https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12565

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI** **CIVIL CASE NO. HCCC E101 OF 2026** **HON. SENATOR ALLAN CHESANG..........PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT** **VERSUS** **STANDARD GROUP PLC..................DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT** **RULING** 1. Before the Court is the Notice of Motion dated 1st April 2026 brought under, inter alia, Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 40 Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules. 2. The Applicant seeks interlocutory injunctive orders restraining the Respondent, whether by itself, its servants or agents, from publishing or republishing defamatory statements concerning him pending the hearing and determination of the suit. He further seeks mandatory orders directing the Respondent to remove the impugned publication from its print, electronic and digital platforms. 3. The application is supported by the Applicant’s affidavit and is opposed through the Respondent’s replying affidavit. Both parties filed written submissions and lists of authorities. **Background** 1. The application arises from publications made by the Respondent on or about 20th March 2026 in its newspaper, online platforms and television broadcasts under the headline “The Masterminds of Harambee House Tender Scam.” The Applicant contends that the publication falsely portrayed him as having been implicated in fraudulent procurement dealings and referred to previous criminal investigations involving him. He asserts that the publication was false, malicious and defamatory and has continued to injure his reputation because it remains available on the Respondent’s digital platforms. 2. The Respondent opposes the application, contending that the Applicant has failed to satisfy the threshold for grant of an interlocutory injunction in a defamation action. It maintains that the publications concerned matters of public interest, denies malice and contends that the issues raised can only properly be determined upon a full trial. **Issues for determination** 1. The sole issue for determination is whether the Applicant has satisfied the legal threshold for the grant of interlocutory injunctive relief in a defamation suit. **Analysis** 1. The principles governing interlocutory injunctions are settled. An applicant must demonstrate a **prima facie case with a probability of success,** that he stands to **suffer irreparable injury incapable of compensation by an award of damages** and, where the Court is in doubt, the application is determined **on a balance of convenience**. 2. However, applications for injunctions in defamation proceedings stand on a different footing. Courts have consistently held that because such orders restrain publication before the substantive dispute has been determined, they should only issue in the clearest of cases. 3. The long-established principle in **Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269** remains applicable. Where the defendant indicates an intention to justify the publication or otherwise raises a defence that is not obviously frivolous, the Court ordinarily declines to restrain publication before trial. The same cautious approach has been adopted in **Micah Cheserem vs Immediate Media Services & 4 Others**,[**[2010] KEHC 4109 (KLR)**](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2010/4109/eng%402010-04-18) which recognized that interlocutory injunctions in libel actions are exceptional remedies and should only be granted where the words are manifestly defamatory and no sustainable defence is disclosed. **Whether a prima facie case has been established** 1. There is no dispute that the impugned publication refers to the Applicant. Equally, there is no dispute that the Respondent published the impugned material. 2. The Applicant argues that the publication portrays him as corrupt and criminal and therefore satisfies the elements of defamation. He relies on several authorities, including **Miguna Miguna v Standard Group Ltd & 4 Others (2017)** and submits that the publication has gravely injured his political and personal reputation. 3. The Respondent has denied liability and raised substantive defences. It disputes malice, challenges the Applicant’s claim and contends that the publications related to matters of public interest. 4. While the Applicant’s submissions raise arguable issues deserving investigation at trial, that alone does not entitle the Applicant to interlocutory injunctive relief. Similarly, whether the defences raised by the Respondent ultimately succeed cannot properly be determined upon affidavit evidence. The Court would be required to examine the truth or otherwise of the impugned statements, the extent of verification undertaken by the Respondent, whether the publications were fair and accurate and whether any defences recognized in defamation law are available. Those are matters that require oral evidence, cross-examination and a full trial. 5. At this interlocutory stage, the Court must guard against making findings that may embarrass the trial court. **Whether he stands to suffer irreparable injury incapable of compensation by an award of damages** 1. The Applicant submits that the publications continue to remain accessible online and therefore continue to injure his reputation. 2. There can be little doubt that injury to reputation may, in appropriate cases, be substantial. Indeed, reputation is an important aspect of human dignity protected by Article 28 of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the law of defamation itself recognizes damages as the primary remedy for injury to reputation. The plaint before the Court seeks general, aggravated and exemplary damages, thereby acknowledging that monetary compensation remains an available remedy should liability ultimately be established. 3. The Applicant has not demonstrated any exceptional circumstance showing that damages would be incapable of adequately compensating him if he succeeds at trial. 4. The Applicant also seeks an order compelling the Respondent to remove the impugned publication from its various platforms. Such relief is mandatory in nature. The principles governing mandatory interlocutory injunctions are even more stringent than those applicable to prohibitory injunctions. They are granted only in exceptional and clear cases where the Court is satisfied that the matter ought to be decided immediately. 5. The present dispute raises contested questions regarding the truthfulness of the publication, the existence of malice and the availability of legal defences. Those questions cannot appropriately be resolved at an interlocutory stage. **Balance of convinience** 1. The Court must also remain alive to the constitutional context within which this dispute arises. The Applicant’s right to dignity and reputation deserves protection. Equally, the Respondent enjoys constitutional protection in the exercise of media freedom and freedom of expression. 2. The impugned publication concerns allegations relating to the conduct of a serving Senator and public procurement, matters that are undeniably of public interest. Whether the Respondent discharged its professional obligation of responsible journalism is a question reserved for trial. To restrain publication before that inquiry is undertaken would amount to prior restraint, a remedy that courts have consistently approached with considerable caution. 3. This Court is therefore not persuaded that this is one of those exceptional cases where the constitutional protection accorded to freedom of expression should yield at an interlocutory stage. **Disposition** 1. Having considered the Application, supporting affidavit, Grounds of opposition, submissions and authorities cited by learned Counsel for the parties, I am not satisfied that the Applicant has met the higher threshold required for the grant of interlocutory injunctive relief in a defamation action. 2. Accordingly, the Notice of Motion dated 1st April 2026 is dismissed. 3. The costs of the application shall abide the outcome of the main suit. 4. Parties are directed to appear before the Deputy Registrar for pre-trial directions, to pave way for the main suit to be set down for hearing. **DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 30th DAY OF JULY, 2026 VIRTUALLY, THROUGH THE MICROSOFT TEAMS PLATFORM.** **KENNEDY KANDET** **JUDGE** **IN THE PRESENCE OF:** **KYUMU FOR THE APPLICANT.** **CHEBON FOR THE RESPONDENT.** **COURT ASSISTANT: AGGREY.**