointment dated 27th April 2022 (produced as PEXH-1), the Respondent employed the Claimant as a Relationship Manager, Energy & Hull, with effect from 9th May 2022, at a monthly basic salary of Kshs. 315,000/= together with an allowance of Kshs. 135,000/=, bringing his total monthly income to Kshs. 450,000/=, subject to an initial probationary period of three (3) months. The Court notes, for completeness, that the Respondent in its pleadings and RW1 in his witness statement referred to the Claimant's commencement date as 9th August 2022; that date, however, coincides with the lapse of the probationary period, not the date of engagement, and this Court, in the absence of any challenge to the Letter of Appointment produced as PEXH-1, accepts the Claimant's unchallenged documentary evidence that his employment in fact commenced on 9th May 2022. 6.The Claimant pleaded, and testified, that although his probationary period lapsed on 9th August 2022, the Respondent did not issue him with a letter of confirmation immediately. A confirmation/performance appraisal was instead conducted on 15th September 2022, and shortly thereafter, on 3rd November 2022, the Claimant was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). It was not until 11th November 2022 that the Respondent issued the Claimant with a Letter of Confirmation in Service, backdated to 9th August 2022 (PEXH-2). 7.The Claimant's case is that at all material times the Respondent treated him unfairly and unreasonably, in a concerted effort to push him out of employment. He particularised this treatment as including: placement on a PIP premised on unrealistic goals divorced from his contract of employment; failure to provide adequate means and facilitation to enable him to meet the goals and targets set for him; stifling of his performance through the withdrawal and curtailment of resources, including his corporate cab-approval privileges, which were transferred to an officer based in Nairobi; being wrongfully blamed for the shortfalls of other officers; and the refusal of a salary advance sought to defray his ailing parent's medical bills. 8.The Claimant further pleaded and testified that by a letter dated 17th February 2023, the Respondent invited him to a Performance Hearing initially scheduled for 22nd February 2023, which, after two postponements occasioned by the Respondent's Human Resource & Administration Manager, was eventually held virtually on 1st March 2023. It was the Claimant's case that the outcome of that hearing was never communicated to him, or at all, despite numerous follow-up requests, including a written request by way of email dated 9th May 2023. 9.Instead of receiving the outcome of the Performance Hearing, the Claimant was, on 22nd May 2023, served with a Letter of Notice of Intended Redundancy dated 12th May 2023 (PEXH-5) — a mere three days after his written demand of 9th May 2023 for the outcome of the performance process. He testified that after service of that notice, he was never engaged further on the subject of the intended redundancy, and that on 22nd June 2023 he was served, without any prior consultation, with a Letter of Notice of Termination on account of Redundancy dated 21st June 2023 (PEXH-6). 10.It is the Claimant's case that the purported redundancy exercise was unprocedural, unlawful, and contrived, being nothing more than a device to oust him from employment and thereby avoid the safeguards that would otherwise have attended a termination founded on performance. 11.On the strength of the foregoing, the Claimant pleaded and claimed the following amounts, said to be due and outstanding as at the date of termination: accrued and unpaid leave of 6.05 days at the rate of Kshs. 21,511.40 per day, totalling Kshs. 130,143.97; unpaid monthly telephone allowance of Kshs. 2,000/= for 13 months, totalling Kshs. 26,000/=; unpaid fuel allowance for the month of June 2023 of Kshs. 10,000/=; reimbursement of out-of-pocket taxi and fuel expenses of Kshs. 100,000/=; and unremitted employer pension contributions calculated at 7.5% of his basic salary of Kshs. 315,000/= for 12 months, totalling Kshs. 283,500/=. He further sought compensation for unfair termination equivalent to 12 months' salary, being Kshs. 5,400,000/=, together with interest and costs. Evidence of the Claimant Under Cross-Examination 12.Under cross-examination, the Claimant testified that during his tenure he reported to the General Manager, Business Development. He maintained that the job description for his role, as set out in the advertisement to which he responded, was to grow an already-existing portfolio — meaning that he was not starting from a blank slate, as the Energy & Hull department was already in existence when he joined the Respondent. 13.He further testified that prior to joining the Respondent he had been employed by Evergreen Energy and by other entities, including in the insurance industry, and that he possessed sufficient experience in both the energy and insurance sectors. He maintained that the Respondent recruited him on the strength of that experience and his qualifications. 14.On the question of targets, the Claimant testified that the Respondent never issued him with any departmental target for insurance business, and that the figure of Kshs. 70 million referred to in the Respondent's correspondence, and pleaded at paragraph 8 of his witness statement, was unknown to him. He testified that during his performance appraisal he was instead given a target of Kshs. 25 million, and that it was not clear from the Respondent's own documentation whether the Kshs. 70 million figure, even if applicable, was an annual or a quarterly target. He added that the advertisement for his position had referred to a general target of growing the business by Kshs. 200 million, without any attendant timelines. He denied ever signing a job description or committing to any specific target, and confirmed that by the time of his appraisal he had not met a lesser, ten-million-shilling benchmark that had also been referenced to him. 15.The Claimant testified that his field and entertainment allowance was withdrawn, that he was left to run the department alone, and that he had no budget to work with. He maintained that, notwithstanding his failure to meet the targets set for him, he continued to generate business for the Respondent. 16.On the performance hearing, the Claimant confirmed that it was conducted virtually on 1st March 2023, and that its outcome was never communicated to him. He testified that by his email of 9th May 2023 he sought the outcome of that hearing, that the email was never responded to, and that he was later informed, only verbally, that the Committee had been unable to reach unanimous agreement on whether to terminate his employment. 17.Regarding the redundancy notice, the Claimant testified that although it stated that five roles would be affected, it did not specify which roles those were, and that even the managers at his branch were not aware that any redundancy process was underway. 18.On his terminal dues, the Claimant confirmed that under his letter of appointment he was entitled to a global allowance amount of Kshs. 135,000/=, and that, per the Respondent's Human Resource policy and his grade, he was entitled to fuel and travel allowances. He explained that he did not requisition these allowances because the circumstances of his work did not call for prior requisition, and that he was instead claiming what he had actually expended from his own pocket, supported by receipts, after his Shell fuel card was cancelled in June 2023. C. The Respondent's Case 19.The Respondent, in its Memorandum of Response, admitted the formal particulars of the parties but denied that it subjected the Claimant to any unfair or unreasonable treatment. It averred that it employed the Claimant as a Relationship Manager — Energy & Hull, Grade 6, subject to a probationary period of three months, and that its decision to terminate his employment was well-founded, justifiable, and the culmination of a staff-streamlining exercise that occasioned the elimination and/or modification of positions and roles within its marketing departments, rendering the services of the holders of those positions superfluous. 20.The Respondent pleaded that the termination of the Claimant's employment was preceded by the requisite general and specific notices of the impending redundancy, together with notification to the Labour Officer, issued sequentially; that it took into account all relevant considerations and applied an appropriate criterion in determining the employees to be declared redundant; and that it explored and held meaningful pre-redundancy consultations preceding the issuance of specific notices to the Claimant and other affected employees, all as required under the Employment Act. 21.The Respondent further pleaded that it settled all dues owed to the Claimant upon termination, which the Claimant acknowledged by signing the letter of termination, and that he was thereby estopped from advancing additional claims. It averred that the contract of employment provided for consolidated allowances, such that the Claimant's claims for telephone allowance, fuel allowance, and cost of taxi services had no legal or contractual basis. It denied the particulars of claim pleaded at paragraphs 14 to 18 of the Memorandum of Claim in their entirety, put the Claimant to strict proof, and prayed that the suit be dismissed with costs.Evidence of RW1 Under Cross-Examination 22.Under cross-examination, RW1 candidly admitted that he did not work in, and had never worked in, the Respondent's Human Resource Department; that he was not the Claimant's direct manager; and that he had at no time supervised the Claimant's work or appraised his performance. 23.RW1 further admitted that he did not sit in the Claimant's PIP hearing of 3rd November 2022, and that he was not present at the performance hearing of 1st March 2023. His testimony, by his own admission, was accordingly based on internal records rather than personal knowledge of the events culminating in the Claimant's termination. 24.RW1 maintained that the Energy and Hull Department had been abolished, and that the entire Energy & Hull portfolio, including the Oil & Gas segment in which the Claimant served as relationship manager, had been scrapped in its entirety. He conceded, however, that the Respondent had not placed before this Court any Board minutes, management decision, restructuring report, or revised organogram from which the decision to abolish the division could be discerned. 25.On the number of employees affected, RW1 testified that four employees were affected by the redundancy, one of them being a Mr. Fredrick Moti of the Marketing Division, who assisted in underwriting business brought in by the Claimant. He conceded that no document had been filed to demonstrate that any of the four in fact exited the Respondent's employment on account of redundancy. This is to be contrasted with the Respondent's own written submissions, which assert that the exercise impacted five roles and that five employees were declared redundant — an inconsistency to which this Court returns below. 26.RW1 conceded that the Respondent had not filed any minutes evidencing consultation between it and the employees proposed to be affected, though he asserted, without producing a single such document, that email correspondence spoke to consultation having occurred. He further asserted that the Respondent applied an objective criterion in selecting those to be affected by the redundancy, but admitted, when pressed, that nothing had been placed before this Court from which that criterion, or its application, could be ascertained. 27.RW1 confirmed that the Claimant's employment was not terminated on account of performance, and that the notice of intended redundancy came barely two months after the unresolved performance hearing of 1st March 2023. He confirmed that, per the Respondent's own policy, the employer was obligated to contribute 7.5% of an employee's basic salary to a pension scheme, but conceded that no document had been filed to demonstrate that such remittance had in fact been made on the Claimant's behalf, notwithstanding the Claimant's request for a statement evidencing the same, which was never furnished. RW1 also confirmed the Claimant's basic salary of Kshs. 315,000/= and allowance of Kshs. 135,000/= per the letter of appointment, and stated that he was not certain why the Claimant had been denied a salary advance, given that no disciplinary case was pending against him. D. Issues For Determination 28.Having considered the pleadings, the oral and documentary evidence on record, and the rival submissions of counsel, this Court is of the view that the following issues arise for determination:a)Whether the termination of the Claimant's employment on account of redundancy was substantively justified and genuine within the meaning of Section 2 of the Employment Act, 2007;b)Whether the Respondent complied with the mandatory procedural requirements of Section 40 of the Employment Act, 2007, including the requirement of meaningful consultation;c)Whether the termination was, in all the circumstances, fair within the meaning of Sections 43 and 45 of the Employment Act, 2007;d)Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought; ande)Who bears the costs of this suit. E. Analysis And Determination The Legal Framework 29.Redundancy is a species of termination of employment that falls, in law, within the category of “no-fault” dismissals — that is to say, it arises not from any wrongdoing on the part of the employee, but from operational circumstances attributable to the employer. It is for this reason that Parliament, in enacting the Employment Act, 2007, surrounded redundancy with statutory safeguards designed to protect employees from its potential abuse as a subterfuge for terminations that would otherwise be susceptible to challenge on disciplinary or performance grounds. 30.Section 2 of the Employment Act defines redundancy as:“the loss of employment, occupation, job or career by involuntary means through no fault of an employee, involving termination of employment at the initiative of the employer, where the services of an employee are superfluous, and the practices commonly known as abolition of office, job or occupation and loss of employment.” 31.Section 40(1) of the Act then sets out, in mandatory terms, the conditions precedent to a lawful redundancy. An employer shall not terminate a contract of service on account of redundancy unless it: (a) where the employee is a member of a trade union, notifies the union and the labour officer of the reasons for, and extent of, the intended redundancy, not less than a month prior to the intended date of termination; (b) where the employee is not a member of a trade union, notifies the employee personally in writing and the labour officer; (c) has, in the selection of employees to be declared redundant, had due regard to seniority in time and to the skill, ability and reliability of each employee of the particular class affected; (d) has not, where a collective bargaining agreement exists, placed the employee at a disadvantage on account of union membership; (e) has paid off, in cash, any leave due to the employee; (f) has paid the employee not less than one month's notice or one month's wages in lieu of notice; and (g) has paid severance pay at the rate of not less than fifteen days' pay for each completed year of service. 32.These conditions are conjunctive, and it is now settled law that they are mandatory rather than directory: see Thomas De La Rue (K) Ltd v David Opondo Omutelema [2013] eKLR, where the Court of Appeal held that the requirements of Section 40 are mandatory and that non-compliance renders a termination on account of redundancy unfair. 33.Sections 43 and 45 of the Act apply with equal force to a termination on account of redundancy as they do to any other termination. Section 43(1) places a legal burden on the employer to prove the reason or reasons for termination, and where it fails to do so, the termination is deemed unfair within the meaning of Section 45. Once, therefore, an employee establishes that his employment was terminated, the evidential burden shifts to the employer to justify both the reason for, and the manner of, that termination — including, in a case of redundancy, proof that the redundancy was genuine and that the process leading to it was fair. Whether the Redundancy Was Genuine and Substantively Justified 34.It is common ground that the Claimant's employment was terminated, and that the Respondent's stated reason was redundancy. The burden accordingly lay on the Respondent to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the redundancy was genuine — that is, that the Claimant's role had in truth become superfluous on account of a bona fide operational cause, rather than that the label of “redundancy” was appropriated to achieve an end that the ordinary law of unfair termination would not otherwise sanction. 35.This Court has carefully considered the evidence tendered by the Respondent in discharge of that burden and finds it wanting in material respects. RW1, the Respondent's sole witness, was not the Claimant's supervisor, did not appraise his performance, did not sit in his PIP hearing, and was not present at the performance hearing of 1st March 2023. He had, on his own admission, no personal knowledge of the material events. More significantly, he was unable to produce a single Board resolution, management decision, restructuring report, or revised organogram evidencing the decision said to have been taken to abolish the Energy & Hull division. An employer who asserts a genuine operational cause for redundancy, and who is well able to access its own internal records, board minutes and organisational charts, cannot discharge the burden placed upon it by Sections 43 and 45 of the Act by resting its case on the bare, second-hand assertion of a witness who played no part in the impugned decision. 36.This Court also takes into account the sequence and proximity of events. The Claimant was subjected to a prolonged performance-management process culminating in a hearing on 1st March 2023, the outcome of which — on the unchallenged evidence — was never communicated to him despite his repeated requests, the last of which was by email dated 9th May 2023. It was verbally intimated to him that the Committee tasked with the process could not unanimously agree to terminate his employment on performance grounds. It is telling that the Notice of Intended Redundancy is dated 12th May 2023 — a mere three days after the Claimant's written demand for the outcome of that unresolved performance process — and that the Notice of Termination on account of Redundancy followed on 21st June 2023, without any intervening engagement. RW1 himself confirmed that the Claimant was not terminated for performance reasons, and could offer no explanation for why a redundancy situation should have crystallised so abruptly on the heels of a stalled and apparently inconclusive performance hearing. 37.This Court is satisfied, on the totality of this evidence, that there was no unanimity within the Respondent's own ranks as to whether the Claimant's performance warranted the termination of his employment, and that the redundancy process was resorted to as an expedient alternative route by which to exit the Claimant from employment, outside the safeguards that would otherwise have attended a termination founded on capacity or performance. A genuine redundancy is not, and cannot be, a convenient repackaging of a stalled disciplinary or performance process; where an employer cannot account for the coincidence of timing between the two, an adverse inference lies against the genuineness of the redundancy so declared. 38.The unreliability of the Respondent's case is further underscored by the ambiguity surrounding who, precisely, was affected by the redundancy, and on what criteria. RW1 testified under cross-examination that four employees were affected, naming only Mr. Fredrick Moti in addition to the Claimant, and conceding that no documentation had been produced to show that any of the four in fact exited the Respondent's employment on that account. This sits uneasily with the Respondent's own written submissions, which assert that five roles were impacted and that five employees were declared redundant. An employer that cannot, between its pleadings, its witness, and its own submissions, speak with one voice as to how many employees were affected by a redundancy it says it carefully planned, cannot be said to have discharged the burden of proving that the exercise was a genuine, considered operational undertaking, as opposed to an improvised justification for the exit of a single, targeted employee. 39.For these reasons, this Court finds that the Respondent has failed to discharge the burden placed upon it under Sections 43(1) and 45(2) of the Employment Act to prove the existence of a valid and genuine reason for the Claimant's termination on account of redundancy. Whether the Respondent Complied with the Procedural Requirements of Section 40 — the Centrality of Consultation 40.Even where a valid operational cause for redundancy exists, an employer remains bound to comply with the procedural safeguards codified in Section 40 of the Act. Central among these — although not spelt out in so many words in the text of Section 40 — is the requirement that the employer meaningfully consult the affected employee before a final decision to terminate is taken. While the Employment Act does not, in express terms, use the word “consultation”, our courts have consistently held that the requirement is necessarily implied in Section 40(1)(a) and (b), reinforced by the principle of fair labour practices donated by Article 41 of the Constitution, and further reinforced by Kenya's obligations as a State party to the International Labour Organization, in particular Article 13 of Recommendation No. 166 to the Termination of Employment Convention, 1982 (No. 158). 41.The importance of consultation, and its purpose, was authoritatively addressed by the Court of Appeal in Kenya Airways Limited v Aviation & Allied Workers Union Kenya & 3 Others [2014] eKLR. In his judgment, Maraga, JA (as he then was) reproduced Article 13 of ILO Recommendation No. 166, which provides:“When the employer contemplates terminations for reasons of an economic, technological, structural or similar nature, the employer shall: (a) provide the workers' representatives concerned in good time with relevant information including the reasons for the terminations contemplated, the number and categories of workers likely to be affected and the period over which the terminations are intended to be carried out; (b) give, in accordance with national law and practice, the workers' representatives concerned, as early as possible, an opportunity for consultation on measures to be taken to avert or to minimise the terminations and measures to mitigate the adverse effects of any terminations on the workers concerned such as finding alternative employment.” 42.The learned Judge of Appeal went on to hold as follows:“...I am of the firm view that the requirement of consultations [is] implicit in these provisions. The purpose of the notice under Section 40(1)(a) and (b) of the Employment Act... is to give the parties an opportunity to consider measures to be taken to avert or to minimise the terminations and measures to mitigate the adverse effects of any terminations on the workers concerned... The consultations are therefore meant to cause the parties to discuss and negotiate a way out of the intended redundancy, if possible, or the best way of implementing it if it is unavoidable.” 43.It is notable that in reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal in Kenya Airways found no difficulty in drawing upon comparative labour jurisprudence, including that of South Africa — the learned Judge of Appeal [Maraga J.A, as he then was] expressly declined to fault the trial court's reliance on the treatise by Rycroft and Jordan, A Guide to South African Labour Law, on the requirement of consultation, holding such comparative reference to be legitimate and proper. This is unsurprising: South Africa's Labour Relations Act, 1995, at section 189, imposes an express statutory duty on an employer contemplating dismissals for operational requirements to consult, and that jurisdiction's jurisprudence has long emphasised that such consultation must be a genuine, good-faith engagement and not a mere formality — an emphasis that resonates fully with, and has informed, the development of our own law on the subject. 44.The Court of Appeal, again sitting at Mombasa, revisited the content of the consultation obligation in Cargill Kenya Limited v Mwaka & 3 Others [2021] eKLR, where it held, after considering Kenya's obligations under the ILO Convention, that although consultation is not expressly provided for in Section 40 of the Act, it is necessarily implied by that section, and that in cases where employees are represented, or ought reasonably to be engaged, a reasonable employer would ordinarily be expected to:“(a)seek to give as much warning as possible of the impending redundancies so as to enable the employees who could be affected to take early steps to inform themselves of the relevant facts, consider possible alternative solutions and, if necessary, find alternative employment...; (b) consult... as to the best means by which the desired management result could be achieved fairly and with as little hardship to the employees as possible... and, in particular, seek to agree on the criteria to be applied in selecting the employees to be made redundant...; (c) seek to establish criteria for selection which, so far as possible, did not depend solely upon the opinion of the person making the selection but could be objectively checked against such things as attendance record, efficiency at the job, experience, or length of service; (d) seek to ensure that the selection was made fairly in accordance with that criteria...; [and] (e) seek to see whether instead of dismissing an employee he could offer him alternative employment.” 45.The Court of Appeal in Cargill went on to find, on facts strikingly similar to those before this Court, that where there is no evidence on record of any consultation undertaken in the manner described, a finding that the termination was procedurally unfair for want of consultation cannot be faulted. 46.The point was made with equal, and perhaps more pointed, force by the Court of Appeal in The German School Society & another v Ohany & another [2023] KECA 894 (KLR), where the Court, underscoring that consultation must be substantive and not illusory, held that consultation “must not be cosmetic”, and that consultations “have to be a reality, not a charade.” That admonition applies squarely to the facts of this case. 47.Applying these principles to the evidence before this Court, it is clear that no consultation — meaningful or otherwise — was ever extended to the Claimant. RW1 could not point to a single minute, memorandum, or record of any consultative engagement with the Claimant, whether before or after the Notice of Intended Redundancy of 12th May 2023. His bare assertion that “email correspondence spoke to” consultation, unsupported by the production of even one such email, amounts to no evidence at all. The Notice of Intended Redundancy itself, on the Claimant's uncontroverted evidence, mentioned that five roles would be affected without specifying which, and was followed by total silence until the Notice of Termination was served forty days later, on 21st June 2023. That sequence is the very antithesis of a process meant, in the words of the Court of Appeal in Kenya Airways, “to cause the parties to discuss and negotiate a way out of the intended redundancy.” The notice, on this record, was not a gateway to dialogue but a formality preceding a decision already made. 48.Nor did the Respondent comply with the selection-criteria limb of Section 40(1)(c). Beyond RW1's bare assertion that an objective criterion was applied, nothing was placed before this Court — no matrix, no scoring sheet, no comparative assessment of the employees said to be at risk — from which such a criterion, or its fair application, could be verified. Coupled with the irreconcilable discrepancy between RW1's evidence that four employees were affected and the Respondent's own submissions asserting that five were affected, this Court finds that the Respondent's evidence on the question of who was affected by the redundancy, and by what criteria, was materially ambiguous and unreliable. 50.For all the foregoing reasons, this Court finds and holds that the Respondent failed to comply with the mandatory procedural requirements of Section 40 of the Employment Act, in particular the requirement of meaningful consultation, and that the termination of the Claimant's employment was, on that ground alone, procedurally unfair. Conclusion on Fairness of Termination 51.Having found that the Respondent has failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, either a genuine and substantively justified reason for declaring the Claimant redundant, or that the process leading to his termination was procedurally fair, this Court finds and holds that the termination of the Claimant's employment on account of redundancy was both substantively and procedurally unfair within the meaning of Sections 43 and 45 of the Employment Act, 2007, and unlawful. The Claimant's Monetary Claims 52.Turning to quantum, this Court has considered the claims for unpaid telephone allowance (Kshs. 26,000/=), unpaid fuel allowance for June 2023 (Kshs. 10,000/=), and reimbursement of out-of-pocket taxi and fuel expenses (Kshs. 100,000/=). The Claimant's own Letter of Appointment records a single, consolidated monthly remuneration of Kshs. 450,000/= made up of basic salary and allowance, without separately itemised telephone, fuel, or taxi allowances distinct from that consolidated sum. In the circumstances, and noting further that these claims were not shown to arise from any distinct contractual entitlement over and above the consolidated package already paid to the Claimant, this Court declines to make separate awards under these heads, and the same are hereby dismissed. 53.On accrued and unpaid leave, the Claimant's evidence — that he was entitled to 21 days' annual leave, was paid out for 12.95 days, and remained owed 6.05 days at the daily rate of Kshs. 21,511.40, totalling Kshs. 130,143.97 — was neither controverted nor rebutted. RW1 produced no leave records, computation, or evidence of any further payment to dislodge this claim. Section 28 of the Employment Act entitles an employee to annual leave, and payment in lieu of accrued but untaken leave upon termination. Where, as here, an employer fails to produce leave records within its custody to rebut a specific, particularised claim, the employee's evidence on the point must be taken as proved. This Court accordingly finds the Claimant's claim for accrued and unpaid leave, in the sum of Kshs. 130,143.97, established and payable. 54.On the claim for unremitted employer pension contributions, the evidence, which stands unrebutted, is that the Respondent was obligated under its own Human Resource policy to remit an employer pension contribution equivalent to 7.5% of the Claimant's basic salary, that it failed to demonstrate that any such remittance was made, and that it failed, despite demand, to furnish the Claimant with a pension statement evidencing compliance. Where the records necessary to verify compliance with a statutory or contractual pension obligation lie exclusively within an employer's custody, and the employer, without explanation, fails to produce them, an adverse inference properly lies against it. In the circumstances of this case, and in the absence of any pension statement or remittance schedule from the Respondent from which a precise computation could otherwise be verified, I find the Claimant’s claim under the head unrebutted. I award him the Kshs. 315,000/= sought , which sum the Respondent shall pay to the Claimant, or remit to his pension scheme, as the case may be. 55.On compensation for unfair termination, Section 49(1)(c) of the Act caps such an award at twelve months' gross salary, while Section 49(4) directs the Court, in assessing quantum, to have regard, among other factors, to the length of service, the manner of termination, the extent of the employer's compliance with its statutory obligations, and the practicability of reinstatement. The Claimant's tenure, though marked by real hardship, was comparatively short — approximately thirteen months. Guided by the approach of the Court of Appeal in Cargill Kenya Limited v Mwaka & 3 Others (where an award of nine months was found excessive and reduced to four, having regard to tenure) and by the persuasive reasoning in Daniel Mburu Muriu v Hygrotech East Africa Ltd [2021] eKLR, this Court is satisfied that an award of the maximum twelve months would not be warranted on these facts, but that the seriousness of the Respondent's procedural and substantive failures — including its wholesale failure to consult, the ambiguity of its own case as to who was affected, and its use of redundancy to circumvent an unresolved performance process — justifies an award above the median. This Court accordingly assesses fair compensation for unfair termination at six (6) months' gross salary, being Kshs. 450,000/= x 6 = Kshs. 2,700,000/=, subject to statutory deductions. F. Findings And Disposition 56.For the reasons set out above, this Court finds and holds that the termination of the Claimant's employment by the Respondent on account of redundancy was unfair and unlawful, both substantively and procedurally, the Respondent having failed to prove a genuine operational cause for the redundancy and having wholly failed to accord the Claimant the meaningful consultation mandated by Section 40 of the Employment Act, 2007. 57.This Court accordingly enters judgment for the Claimant against the Respondent, and makes the following orders:i)A declaration be and is hereby issued that the termination of the Claimant's employment by the Respondent on account of redundancy was unfair and unlawful.ii)The Respondent shall pay the Claimant compensation for unfair termination in the sum of Kshs. 2,700,000/= (being six months' gross salary), subject to statutory deductions.iii)The Respondent shall pay the Claimant Kshs. 130,143.97 being compensation for accrued and unutilised leave days.iv)The Respondent shall pay the Claimant Kshs. 315,000/= being compensation for the unremitted employer pension contribution.v)The sums in (ii), (iii) and (iv) above shall attract interest at court rates from the date of this Judgment until payment in full.vi)The Claimant shall have the costs of this suit. 58.The Claimant's prayers for unpaid telephone allowance, unpaid fuel allowance, and reimbursement of out-of-pocket taxi and fuel expenses are dismissed, for the reasons given in the body of this Judgment. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY THIS 30TH DAY OF JUNE 2026.OCHARO KEBIRAJUDGE