https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1386

Consolidated Bank of Kenya Limited v Njuguna (Civil Appeal 274 of 2020) [2026] KECA 1386 (KLR) (10 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KECA 1386 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Court of Appeal at Nairobi Civil Appeal 274 of 2020 K M'Inoti, EC Mwita & B Ongaya, JJA July 10, 2026 Between Consolidated Bank of Kenya Limited Appellant and Eustace Muchigiri Njuguna Respondent (Being an appeal from the Judgment of the Employment & Labour Relations Court at Nairobi (Wasilwa, J.) dated 21st May, 2020 in ELRC Cause No. 1106 of 2017) Judgment 1.This appeal arises from the Judgment of the Employment and Labour Relations Court (ELRC) by Wasilwa, J. delivered on 21st May, 2020. The respondent, Eustace Muchigiri Njuguna, filed a claim in the ELRC at Nairobi against the appellant, Consolidated Bank of Kenya Limited, for unfair termination of employment. His case was that the respondent employed him in 2009 and he rose through the ranks to become a credit officer, earning a gross salary of Kshs. 1,558,044 per annum. He worked for the appellant until 20th June, 2014, when he was summarily dismissed inter alia for failing to protect the bank’s interests by allowing the irregular transfer of funds from the USD accounts of Masafi Fruits & Vegetables Limited to the accounts of Willy Musinga Mutiso and other accounts. 2.Before the dismissal, the respondent is said to have received a Show Cause Letter on 21st May, 2014 and was required to respond to the allegations of malpractice before 4 pm the following day. He stated that he timely presented his written response dated 22nd May, 2014 to the Human Resource Manager and he explained the extent of his engagement in the impugned transactions. That on or about 22nd May, 2014 at 3:45 pm, he received an email inviting him to a disciplinary hearing to be held on 23rd May, 2014 at 11:30 am. He contended that the composition of the disciplinary committee was conflicted because its chairman, who was the patron and head of treasury, was familiar with the directors of Masafi Fruits & Vegetables Limited and had also participated in the impugned transactions. He thus questioned the chairman’s impartiality, which he felt was prejudicial to him and against the rules of natural justice and fair procedure. 3.The respondent claimed that he was dismissed from employment for allegedly authorizing a fund transfer without approval from the Acting Head of Credit. He noted that, being an officer, clause 10.4 of the appellant’s Human Resource Policies and Procedures Manual Revised January 2009, provided that the CEO was the only one mandated to warn, suspend or terminate his employment. That the appellant’s Human Resource Manager, however, acted ultra vires her mandate by unlawfully dismissing him from employment against the advice of the Ag. CEO. That it was the Head of Human Resource who penned and signed the summary dismissal letter dated 20th June, 2014. Accordingly, the respondent sought:a.A declaration that his dismissal from employment was null and void for breach of the appellant’s Human Resources Policies and Procedures Manual Revised January 2009;b.An order reinstating him to his position without any loss of benefits;c.In the alternative, an order for payment with effect from 20th June, 2014 to the date of judgment at the rate of Kshs. 129,839 per month.d.Three months’ salary in lieu of notice...Kshs. 464,565.00.e.12 months’ salary as compensation for unfair/ unlawful termination.....Kshs. 1,558,068.f.Interest on (c), (d) and (e) above at court rates from time of filing suit till payment in full.g.Costs of the suit. 4.The appellant responded that it has a Credit Policy, which provides under clause 2.12 of the Credit Principles that committing the Bank to a transaction without proper authority is a serious breach of discipline. That following a tip-off from a staff member, the bank’s Internal Audit Department investigated irregularities in the management of accounts at the Harambee Avenue Branch for the period September 2013 to May 2014. That most transactions resulted in unauthorized overdrawn positions in customers’ accounts in violation of the respondent’s job description and the bank’s Credit Policy. Consequently, the respondent was issued with a Show Cause Letter informing him of the allegations and giving particulars of the said accounts. That the letter also informed the respondent that his actions amounted to gross misconduct and that he had been given time to respond to the allegations. The appellant stated that it conducted a disciplinary hearing against the respondent because his response to the Show Cause Letter was unsatisfactory. 5.The appellant’s further case was that during the disciplinary hearing held on 23rd May, 2014, the respondent made several admissions, and the disciplinary committee noted that his authorization helped the customer get away with the appellant’s money. In addition, the committee reviewed the evidence and recommended that the respondent be summarily dismissed. While making this recommendation, the committee noted that the respondent’s actions were not intended to protect the bank’s interests, but were to assist Masafi Fruits & Vegetables in avoiding paying what they owed the bank. That the CEO reviewed the committee’s recommendations and noted that the respondent was aware of his duty to report fraud and breach of procedures or other irregularities, which led to the appellant terminating his services. 6.The appellant referred to particulars of the letter dated 20th June, 2014 and asserted that the respondent was informed of the reasons for termination of his services and the resultant exposure of the appellant to possible financial loss. That the respondent was also given details of his terminal dues and upon completing the necessary forms, was paid all his final dues and issued with a certificate of service. The appellant further stated that the respondent’s disciplinary process therefore adhered to its Human Resource Policy and the Employment Act. That the respondent never raised any objection about the alleged conflict of interest at the disciplinary hearing and that the termination of his employment was lawful. The appellant maintained that by the Head of Human Resource signing the respondent’s summary dismissal letter did not by itself negate the fact that the termination process was lawful. The appellant prayed that his claim be dismissed with costs. 7.During the hearing of the matter before the superior court, the respondent testified in support of his case while the appellant called two witnesses, Ms. Rose Mukoba and Ms. Elizabeth Koech. Both parties thereafter filed submissions, and the trial court delivered Judgment in the case. The learned trial Judge noted that the Minutes of the disciplinary hearing did not indicate whether the respondent objected to the committee’s membership. That the said Minutes were written in prose, and it was unclear whether the complaints raised against the respondent were put to him and what his responses were. Further, the respondent’s answer to the issue of the overdrawn account of Masafi Fruits & Vegetables was not recorded on pages 4 to 5 of the Minutes. The trial court stated that it was also unclear from the said Minutes whether the appellant had established valid reasons to dismiss the respondent. That this, coupled with the finding that the appellant contravened its Manual by having the respondent’s show-cause and dismissal letters signed by the Human Resource, warranted the holding that the respondent’s dismissal was unfair. The trial court subsequently awarded the respondent six months’ salary as compensation for the unfair termination, and one month’s salary in lieu of notice. Further, the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the suit plus interest at court rates effective from the date of the judgment. 8.The appellant was aggrieved by the said judgment and filed the instant appeal. It prays for orders that this appeal be allowed, and the Judgment of the Superior Court be set aside. The memorandum of appeal dated 15th July, 2020 sets out 10 grounds of appeal, reproduced verbatim as follows:i.The learned judge erred in law and in fact in finding that the termination of the Respondent was unlawful on account that the Letter of Termination had been signed by the Head of Human Resource Department and not by the Chief Executive Officer when:a.There was evidence that the Appellant’s Head of Human Resource Department had been instructed by the Chief Executive Officer to sign the termination letter.b.The Appellant’s Human Resource Manual uses the word “will” and not “shall” as regards the signing of Termination letter for Appellant’s officers and unionisable employees.c.No provision of the Employment Act, 2007 was alleged to have been violated when the Respondent’s termination letter was signed by the Head of Human Resource Department.ii.The learned judge erred in law and in fact in finding that the termination of the Respondent was unlawful on account that minutes of the disciplinary hearing were in prose form when there is no provision in the Employment Act, 2007 that provides on how minutes in a disciplinary hearing are to be written.iii.The Learned Judge erred in law and in fact in finding that the actions complained against the Respondent were unclear when the Respondent was issued with a Show Cause letter detailing the accusations against the Respondent.iv.The learned judge erred in law and in fact in failing to find that the actions by the Respondent amounted to dishonesty and thus the Appellant had reasonable grounds to terminate his services.v.The learned judge erred in law and in fact by awarding salary in lieu of notice when the Appellant was not required to issue notice to the Respondent in line with the provisions of Section 44 of the Employment Act.vi.The learned judge erred in law and in fact by awarding 6 months’ salary compensation for unlawful termination without taking into account the provisions of Sections 49 and 50 of the Employment Act and the requirement that an employee whose contract of employment is terminated should mitigate their losses.vii.The Learned Judge erred in law and in fact in failing to give any adequate and credible reason on how she arrived at 6 months’ salary as compensation to the Respondent.viii.The learned judge erred in law and in fact by awarding one-month salary in lieu of notice without any justifiable reasons.ix.The Learned Judge erred in law and in fact in failing to evaluate the evidence by the Appellant and/or consider its elaborate and detailed Written Submissions.x.The Learned Judge exhibited bias by selectively evaluating the evidence by the Respondent and failed to consider the totality of the Appellant’s evidence. 9.Subsequently, the respondent filed a cross-appeal dated 2nd September, 2020, contending that the impugned Judgment ought to be varied or reversed on the following grounds: whether the learned Judge erred in law by failing to correctly apply provisions of Section 49(1) (a) of the Employment Act, 2007 as read with clause 9 of the respondent’s contract of service; whether the learned Judge erred in law by failing to reinstate the respondent or in the alternative offer compensation, having established that the termination of his employment was null and void for flauting clause 10.4 of the appellant’s Human Resource Policies and Procedures Manual; whether the respondent’s contract of service was ever terminated under provisions of the Employment Act, 2007 and the contract of service; and whether the Judge exercised her discretion judiciously as required under Section 49(1)(c) of the Employment Act, 2007 in the circumstances of the case. 10.The respondent prays for the appellant’s appeal to be dismissed with costs and the impugned Judgment by the trial court varied and substituted with orders as follows:a.An order vacating the award for 1 month salary and substituting it with an award for 3 months’ salary in lieu of notice.b.An order vacating the award for 6 months’ salary and substituting it with an award for 12 months’ salary as compensation for unfair termination.c.An order directed to the appellant to reinstate or re- engage the respondent with no loss of benefits,In the alternativE, an order compelling the appellant to remit to the respondent full salary WEF 20th June 2014 to date at the rate of 129,837 per month.Cost of this Cross-Appeal. 11.In its written submissions dated 4th October, 2021, the appellant urges its grounds of appeal under three issues for determination as follows: whether the Court erred in law and in finding that the respondent’s termination was unlawful; whether the Court erred in law and in fact in awarding the respondent 6 months’ salary as compensation for unfair termination and 1 month salary in lieu of notice; and whether the appellant is entitled to costs of the suit and the present appeal. The appellant submits that it adhered to the statutory procedure set out under Sections 41 and 45(2) of the Employment Act when terminating the respondent’s employment contract. That it also had reasonable grounds to terminate the respondent’s employment for failing to protect the interest of the Bank and disregarding the Credit Policy & Procedures. That the respondent’s display of dishonesty and deficient integrity in the course of his duty eroded all elements of trust between the parties, and it was within its right to terminate his services. 12.On the reliefs granted by the trial court, the appellant submits that the learned Judge failed to particularly consider the provisions of Sections 49(4) (b), (k), (l) and (m) in awarding damages. That the trial Judge did not justify why she awarded the respondent 6 months’ salary as compensation and not any other remedies under Section 49(1). The appellant urges this Court to find that it has proved that the ELRC erred in failing to find the respondent’s termination of employment lawful and wrongfully awarded the remedies in its judgment. 13.The respondent’s written submissions are dated 18th March, 2022. He states that the learned Judge erred by awarding him one month’s salary instead of the three months stipulated in the contract of employment. That this Court should therefore allow the cross-appeal and substitute the trial court’s award for one month with three months’ salary as notice pay. He further submits that he was entitled to an order for reinstatement or the alternative prayer as pleaded in the amended memorandum of claim, but which the Judge completely failed to consider and make a finding on. It is submitted that the trial Judge was lenient in granting 6 months’ salary as compensation, considering the appellant acted maliciously and flauted its own HR Manual. That he deserved the maximum award of 12 months’ salary compensation for unfair termination as pleaded. The respondent relies on International Planned Parenthood Federation v Pamela Ebot Arrey Effiom [2016] eKLR, in which the court quoted the decision of this Court (Gicheru, Kwach & Muli, JJ.A) in C.P.C. Industrial Products v Angima, Civil Appeal No. 197 of 1992, that the court was bound to consider the employer’s malicious, oppressive or callous acts in assessing the damages the employee would be entitled to for wrongful termination or dismissal. 14.When this appeal came up for plenary hearing before us on 24th March, 2026, learned counsel, Mr. Kigata appeared for the appellant, while learned counsel, Mr. Masaviru appeared for the respondent. Mr. Kigata highlighted that the respondent was dismissed on account of disregarding the appellant’s credit policy in view of the evidence on record for procedure on loan processing; the trial Court granted six months’ salaries without reference to the applicable provisions in section 49 of the Employment Act; while the termination letter was by the Human Resource Manager and not by the Chief Executive Officer as required in the Manual, the Manual was not law; and, the appeal should therefore be allowed. 15.On the other hand, Mr. Masaviru highlighted that per the Manual, only the Chief Executive officer had the authority to terminate a non-unionisable employee like the respondent; the Chief Executive Officer had reviewed the case and stated that the respondent should resign and not get dismissed as was imposed; the respondent provided no vouchers or other evidence to show that the respondent authorized transfer of the money as was alleged; clause 9 of the Manual provided for a three months’ payment in lieu of the termination notice; and, that the cross- appeal should be allowed. 16.Our role in this first appeal is as was held in Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Company Ltd & Others [1968] EA 123. The East Africa Court of Appeal established that a first appellate court must re-evaluate all evidence and reach its own conclusions. The court noted the first appellate court must, however, bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make allowance accordingly. 17.We have distilled from the appeal and cross-appeal that the issues for our determination are as follows:a.Whether the dismissal was unfair because the reasons for dismissal were not shown to exist; and, that the Chief Executive Officer did not sign the dismissal letter.b.Whether the learned trial Judge erred by awarding the respondent 6 months’ salary as compensation for the unfair termination.c.Whether the respondent was entitled to pay in lieu of notice and whether it ought to have been awarded at three months’ salary and not one month’s salary as awarded by the trial court.d.Whether the respondent was entitled to an order of reinstatement or pay for the unexpired term of the contract of service.e.What orders should this Court make on the appeal and cross-appeal. 18.On the reasons for dismissal, the trial Court found that from the minutes of the disciplinary hearing attached to the proceedings, the actions or inactions complained against the respondent were not clear. Further, the minutes were done in prose form and it was not clear whether the complaints raised against the Claimant were put to him and what his responses were. We have considered the report of the disciplinary hearings held on Friday 23rd May, 2014 in respect of irregularities in the management of 8 accounts at the appellant’s Harambee Avenue Branch. The report which is in prose and with respect to the respondent sets out as follows;“He is a Business Development Officer at the Branch and he appeared before the Committee on Friday, 23rd May 2014. Eustace began the hearing by claiming that the show cause letter of 21st May 2014 did not address the correct position of the accounts in question. However, it was pointed out to him that even the position he was trying to present in his response was not the correct position as the accounts had been overdrawn without approval from the Ag. Head of CreditHe also clarified that fact that the USD account of Masafi Fruits & Vegetables Ltd has never been overdrawn but rather it is the Ksh. account which is currently overdrawn.He went on to state as follows regarding various accounts:” 19.From the forgoing record of the start of the disciplinary hearing against the respondent, we find that the parties lacked clarity on the particulars or details of the case that was levelled against the respondent for the simple reason that the disciplinary panel and the respondent were not in agreement about the allegations. While disputing the particulars of the allegations in the show cause letter of 21st May, 2014, the panel equally disputed the account of particulars by the respondent and which account by the respondent is not detailed in the report. The disciplinary hearing report does not explain how that variance between the panel and the respondent in the allegations levelled against the respondent was resolved, if at all it was addressed at all. 20.We therefore find that the trial Court did not misdirect itself but was plainly correct in finding that the actions or inactions complained against the respondent were not clear as at the time and through the disciplinary hearing. While evidence was provided on record for the appellant’s procedure on loan processing as was submitted by Mr. Kigata, we find such evidence did not in any material respect undermine the trial Court’s finding that as at the time of the disciplinary hearing, the particulars of the case levelled against the respondent by way of his actions and inactions complained against him lacked clarity. 21.Section 43 of the Employment Act provides that in any claim arising out of termination of a contract, the employer shall be required to prove the reason or reasons for the termination, and where the employer fails to do so, the termination shall be deemed to have been unfair within the meaning of section 45. The section further states that the reason or reasons for termination of a contract are the matters that the employer at the time of termination of the contract genuinely believed to exist, and which caused the employer to terminate the services of the employee. We find that to the extent that at the disciplinary hearing the particulars of the allegations levelled against the respondent were not clear to both the disciplinary panel and the respondent, it meant that the ensuing dismissal could not be founded upon reasons that the respondent genuinely believed to exist. 22.The respondent has acknowledged that clause 10.4 of the appellant’s Human Resource Manual was breached but it is submitted that the breach could not render the dismissal unlawful. Clause 10.4 of the Manual states as follows;“Where the breach is of such a nature as to warrant a final warning, suspension, termination or dismissal, recommendations will be made to the Chief Executive for approval on guidance before action is taken.Warning letters will be issued by respective Heads of Departments but copied to Human Resource Department. Termination and dismissal letters will be signed by the Chief Executive for officers, while the Head of Human Resource will sign such letters for unionisable employees.” 23.The undisputed evidence was that the Chief Executive approved that the respondent should resign. However, the letter for summary dismissal dated 20th June, 2014 was issued and signed by Mrs. Jacinta Lwanga, Head of Human Resources. The letter did not state that it was being issued upon authority or signed on behalf of the Chief Executive Officer. We therefore find that the letter was issued by the Head of Human Resources in her own behalf in that capacity and in complete disregard of the express role and authority of the Chief Executive Officer in clause 10.4 of the Manual. We find that the trial court did not err in finding thus;“38.Indeed this position of the Manual was flouted by the Respondent as the show cause letter to the Claimant and even the dismissal letter was authored by the Head of Human Resource.” 24.Section 45 (2) (c) of the Employment Act states that termination of employment by an employer is unfair, inter alia, if the employer fails to prove that the employment was terminated in accordance with fair procedure. Further, one of the considerations in deciding whether it was just and equitable for an employer to terminate the employment of an employee per section 45 (5) (a) of the Act is the procedure adopted by the employer in reaching the decision to dismiss the employee, the communication of that decision to the employee and the handling of any appeal against the decision. We find that the procedure adopted to dismiss the respondent breached clause 10.4 of the Manual and the appellant thereby adopted an unfair procedure thereby making the dismissal unfair and unlawful to that extent. 25.We find that the trial Court did not err in law or fact in holding that the dismissal was unfair because the reasons for dismissal were not shown to exist as at the time of disciplinary hearing and, that the Chief Executive Officer did not sign the dismissal letter as was required in the Manual. 26.Did the learned trial Judge erred by awarding the respondent 6 months’ salary as compensation for the unfair termination? The guiding provisions is section 50 of the Employment Act which directing the court to apply section 49 (4) of the Act. Section 49(4) of the Act provides as follows;“(4)A labour officer shall, in deciding whether to recommend the remedies specified in subsections (1)and (3), take into account any or all of the following-a.the wishes of the employee;b.the circumstances in which the termination took place, including the extent, if any, to which the employee caused or contributed to the termination; and,c.the practicability of recommending reinstatement or re-engagement;d.the common law principle that there should be no order for specific performance in a contract for service except in very exceptional circumstances;e.the employee’s length of service with the employer;f.the reasonable expectation of the employee as to the length of time for which his employment with that employer might have continued but for the termination;g.the opportunities available to the employee for securing comparable or suitable employment with another employer;h.the value of any severance payable by law;i.the right to press claims or any unpaid wages, expenses or other claims owing to the employee;j.any expenses reasonable incurred by the employee as a consequence of the termination;k.any conduct of the employee which to any extent caused or contributed to the termination;l.any failure by the employee to reasonably mitigate the losses attributable to the unjustified termination; and,m.any compensation, including ex-gratia payment, in respect of termination of employment paid by the employer and received by the employee.” 27.The appellant’s submission that the compensation was not available because the dismissal was not unfair has already evaporated with our finding that the trial Court did not err in finding that the dismissal was unfair. 28.While urging us to deviate from the 6-moths awarded by the trial court and to instead award 12 months’ salaries, it was submitted for the respondent that the appellant breached the Manual. It has not been specifically shown for the respondent the material respects in which the trial court may have exercised the discretion in breach of the considerations in section 49 of the Employment Act. In Mbogo & Another v. Shah [1968] EA 93 it was held that this Court will only interfere with a trial court’s exercise of judicial discretion if it is established that the lower court misdirected itself, acted on wrong principles, considered irrelevant matters, or arrived at a decision that is so manifestly wrong that it results in an injustice. 29.We have considered that the respondent has urged that he was summarily dismissed despite the Chief Executive Officer recommending that he resigns. We have considered that if he resigned at the instance of the appellant, the contractual regime between the parties was for payment of three months’ salaries in lieu of notice. We have also considered that no evidence is on record to suggest shrunk opportunities available to the respondent for securing comparable or suitable employment with another employer; the respondent had been employed by the appellant in a service running for only about five years as at dismissal; while the dismissal was unfair the relationship between the parties was constrained in the sensitive banking enterprise; the respondent did not urge and submit on the otherwise aggravating factors on the part of the appellant; and, the respondent had not shown steps taken to mitigate his grievances such as about the allegedly biased disciplinary panel. In view of these considerations as envisaged in section 49 (4) of the Act and in absence of submissions to show that the trial court had misdirected itself, acted on wrong principles, considered irrelevant matters, or arrived at a decision that is so manifestly wrong that it resulted in an injustice, we will not disturb but will uphold the award of six months’ compensation for the unfair dismissal. 30.The next issue for determination is whether the respondent was entitled to pay in lieu of notice and whether it ought to have been awarded at three months’ salary and not one month’s salary as awarded by the trial court. As submitted for the respondent, under section 49(1) (a) of the Employment Act, where a summary dismissal is unjustified the employer will pay the employee the wages which the employee would have earned had the employee been given the period of notice to which he was entitled under the Act or the contract of service. The evidence on record is that the contractual provision was that on confirmation either party was entitled to terminate the employment by giving three months’ notice in writing or payment in lieu of such notice. Accordingly, we find for the respondent on the cross-appeal that the trial court erred by awarding one month pay in lieu of notice which finding is liable to setting aside and replaced with an award of three months making Kshs.129,837 x 3 thus Kshs.349, 511.00. While making that finding, we have considered the submission made for the appellant that under section 44 of the Employment Act, pay in lieu of notice was unavailable because the appellant was entitled to dismiss summarily with no notice or shorter notice than was contractual or prescribed by statute. However, we find that section 44 of the Act does not apply in view of the finding that the summary dismissal was unfair. 31.The next issue for determination is whether the respondent was entitled to an order of reinstatement or pay for the unexpired term of the contract of service. It is submitted for the respondent that after finding that the dismissal was unfair, the trial Court was silent on the prayer for reinstatement or in alternative compensation in form of salary for the remaining period as was prayed for in the amended memorandum of claim. While indeed the trial court made no decision on the prayer for reinstatement or pay for remainder of the contractual period, we find that nothing turns on that point to justify variation of the trial court’s judgment. Section 12 (3) (vii) of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act provides that the court may grant an order for reinstatement of any employee within three years of dismissal, subject to such conditions as the Court thinks fit to impose under circumstances contemplated under any written law. In the present case the respondent had been dismissed by the letter dated 20th June, 2014 and the judgment was delivered on 21st May, 2020, being about five years and eleven months from the date of the dismissal. Apart from the exceptional circumstances and practicability of reinstatement which have not been urged for the respondent as envisaged in section 49 of the Act, we find that section 12(3) (vii) strictly barred considerations of an order of reinstatement. Further, once the contract of service was terminated on 20th June, 2014, in absence of a good reason attributable to the appellant as defeating the respondent’s capacity to move on in gainful activities to mitigate his situation, a claim for lost earnings consequential to the dismissal is unsustainable or would amount to unjust enrichment. We hasten to observe that the respondent has not pointed out to us a contractual or statutory provision that would entitle him to such relief. 32.The upshot is that the appeal is disallowed and the cross-appeal partially succeeds for setting aside of the award of one-month salary payment in lieu of notice and substituting therefor three months’ salary payments in lieu of notice Kshs. 349, 511.00. 33.In the premises we dismiss the appeal; partially allow the cross- appeal as stated above; order the appellant to pay costs of both the appeal and cross-appeal; and, we confirm the final orders of the superior court save the setting aside the award on one month pay in lieu of notice 129,837/= and substituting therefore Kshs. 349, 511/=. DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 10TH DAY OF JULY, 2026.K. M’INOTI...................................JUDGE OF APPEALE. C. MWITA...................................JUDGE OF APPEALB. ONGAYA...................................JUDGE OF APPEALI certify that this is a true copy of the original.SignedDeputy Registrar