https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1613

County Secretary of Kajiado, Ole Sakude & 46 others v Salaries & Remuneration Commission & another (Civil Appeal 230 of 2020) [2026] KECA 1613 (KLR) (31 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KECA 1613 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Court of Appeal at Nairobi Civil Appeal 230 of 2020 DK Musinga, P Lilan & JO Okello, JJA July 31, 2026 Between County Secretary of Kajiado, Francis Ole Sakude & 46 others & 46 others Appellant and Salaries & Remuneration Commission Respondent and Council of Governors Interested Party (Being an appeal from the Judgment of the Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi (Abuodha, J.) dated 14th May 2020 in ELRC Petition No. 136 of 2016) Judgment 1.Before this Court is an appeal from the judgment of the Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi (Abuodha, J.) delivered on 14th May 2020 dismissing the appellants' constitutional petition with costs. 2.The appellants are the forty-seven persons who, at the material time, served as County Secretaries in the respective county governments established under the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. The dispute giving rise to this appeal traces its origins to the establishment of county governments following the promulgation of the Constitution. According to the appellants, section 15 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution required Parliament to enact legislation to provide for the phased transfer of functions from the national government to county governments. In fulfilment of that constitutional obligation, Parliament enacted the Transition to Devolved Government Act which established the Transition Authority (now defunct) to facilitate the transition to the devolved system of government. Among its statutory functions, the Authority was mandated to make recommendations on the effective management of the assets of the national and county governments and to advise on the rationalization and deployment of human resources between the two levels of government. 3.The appellants pleaded that in the discharge of its statutory mandate, the Transition Authority undertook job evaluation, prepared job descriptions and specifications for county public offices and recommended corresponding remuneration structures. In relation to the office of County Secretary, it recommended placement at the equivalent of Job Group T with a salary scale ranging from Kshs.152,060/= to Kshs.302,980/= per month, together with house and commuter allowances of Kshs. 70,000/= and 24,000/= respectively. They asserted that counties advertised the positions under Job Group T, that applicants applied on the understanding that they would remain under that Job Group if successful, and that those appointed executed contracts reflecting those terms of engagement. 4.The appellants contended that notwithstanding those recommendations, the respondent issued a circular dated 29th July 2013 advising governors that County Secretaries be remunerated at a substantially lower salary scale ranging between Kshs.135,000/= and Kshs.180,000/= together with house and other allowances. They further asserted that by a subsequent unilateral circular dated 31st July 2014, the respondent introduced a consolidated remuneration package ranging between Kshs.225,000/= and Kshs.300,000/=, comprising sixty per cent basic salary and forty per cent allowances. According to the appellants, whereas officers serving in the equivalent Job Group T within the national public service earned salaries ranging between Kshs.396,600/= and Kshs.547,540/= together with separate allowances, County Secretaries were subjected to a consolidated remuneration package, thereby resulting in different remuneration from that payable to public officers serving in the equivalent Job Group T. 5.The appellants further pleaded that on 29th August 2016 they requested the respondent to harmonize their remuneration with that of officers serving in the equivalent grade within the national public service in accordance with Part III of the Human Resource Policies and Procedures Manual for the Public Service. The respondent replied vide a letter dated 23rd September 2016, stating that the office of County Secretary fell under Job Group S as opposed to Job Group T, which response was based on an earlier circular dated 18th December 2014 where the respondent purported to re-designate the County Secretaries in Civil Service Job Group S equivalent. According to the appellants, that communication amounted to an unlawful redesignation of the office of County Secretary, notwithstanding that Article 230 of the Constitution and section 7 of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission Act only empowered the respondent to advise on remuneration and benefits and not to create, abolish, redesignate or reclassify public offices. 6.The appellants further asserted that upon requesting the job evaluation report on which the respondent had based its decision, they were instead invited to a meeting convened on 8th November 2016 to discuss preliminary job evaluation results. They maintained that they were not supplied with the report beforehand and were therefore denied a meaningful opportunity to study its contents and make informed representations before the respondent finalized its recommendations. They contended that they were thereby denied an opportunity to study the preliminary report and formulate recommendations before the respondent finalized the job evaluation exercise. 7.The appellants further contended that the respondent's decision fundamentally altered the hierarchy within county governments by placing County Secretaries in the same job group as Chief Officers, notwithstanding that County Secretaries were the heads of the county public service under section 44 of the County Governments Act. They maintained that if County Secretaries were reduced to Job Group S, which was equivalent to that of Chief Officers, it would disrupt the chain of command within county governments and create administrative difficulties. They further asserted that some county governments had proceeded to advertise the office of County Secretary under Job Group S on the strength of the respondent's advisories. 8.On the basis of the foregoing matters, the appellants instituted the constitutional petition dated 10th November 2016, challenging the constitutionality and legality of the respondent's decisions, circulars and advisory communications concerning the grading, remuneration and benefits attached to the office of County Secretary. They contended that the respondent had acted ultra vires Article 230 of the Constitution and the Salaries and Remuneration Commission Act by unlawfully redesignating the office of County Secretary from Job Group T to Job Group S and, in so doing, violated the national values and principles of governance as well as their constitutional rights to equality and freedom from discrimination, fair labour practices, fair administrative action and a fair hearing. They accordingly sought, inter alia, declarations that the respondent's actions and the impugned circulars, advisories and purported redesignation were unconstitutional, unlawful, null and void; declarations that their constitutional rights had been violated; compensation of Kshs. 1,000,000/= to each appellant or such other sum as the court deemed appropriate; permanent injunctions restraining the respondent from releasing, circulating or publishing the final county job evaluation report or any report varying, demoting or otherwise altering the grading, remuneration or benefits attached to the office of County Secretary; general and aggravated damages; costs; and such further relief as the court considered just and appropriate. 9.The respondent opposed the petition through a replying affidavit sworn by Anne Gitau, its Secretary. She maintained that the respondent is an independent constitutional commission established under Article 230 of the Constitution with the mandate to set and regularly review the remuneration and benefits of State officers and to advise the national and county governments on the remuneration and benefits of all other public officers. She asserted that, in discharging that mandate, the respondent is guided by the constitutional principles set out in Article 230(5), including the need to ensure that the total public wage bill is fiscally sustainable, that public service attracts and retains the requisite skills, and that remuneration is administered in a transparent and fair manner. She further averred that section 11 of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission Act empowered the respondent, among other functions, to conduct comparative remuneration surveys, undertake job evaluation and make recommendations on the remuneration and benefits of public officers. 10.The respondent averred that although the Transition Authority had been established to facilitate the transition to devolved government, its role in matters relating to remuneration and benefits did not override the respondent's constitutional mandate. It maintained that the recommendations made by the Transition Authority were transitional in nature and could neither bind nor limit the respondent in the exercise of its constitutional functions. According to the respondent, following the establishment of county governments, it undertook a comprehensive job evaluation exercise across the public service, including county governments, with the objective of developing a harmonized grading and remuneration structure founded on the principle of equal pay for work of equal value. The exercise, it stated, involved the evaluation of 40,298 jobs across 228 public institutions and was preceded by stakeholder sensitization, training, job analysis, validation of job descriptions and extensive stakeholder engagement. 11.The respondent denied having redesignated the office of County Secretary from Job Group T to Job Group S. It maintained that it had never classified County Secretaries into any job group and that the reference to an equivalent job group in its communications was made solely for purposes of determining the payment of specified allowances, particularly hardship and subsistence allowances, and not for grading or classification of the office. It further explained that the circular of 29th July 2013 merely advised county governments on the remuneration and benefits payable to County Secretaries pursuant to Article 259(11) of the Constitution, while the letter dated 23rd September 2016 was issued in response to the appellants' request for harmonization of their allowances and merely clarified the basis upon which equivalent job groups had been assigned for that limited purpose. The respondent consequently denied acting outside its constitutional mandate or reducing the appellants' remuneration and benefits. 12.The respondent likewise denied violating the appellants' constitutional rights or denying them an opportunity to participate in the job evaluation process. It maintained that stakeholder participation formed an integral part of the exercise from its inception and that County Secretaries, like other public officers, participated through sensitization workshops, completion of job analysis questionnaires, validation of job descriptions and consultative engagements. It asserted that, after completing the evaluation, it invited the appellants to a workshop on 8th November 2016 to discuss the draft results, but that the appellants protested and walked out before the respondent's representatives could present the report. The respondent therefore denied any breach of the appellants' rights to fair administrative action, equality or fair labour practices, contending that the petition was misconceived, sought to impede the discharge of its constitutional mandate and should be dismissed with costs. 13.The appellants subsequently filed a supplementary affidavit sworn by Peter Leley in his capacity as Chairman of the County Secretaries Forum in response to the respondent's replying affidavit. They maintained that the respondent had sought to reduce the dispute to one of semantics and technicalities. According to the appellants, whether the respondent described its actions as the formulation of a new grading structure or as the redesignation of public offices, the practical effect remained the same because County Secretaries had been moved from the equivalent of Job Group T to Job Group S. They asserted that, had the respondent confined itself to formulating a new grading structure without altering the status of the office, County Secretaries would have remained classified under the same grade as their counterparts in Job Group T. 14.The appellants further contended that the respondent's actions undermined the objective set out in section 11(c) of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission Act which requires the Commission to advise on harmonization, equity and fairness in remuneration so as to attract and retain requisite skills in the public service. They maintained that the respondent's actions had diminished the attractiveness of the office of County Secretary and were likely to result in a lack of commitment among serving County Secretaries as well as difficulty in attracting suitably qualified persons to the office. 15.The appellants also disputed the respondent's assertion that adequate public participation had been undertaken. They contended that the respondent had effectively admitted that public participation had not been conducted at the initial stage of the process, and argued that there was no guarantee that any subsequent engagement would remedy that omission. They further maintained that the Constitution requires independent commissions to uphold constitutionalism and secure observance of democratic values and principles in the discharge of their mandates. 16.Lastly, the appellants rejected the respondent's assertion that the petition was merely an attempt to secure an increase in remuneration. They maintained that the proceedings had been instituted to vindicate their constitutional rights and to ensure that the job evaluation exercise was conducted in a manner that was participatory, fair and transparent. They accordingly urged the court to allow both the petition with costs. 17.Upon considering the pleadings, affidavits and submissions of the parties, the trial court rendered its decision on 14th May 2020. The learned judge did not expressly formulate the issues for determination. After setting out the respective positions advanced by the parties, he proceeded to consider the dispute in light of the constitutional and statutory framework governing the respondent's mandate before addressing the alleged violations of the appellants' constitutional rights. 18.The learned judge held that matters relating to the salaries, remuneration and benefits of State and public officers in the national and county governments fall within the exclusive constitutional mandate of the respondent. He observed that the Transition Authority and the respondent were established under different legal frameworks to perform distinct functions and that any advice or recommendations by the Transition Authority on remuneration were subject to the respondent's constitutional mandate. Relying on Teachers Service Commission v Kenya National Union of Teachers & 3 Others, Civil Appeal No. 196 of 2015, the court held that the respondent's advice on remuneration and benefits is binding upon both the national and county governments. The learned judge further observed that the appellants had not exhibited evidence demonstrating that the Transition Authority had undertaken the job description, job specification and remuneration exercise upon which they relied. 19.Turning to the alleged constitutional violations, the learned judge held that Articles 25(c) and 50 of the Constitution were inapplicable because the dispute arose from an internal consultative and administrative process concerning remuneration and benefits rather than proceedings before a court or tribunal. He further found that the appellants had not sufficiently demonstrated discrimination contrary to Article 27 and reiterated that a party alleging infringement of constitutional rights must identify the constitutional provisions alleged to have been violated and demonstrate with precision the manner of the alleged violation. Having found that the petition disclosed no constitutional issue warranting the grant of the reliefs sought, the learned judge dismissed it with costs. 20.Aggrieved by the judgment, the appellants lodged the present appeal.In their Memorandum of Appeal dated 29th May 2020, they fault the learned judge for holding that the petition was devoid of any constitutional issue warranting the grant of the reliefs sought; failing to find that the respondent acted outside its constitutional and statutory mandate by redesignating the office of County Secretary from Job Group T, or its equivalent, to Job Group S, or its equivalent, before completing its purported job review exercise; failing to distinguish between the respondent's mandate to set and review the remuneration and benefits of State officers and its mandate to advise the national and county governments on the remuneration and benefits of public officers; failing to appreciate the evidence that the office of County Secretary was initially advertised and retained under Job Group T before being advertised under Job Group S on the respondent's advice; failing to find that the respondent violated the appellants' rights to fair administrative action, equality and freedom from discrimination, and fair labour practices; taking an inordinately long period to determine the petition; and rendering what they describe as a shallow, unreasoned, retrogressive and uninspiring judgment. 21.The appellants accordingly pray that the appeal be allowed, the judgment of the Employment and Labour Relations Court delivered on 14th May 2020 be set aside, and the reliefs sought in the petition together with the costs of the appeal be granted. 22.At the hearing of the appeal, learned counsel Mr. Ochieng held brief for Senior Counsel Prof. Tom Ojienda for the appellants, while learned counsel Mr. Sitienei appeared alongside Mr. Muthomi Ireri for the respondent. Both counsel briefly highlighted their respective clients’ written submissions, which they relied upon in urging the respective positions of their clients. 23.Highlighting the appellant's written submissions dated 4ᵗʰ March 2026, Mr. Ochieng maintained that the appellants were duly appointed County Secretaries following competitive recruitment by their respective County Governments pursuant to public advertisements issued under a remuneration framework equivalent to Job Group "T". According to counsel, the appointments were based on the recommendations of the Transition Authority following a comprehensive job evaluation which proposed a salary scale ranging between Kshs. 152,060/= and Kshs. 302,980/= per month, together with a house allowance of Kshs. 70,000/= and a commuter allowance of Kshs. 24,000/=. Upon their appointment, the appellants executed contracts of employment reflecting those terms, thereby acquiring contractual rights and legitimate expectations that their remuneration, benefits and grading would remain consistent with that framework including allowances provided under the public service circular dated 10th April 2007, namely Kshs. 65,000/= entertainment allowance, Kshs. 60,000/= extraneous allowance, and Kshs. 15,000/= domestic allowance. 24.Counsel submitted that the respondent subsequently departed from the Transition Authority's recommendations by issuing successive circulars dated 29ᵗʰ July 2013, 31ˢᵗ July 2014 and 18ᵗʰ December 2014. It was contended that the first circular introduced a significantly lower salary structure for County Secretaries, the second consolidated their remuneration into a gross monthly package, while the third redesignated the office of County Secretary from Job Group "T" to Job Group "S". According to counsel, those measures were undertaken unilaterally, without consultation or lawful authority, and had the cumulative effect of reducing the appellants' remuneration, diminishing their benefits and lowering their status within the public service. 25.Counsel further submitted that despite formally writing to the respondent on 29ᵗʰ August 2016 seeking harmonization of their remuneration with the established public service structure, the respondent declined the request and maintained the altered remuneration framework. It was contended that those actions culminated in the filing of the constitutional petition. The learned judge nevertheless dismissed the petition after holding that it disclosed no constitutional issues, that the respondent's advice was binding, and that there was no evidence of redesignation, demotion or discrimination. Counsel asserted that those findings were reached in disregard of both the evidence on record and the applicable constitutional principles. 26.Turning to the grounds of appeal, counsel first submitted that the learned judge erred in holding that the petition did not raise constitutional issues. It was contended that the appellants had expressly pleaded violations of Articles 27, 41 and 47 of the Constitution arising from specific administrative actions undertaken by the respondent which altered their remuneration, grading and conditions of service. Counsel maintained that the respondent's decisions embodied in the circulars dated 29th July 2013, 31st July 2014 and 18th December 2014 interfered with accrued contractual rights and legitimate expectations founded upon the appellants' contracts of employment and therefore transcended an ordinary employment dispute, rendering the matter amenable to constitutional adjudication. 27.Developing that argument, counsel submitted that the appellants had produced documentary evidence demonstrating that their contracts of employment were executed under a remuneration framework equivalent to Job Group "T", thereby creating enforceable contractual rights and legitimate expectations which could not lawfully be defeated through unilateral administrative action. It was therefore contended that the learned judge failed to appreciate the constitutional implications arising from the respondent's alteration of the appellants' remuneration and terms of service. 28.Counsel further contended that the appellants had placed evidence before the trial court demonstrating that the respondent denied them access to the preliminary job evaluation report upon which the impugned decisions were based and excluded them from meaningful participation in the decision-making process that culminated in decisions affecting their remuneration and status. In that regard, reliance was placed on Judicial Service Commission v Mbalu Mutava & another [2015] eKLR, where this Court held that Article 47 entrenches the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair, and that where a person's rights or fundamental freedoms are adversely affected, that person is entitled to written reasons for the administrative action. Counsel submitted that the respondent's conduct violated both the appellants' right to fair labour practices under Article 41 and their right to fair administrative action under Article 47 of the Constitution. 29.Counsel additionally maintained that the respondent's refusal to disclose the preliminary job evaluation report before convening the meeting of 8ᵗʰ November 2016 deprived the appellants of a meaningful opportunity to interrogate the basis of the proposed changes or effectively participate in the decision-making process. It was reiterated that those procedural deficiencies were not mere technical irregularities but went to the root of the impugned administrative decisions because the job evaluation exercise ultimately informed the restructuring of the appellants' remuneration and grading. 30.Counsel also faulted the learned judge for treating the dispute as a mere disagreement over remuneration policy instead of appreciating that the respondent's actions affected accrued contractual rights, legitimate expectations and employment benefits, thereby raising constitutional questions. In support of that proposition, counsel relied on Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 Others [2013] eKLR, where this Court cautioned against dismissing constitutional claims on narrow or formalistic grounds, particularly in circumstances such as the present where documentary evidence demonstrates direct interference with employment terms without granting the appellants an opportunity to be heard. Reliance was also placed on Crispus Karanja Njogu v Attorney General, Criminal Application No. 39 of 2000, in which this Court emphasized that constitutional provisions ought to be interpreted broadly and liberally as a living instrument embodying the values and aspirations of the people. Counsel therefore asserted that the learned judge adopted an unduly restrictive approach to constitutional adjudication and thereby arrived at a conclusion that is unsustainable. 31.On the second ground of appeal, counsel submitted that the learned judge erred in failing to find that the respondent violated the appellants' right to fair administrative action under Article 47 of the Constitution. It was contended that although the respondent invited the appellants to a meeting on 8ᵗʰ November 2016 to discuss the preliminary job evaluation results, it neither furnished them with the preliminary job evaluation report before the meeting nor availed it during the deliberations. According to counsel, the respondent thereby deprived the appellants of an opportunity to understand, interrogate or effectively respond to the basis upon which the proposed restructuring of their remuneration and grading was founded. As a result, the decision-making process was rendered opaque, non- participatory and procedurally unfair. 32.Counsel further submitted that administrative bodies are constitutionally obligated to disclose the material upon which they intend to rely and to afford persons likely to be adversely affected by their decisions a genuine opportunity to participate before such decisions are made. In support of that proposition, counsel relied on Judicial Service Commission v Mbalu Mutava & another (supra), where this Court held that Article 47 guarantees administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair, and that where a right or fundamental freedom is adversely affected, the affected person is entitled to written reasons for the administrative action. It was therefore contended that the learned judge erred in treating the respondent's conduct as an ordinary internal administrative process instead of recognizing that the procedural deficiencies vitiated the impugned decisions and rendered them constitutionally infirm. 33.Addressing the third ground of appeal, counsel submitted that the learned judge erred in finding that there was no evidence of redesignation or constructive demotion. It was contended that the respondent's successive decisions fundamentally altered the appellants' terms and conditions of service by redesignating the office of County Secretary from Job Group "T" to Job Group "S", while simultaneously reducing the remuneration and benefits attached to the office. According to counsel, those changes were effected unilaterally and without any lawful justification, notwithstanding that the appellants had been recruited, appointed and contracted under a remuneration framework equivalent to Job Group "T". Counsel therefore maintained that the impugned decisions substantially diminished both the appellants' remuneration and their status within the public service. 34.Counsel further contended that the redesignation was not merely nominal but had tangible consequences for the appellants' employment. In that regard, reliance was placed on subsequent advertisements issued by the respondent which classified the office of County Secretary alongside positions graded at Job Group "S", thereby demonstrating that the office had effectively been downgraded. It was submitted that the learned judge adopted an unduly formalistic approach by focusing on the absence of an express declaration of demotion instead of considering the practical effect of the respondent's actions. Counsel urged that employment rights ought to be assessed substantively, and that the reduction in remuneration, benefits and status constituted clear evidence of constructive demotion notwithstanding the absence of an express designation to that effect. 35.Counsel further contended that the learned judge failed to properly evaluate the evidence relating to Job Group "T". According to counsel, the appellants produced extensive documentary evidence, including the Transition Authority's remuneration proposals, their contracts of employment, the applicable public service circulars and other supporting documents, all demonstrating that the office of County Secretary had been advertised, applied for and occupied under a remuneration framework equivalent to Job Group "T". It was submitted that those documents established the appellants' original grading, remuneration and terms of service, and corroborated their contention that the respondent subsequently departed from that framework without lawful justification. 36.Counsel maintained that, despite the significance of that documentary evidence, the learned judge dismissed it without evaluating its probative value or considering its cumulative effect. It was contended that had the evidence been properly analysed, the court would have found that the respondent had indeed altered the appellants' grading, remuneration and conditions of service. Counsel therefore submitted that the learned judge misapprehended the factual basis of the dispute and consequently arrived at the erroneous conclusion that there had been no redesignation or alteration of the appellants' terms of service. 37.Finally, counsel submitted that the learned judge erred in failing to find that the appellants had been subjected to discrimination contrary to Article 27 of the Constitution. It was contended that the evidence on record demonstrated that public officers occupying positions equivalent to Job Group "T" within the national government received substantially higher remuneration and more favourable benefits than County Secretaries, yet the respondent imposed lower remuneration structures upon the appellants without objective or reasonable justification. Counsel faulted the learned judge for failing to undertake a comparative analysis of similarly situated officers before dismissing the claim of discrimination. In support of that submission, reliance was placed on FAAF v RFM & 2 others [2023] KECA 1322 (KLR), where this Court cited Peter K. Waweru v Republic [2006] eKLR for the principle that discrimination arises where persons in similar circumstances are subjected to differential treatment without reasonable or objective justification. Counsel therefore maintained that the said evidence established unequal treatment contrary to Article 27 of the Constitution. 38.In conclusion, counsel submitted that the learned judge misapprehended both the law and the evidence, failed to properly evaluate the material placed before the court, and adopted an unduly restrictive approach to constitutional adjudication. Counsel accordingly urged this Court to allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, declare that the appellants' rights under Articles 27, 41 and 47 of the Constitution had been violated, and grant the appropriate reliefs, including compensation for the loss of remuneration, diminution of benefits and infringement of their constitutional rights. 39.On his part, learned counsel Mr. Sitienei, highlighting the respondent's written submissions dated 21ˢᵗ March 2026, urged the Court to dismiss the appeal in its entirety and uphold the judgment of the Employment and Labour Relations Court. According to counsel, the trial court correctly determined all the issues raised in the petition in favour of the respondent, and no basis had been established to warrant appellate interference. 40.Counsel traced the constitutional and statutory framework governing the dispute, submitting that Article 230(4) of the Constitution mandates the respondent to set and regularly review the remuneration and benefits of State officers and to advise the national and county governments on the remuneration and benefits of all other public officers. It was contended that County Secretaries are public officers and are therefore subject to the respondent's constitutional mandate. Counsel further maintained that the Transition Authority had no independent mandate to determine or vary the remuneration of County Secretaries since its functions under section 7 of the Transition to Devolved Government Act were expressly subject to the respondent's advice on remuneration matters. 41.Elaborating on the respondent's mandate vis-à-vis the dispute in question, counsel submitted that the respondent issued remuneration advice through a series of circulars without assigning County Secretaries to any Civil Service job group because the grading framework applicable to county public officers is distinct from that of the national public service. It was contended that the Corrigendum Circular issued in December 2014 merely clarified the applicable rates for house, hardship and subsistence allowances by reference to the Job Group "S" equivalent and did not redesignate or demote the appellants. Counsel further pointed out that although the appellants later sought harmonization with Job Group "T", the respondent declined that request by a reasoned letter dated 23ʳᵈ September 2016. Thereafter, a nationwide job evaluation involving all forty-seven counties was undertaken with the participation of the appellants, although implementation of the results affecting County Secretaries was held in abeyance pending determination of the petition. 42.Turning to the appeal, counsel submitted that the twelve grounds contained in the memorandum of appeal were properly condensed into five issues, namely, whether the petition disclosed any genuine constitutional question; whether the respondent's advice under Article 230(4)(b) is mandatory and binding, whether the appellants were ever lawfully designated to Job Group "T"; whether any of the appellants' constitutional rights had been violated; and whether the appeal had been overtaken by events and rendered academic. 43.Addressing the first issue, counsel submitted that the petition failed to satisfy the threshold for constitutional litigation. Reliance was placed on Anarita Karimi Njeru v The Republic (1976-1980) KLR 1272, where the court held that a party alleging constitutional violations must plead with precision the constitutional provisions infringed, the manner of infringement and the relief sought. Counsel further relied on Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & Others (supra) in which this Court reaffirmed the principles in Anarita Karimi Njeru and held that constitutional petitions must be pleaded with sufficient precision. It was submitted that the appellants merely cited constitutional provisions without demonstrating the nexus between the respondent's conduct and the alleged violations thereby transforming what was essentially a remuneration dispute into an unmeritorious constitutional petition. Counsel therefore maintained that the trial court correctly found that the petition disclosed no constitutional issue warranting the reliefs sought. 44.Counsel further contended that the appellants had selectively relied on passages from Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & Others (supra) to argue for a relaxed pleading standard. According to counsel, a proper reading of that decision demonstrated that this Court reaffirmed, rather than departed from the principles in Anarita Karimi Njeru, ultimately dismissing the petition for failure to satisfy the requisite threshold. As regards the complaint concerning the four-year delay in delivery of judgment, counsel submitted that judicial delay, without proof of prejudice, does not invalidate a decision that is otherwise sound in law and supported by the evidence. 45.On the second issue, counsel submitted that the question whether the respondent's advice under Article 230(4)(b) is binding is no longer open to debate. Reliance was first placed on Teachers Service Commission v Kenya National Union of Teachers & 3 Others [2015] eKLR, where this Court held that construing the respondent's advisory mandate as non-binding would defeat the purposes and values underpinning Article 230 of the Constitution. Counsel also cited Muthuuri & 4 Others v National Police Service Commission & 2 Others [2023] KESC 52 (KLR), in which the Supreme Court emphasized that no valid remuneration or benefits for State or public officers may arise from a process that disregards the respondent's constitutional role. Most significantly, reliance was placed on National Hospital Insurance Fund Management Board v Kenya Union of Commercial Food and Allied Workers & another [2025] KESC 37 (KLR), where the Supreme Court held that remuneration arrangements entered into by a public body without the respondent's prior advice and approval are of no legal consequence. Counsel therefore asserted that the respondent's advice was binding upon county governments and that the appeal ought to fail on that ground alone. 46.Counsel further submitted that the appellants were never lawfully designated to Job Group "T" by any competent authority. It was reiterated that the December 2014 Corrigendum Circular merely referred to the Job Group "S" equivalent for purposes of computing three specific allowances and did not confer any substantive job group upon the appellants. According to counsel, no Gazette Notice, respondent's circular or executive decision formally assigned County Secretaries to Job Group "T". Counsel therefore supported the trial court's finding that references to Job Group "T" merely served as a reference point for harmonization and payment of allowances and did not amount to conferment of that job group. 47.Addressing the alleged constitutional violations, counsel submitted that none of the rights invoked by the appellants had been infringed. Reliance was placed on Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 Others v Royal Media Services Limited & 5 Others [2014] KESC 53 (KLR), where the Supreme Court observed that purposive constitutional interpretation does not justify a finding of constitutional violation where none has been established on the evidence, and that procedural unfairness cannot be inferred merely because an administrative decision fails to accord with a party's expectations. Counsel maintained that the learned judge therefore correctly rejected the alleged constitutional violations. 48.With regard to Article 47 of the Constitution, counsel submitted that the respondent acted with procedural fairness throughout the job evaluation process. It was contended that the respondent consulted the appellants, conducted the nationwide job evaluation with their participation, responded to their request for harmonization through a reasoned letter in September 2016, invited them to the presentation of the preliminary job evaluation results on 8ᵗʰ November 2016, and ultimately provided an internal appeal mechanism upon publication of the final results. Although the appellants complained that the preliminary results had neither been supplied before the meeting nor read during the presentation, counsel submitted that Article 47 did not require disclosure of preliminary material at that stage because the exercise remained subject to review and internal appeal. It was further contended that the appellants participated in completing and validating the Job Analysis Questionnaires and Job Description Manuals, but nevertheless failed to pursue the available internal appeal mechanism before instituting the petition. Counsel therefore maintained that no violation of Article 47 had been established. 49.Turning to Article 27, counsel submitted that the appellants failed to establish unlawful discrimination because they identified no appropriate comparator who was similarly situated but treated more favourably. It was contended that County Secretaries operate within a constitutionally distinct level of government with different statutory responsibilities and fiscal structures from officers serving in the national government. Counsel maintained that any disparity in remuneration reflected the constitutional requirement under Article 230(5) that the respondent be guided by fiscal sustainability within both levels of government, and therefore constituted a lawful distinction rather than discriminatory treatment. 50.Counsel similarly submitted that Articles 41 and 236(b) of the Constitution had not been violated because no demotion had occurred. According to counsel, a claim of demotion presupposes the existence of a lawfully established rank from which an officer has been downgraded. Since the appellants had never been formally designated to Job Group "T", it was asserted that the constitutional protection against demotion was inapplicable. Counsel maintained that throughout the relevant period, the appellants retained the same offices, responsibilities and remuneration as advised by the respondent. 51.Counsel further submitted that the appellants failed to discharge the evidentiary burden imposed by law. Relying on section 107 of the Evidence Act, counsel maintained that the burden rested upon the appellants to prove that they had been formally designated to Job Group "T" and subsequently demoted. In support of that proposition, reliance was placed on Anne Wambui Ndiritu (Suing as Administrator for the Estate of George Ndiritu Kariamburi, Deceased) v Joseph Kiprono Ropkoi & Four By Four Safaris Company Ltd, Civil Appeal No. 345 of 2000 [2004] eKLR, where this Court reaffirmed that the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting a fact. Counsel maintained that the appellants produced no Gazette Notice, formal respondent's circular or executive decision conferring them with Job Group "T” and consequently failed to establish the factual basis of their claim. 52.On the final issue, counsel submitted that the appeal had been overtaken by events and was therefore academic. Inviting the Court to take judicial notice of Regulation 4(1) of the SRC (Remuneration and Benefits of State and Public Officers) Regulations, 2013, counsel pointed out that the challenged job evaluation formed part of the Second Review Cycle, which had long been completed and superseded by subsequent review cycles. Consequently, the appellants' prayer seeking to restrain implementation of the Second Review Cycle had been spent, and any declaration concerning that exercise would serve no practical purpose. In support of that submission, counsel relied on Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi v Mwangi Stephen Muriithi & Another [2014] KECA 642 (KLR), where this Court held that courts ordinarily decline to determine matters that have become hypothetical or academic. 53.In conclusion, counsel submitted that the trial court correctly found that the petition lacked constitutional merit, that the respondent's advice under Article 230(4)(b) is mandatory and binding, that the appellants were never lawfully designated to Job Group "T", that none of the alleged constitutional rights had been violated, and that the appeal had, in any event, been overtaken by events. Counsel accordingly urged this Court to dismiss the appeal with costs both in this Court and before the trial court. 54.As this is a first appeal, it is our duty to analyze and re-assess the evidence on record and reach our own conclusions in the matter. It was put more appropriately in Selle -vs- Associated Motor Boat Co. [1968] EA 123, thus:“An appeal to this Court from a trial by the High Court is by way of retrial and the principles upon which this Court acts in such an appeal are well settled. Briefly put they are that this Court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect. In particular this Court is not bound necessarily to follow the trial judge’s findings of fact if it appears either that he has clearly failed on some point to take account of particular circumstances or probabilities materially to estimate the evidence or if the impression based on the demeanor of a witness is inconsistent with the evidence in the case generally (Abdul Hameed Saif vs. Ali Mohamed Sholan (1955), 22 E. A. C. A. 270).” 55.We have carefully considered the record of appeal, the impugned judgment, the memorandum of appeal, the rival submissions by counsel and the authorities relied upon by the parties. In our view, although the memorandum of appeal contains twelve grounds of appeal, the appeal ultimately turns on five broad issues, namely, whether the learned judge erred in holding that the petition did not disclose constitutional issues warranting the intervention of the court; whether the respondent acted within the confines of its constitutional and statutory mandate in issuing the impugned circulars and advisory communications relating to the remuneration and grading of County Secretaries; whether the respondent unlawfully redesignated, or otherwise altered the status of, the office of County Secretary from Job Group "T", or its equivalent, to Job Group "S", or its equivalent; whether the respondent violated the appellants' rights under Articles 27, 41 and 47 of the Constitution; and whether the appeal has been overtaken by events and, if so, the effect, if any, of that finding on the reliefs sought. 56.On the first issue, the appellants contend that the learned judge erred in holding that the petition disclosed no constitutional question warranting the intervention of the court. They contend that the learned judge adopted an unduly restrictive approach to constitutional adjudication by treating the dispute as an ordinary disagreement concerning remuneration. The respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the petition merely challenged remuneration advice lawfully issued pursuant to Article 230 of the Constitution and therefore raised no genuine constitutional controversy. 57.It is common ground that the respondent is an independent constitutional commission established under Article 230 of the Constitution. Equally undisputed is that the respondent is mandated under Article 230(4) to set and regularly review the remuneration and benefits of State officers and to advise the national and county governments on the remuneration and benefits of all other public officers. The dispute before the trial court as borne out by the record, however, was not confined to the correctness of the remuneration advice issued by the respondent. On the contrary, the appellants challenged the legality and constitutionality of the respondent's exercise of that mandate. They contended that the respondent exceeded the limits of Article 230(4) of the Constitution by unlawfully redesignating the office of County Secretary, interfered with their accrued contractual rights and legitimate expectations, and in so doing violated their constitutional rights under Articles 27, 41 and 47. They consequently sought declarations of constitutional invalidity, declarations of violation of constitutional rights, compensation for those violations, injunctive relief and other consequential orders. 58.The respondent, for its part, maintained that the petition failed to satisfy the constitutional pleading threshold established in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (supra) and reaffirmed by this Court in Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 Others (supra). Its contention was that the appellants merely cited constitutional provisions without demonstrating, with the requisite precision, how those provisions had been violated. It is trite law that a party invoking the Constitution must identify the constitutional provisions alleged to have been infringed and demonstrate the manner in which those infringements are said to have occurred. The requirement for reasonable precision serves the important purpose of defining the dispute before the court and enabling the opposing party to know the case it is required to meet. 59.The principle enunciated in Anarita Karimi Njeru remains good law.Indeed, in Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 Others (supra), this Court cited with approval the decision in Anarita Karimi Njeru and reaffirmed the requirement that constitutional violations must be pleaded with reasonable precision. In doing so, the Court underscored the rationale underpinning that requirement, observing that:"We cannot but emphasize the importance of precise claims in due process, substantive justice, and the exercise of jurisdiction by a court. In essence, due process, substantive justice and the exercise of jurisdiction are a function of precise legal and factual claims. However, we also note that precision is not coterminous with exactitude. Restated, although precision must remain a requirement as it is important, it demands neither formulaic prescription of the factual claims nor formalistic utterance of the constitutional provisions alleged to have been violated. We speak particularly knowing that the whole function of pleadings, hearings, submissions and the judicial decision is to define issues in litigation and adjudication, and to demand exactitude ex ante is to miss the point.However, our analysis cannot end at that level of generality. It was the High Court’s observation that the petition before it was not the “epitome of precise, comprehensive, or elegant drafting.” Yet the principle in Anarita Karimi Njeru (supra) underscores the importance of defining the dispute to be decided by the court. In our view, it is a misconception to claim as it has been in recent times with increased frequency that compliance with rules of procedure is antithetical to Article 159 of the Constitution and the overriding objective principle under section 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act (Cap 21) and section 3A and 3B of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act (Cap 9). Procedure is also a handmaiden of just determination of cases. Cases cannot be dealt with justly unless the parties and the court know the issues in controversy. Pleadings assist in that regard and are a tenet of substantive justice, as they give fair notice to the other party. The principle in Anarita Karimi Njeru (supra) that established the rule that requires reasonable precision in framing of issues in constitutional petitions is an extension of this principle.” 60.In our view, this Court in Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 Others (supra) did not elevate the principle in Anarita Karimi Njeru into a rigid procedural bar. Rather, it recognised that the requirement is one of reasonable precision intended to facilitate the fair and effective adjudication of constitutional disputes, and not to defeat otherwise meritorious claims through undue technicality. That approach is entirely consistent with this Court's earlier decision in Center for Rights Education and Awareness & another v John Harun Mwau & 6 Others [2012] eKLR, where the Court reaffirmed that, in accordance with Article 259 of the Constitution, constitutional provisions must be interpreted purposively, broadly and holistically in a manner that promotes the Constitution's purposes, values and principles, advances the rule of law and fundamental rights, and contributes to good governance. The Court further emphasized that the Constitution must be read as an integrated whole, with each provision sustaining the others so as to give effect to the overall design and objectives of the constitutional text. 61.Applying the foregoing principles to the present appeal, we are unable, with respect, to agree with the learned judge that the petition disclosed no constitutional issue warranting the trial court’s intervention. A careful perusal of the petition dated 10th November 2016 reveals that the appellants identified the constitutional provisions they alleged had been violated, the administrative decisions they impugned, the manner in which they contended those decisions exceeded the respondent's constitutional mandate, and the specific constitutional remedies they sought. Whether the appellants ultimately discharged the burden of proving those allegations is a distinct issue from whether the petition disclosed constitutional questions. The possibility that the claims might ultimately fail on the merits does not, without more, mean that the petition was devoid of constitutional issues warranting the court's determination. 62.Indeed, the respondent itself defended the impugned decisions by invoking Article 230 of the Constitution, the Salaries and Remuneration Commission Act, Cap 412D and the constitutional principles governing independent commissions. It justified the impugned circulars by reference to its constitutional mandate, the fiscal sustainability principles under Article 230(5), the job evaluation exercise undertaken across the public service and the consultative process preceding the impugned decisions. Those, in our view, are all constitutional and statutory questions requiring judicial determination. It would therefore be contradictory to conclude, on the one hand, that the respondent's actions were constitutionally justified while, on the other, holding that the petition itself disclosed no constitutional controversy. 63.In our respectful view, the learned judge conflated two distinct issues.The first was whether the petition raised constitutional questions requiring the court's determination. The second was whether the appellants had proved the alleged constitutional violations. The former concerns the nature of the dispute, while the latter concerns whether the claim succeeds on the evidence. A petition may properly raise constitutional questions yet ultimately fail because the alleged violations are not proved. Conversely, the failure to prove a constitutional violation does not mean that the petition ceased to be a constitutional petition. Accordingly, while we respectfully disagree with the learned judge's finding that the petition disclosed no constitutional issue, we must nevertheless, and in line with our mandate as the first appellate court, determine whether the respondent acted within its constitutional and statutory mandate, and whether the appellants established any violation of their constitutional rights. 64.Having found that the petition raised constitutional questions warranting judicial determination, we now proceed to consider whether those questions have merit. Central to that inquiry is whether the respondent acted within the limits of its constitutional and statutory mandate in issuing the impugned circulars and advisory communications concerning the office of County Secretary. Resolution of that issue, in our view, requires an examination of the constitutional framework establishing the respondent's mandate, the statutory provisions enacted to operationalize that mandate, and the respective roles of the respondent and the Transition Authority during the implementation of devolved governments. 65.The office of the respondent is established under Article 230 of the Constitution as an independent constitutional commission. Article 230(4) delineates its mandate in two distinct respects. First, the respondent is empowered to set and regularly review the remuneration and benefits of all State officers. Secondly, it is required to advise the national and county governments on the remuneration and benefits of all other public officers. In discharging that mandate, Article 230(5) obliges the respondent to be guided by several constitutional considerations, including the need to ensure that the total public compensation bill is fiscally sustainable, that the public services are able to attract and retain the skills necessary for the execution of their functions, that productivity and performance are recognised, and that transparency and fairness are promoted. 66.Parliament subsequently enacted the Salaries and Remuneration Commission Act, Cap 412D to give effect to Article 230. The preamble to the said Act stipulates that it is “An Act of Parliament to make further provision as to the functions and powers of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission, the qualifications and procedures for the appointment of the Chairperson and members of the Commission, and for connected purposes.” Section 11 thereof stipulates the respondent's mandate by requiring it, among other things, to inquire into and advise on salaries and remuneration payable out of public funds; keep under review all matters relating to the salaries and remuneration of public officers; advise the national and county governments on the harmonization, equity and fairness of remuneration for the attraction and retention of the requisite skills in the public service; conduct comparative surveys of labour markets and remuneration trends; make recommendations on matters relating to the salaries, remuneration and pensions of State and public officers; and perform such other functions as may be conferred by the Constitution or any other written law. The constitutional and statutory framework therefore confers upon the respondent a mandate that extends well beyond prescribing salary scales. It is entrusted with the broader responsibility of developing objective remuneration policies, promoting harmonization and equity across the public service, and advising both levels of government on remuneration matters in furtherance of the constitutional values underpinning Article 230. 67.The appellants nevertheless contend that, while the respondent undoubtedly possesses constitutional authority to advise on remuneration and benefits, it has no constitutional or statutory mandate to create, abolish, redesignate or reclassify public offices. According to them, that is precisely what occurred when the respondent allegedly moved County Secretaries from Job Group "T", or its equivalent, to Job Group "S", or its equivalent, before the completion of the nationwide job evaluation exercise. They maintain that the respondent thereby ventured beyond advising on remuneration and instead altered the legal status of an established public office. Conversely, the respondent maintains that it never redesignated the office of County Secretary at all, and that every reference to Job Group "S" was made solely for purposes of identifying an equivalent grade upon which specified allowances would be computed. It therefore argues that the entire appeal rests upon a misconception of the legal effect of its advisory communications. 68.Before considering those competing positions, it is necessary to appreciate the role assigned to the Transition Authority during the transition to devolved government. The Authority was established under section 4 of the Transition to Devolved Government Act to facilitate and coordinate the transition to the devolved system of government as contemplated by section 15 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution. In furtherance of that mandate, section 7 of the Act entrusted it with a wide range of responsibilities, including facilitating the phased transfer of functions to county governments, determining the resource requirements attendant to those functions, developing the framework for their transfer, auditing the existing human resource of the Government and local authorities, assessing the capacity needs of the national and county governments, recommending measures necessary to ensure adequate institutional capacity, and advising on the effective and efficient rationalization and deployment of human resources between the two levels of government. Viewed in that context, the Authority played a central role in developing the institutional and human resource framework required for the establishment and effective functioning of county governments during the transitional period. It was in the discharge of that statutory mandate that the Authority developed job descriptions and specifications for selected county offices and made recommendations on the corresponding remuneration structures to facilitate the orderly operationalization of county governments. 69.However, and notwithstanding the important role played by the Transition Authority during the transition to devolved government, its functions must, inevitably, be understood within the constitutional framework under which it was established. The Authority was a statutory body created to facilitate and coordinate the transition to the devolved system of government, and its mandate was, pursuant to the provisions of section 37 of the Transition to Devolved Government Act, temporary in nature. The respondent, by contrast, is an independent constitutional commission established under Article 230 of the Constitution and entrusted with the continuing responsibility of setting and regularly reviewing the remuneration and benefits of State officers and advising the national and county governments on the remuneration and benefits of all other public officers. It follows, therefore, that any recommendations made by the Transition Authority concerning job structures or remuneration during the transition period could only be advisory, and could neither override nor limit the respondent's constitutional mandate. To hold otherwise would be to subordinate the authority of a constitutional commission to that of a statutory body established solely to facilitate the transition to devolved government, a result inconsistent with the constitutional hierarchy established by the Constitution. 70.The above conclusion finds considerable support in the jurisprudence of this Court and the Supreme Court. In Teachers Service Commission v Kenya National Union of Teachers & 3 Others (supra), this Court considered the constitutional significance of the respondent's advisory role under Article 230(4)(b). Rejecting the argument that such advice was merely optional, Githinji, JA. in his lead judgment observed thus:“The very composition of SRC indicates that its advice has to be given great weight. The phrase “only on that advice…” used in Article 259(11) shows that the advice is a mandatory condition precedent for a valid exercise of power or function. If the word “advise” in Article 230 (4) (b) is construed to be not binding, the country would be returned to the pre-Constitution 2010 era which would defeat the purposes, values and principles of the Constitution and of the institutionalisation of SRC under the Constitution. It is conceivable and indeed inevitable that many employers in public sector would defy SRC’s advice, leading to unimaginable financial crisis in the management of national wage bill.Having regard to the mischief that the institutionalisation of SRC under the Constitution was intended to cure the principles of public finance and fiscal responsibility, the budgetary process and the complexity of salaries and benefits determination for public officers, I hold that the advice of SRC under Article 230(4)(b) on remuneration and benefits of all public officers is binding on national and county governments and any power or function exercised without that advise is invalid.” 71.Similarly, Otieno-Odek, JA. in the same decision observed thus:“Guided by the Supreme Court decision In the Matter of Advisory Opinion of the Court, Constitutional Application No. 2 of 2011 at paragraph 93 and persuaded conclusions by the learned Justice Lenaola in Kenya National Commission on Human Rights -v- AG & Another, Petition No. 132 of 2013; 2015 eKLR, I hereby come to the conclusion and finding that the advice given by SRC is binding. The advice is binding because to hold otherwise would render the functions of SRC under Article 230 (5) idle; it would render SRC ineffective and irrelevant; it will introduce a discretionary concept of pick and choose in Kenya’s governance structure. An interpretation that renders a constitutional Article idle and an Independent Commission ineffective does not pass the threshold of constitutionality. SRC is a constitutional organ and the trial judge erred in interpreting the Constitution in a manner that renders SRC’s singular and exclusive mandate in Article 230 (5)( a) idle and ineffective. The trial court misapprehended the doctrine of separation of functions which is keystone in Kenya’s governance structure. In holding that SRC has a non-binding advisory role in the determination remuneration and benefits of public officers, the trial court disregarded the central and exclusive juridical competence of SRC in the determination of fiscal sustainability of the total public compensation bill as per Article 230 (5) (a) of the Constitution.I am fortified in my finding that the advice given by SRC is binding because a constitution does not contain mere advice; it does not contain provisions that would not have a binding force and obligation of law; everything in the constitution must have the force and binding obligation of law; nothing can be put in a constitutional instrument in the form of mere advice with no binding obligation and be placed in company of other binding Articles. A constitution cannot contain mere advice, incapable of being enforced and whose violation is attendant with no legal consequences. Unless expressly stated, the 2010 Constitution does not contain Articles or provisions that are without force of law and whose binding nature is discretionary. Except as otherwise stated in the Constitution, Article 259 (11) removes all discretionary power and by so doing, the Constitution contains binding provisions.” 72.The Supreme Court has since affirmed and strengthened that position. In Muthuuri & 4 Others v National Police Service Commission & 2 Others (supra), the Court reaffirmed that, by virtue of Article 259(11) of the Constitution, where a constitutional body is required to obtain the respondent's advice before determining the remuneration and benefits of public officers, that advice is binding. More recently, in National Hospital Insurance Fund Management Board v Kenya Union of Commercial Food and Allied Workers & another (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated that the respondent could not effectively discharge its constitutional mandate of ensuring the fiscal sustainability of the public compensation bill if its advice were merely optional. The Court consequently held that any collective bargaining agreement concluded without first obtaining the respondent's advice and approval was of no legal consequence. Those decisions expressly underscore the respondent's central constitutional role in the regulation of remuneration and benefits within the public service. 73.We therefore agree with the learned judge that any remuneration recommendations previously made by the Transition Authority remained subject to the respondent's constitutional mandate under Article 230. To that extent, the appellants' argument that the respondent lacked authority to depart from the remuneration proposals advanced by the Transition Authority cannot be sustained. The constitutional design clearly places ultimate responsibility for advising on the remuneration and benefits of public officers upon the respondent. The real controversy, however, is not whether the respondent possessed authority to review remuneration. Rather, it is whether, in the course of exercising that authority, it crossed the constitutional boundary between advising on remuneration and unlawfully altering the grading or status of the office of County Secretary. We now turn to determine that issue. 74.The appellants' germane complaint is that, although the respondent was constitutionally empowered to advise on remuneration and benefits, it exceeded that mandate by redesignating the office of County Secretary from Job Group "T", or its equivalent, to Job Group "S", or its equivalent, before completing the county job evaluation exercise. According to the appellants, that redesignation fundamentally altered their status within the public service, diminished their remuneration and benefits, disrupted the hierarchy within county governments and ultimately amounted to an unlawful constructive demotion. The respondent, on its part, unwaveringly denied ever redesignating the office of County Secretary. It maintained that the references to Job Group "S" appearing in the impugned circulars and subsequent correspondence were made solely for purposes of identifying the appropriate equivalent grade for payment of hardship, subsistence and related allowances, and did not amount to the assignment of any Civil Service job group to County Secretaries. 75.In resolving that dispute, the starting point, in our view, is to distinguish between three related but legally distinct concepts, namely: the creation and classification of a public office; the evaluation or grading of that office for remuneration purposes; and the determination of the remuneration and benefits attached to it. Although these concepts are frequently conflated in ordinary discourse, they serve different legal purposes and derive from different sources of legal authority. The creation and classification of a public office concerns the establishment of the office, its functions, status and place within the organizational structure of the public service under the applicable constitutional and statutory framework. Job evaluation or grading, in contrast, is a technical process of assessing the relative worth of an office by reference to objective factors, such as the nature of its duties, responsibilities, competencies and working conditions, in order to place it within an appropriate remuneration structure. The determination of remuneration and benefits, which Article 230(4)(b) entrusts to the respondent, concerns the salaries, allowances and other benefits payable to the holder of the office once it has been so evaluated. It follows that, while the outcome of a job evaluation may inform the remuneration and benefits payable to the holder of an office, it does not, without more, create, abolish, redesignate or reclassify the office itself, those being matters conceptually and legally distinct from the determination of remuneration. 76.The evidence on record shows that the Transition Authority developed a remuneration framework for County Secretaries in which the office was assigned an equivalency corresponding to what the appellants describe as Job Group "T". There is no doubt that those recommendations informed the recruitment and remuneration processes undertaken by county governments during the transition to devolved government. However, we agree with the respondent that neither the trial court nor this Court were referred to any constitutional provision, statute, Gazette Notice, or other instrument having the force of law that formally classified the office of County Secretary within the Civil Service grading structure or expressly designated it as falling under Job Group "T". The material before us instead demonstrates that the Transition Authority adopted an equivalency framework solely for purposes of determining remuneration during the transitional period. Consistent with the distinction we have drawn above, such an equivalency informed the remuneration payable to the office but did not, without more, constitute a formal legal classification or redesignation of the office within the Civil Service grading structure. 77.Equally significant is the respondent's explanation concerning the impugned circular of 18th December 2014 and the subsequent letter dated 23rd September 2016. Throughout the proceedings, the respondent consistently maintained that those communications did not purport to redesignate the office of County Secretary but merely identified the Job Group "S" equivalent for purposes of computing specified allowances. That explanation was not advanced for the first time during the appeal. It formed part of the respondent's replying affidavit before the trial court and remained consistent throughout the proceedings. The learned judge accepted that explanation, observing that the respondent had not assigned County Secretaries to any Civil Service job group, but had merely referred to an equivalent grade for the limited purpose of determining certain allowances. 78.We respectfully agree that in principle, the use of an equivalent job group as a reference point for remuneration does not, without more, amount to the legal redesignation of a public office. Indeed, public officers serving outside the traditional Civil Service frequently have their remuneration benchmarked against equivalent grades for purposes of harmonization without thereby becoming members of those grades. Such equivalency, in our view, serves an administrative and remunerative function, and should not be equated with the formal classification of the office itself. 79.The foregoing conclusion does not, however, dispose of the appellants' grievance. Their complaint is not that the respondent expressly redesignated the office of County Secretary within the Civil Service grading structure. Rather, they contend that, notwithstanding the respondent's characterization of the impugned circulars as merely establishing an equivalent grade for remuneration purposes, the practical effect of those decisions was to diminish the remuneration, benefits and status previously enjoyed by holders of that office. In particular, they point to the subsequent advertisements placing County Secretaries alongside officers serving in Job Group "S" as demonstrating that what was presented as an equivalency exercise ultimately translated into an effective downgrading of the office. The salient issue for determination, therefore, is not merely what the impugned instruments purported to do, but whether, in their implementation and practical operation, they produced the legal consequences alleged by the appellants. 80.We are cognizant that constitutional adjudication is concerned not merely with form but with substance. Consistent with the purposive approach to constitutional interpretation, a court must look beyond the terminology employed by the decision maker and examine the actual legal effect of the impugned decision. An administrative authority cannot shield its actions from constitutional scrutiny by adopting a description that obscures their true legal character. Where, upon such examination, the substance of the impugned decision reveals that a public office has in effect been downgraded or that vested rights or legitimate entitlements have been adversely affected, the court is entitled to determine its legality by reference to its practical operation rather than its formal description. 81.Having carefully reviewed the record, we are unable to conclude that the evidence placed before the trial court established that the respondent formally redesignated the office of County Secretary from Job Group "T" to Job Group "S". Although the appellants demonstrated that the respondent referred to Job Group "S" equivalents in its circulars and correspondence, and although those references undoubtedly influenced remuneration and allowances, the evidence on record falls short of demonstrating that the respondent purported to alter the legal classification of the office itself. We reiterate that no Gazette Notice, formal job classification instrument or other legally operative document issued by the respondent redesignating the office was placed before the trial court or this Court. In those circumstances, we are not persuaded that the respondent exceeded its constitutional mandate merely by employing an equivalent job group for remuneration purposes. 82.The above finding, however, does not dispose of the appellants' remaining grievances. Although we have concluded that no unlawful redesignation occurred, the appellants further contend that the process by which the respondent reviewed their remuneration and implemented the impugned decisions infringed their constitutional rights to fair administrative action, fair labour practices, and equality before the law. Their complaint is directed, not at the existence of the respondent's constitutional mandate, but at the manner in which that mandate was exercised. We therefore turn to consider whether the impugned process complied with the constitutional guarantees enshrined in Articles 27, 41 and 47 of the Constitution. 83.The appellants contend that the respondent's implementation of the impugned decisions resulted in unjustified differential treatment between County Secretaries and holders of comparable constitutional and statutory offices, deprived them of remuneration and benefits that had accrued upon their appointment, and was undertaken without affording them procedural fairness. The respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the impugned decisions were the product of an objective job evaluation exercise conducted pursuant to Article 230 of the Constitution; that the exercise was preceded by extensive stakeholder engagement; and that the appellants failed to establish any discrimination, unfair labour practice, or procedural impropriety. 84.We begin with the appellants' claim that the respondent violated their right to fair administrative action under Article 47 of the Constitution. Article 47 occupies a central place in Kenya's constitutional framework by guaranteeing every person administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair. That constitutional guarantee is given legislative effect by the Fair Administrative Action Act, Cap 7L. Section 4 thereof requires every administrator to act lawfully, reasonably, and in a procedurally fair manner whenever an administrative decision is likely to adversely affect the rights or legitimate expectations of any person. 85.The scope and importance of Article 47 have received authoritative consideration from this Court. In Judicial Service Commission v Mbalu Mutava & another (supra), Githinji, JA. in the lead judgment observed thus:“Article 47(1) does not exclude the application of common law particularly the common law right to fair hearing. As I have endeavoured to show above, natural justice comprises the doctrine of or is synonymous with “acting fairly”. The term “procedurally fair” used in article 47(1) by a proper construction, imports and subsumes to a certain degree, the common law including rules of natural justice which means that common law is complementary to right to fair administrative action. In construing the contents and scope of fair administrative action, the justice of the common law will greatly influence the future development of the administrative law under the Constitution.Article 47(1) marks an important and transformative development of administrative justice for, it not only lays a constitutional foundation for control of the powers of state organs and other administrative bodies, but also entrenches the right to fair administrative action in the Bill of Rights. The right to fair administrative action is a reflection of some of the national values in article 10 such as the rule of law, human dignity, social justice, good governance, transparency and accountability. The administrative actions of public officers, state organs and other administrative bodies are now subjected by article 47(1) to the principle of constitutionality rather than to the doctrine of ultra vires from which administrative law under the common law was developed.” 86.Similarly, in Suchan Investment Limited v Ministry of National Heritage & Culture & 3 others [2016] eKLR, this Court emphasized that Article 47, read together with the Fair Administrative Action Act, constitutionalized the principles of administrative justice by subjecting the exercise of public power to the requirements of lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness. The Court further explained that the introduction of proportionality as a ground of review under section 7(2)(l) of the Fair Administrative Action Act permits, in appropriate cases, a limited review of the merits of an administrative decision. Constitutional review is, therefore, no longer confined to examining the legality of the decision-making process but extends, where justified, to determining whether the exercise of public power is proportionate and consistent with the values and principles of the Constitution. 87.There can be no doubt that the respondent's circulars and advisory communications constituted administrative action within the meaning of Article 47. Although the respondent exercises an independent constitutional mandate, the decisions it makes in implementing that mandate are capable of affecting the legal rights, financial entitlements and legitimate expectations of public officers. Those decisions are, therefore, amenable to constitutional scrutiny for compliance with Article 47. While the appellants contend that their contracts of employment and the remuneration framework prevailing at the time of their appointment gave rise to a legitimate expectation that their remuneration and benefits would remain unchanged, any such expectation could only exist subject to the respondent's constitutional mandate under Article 230 of the Constitution to review and advise on the remuneration and benefits of public officers. Legitimate expectation cannot operate to prevent the lawful exercise of that constitutional mandate but it does entitle affected persons to a process that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. It bears emphasizing that independence from direction or control under Article 249 of the Constitution does not place a constitutional commission beyond the reach of the Constitution itself. Therefore, like every other public body exercising constitutional or statutory authority, the respondent remains bound by the national values and principles of governance contained in Article 10 and by the Bill of Rights. 88.The vexing question, however, remains whether the appellants discharged the burden of demonstrating that the respondent exercised its constitutional mandate in a manner that was unlawful, unreasonable or procedurally unfair, contrary to Article 47 of the Constitution. Having independently re-evaluated the entire record, we are satisfied that they did not. The evidence demonstrates that the impugned decisions were not the product of an arbitrary or unilateral exercise of power. Rather, they emerged from a comprehensive review of remuneration structures within the public service undertaken following the advent of devolved government and in fulfilment of the respondent's constitutional mandate under Article 230 of the Constitution. The record further shows that before issuing the impugned advisories, the respondent undertook extensive stakeholder engagement involving, among others, the Council of Governors, county governments and other relevant public institutions. The consultative process did not end there. The evidence further demonstrates that, even after issuing the impugned circulars, the respondent continued to receive and consider representations from affected stakeholders and responded to concerns raised regarding the remuneration framework applicable to County Secretaries. Viewed as a whole, the record discloses a deliberative and consultative decision-making process that is wholly inconsistent with the appellants' contention that the respondent acted arbitrarily, without consultation, or in breach of the requirements of procedural fairness. 89.The appellants nevertheless contend that the respondent was constitutionally obliged to accord each of them an individual hearing before implementing decisions affecting their remuneration and benefits. That proposition cannot be accepted as an inflexible requirement of Article 47. Procedural fairness is not a rigid or immutable concept whose content is identical in every case. As this Court observed in Judicial Service Commission v Mbalu Mutava & another (supra), the requirements of procedural fairness are inherently contextual and depend upon the nature of the administrative function, the statutory or constitutional framework within which it is exercised, and the circumstances of the particular case. Accordingly, administrative decisions of general application, including those involving the formulation or review of remuneration structures affecting an entire class of public officers, do not invariably require that every affected officer be afforded an individual oral hearing. What Article 47 demands is a procedure that is fair, transparent and responsive, and one that affords those affected a meaningful opportunity, whether directly or through appropriate consultative mechanisms to make representations before the decision is made. 90.In the present case, the impugned circulars were not directed exclusively at the appellants. They formed part of a broader exercise undertaken by the respondent in the discharge of its constitutional mandate to harmonize remuneration across the public service. The appellants did not place before the trial court evidence demonstrating that the respondent ignored mandatory procedural requirements prescribed either by the Constitution or by statute, refused to consider representations that were made, or acted in bad faith. Their grievance was directed principally at the substantive outcome of the respondent's advice, rather than at demonstrable procedural defects in the decision making process. In those circumstances, we are not persuaded that the learned judge erred in finding that the alleged violation of Article 47 had not been established. 91.The appellants also invoked Articles 27 and 41 of the Constitution.Article 27 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection and benefit of the law, while Article 41 secures to every worker the right to fair labour practices. Those provisions undoubtedly protect public officers from arbitrary, discriminatory or irrational treatment in matters relating to employment and remuneration. They do not, however, prohibit, per se, differentiation founded upon objective, rational and constitutionally permissible considerations. See the decision of this Court in Mohammed Abduba Dida v Debate Media Limited & another [2018] eKLR. 92.Although the appellants assert that County Secretaries were treated differently from other public officers occupying comparable positions, the evidentiary basis for that assertion is, in our view, limited. Beyond pointing to the remuneration framework that previously applied during the transition period and comparing it with the respondent's subsequent advisories, no cogent evidence was presented demonstrating that officers who were similarly situated in all material respects received preferential treatment without an objective and rational justification. Equally, no evidence was adduced demonstrating that the respondent applied different criteria to County Secretaries from those applied to other categories of public officers undergoing the same job evaluation process. In the absence of such evidence, we are unable to conclude that the differentiation complained of amounted to unconstitutional discrimination or an infringement of the right to fair labour practices. 93.We therefore agree with the learned judge that, although the respondent's decisions were amenable to constitutional scrutiny, the evidence adduced before the trial court did not establish that the respondent exercised its constitutional mandate in a manner that violated Articles 27, 41 or 47 of the Constitution. That conclusion inevitably leaves only the question whether the reliefs sought have, in any event, been overtaken by subsequent events and the effect, if any, of that development upon the appeal. 94.The respondent urged this Court to find that the dispute between the parties had been overtaken by events. It was submitted that the impugned circulars related to the remuneration review cycle covering the period 2013 to 2017 and that, since then, the respondent has undertaken subsequent remuneration reviews applicable to county governments. At the hearing of this appeal, counsel for the respondent reiterated that position, while counsel for the appellants acknowledged that the prayer seeking to restrain implementation of the impugned circulars could no longer be granted, but maintained that the appeal remained alive in so far as it sought declarations of constitutional violation and compensation. 95.The doctrine of mootness is now firmly embedded in our jurisprudence. As the Supreme Court observed in Institute for Social Accountability & another v National Assembly & 3 others (Petition 1 of 2018) [2022] KESC 39 (KLR) (8 August 2022) (Judgment), a matter is moot where it has lost its practical significance or where a judicial determination will no longer resolve the controversy affecting the rights of the parties. There must, therefore, remain a live controversy throughout the proceedings if a court is to exercise its adjudicative function. The Court reaffirmed that principle in Dande & 3 others v Inspector General, National Police Service & 5 others [2023] KESC 40 (KLR) where it held that courts should refrain from determining abstract, academic or hypothetical questions that no longer have any practical bearing on the rights of the parties, since judicial resources are reserved for the resolution of real controversies. 96.The doctrine, however, is not to be applied mechanically. The mere fact that subsequent events have overtaken some of the reliefs originally sought does not, without more, render the entire dispute moot. The court must examine whether there remains a tangible and live controversy capable of affecting the parties' rights, or whether any effective relief may still be granted. It is only where no practical purpose would be served by further adjudication that a court should decline to determine the matter as having become academic. 97.In the present appeal, it is evident that the injunctive relief sought in the petition has indeed been overtaken by events. The impugned remuneration framework has since run its course and has been superseded by subsequent remuneration reviews undertaken by the respondent in the exercise of its constitutional mandate. An order restraining the implementation of instruments that are no longer operative would serve no practical purpose and would amount to the grant of relief in vain. 98.The position is, however, different with respect to the declaratory and compensatory reliefs sought by the appellants. A declaration concerning the legality or constitutionality of public action serves a purpose distinct from injunctive relief. Likewise, a claim for compensation founded upon an alleged violation of constitutional rights is not extinguished merely because the administrative decision complained of has ceased to operate. If a constitutional violation were established, the subsequent expiry or replacement of the impugned administrative framework would not, without more, defeat an otherwise meritorious claim for declaratory or compensatory relief. The appellants were therefore entitled to pursue this appeal notwithstanding their concession that the injunctive prayer had become spent. 99.Having independently reconsidered the entire record, the judgment of the trial court, the grounds of appeal, the parties' submissions, and the applicable constitutional and statutory framework, we are satisfied that although the learned judge erred in concluding that the petition disclosed no constitutional issues for determination, that error did not affect the correctness of the ultimate decision.Accordingly, although we depart from aspects of the learned judge's reasoning, we invariably arrive at the same conclusion that the appellants failed to establish any basis for the grant of the declaratory and other reliefs sought. 100.In the end, and for the reasons given hereinabove, we find no basis for interfering with the judgment of the trial court. Accordingly, this appeal is not merited and it is hereby dismissed. Given that the appeal concerned the interpretation of constitutional provisions governing the respective mandates of public institutions and raised issues of public importance relating to county governance and public remuneration, we consider it appropriate to direct that each party shall bear its own costs of the appeal. DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 31ST DAY OF JULY 2026.D. K. MUSINGA…………………………JUDGE OF APPEALP. LILAN…………………………JUDGE OF APPEALDR. J. O. OKELLO…………………………JUDGE OF APPEALI certify that this is a true copy of the original.SignedDEPUTY REGISTRAR