https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12886

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI** **MILIMANI LAW COURTS** **CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS DIVISION** **PETITION NO. 70 OF 2010** **CYCAD PROPERTIES LIMITED …………………………. PETITIONER** **AND** **THE HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL …………………...1ST RESPONDENT** **THE MINISTER OF ROADS …………………………. 2ND RESPONDENT** **THE MINISTRY OF LANDS ………………………….. 3RD RESPONDENT** **KENYA NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY …… 4TH RESPONDENT** **KENYA URBAN ROADS AUTHORITY ……………... 5TH RESPONDENT** **RULING** 1. Before this Court for determination is a Reference by way of **Chamber Summons dated 3rd November 2024** brought under Paragraph 11 of the Advocates Remuneration Order in which the 1st Respondent is challenging the Ruling on taxation dated 19th November 2024 regarding the Petitioner's Party & Party Bill of Costs dated 24th January2024. 2. The Chamber Summons seeks the following **ORDERS: -** 3. ***THAT this Honourable Court be pleased to review the Ruling on Taxation on the Petitioner’s Pary & Party Bill of Costs dated 24th January 2024 delivered on 19th November 2024 and appropriately tax items No. 1 on Instructions Fees and item No. 2 on Getting Up Fees as the Deputy Registrar erroneously taxed the same at highly excessive amounts, contrary to the principles of taxation and the nature of the subject matter.*** 4. ***THAT each party bears its own costs of this Reference.*** 5. The Reference is further supported by the affidavit sworn by Joseph Ngumbi, a Deputy Chief State Counsel in the Office of the Attorney General, the 1st Respondent herein and is premised on the grounds on the face thereof. 6. The 1st Respondent/applicant claims that the Deputy Registrar erred by awarding Kshs. 5,000,000/= in instruction fees and Kshs. 1,666,666/= in getting up fees, which are excessive for a constitutional rights petition and unjustly burdening taxpayers. It is also asserted that the Deputy Registrar improperly exercised discretion, resulting in awards that restrict court access to only the very wealthy and cause unjust enrichment at the taxpayer expense. It is urged that the Court should review and lower the taxation award to reasonable, affordable amounts that reflect economic reality and align with principles of fairness and taxation. 7. In response to the Reference, the Petitioner/Respondent filed a **Replying Affidavit** sworn on **29th January 2026** by Radia Vinayak, the Cycad Properties Limited/the Petitioner’s Director, opposing the Reference. He deposes that the proceedings concerning **Title Number** **Nairobi Block 112/193 in Runda Estate** have lasted for over a decade and that this Petition was consolidated with ***Petition No. 69 of 2010 Elizabeth Wambui Githinji & 28 Others v. Kenya Urban Roads Authority*.** It is deposed that though initially dismissed by the High Court, the Petitioner succeeded on Appeal in *Civil Appeal No. 160 of 2013* and was awarded costs for both the High Court and the Court of Appeal proceedings. 8. It is pleaded that the costs awarded in Court of Appeal were certified at Kshs. 417,758.25/= through a Certificate of Taxation dated 18th December 2024. That, with respect to the Bill of Costs filed in the High Court, following written submissions ordered by the Taxing Master, a Ruling was delivered on 19th November 2024, taxing the said Bill of Costs at Kshs. 6,769,143 and a Certificate of Taxation was subsequently issued on 17th January 2025, prompting the 1st Respondent’s Reference. 9. It is contended that the 1st Respondent’s claim that the Kshs. 5,000,000/= instruction fees and Kshs. 1,666,666/= getting up fees are excessive is not correct and that the amount is justified because the Runda Estate subject property was valued at approximately Kshs. 650,000,000 during the proceedings. 10. The deponent highlights parity with the consolidated *Petition No. 69 of 2010* and asserts that the Taxing Master similarly awarded Kshs. 5,000,000/= as instruction fees, which the Respondents fully paid. That accordingly, challenging the same fee in this Reference is discriminatory and lacks justification. 11. It is deposed that the arguments regarding taxpayer burden and economic state must be balanced against the loss, complexity and constitutional rights violations suffered by the Petitioner and that the Petitioner is entitled to equal protection under ***Article 27 of the Constitution***. It is averred that the Taxing Master’s award is discretionary and should not be interfered with in the absence of a manifest error or violation of taxation principles. 12. The Reference was canvassed by way of written submissions. **The 1st Respondent/ Applicant’s Submissions** 1. In the 1st Respondent’s Submissions dated **18th February 2026**, Counsel submits that the Ruling was delivered in his absence and was only released on 3rd December 2024. That consequently, the Chamber Summons Reference was inadvertently dated 3rd November 2024, instead of the correct date 3rd December 2024, for which he apologizes. (this was noted and in my view, it is a technical error of dating which does not prejudice any party hence the correction is allowed). 2. It is submitted that the Deputy Registrar erroneously taxed Item No. 1 being instruction fees at Kshs. 5,000,000/= and Item No. 2 being getting up fees at Kshs. 1,666,666/= which sums are argued to be unreasonably high, excessive and result in over-reimbursement. 3. On the issue of public interest & constitutional nature, it was submitted that since the matter is a constitutional rights enforcement petition, not a commercial suit, awarding such high fees restricts court access to only the very wealthy and amounts to unjust enrichment at the expense of innocent taxpayers. 4. The 1st Respondent drew a distinction from *Petition No. 69 of 2010* and submitting that the Deputy Registrar improperly relied on the taxation ruling in that related matter yet *Petition No. 69 of 2010* involved 29 Petitioners while the instant petition was only filed by a single Petitioner. That accordingly, awarding the exact same instruction fees to a sole petitioner leads to over-reimbursement and that the Petitioner should instead receive a lower, proportionate amount. 5. The 1st Respondent urged this Court to review the taxation ruling of 19th November 2024, set aside the taxation of Items 1 and 2 and issue appropriate orders in the interest of justice. **The Petitioner/Respondent’s Submissions** 1. When the parties appeared before this Court on 16th June 2026, the Court noted that the Petitioner had not yet filed its submissions and directed that they file and serve their submissions by close of business. However, I have noted from the Judiciary’s Case Tracking System that the only submissions filed by the Petitioner are the same ones filed before the Taxing Master dated **2nd October 2024** which are in response to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Respondents’ submissions dated 3rd September 2024 opposing the Party and Party Bill of Costs dated 24th January 2024. These are summarized hereunder. 2. The Petitioner prayed that since all other items in the Bill of Costs, apart from instructions fees and getting up fees were unchallenged, they be taxed as drawn. It was further submitted that while no monetary relief was explicitly claimed on the face of the petition, the subject matter property was valued at approximately Kshs. 650,000,000/=. Counsel cited the case of ***Joreth Limited v. Kigano & Associates*** and noted that if the subject matter value is not directly ascertainable from pleadings, the taxing officer has discretion to assess instruction fees based on the nature, importance, party interests, complexity and conduct of the case. 3. It was submitted that the dispute involved significant public interest, high-value investments at Kshs. 650M, experienced counsel and a Court of Appeal decision featuring a dissenting opinion, all demonstrating the complex and critical nature of the matter. Counsel for the Petitioner rejected the Respondents’ proposed reduced figure of Kshs. 1,000,000/= and asserted that instead, if the court lowered the claimed Kshs. 20,000,000/=, it should follow the precedent in the related ***Elizabeth Wambui Githinji*** ***Petition No. 69 of 2010*** arising from the same facts where instruction fees were assessed at Kshs. 5,000,000/=. **Analysis and Determination** 1. From the foregoing, the main issue for determination is ***whether the reference is merited.*** The principles governing taxation of bills of costs in constitutional petitions and more specifically on instructions fees were set out in **SC Petition (Appl.) No. E024 of 2023 and Applications Nos. E030, E034 & E038 of 2024 Nairobi Bottlers Limited Versus Mark Ndumia Ndungu and Coca Cola Central, East &West Africa Limited** where the Supreme Court, citing its earlier decision, expressed itself as follows: - ***“[8] This Court, in the case of Fredrick Otieno Outa v Jared Otieno Odoto & 3 Others SC Petition No 6 of 2014; [2023] KESC 75 (KLR) highlighted the following principles to be considered in an application for setting aside a taxation decision:*** ***“(11) A certificate of taxation will be set aside and a single Judge can only interfere with the taxing officer’s decision on taxation if;*** 1. ***there is an error of principle committed by the taxing officer;*** 2. ***the fee awarded is shown to be manifestly excessive or is so high as to confine access to the court to the wealthy; (and I may add, conversely, if the award is so manifestly deficient as to amount to an injustice to one party).*** 3. ***the court is satisfied that the successful litigant is entitled to fair reimbursement for the costs he has incurred, (and I may add, the award must not be regarded as a punishment of the defeated party but as a recompense to the successful party for the expenses to which he had been subjected by the other party); and*** 4. ***the award proposed is so far as practicable, consistent with previous awards in similar cases.*** ***To these general principles, I may add that;*** 1. ***There is no mathematical formula to be used by the taxing officer to arrive at a precise figure because each case must be considered and decided on its own peculiar circumstances,*** 2. ***Although the taxing officer exercises unfettered judicial discretion in matters of taxation that discretion must be exercised judicially, not whimsically,*** 3. ***The single Judge will normally not interfere with the decision of the taxing officer merely because the Judge believes he would have awarded a different figure had he been in the taxing officer’s shoes.”*** 4. From the above decisions of the Supreme Court, it is trite that, each case must be considered and decided on its own peculiar circumstances and the Taxing Master’s unfettered judicial discretion must be exercised judicially. Further, the High Court in considering a Reference will normally not interfere with the decision of the Taxing Master merely because the Judge believes he would have awarded a different figure had he been the Taxing Master. The Court of Appeal in **Kipkorir Titoo & Kiavi Advocates v Deposit Protection Fraud Board {2005] 1KLR 528** restated this principle thus: - ***“On a reference to Judge from the taxation by the taxing officer, the Judge will not normally interfere with the exercise of discretion by the taxing officer unless the taxing officer erred in principle in assessing the costs, an example for an error or principle is where the costs allowed are so manifestly excessive as to justify an inference that the taxing officer acted on erroneous principles.”*** 1. Similarly, in **First American Bank Ltd v Shah & Another [2002] 1 EA 64,** Ringera, J (*as he then was)* expressed himself thus: - ***“This court cannot interfere with the taxing officer’s decision on taxation unless it is shown that either the decision was based on an error of principle, or the fee awarded was so manifestly excessive as to justify an inference that it was based on an error of principle… it would be an error of principle to take into account irrelevant factors or to omit to take into account relevant factors…some of the relevant factors include the nature and importance of the cause or matter, the amount or value of the subject matter involved, the interest of the parties, the general conduct of proceedings and any direction by the trial judge…not all the above factors may exist in any given case and it is therefore open to the taxing officer to consider only such factors as may exist in the actual case before him.”*** 1. I note that the main contention in this Reference is item 1 on instruction fees alone, which is the basis upon which the getting up fees is arrived at. The Supreme Court in the **Nairobi Bottlers Limited Versus Mark Ndumia Ndungu *(supra)*** stated as follows: ***“[9] Bearing these principles in mind, I turn to the reference. Starting with the value of the subject matter. The Taxing Officer handled the issue as follows:*** ***“[9] The last issue for determination is on what really constitutes the value of the subject matter in this case. Counsel for the 1st respondent has submitted at length on this issue and posited that the value of the subject matter is Ksh.8,888,367,426.00. This figure, they submit, was the petitioner’s own calculation hence they ought to be bound by it. In rebuttal, the petitioner has argued that, this was merely an approximation of what the petitioner would have incurred in compliance with the final orders of the High Court had the Supreme Court not granted the conservatory orders. According to the Petitioner, the claim before the High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court was on the issue of breach and or violation of consumer rights as enshrined under Article 46 of the Constitution and nothing turned on the value of the subject matter.*** ***[10] I have perused the entire court record and I must agree with the petitioner that the petition before the High Court did not have any quantifiable value. The foot prints of Kshs.8,888,367,426.00 found their way in these proceedings at stage of seeking conservatory orders.”*** ***[10] It has to be restated that the genesis of this Reference is a constitutional petition that originated from the High Court through the Court of Appeal up to this Court and concerned the appellant/respondent’s omission in displaying the nutritional value, storage directions, customer care email address and phone number on the Coca Cola, Fanta, Krest, Stoney and Sprite glass bottles as it does on its plastic bottles and how this constituted a violation of consumer rights under Article 46(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Constitution. The High Court and the Court of Appeal decided in favour of the 1st respondent and issued declarations that the appellant/respondent’s omission constituted a violation of the consumer rights under Article 46(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Constitution and that the omission amounted to discrimination and unequal treatment of consumers contrary to Article 27(2), (4) and (5) of the Constitution. The Court issued a mandatory injunction directing the appellant/respondent to provide the nutritional information storage directions and customer care mobile number and email address on all of their Coca Cola, Fanta, Krest, Stoney and Sprite brands glass bottles within six (6) months of the date of delivery of the High Court judgment.*** ***[11] Therefore, I agree with the Taxing Officer that the subject matter is not discernible either from the Judgment or settled consent and the figure put forward of Kshs.8.8 billion emanated from the conservatory proceedings. It is thus my finding that the Taxing Officer was well guided by the Court’s decision in Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot and Company Advocates (Petition E011 of 2023) [2024] KESC 44 (KLR) where the Court held as follows:*** ***“57. Whilst the determination of the value of subject matter from a judgment and settlement of the parties is quite straight forward, the determination from pleadings is not. The determination of the value of the subject matter, may be difficult, for instance, where the pleadings/suit is struck out at a preliminary stage, such as in this case, and the value can only be determined/ascertained upon the conclusion of a trial. …..*** ***59. We are of a considered opinion that a claim in a suit which is struck out at the preliminary stage does not ipso facto render that claim or amount pleaded therein without more the value of the subject matter. The position still remains that the amount therein has not been ascertained or determined, and as such, it cannot be applied as the value of a subject matter in a disputed taxation. The application of such a claim or amount as the value of the subject matter would go against the rationale that the fees/costs paid to an advocate and a successful party should be reasonable.” [Emphasis added]*** ***[12] Now turning to item No. 1 being the instruction fees, I am guided by Paragraph 9 (2) of the Third Schedule to the effect that the fees allowed for instructions to appeal or to oppose an appeal is the discretion of the taxing officer and shall be such sum as he shall consider reasonable, having regard to the amount involved in the appeal, its nature, importance and difficulty, the interest of the parties, the other costs to be allowed, the general conduct of the proceedings, the person to bear the costs and all other relevant circumstances; and shall include all the work done in connection with the appeal, including attendances, correspondence, perusals, and consulting authorities. The absolute least is that fees must be commensurate to work done, and it will amount to unjust enrichment if it is not awarded for this purpose.*** ***[13] After examination of various matters previously taxed, the Taxing Officer arrived at the following decision:*** ***“[13] I have already found that there is no known value of the subject matter. In SC Petition No. 16 of 2019 Non-Governmental Organisations Coordination Board Vs. Eric Gitari & 5 Others that dealt with the rights of the LGBTIQ community, the petitioner had sought instruction fee of Kshs.25,000,000/= but I taxed it at Kshs.5,000,000/= having considered the complexity of the matter, the industry involved and other relevant factors. In SC Application No. E042 of 2023 Symbion Kenya Limited Vs. Goodison Sixty-One Schools Limited, a matter involving arbitration, Kshs.36,367,945.33 had been sought under instruction fee but I taxed instruction fee at Kshs.1,000,000/=. In SC Petition No. 6 of 2017 Fredrick Outa Vs. Jared O. Okello & Others that sought for instruction fee of Kshs.10,000,000/=, I taxed it at Ksh.6,000,000/= but on review, it was reviewed to Kshs.1,000,000/=.*** ***[14] Having sufficiently alluded to my previous decisions, I hereby tax item 1 at Ksh.1,000,000/= (One Million Shillings) considering that the petition’s life was cut short at its infancy stage vide the Ruling delivered on 10th November, 2023. Ksh.89,000,000/= is taxed off.”*** ***[14] It is acknowledged that the subject matter revolved around constitutional issues on consumer protection. However, the appeal was struck out at a preliminary stage and, therefore, was not heard. I am further guided by the principles set out earlier in this Ruling, including the fact that taxation is not a mathematical exercise, but a discretionary process and a single Judge will not normally interfere with the decision of the Taxing Officer just because they would have awarded a different figure. Additionally, taking into account that the novelty and complexity of the matter were not determined and further considering the range of costs awarded in other matters, I am of the view that the sum awarded by the Taxing Officer was reasonable in the circumstances, and I therefore decline to interfere with the Taxing Officer’s decision. [15] On the instruction fees for Applications Nos. E030, E034 and E038 of 2023 the Taxing Officer reasoned as follows:*** ***“[18] On items 1, the 1st respondent seeks Ksh.500,000/- as instruction fee. This has been opposed by the petitioner on the basis that the same is exaggerated and contrary to the Third Schedule which provides as Kshs.1000/- as instruction fee to oppose an application. I have read Paragraph 9(1) of the Supreme Court Third Schedule and I agree with the petition that the fee to be allowed for instruction to make, support or oppose any application shall be such sum as the taxing master shall consider reasonable by shall not be less than one thousand shillings. …*** ***[19] However, considering the nature of the dispute and the industry involved in opposing the same, awarding Ksh. 1,000/- will not be fair representation of the work done by counsel …..*** ***[20] In view of my previous decisions referred to herein and bearing in mind that the three applications herein were dealt with simultaneously and the appeal struck out for having been filed out of time, I am of the of 2024 view that this taxation ought not to appear as a punishment to the Petitioner for failure to file the appeal in time but rather appease the victor with a reasonable order of cost. In SC Petition (Application) No. 6 of 2016 Manchester Outfitters Suiting Division Limited now called King Woollen Mills Limited & Another Vs. Standard Chartered Financial Services Limited & Another, the Supreme Court awarded costs of a nominal amount of Kshs.20,000/=. Furthermore, the 1st respondent is equally being compensated with other costs in the main petition.”*** ***[16] I find that it is evident the Taxing Officer, in arriving at the instructions fees for the three applications, took into account Paragraph 9(1) of the Third Schedule of the Supreme Court Rules, 2020 alongside the relevant principles of taxation. Paragraph 9(1) of the Third Schedule of the Supreme Court Rules, 2020 provides as follows:*** ***“The fee to be allowed for instruction to make, support or oppose any application shall be such sum as the taxing officer shall consider reasonable but shall not be less than one thousand shillings.”*** ***[17] By awarding a sum reflective of the work involved while ensuring that the outcome neither penalized the appellant/respondent nor unduly favoured the 1st respondent/applicant, it is my considered finding that the Taxing Officer adhered to the principles of fairness and proportionality. This measured approach underscores the critical balance between compensating legal efforts and discouraging excessive claims.*** ***[18] Having evaluated the matter holistically, I find no justification to interfere with the decision of the Taxing Officer. The sums awarded were both reasonable and fair compensation, aligning with the legal framework and the underlying objective of cost taxation. Consequently, the award on instruction fees for Applications Nos. E030, E034 and E038 of 2023 is upheld.”*** 1. It is discernible from the above case, citing many other decisions, that the Supreme Court found no error in principle and declined to disturb the Taxing Officer’s discretionary decision, holding that the dispute had no quantifiable monetary value since the Ksh 8.8 billion claim arose during separate conservatory proceedings and did not define the subject matter value. The apex Court added that because the appeal was struck out at an early stage before its complexity or novelty could be tested, the Taxing Officer’s award of Kshs. 1 million was deemed fair, reasonable and proportionate to the work done. The Court also affirmed the Taxing Master’s award of costs in three related applications terming them as reasonable. 2. In the instant proceedings, it is uncontroverted that the case was a public interest litigation that went all the way to the Court of Appeal. I have considered the principles to be taken into account where instructions fees are taxed in a public interest litigation. Prof. Ojwang J.B. (*as he then was in the high Court*) in **Republic vs. Ministry of Agriculture & 2 Others Ex parte Muchiri W’Njuguna & 6 Others, (2006) eKLR** held thus: - ***“1. The proceedings in question were purely public-law proceedings and are to be considered entirely free of any private-business arrangements or earnings of the tea production sector;*** ***2. The taxation of advocates’ instruction fees is to seek no more and no less than reasonable compensation for professional work done;*** ***3. The taxation of advocates’ instruction fees should avoid any prospect of unjust enrichment, for any particular party or parties;*** ***4. So far as apposite, comparability should be applied in the assessment of advocate’s instruction fees;*** ***5. Objectivity is to be sought, when applying loose-textures criteria in the taxation of costs;*** ***6. Where complexity of proceedings is a relevant factor, firstly, the specific elements of the same are to be judged on the basis of the express or implied recognition and mode of treatment by the trial judge;*** ***7. Where responsibility borne by advocates is taken into account, its nature is to be specified;*** ***8. Where novelty is taken into account, its nature is to be clarified;*** ***9. Where account is taken of time spent, research done, skill deployed by counsel, the pertinent details are to be set out in summarised form.”*** 1. In her Ruling on 19th November 2024, the Taxing Master in this petition stated that: - ***“The following item is opposed and is taxed as per the reasons below:*** ***(a) liem (instructions fees)-The applicable provisions under this item is Schedule VI(A)(0) of the 2006 ARO since the reliefs sought are in the nature of prerogative orders.*** ***Schedule VI(A)(100) of the 2006 ARO provides*** ***"Prerogative orders*** ***To present or oppose an application for a Prerogative Order; such sum as may******be reasonable but not less than Kshs. 28,000/=*** ***In Premchand Raichand Ltd v Quarry Services of East Africa Ltd (1972) EA 162, the Court outlined the principles of taxation as follows,*** ***"(a) That costs should not be allowed to rise to a level as to confine access to justice as to the wealthy.*** ***(b) That a successful litigant ought to be fairly reimbursed for the cost he has had to incur.*** ***(c) That the general level of remuneration of Advocates must be such as to attract recruits to the profession.*** ***(d) So far as practicable there should be consistency in the award made and*** ***(e) The Court will only interfere when the award of the taxing officer is so high or so low as to amount to an injustice to one party."*** ***Similarly, in the case of Joreth Limited v Kigano & Associates [2002] eKLR the Court set out various factors that are to be considered in determining instructions fee. These factors include the importance of the matter, general conduct of the case, the nature of the case, time taken for its dispatch and the impact of the case on the parties.*** ***As noted earlier, there is already a ruling in force with respect to the taxed Bill of Costs in Petition 69 of 2010. In the case of Registered Trustees of the Cashewnut Industry Development Fund Cashewnut Board of Tanzania Civil Appeal no. 18 of 2001, the court stated*** ***“... There must, so far as is practicable, be consistency in the awards made, both to do justice between one person and another and so that a person contemplating litigation can be advised by his advocate very approximately what, for the kind of a case contemplated, is likely to be his potential liability for costs.”*** ***Thus, there is need to observe the principle of consistency in awarding the current costs as far as practicable Considering the importance of the suit to the parties, time spent, research done, skills deployed by Counsel, doing the best I can and guided by the cited case law 1 award Kshs. 5,000,000/= as instructions fees*** ***(b) Consequently, item 2 on getting up fees is taxed at Ksh 1.666,666/=.*** 1. From my consideration of the above reasoning by the Taxing Master, it is my finding that the Taxing Master correctly assessed the instructions fees taking into account the established legal principles, the law and the peculiar nature of the case. I find no error of principle committed by the Taxing Master, to justify interfere with the decision of the Taxing Officer even in light of the Respondent/Applicant’s contention that it amounts to unjustifiable enrichment. In addition, the fact of the petitioner being only one as opposed to the 29 petitioners in the other Petition 69 of 2010 cannot be a basis for a taxing master being asked to make a finding that instructions fees should be much less where the petitioner is only one. 2. It is also clear that the same principles and an almost similar amount was awarded in the consolidated *Petition No. 69 of 2010* and accordingly, since both Petitions were similar in nature albeit *Pet. No. 69* had more parties, I find that the sums awarded on instructions fees were both reasonable and fair compensation. 3. This Court is cognizant of the general rule that it should not interfere with the Taxing Master’s award on taxation except in exceptional circumstances where there is an error of principle as was aptly espoused in **KANU National Elections Board & 2 others v Salah Yakub Farah [2018] eKLR** where it was held thus: - ***“The general principles governing interference with the exercise of the taxing master’s discretion were authoritatively stated by the South African court in the case of Visser vs Gubb 1981 (3) SA 753 (C) 754H – 755C as follows:*** ***“The court will not interfere with the exercise of such discretion unless it appears that the taxing master has not exercised his discretion judicially and has exercised it improperly, for example, by disregarding factors which he should properly have considered, or considering matters which it was improper for him to have considered; or he had failed to bring his mind to bear on the question in issue; or he has acted on a wrong principle. The court will also interfere where it is of the opinion that the taxing master was clearly wrong but will only do so if it is in the same position as, or a better position than, the taxing master to determine the point in issue . . . The court must be of the view that the taxing master was clearly wrong, i.e. its conviction on a review that he was wrong must be considerably more pronounced than would have sufficed had there been an ordinary right of appeal.”*** 1. There was no evidence adduced by the Applicant to establish that the award made by the Taxing Master on instructions fees is at variance with the legal framework and the underlying objective of taxation of costs. Consequently, I find the Reference dated 3rd December, 2024 (as corrected), is not merited. It is hereby dismissed and the decision of the taxing master contained in the Ruling dated 19th November 2024 is upheld. Certificate of Taxation and Certificate of Order Against the Government to issue. 2. Each party shall bear their own costs of the Reference. 3. As costs against the Government cannot be enforced in these same proceedings in view of section 21 of the Government Proceedings Act, this file is now closed. 4. Orders accordingly. **Dated, Signed and Delivered virtually at Nakuru this 11th Day of August,2026** **R.E. ABURILI** **JUDGE**