https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/8319

DC v AKK (Family Originating Summons E001 of 2026) [2026] KEHC 8319 (KLR) (12 June 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 8319 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Eldoret Family Originating Summons E001 of 2026 RN Nyakundi, J June 12, 2026 IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 45(3) OF THE CONSTITUTION 2010 AND IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 17 OF THE MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY ACT 2013 AND IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 13 OF THE MARRIAGE ACT 2014 AND IN THE MATTER OF ORDER 40 RULE 1 AND 2 OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES AND SECTION & 63(E), OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE ACT AND IN THE MATTER OF SECTIONS 1A, 1B, 3 & 3A OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE ACT, CAP 21 LAWS OF KENYA Between DC Petitioner and AKK Respondent Judgment 1.The Petitioner herein DC filed the instant Originating Summons dated 5th March 2026 pursuant to Article 45 (3) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, section 17 of the Matrimonial Property Act 2013, section 13 of the Marriage Act 2014 and section 1A, 1B, 3 & 3A of the Civil Procedure Act. The Petitioner sought the following orders: -a.That a declaration be and is hereby issued declaring that the Applicant/Plaintiff is entitled to whole share or such other share as the Court may award of the properties (movable and immovable) acquired by the Plaintiff prior to and/or during the subsistence of their marriage and that the Defendant holds title, interest, ownership and/or possession of the said properties in trust for the Plaintiff/Applicant in their respective shares as the legal owners and cestui que trust respectively namely: -a.Eldoret Municipality/Block x/2365 measuring approximately 0.29HAb.House-Hold Items and all other properties acquired during the subsistence of the marriage and personal effects full details whereof are well within the Defendant/Respondent's knowledge.b.That a declaration do issue to the effect that the above matrimonial properties be shared according to the contribution made by the parties towards their development and/or improvement or in any other ratio as this Honourable Court may deem just and expedient to order/direct.c.That a declaration do issue to the effect that the household items be released to the Applicant/Plaintiff and/or that the same be shared in any ratio as this Honourable Court may deem just and expedient to order.d.That in the alternative to all the above, an order be and is hereby issued directing that the Respondent/Defendant is not entitled to any share of the above said properties as enumerated in (1) (a-d) above.e.That in the alternative to all the above, an order do issue directing that a valuation be carried out on all the above properties and a valuation report be filed in Court by a mutually acceptable valuer after which the Court will apportion what is payable to each party and subsequent to the said valuation, the Defendant be ordered to pay to the Plaintiff his entitlement and/or such other share as the Court may order in the best interest of justice.f.That such other and/or further orders be granted as the Court may deem fit, fair and expedient in the circumstances.g.That the Defendant be condemned to pay costs and interest to the Plaintiff. 2.The Summons is supported by the annexed Affidavit sworn by DC, the Petitioner herein who deponed as follows: -a.That I am the Plaintiff/Applicant herein.b.That the Defendant and I cohabited as husband and wife and our since 2010 to 2023.c.That during the subsistence of our marriage, I solely acquired and developed Eldoret Municipality Block x/2365.d.That the Defendant and I were blessed with four (2) issues of our marriage.e.That our said marriage has since been dissolved vide Eldoret Chief Magistrate's Court divorce cause number E113 of 2025.f.That I confirm that I am gainfully employed as a health records technician at Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital while the Defendant was and still is a housewife.g.That the Defendant/Applicant has severally threatened to evict me from our matrimonial home, a threat he has persisted to make especially since our marriage was dissolved.h.That I also acquired household items which I urge this Honourable Court to apportion to us according to our contribution full details of which shall be adduced at the hearing hereof.i.That our marriage/union having been dissolved, it is only fair and just that the properties I acquired solely and/or with minimum contribution on the part of the Respondent/Defendant be distributed in accordance with our respective contributions and/or as shall be quantified by this Honourable Court in the best interest of justice.j.That if not for my financial contribution, the suit properties will not have been acquired as I solely contributed to their acquisition and/or development.k.That the property captioned under paragraph 1 above of the Originating Summons are currently in our possession and/or control of the to my detriment.l.That I am now facing the danger of losing all my past investment and stand to suffer great injustice should the Respondent/Defendant retain the sole ownership and control of the said properties which I acquired single handedly.m.That I pray that the said properties be shared proportionately according to our contribution and/or in such other manner as this Court may deem fit and just and/or the same be sold and the proceeds thereof shared proportionately.n.That the Respondent/Defendant's continued enjoyment of our matrimonial home is prejudicial to me as the said house was solely developed by me.o.That I am swearing this affidavit in strong support of the originating summons filed herewith verily trusting all dispositions herein to be true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.p.That unless appropriate orders are issued, I stand to suffer irreparable loss and damage as I may lose my beneficial interest in the suit parcel of land albeit my contribution thereto either directly or indirectly. Replying Affidavit 3.The Originating Summons was opposed by the Respondent vide a Replying Affidavit 23rd March 2026 who deponed as follows: -a.That I am the Respondent herein.b.That I have read and understood the contents of the Originating Summons and the attached Affidavit, and the same has been explained to me by my advocate and I wish to respond as follows: -c.That the Petitioner and I met and fell in love in 2009 and it was not long before we began cohabiting in a rented house while we planned to purchase property and construct our own home.d.That whereas the Petitioner got employed at Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital, throughout the marriage and after its dissolution I was a business man, a farmer and a casual labour at some instances.e.That at all instances during the subsistence of our marriage, I was the man of the house and I provided and protected our two children and the Petitioner inclusive.f.That since we were so in love, the Petitioner and I agreed that we ought to acquire and own property jointly for the benefit of our family.g.That at all instances while we had the plan to purchase land and build our own home, the Petitioner and I mutually agreed that we needed to save for the same. Since she owned a pay slip and she was always sure of salary, I on the other hand had to hustle my way through, it was for that reason that we decided that she would be the one to keep the money for the intended property purchase.h.That since she was my wife whom I trusted, from mid-2010 every time I got money from the proceeds of farming, casual jobs and businesses, I gave her my share of the savings in cash as agreed. It reached a point that I lost count of how much I was giving since I also had to provide for, manage and maintain the family.i.That sometime in January, 2013 we got word that one James Ratemo Onase was selling his property known as Eldoret Municipality/Block x/2365. We expressed our interest to buy and he expressed his interest to sell. As a couple, we went to inspect the land and we concluded that we needed to purchase the land.j.That before proceeding to the advocate's office to enter into a sale agreement, the Petitioner informed me of her need to go to the bank to withdraw our savings as she informed me she used to deposit the money with her bank as a safety measure. She went to get the money from her bank, and later James Ratemo Onase, the Petitioner and I proceeded to the advocate's office with cash to enter into an agreement for sale.k.That at the advocate's office, while we had expressed our intention to have a sale agreement written for us, the advocate advised us of the need to have a witness in the agreement for it to be valid. The Petitioner and I agreed that I be the witness so that we get the purchase done with.l.That we acquired the property for our mutual benefit and we never processed title for the said property as we wanted both our names to appear on the title given the nature of the sale agreement.m.That after the purchase, we built a two bedroomed house on the property. During the construction of the said house, I ferried timber from my father's land and purchased various building materials some of which were receipted and some not.n.That after we had put up the structure, we both acted to ensure that the same is habitable for our young family and we went ahead to purchase various assorted items to make it a complete home. From late November, 2014 we lived happily in our matrimonial home until 2023 when we began having marital issues.o.That in 2023 vide Eldoret MCCCMISC/E170/2023 the Petitioner claimed that I had threatened her life and the Court ordered me to move out of the house until when the suit was heard and determined. However, the Court also granted me access to the matrimonial property and the children pending the hearing of the suit.p.That to abide by the Court order, I moved out of the matrimonial property and I went to live with my cousin for a period of roughly two years and I only came back in 2025 after the Court ordered us to have equal access to our residence.q.That after my return, the Petitioner invited her relatives to camp in our matrimonial home to cause me discomfort under the guise of protection. At no material time have I ever threatened to evict her from the home since it was purchased and developed by the both of us.r.That even as the Petitioner made my condition of living on the matrimonial property unbearable, I continued and continue paying bills.s.That the Petitioner filed a divorce cause vide Eldoret CMCDC E113 OF 2025 which was heard and determined exparte and a decree absolute was issued on 31st December, 2025.t.That despite us being divorced and having less tolerance of each other, we both live on matrimonial property and in the same house as it's the only place known to us and our children as home.u.That in listing the matrimonial property at paragraph 1 of the Originating Summons, the Petitioner omits listing Motor Vehicle REG. No. KDG xxxD make Nissan Note blue in colour which we purchased and the same registered to her name.v.That after we had completed the construction of our house, we were comfortable with the state of our living at home, but the Petitioner occasionally complained of the inconveniences public transport caused her, especially when getting to work.w.That since she was a lady in the corporate space and with a white color job unlike me, we found it fit to purchase a vehicle to ease her movement and also that of our children. Since I was in love at the time and did not foretell that such a day would come, we agreed the car would be registered to her name.x.That the Petitioner being my beloved and trusted wife at the time, in early 2016 we began saving for the motor vehicle, and just like before, I directed my share of savings to her in cash whenever I got money.y.That sometime in 2019, she informed me that she wanted the car to be imported from Japan, which I had no issue against as long as we could afford it. She further informed me that there was a possibility the importation would be tax exempted due to her disability.z.That during the covid period in 2020 the car arrived. Given that our marriage was based on happiness and mutual support, while the Petitioner always utilized and enjoyed the comfort of the car, in order not to inconvenience her, I used my Brother NK's motorcycle.aa.That after I was supplied with the instant claim, I perused the documents and I was taken by surprise that the Petitioner had and was financing loan accounts during the subsistence of our marriage. At no point in time did we discuss taking out loan accounts as we never experienced financial hurdles that lead us to taking out loans.ab.That during the subsistence of our marriage, we both handled domestic responsibilities and directed our income towards family purposes which made it easy for us to acquire matrimonial property.ac.That through our shared resources and joint effort, we were able to purchase of the following matrimonial property: -a.Eldoret Municipality/Block x/2365 on which our matrimonial home sits.b.Motor vehicle registration number KDG xxxD.c.Assorted household items.ad.That on 8th April, 2026 the Petitioner entered the house and packed up items from the Kitchen namely: a 13kg gas cylinder, a microwave and an electric kettle taking them to an unknown place and as at the time of swearing this affidavit, she has not returned them.ae.That I pray this Honourable Court considers the circumstances and principles of fairness and human worth in this case for a fair, reasonable and equitable distribution of the matrimonial property.af.That I propose the following terms to be applied: -a.The above-mentioned property both movable and immovable be subjected to valuation by a mutually agreed valuer and the valuation report be filed in Court.b.The property be subdivided equally amongst the parties as per the valuation report. iii. The parties to either sell the property or a party who wishes to buy out the interests of the other be at will to do so. 4.The Respondent also filed a Supplementary Affidavit in addition to his Replying Affidavit and deponed as follows: -a.That I reiterate the contents of my Replying Affidavit sworn on 23rd March, 2026 and further state as follows;b.That from the face of the instant application and the Originating Summons of even date, it is not in dispute that the property Eldoret Municipality/Block x/2365 and the developments thereon are matrimonial property.c.That during the subsistence of the marriage I heavily invested directly and indirectly in the purchase and development of property Eldoret Municipality/Block x/2365.d.That before and after the decree absolute was issued, we lived and continue living in the same house situated on the suit property under the current circumstances as it is the only place that we and our children know and call home.e.That in response to Para 3 and 4 of the Supporting Affidavit, the Court noted that both parties needed protection as we were both victims of domestic violence in our marriage. Even as the Court in its determination granted protection on condition that we attend counselling for 30 days, neither of us abided by the Court order.f.That in response to Para 5 of the Supporting Affidavit, there is no such day that I have destroyed any property let alone the interiors or exteriors of the house. As a matter of fact, my children and I also live in the same house as the Applicant and at no material time would I subject them to such harm as a parent.g.That in response to Para 6 of the Supporting Affidavit, we both purchased the property and invested heavily to its development reason why since 2013, there is no title registered against the property yet.h.That in response to Para 7 of the Supporting Affidavit, we both provide for the minors as it is our parental responsibility.i.That in response to Para 8 of the Supporting Affidavit, the Applicant is a woman of means and she states such on oath at paragraph 6 of the Affidavit in Support of the Originating Summons sworn on 5th March, 2026 which is the same date she swears the Supporting Affidavit to the instant application. Further, the Applicant is clearly on a fishing expedition evidenced by the contradictions in her pleadings in order to disinherit and frustrate me.j.That the application as presented is misconceived, mischievous and brought in bad faith to defeat justice.k.That the grounds raised in the application can only be proved through viva voce evidence for justice to prevail.l.That the application is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of this Honourable Court.m.That the application as crafted is a delay tactic aimed at frustrating me from getting a share of the matrimonial property.n.That the application contravenes the provisions of Section 152E of the Land Act No. 6 of 2012 Laws of Kenya.o.That the application as presented has no merit and does not meet the bench mark for grant of the orders sought.p.That no legally and/or tenable reasons have been advanced by the Applicant in support of this application for the orders to be granted pending the hearing of the main suit.q.That the Respondent will on the above and other grounds adduced at the hearing of the application pray that the application be dismissed with cost. 5.The Summons was canvassed by way of written submissions. Petitioner ’s Written Submissions 6.The Petitioner filed her written submissions dated 9th April 2026 on the distribution of the matrimonial property through her Learned Counsel Mrs. Njiru. The learned Counsel submitted that the Applicant and Respondent are divorced within the meaning of the law and during the subsistence of the marriage, matrimonial property Eldoret Municipality Block x/2365 was acquired, including land and the matrimonial home erected and all household properties thereon. She submitted that the Applicant solely purchased the parcel of land, solely financed the construction of the matrimonial home and bought all the household items, she has consistently met financial obligations including school fees, utilities and general upkeep of the family. It was also the learned Counsel’s submission that the Respondent is unemployed, makes no deliberate effort to engage in any income generating activity to supplement the income and contribution of the Applicant and has made minimal or negligible contribution towards acquisition, development or maintenance of the matrimonial property. 7.On the issue of contribution, the Learned Counsel submitted that the Applicant’s contribution towards the purchase of the land was 100%; the Applicant contributed 100% towards financing of construction of their home and that the Applicant is the sole provider of:a)School fees and school requirements;b)Household utilities andc)Daily family needs.On the Respondent’s contribution, the learned Counsel submitted that the Respondent made no financial contribution towards the purchase of the land and the construction of the home. She further stated that the Respondent made minimal non-monetary contribution towards the improvement of the home and continues to do nothing even in payment of school fees, utilities and or general welfare of the home. 8.On the proposed distribution, it was the Learned Counsel’s submission that the Applicant be given 100% to her for the purchase of land and 95% for the construction of the home. It was her justification on this mode of distribution that the purchase of the property and development of the same was traceable solely to the Applicant's financial input with the Respondent making no any meaningful contribution. She opined that granting equal or substantial share would amount to unjust enrichment to the Respondent even as the Applicant continues to shoulder all parental and financial responsibilities. She urged this Court to declare the Applicant as the sole or beneficial owner of the matrimonial land and home and proceeds to award the Respondent 5% share on the house. She also urged this Court to order that the Respondent to vacate the matrimonial home with immediate effect. Respondent’s Written Submissions 9.The Respondent filed his written submissions dated 9th April 2026 on the proposed mode of distribution of Matrimonial Property through his Learned Counsel Mrs. Hamba Caroline. Counsel submitted that during the subsistence of the marriage both parties contributed directly and indirectly to purchase and obtain the following matrimonial property: - Eldoret Municipality/Block x/2365 on which their matrimonial home sits; Motor vehicle registration number KDG xxxD and Assorted household items. 10.On the proposed mode of distribution, the Learned Counsel submitted that the above-mentioned property both movable and immovable be subjected to valuation by a mutually agreed valuer and the valuation report be filed in Court. She also submitted that the property be subdivided equally amongst the parties as per the valuation report. She also opined that the parties to either sale the property or a party who wishes to buy out the interest of the other be at will to do so. Analysis and Determination 11.Having carefully considered the Originating Summons, the Supporting Affidavit, the Replying Affidavit, the Supplementary Affidavit and the written submissions filed by the respective parties, the Court is of the considered view that the following issues arise for determination: -a.Whether the marriage between the parties was dissolved.b.Whether Eldoret Municipality/Block x/2365 constitutes matrimonial property.c.Whether the Petitioner proved her contribution towards the acquisition, development and maintenance of the matrimonial property.d.How should the matrimonial property be divided. Whether the marriage between the parties was dissolved. 12.The starting point in any matrimonial property dispute is to ascertain whether the marriage still subsists or whether it has been dissolved. In the case of ENN Vs SNK [2021] eKLR, the Court expressed itself that division of matrimonial property ought/shall have the following facets proved by either party: -a.The fact of a valid, legal, regular marriage in law;b.Dissolution of such marriage by/through an order of the Court;c.That earmarked/listed property constitutes matrimonial property; acquired and developed during subsistence of the marriage;d.Contribution by each party to the acquisition/development. 13.The Petitioner produced evidence showing that the parties were previously married and that the marriage was subsequently dissolved through Eldoret Chief Magistrates Court Divorce Cause No. E113 of 2025. The Court has perused the Judgment delivered on 24th September 2025 wherein the learned Trial Magistrate pronounced himself in the following terms: -“I hereby pronounce a decree of divorce and order that marriage between the Petitioner and the Respondent be and is hereby dissolved to allow the parties reconstruct their lives afresh. A decree nisi be and is hereby issued, the same shall be made absolute after 30 days from the date hereof, unless in the meantime, the parties reconcile.” 14.The Court further notes that a Decree Nisi dated 24th September 2025 was subsequently issued and thereafter a Decree Absolute dated 3rd December 2025 was issued. The legal consequence of a Decree Absolute is that the marriage ceases to exist in the eyes of the law. The parties cease being husband and wife and become independent individuals with separate legal identities and proprietary rights. The Matrimonial Property Act contemplates that determination and distribution of matrimonial property crystallizes upon dissolution of marriage. The issuance of the Decree Absolute therefore vested this Court with jurisdiction to determine the proprietary interests of the former spouses in the property acquired during the subsistence of their marriage. 15.This Court therefore finds as a fact and as a matter of law that the marriage between the Petitioner and the Respondent was lawfully dissolved and that the parties now stand before this Court as former spouses whose proprietary interests require ascertainment. Whether Eldoret Municipality/Block x/2365 constitutes matrimonial property 16.There is no serious dispute that the parcel known as Eldoret Municipality/Block x/2365 together with the matrimonial home erected thereon constitutes matrimonial property. The Respondent himself admitted in both his Replying Affidavit and Supplementary Affidavit that the suit property was acquired during the subsistence of the marriage and that the matrimonial home was constructed thereon for the benefit of the family. 17.Section 6 of the Matrimonial Property Act 2013defines ‘matrimonial property’ as: -a.the matrimonial home or homes;b.household goods and effects in the matrimonial home or homes; orc.any other immovable and movable property jointly owned and acquired during the subsistence of the marriage. 18.Under Section 2 of the Act, ‘Matrimonial home’ has been defined as: - “any property that is owned or leased by one or both spouses and occupied or utilized by the spouses as their family home, and includes any other attached property”. In the case of T.M.V. Vs F.M.C (2018) eKLR, the Court, expressed that: -“…for property to qualify as matrimonial property, it ought to have been acquired during the subsistence of the marriage between the parties unless otherwise agreed between them that such property would not form part of matrimonial property.” 19.Similarly, in the case of Paul Kagwa Vs Jackline Muteteri (Matrimonial Cause-2005/23) [2006] UGHC 17 (18 May 2006) while citing Bossa, J in John Tom KintuMwanga Vs Myllious Gafafusa Kintu (Divorce Appeal No. 135 of 1997) (unreported) Mwangusywa J expressed himself as hereunder: -“On the last issue of whether the Petitioner is entitled to matrimonial property, I clearly believe that she does and I so hold. Matrimonial property is understood differently by different people. There is always that property which the couple chose to call home. There may be property which may be acquired separately by each spouse before and after marriage… The property to which each spouse is entitled is that property which the parties choose to call home and which they jointly contribute to.” 20.The evidence before this Court establishes that the parties resided on the suit property as their family home for several years and raised their children therein. The property therefore squarely falls within the statutory definition of matrimonial property. The Court consequently finds and holds that Eldoret Municipality/Block x/2365 together with the residential house erected thereon and the household goods acquired for use therein constitute matrimonial property capable of distribution under the Matrimonial Property Act. Whether the Petitioner proved her contribution towards the acquisition, development and maintenance of the matrimonial property. 21.The term matrimonial regime rings strangely in the ears of the disputants and even the Jurists under the Matrimonial Causes Act although in family law the term has general currency to denote the sum of the rules governing the property rights between spouses. These are the rules which take centre stage to guide the Courts in lifting the veil and piercing the corporate legal entity commonly known as the marital union. The rules operate both during the subsistence of the marriage and at its termination by death, divorce or in some other permanent separation. The want of a collective noun like regime to describe this branch of Kenyan law can be attributed to two factors. In the first place, family law itself has been late to acquire practical or pedagogic recognition in Kenyan law. In fact, in the Kenyan legal system both legal and non-legal scholars class know of children’s Court, succession court and that is it. The Matrimonial Causes Act seems to find itself in no-man’s land. Until recently matrimonial disputes between spouses was being litigated using the Married Women's Property Act of 1882 (MWPA)English Law. secondly, the absence of the term matrimonial regime in Kenya’s legal language illustrates well the thesis which French writers have advanced that a so-called system of separation of property between spouses is in reality no system, hence no regime at all but rather a non-system. This English Law though apparent on the face of the record was domesticated jurisprudentially but it still remains that the law was based on common law and not Kenyan law. Even the title itself there is a story as if the distribution was about the female partner and not the male. The presumption then by the law by its title all property which belongs at the time of the marriage to a woman or is acquired by or devolves upon a married woman shall belong to her in all respects as if she were a feme sole. The earlier English jurisprudence developments influenced our domestic decision making in the branch of matrimonial distribution if the decision by the Chancery Division in Gissing v Gissing, [1969] 1 All E.R 1043 (C.A) in which his Lordship observed as follows:It comes to this: where a couple, by their joint efforts, get a house and furniture, intending it to be a continuing provision for them for their joint lives, it is the prima facie inference from their conduct that the house and furniture is a "family asset" in which each is entitled to an equal share. It matters not in whose name it stands; or who pays for what; or who goes out to work and who stays at home. If they both contribute to it by their joint efforts, the prima facie inference is that it belongs to them both equally; at any rate, when each makes a financial contribution which is substantial.It is of interest to compare this passage with his Lordship's language twelve years earlier in Fribance v. Fribance: "'In many cases . .. the intention of the parties is not clear, for the simple reason that they never formed an intention: so the court has to attribute an intention to them. This is particularly the case with the family assets, by which I mean the things intended to be a continuing provision for them during their joint lives, such as the matrimonial home and the furniture in it. When these are acquired by their joint efforts during the marriage, the parties do not give a thought to future separation. They do not contemplate divorce .... They buy the house and furniture out of their available resources without worrying too much as to whom it belongs. The reason is plain. So long as they are Hying together, it does not matter which of them does the saving and which does the paying, or which of them goes out to work or which looks after the home, so long as the things they buy are used for their joint benefit. In the present case it so happened that the wife went out to work and used her earnings to help run the household and buy the children's clothes, while the husband saved. It might very well have been the other way round. The husband might have allotted to the wife enough money to cover all the housekeeping and the children's clothes, and the wife might have saved her earnings. The title to the family assets does not depend on the mere chance of which way round it was. It does not depend on how they happened to allocate their earnings and their expenditure. The whole of their resources were expended for their joint benefit--either in food and clothes and living expenses for which there was nothing to see or in the house and furniture which are family assets and the product should belong to them jointly. It belongs to them in equal shares. "'Lord Denning's doctrine, if one may so call it, of the 'substantial financial contribution" producing an equally owned family asset carried the day in the Court of Appeal since Lord Justice Phillimore agreed with him, adding that justice demanded this solution in the particular case before the court. Lord Justice Edmund Davies dissented. For him the question was not one of justice but "a cold legal question." 1" And this question was answered by the fact that the house had originally been placed in the name of the husband alone. In his view of the facts the wife had not made a substantial contribution to the ability of the husband to buy the house. She was not therefore entitled to any beneficial interest in it. 22.The constitution imperative in Article 45 is germane on the legal scheme of family as it is expresses itself as follows:(1)The family is the natural and fundamental unit of society and the necessary basis of social order, and shall enjoy the recognition and protection of the State.(2)Every adult has the right to marry a person of the opposite sex, based on the free consent of the parties.(3)Parties to a marriage are entitled to equal rights at the time of the marriage, during the marriage and at the dissolution of the marriage.(4)Parliament shall enact legislation that recognises--(a)marriages concluded under any tradition, or system of religious, personal or family law; and(b)any system of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by persons professing a particular religion, to the extent that any such marriages or systems of law are consistent with this Constitution. 23.The point which concerns many disputants of matrimonial disputes is not even the ownership of the matrimonial property but rather in my view the right of the deserted wife to remain in possession of what was admittedly the husband’s house. Secondly, if separation of property runs counter to people’s current attitudes, it also runs counter to the actual behavior of married couples in family budgeting. The questions which arise sometimes have no answers. Where do I go after this matrimonial distribution? Where will my children live? I am retired and no source of income and all the financial resources have been spent in educating my children and building a matrimonial permanent home. Oh, I did not expect that my spouse and I would dissolve our marriage in sundowner years. The doctrine of equal pay for equal work no holds sway the matrimonial property rights distribution. There is also a struggle when matrimonial/family courts are adjudicating cases involving the distribution of matrimonial property on notions of allocation of duties and obligations within the marital union. Generally, it may be a particular family unit allocates the husbands income to meet the mortgage on the matrimonial property or home and the wife’s income to sustain the maintenance of the house keeping expenses. This allocation of duties, obligations and covenants within the marital union is always harmoniously adhered to until and unless the Courts sets asunder the union and each one of them a decree nissi and decree absolute runs at their doorsteps. There maybe also a class of a marriage partnership where the couple driven by the spirit of love may operate a common purse, wallet, account and entrust that all disbursements from that particular common source will be disbursed by the husband diligently without prejudice and occasioning any injustice to the marital union. 24.The Married Women's Property Act of 1882 (MWPA) even its application to Kenya tells a multi-century story on disputes with regard to the distribution of matrimonial property. The legal dust has never settled the battleground as between spouses as who gets what and nature of share entitlement rages on even in the year 2026. So that is the complexity of this regime on matrimonial causes and their outcomes on distribution based on various factors some are subjective whereas others are objective. 25.Lord Justice Romer way back in 1952 in the case of Rimmer v Rimmer stated as follows:It seems to me that …. cases between husband and wife ought not to be governed by the same strict considerations, both at law and in equity, as are commonly applied to the ascertainment of the respective rights of strangers when each of them contributes to the purchase price of property, and, secondly, that the old-established doctrine that equity leans towards equality is peculiarly applicable to disputes of the character of that before us where the facts, as a whole, permit of its application. 26.Having held that properties acquired during coverture are matrimonial property, the critical question begging for an answer is the extent of contribution of each party towards their acquisition. Proof of contribution towards the acquisition of matrimonial property is acritical component in division of matrimonial property. There is no joy riding in a marriage. A spouse must add value in her or his marriage both socially and economically. One cannot harvest where he or she has not sown. Contribution by a spouse for purposes of sharing matrimonial property may be monetary or non-monetary or both. Section 2 of the Matrimonial Property Act provides for contribution and states as follows: -“contribution" means monetary and non-monetary contribution and includes-(a)domestic work and management of the matrimonial home;(b)child care;(c)companionship;(d)management of family business or property; and(e)farm work; 27.Non-monetary contribution is defined in Section 2 of the Matrimonial Property Act to include Domestic work, management of the matrimonial home, child care, management of family business farm work and companionship. What is not clear even as we ride on the jurisprudence of our Apex Courts is whether the financial contribution can take the form of services in kind rather than in cash. I take for example services of housekeeping, child rearing, and companionship which are the common lot of what is associated with wives but in my view those parameters no case have such services in themselves been held to give rise as a claim that the wife thereby made a substantial financial contribution to the purchase of the matrimonial home or any other capital development done within the subsistence of the marriage before the decree absolute set in. There is a presumption which is rebuttable that such wives/spouses contemplated in law as child bearers, home keepers and provider of companionship do not belong to the working class with income generated even beyond the husband/spouse. That presumption might be true in the 19th century where a wife on being married was always delegated and referred to as housewife and her rights and fundamental freedoms were only exercisable with permission of the head of the family/husband or as a king in his kingdom. That legal statement assumes that issue of house help, gardener, cleaner services were non-existent only to be performed by the female spouse. 28.This legal debate and conversation within our jurisprudential circles on account of services provided by the wife who is a child bearer, house keeper and companion and other maintenance services as against the husband are issues which must be settled as to what is the ratio to be accorded in relation to colossal financial investments or borrowings undertaken in enhancing wealth creation in property acquisition and thereafter that marriage breaks down and the spouses approach the matrimonial court for a relief upon divorce. In my view, this should not be a subjective formula. Some of the contributory factors like child bearing and companionship to the other spouse are innate as founded in Genesis 2:18 (NIV) states: "The LORD God said, 'It is not good for the man to be alone. I will make a helper suitable for him.' The way I see it the fountain of part of Section 2 of the Matrimonial Property Act draws its parallel and similarities from the biblical philosophical foundation. That may be the reason why sometimes it is paradoxical to look at these services in the same indicia with monetary contribution. They cannot be in the same runway, legally so to state. 29.The other aspect of what I now call the legal regime in the Matrimonial Property Act is the canon or doctrine of family assets an expression in Pettitt v Pettitt 1969 2 All E.R 285 (H.L) in which property whether real or personal which has been acquired by either spouse in contemplation of their marriage or during its subsistence and was intended for commons use and enjoyment of both spouses or their children such as the matrimonial home it is furniture and other durable chattels that without intending any connotation as to how the beneficial proprietary interest in any particular family asset was held. 30.Section 7 of the Matrimonial Property Act provides as follows:7.Ownership of matrimonial propertySubject to section 6(3), ownership of matrimonial property vests in the spouses according to the contribution of either spouse towards its acquisition, and shall be divided between the spouses if they divorce or their marriage is otherwise dissolved. 31.Moreover, section 9 of the Matrimonial Property Act also provides as under: -9.Acquisition of interest in property by contribution:Where one spouse acquires property before or during the marriage and the property acquired during the marriage does not become matrimonial property, but the other spouse makes a contribution towards the improvement of the property, the spouse who makes a contribution acquires a beneficial interest in the property equal to the contribution made. 32.The Court in Echaria Vs Echaria (2007) eKLR set out clear principles on what constitutes contribution in a matrimonial dispute by stating as follows;“Where the disputed property is not so registered in the joint names of the spouses but is registered in the name of one spouse, the beneficial share of each spouse would ultimately depend on their proven respective proportions of financial contribution either direct or indirect towards the acquisition of the property. However, in cases where each spouse has made a substantial but unascertainable contribution, it may be equitable to apply the maxim “equality is equity” while heeding the caution by lord Pearson in Gissing Vs Gissing…” 33.However, Section 14 of the Matrimonial Property Act does recognize that a spouse can be registered as the sole owner of property but hold in trust of the other spouse. For avoidance of doubt, Section 14 does provide as follows: -Where matrimonial property is acquired during marriage;In the name of the spouse, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the property is held in trust for the other spouse; and in the names of the spouses jointly, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that their beneficial interest in the matrimonial property are equal. 34.In the case of PWK Vs JKG (2015) eKLR the Court had this to say: -“We think that this is an appropriate case where, subject to what we shall say hereafter, a distribution of 50;50 would have been appropriate. This would not be on account of any compelling legal principle that spouses must share equally in matrimonial property but rather, as was succinctly put by a five judge bench of this Court in Echaria Vs Echaria(Supra)”. “where the disputed property is not so registered in the joint names of the spouses but is registered in the name of one spouse, the beneficial share of each spouse would ultimately depend on their proved respective proportions of financial contribution either direct or indirect towards the acquisition of the property. However, in cases where each spouse has made a substantial but unascertainable contribution, it may be equitable to apply the maximum equality is equity while holding the caution of lord Pearson in Gissing Vs Gissing (19700 2 All ER 780 page 788”. Despite the Respondent submitting that the said properties were acquired by him to the exclusion of the Applicant, the Applicant on the other hand painstakingly averred that the same were acquired through proceeds from family business.” 35.Making reference to Section 7 of the Matrimonial Property Act, it is my understanding that where contribution towards the acquisition of matrimonial property can be identified, in the event of divorce or dissolution of the marriage, the said property will be divided between the spouses in accordance with their respective contribution towards the acquisition. In that event, there is no automatic assumption of 50:50 formula or criteria on distribution of matrimonial property between or amongst divorced spouses. In my view, the 50:50 presumption is only to be invoked where there is prima facie evidence that both spouses contributed towards the acquisition of the property and there is no way of determining each spouse’s contribution thereto. It is in that light that I concur with the position in Falconer Vs Falconer [1970] 3 All ER where Justices of Appeal held that: -‘‘And the principles applicable to whether a matrimonial home standing in the name of the husband belonged to them both jointly (in equal or unequal shares) were that the law imputed to the husband and the wife an intention to create a trust for each other by way of inference from their conduct and the surrounding circumstances; an inference of trust would be readily drawn when each had made a substantial financial contribution was stated to be such or indirectly as where both parties went out to work and one paid the housekeeping and the other paid the mortgage instruments; but whether the parties held in equal shares would depend on their respective contributions.’’ 36.Out rightly, this Court notes that there is no rule of the thumb that in the event of a divorce, the property must be shared in the ratio of 50:50. That each case must be decided on its own facts was appreciated by the Court of Appeal in TKM Vs SMW [2020] eKLR where it stated as follows: -“We bear in mind the edict in Muthembwa Vs Muthembwa (2002) 1 EA 186, and many other decisions reminding the Courts that in assessing the contribution of spouses in acquisition of matrimonial property, each case must be dealt with on the basis of its peculiar facts and circumstances but bearing in mind the principle of fairness.” 37.In the case of Federation of Women Lawyers Kenya (FIDA) Vs Attorney General & Another [2018] eKLR it was held that: -“The law recognizes equal worth and equal importance of the parties in marriage. Thus, the beneficial share of each spouse as the law on the division of matrimonial property stands in Kenya ultimately depends on the parties proven respective proportions of financial contribution either direct or indirect towards the acquisition of the property. First, the Act recognizes monetary and non-monetary contribution which is clearly defined. By providing that a party walks out with his or her entitlement based on his or her contribution, the section entrenches the principle of equality in marriage.” 38.It seems to me that the following principles can be derived from the authorities which have been placed before the court:-i.The fact that property or assets owned by a party derive from a source outside the marriage (such as inheritance or pre-acquired wealth) does not per se lead to its exclusion altogether from the court's consideration of a fair outcome to both parties. Insofar as it represents a contribution by one of the parties to the welfare of the family, it is a factor which the judge should take into account: per Lord Nicholls in White v White (above).ii.The overarching principle which supports fairness to both parties is that of 'non discrimination'. The court will treat the contributions made by each of the parties to the marriage as having a broadly equivalent value even though they be different in kind: Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 2 AC 618, [2006] 1 FLR 1186.iii.Each case has to be considered on its own facts and the court's assessment of fairness in that particular case. The judge must consider whether the existence of such property should be reflected in outcome at all. This will depend on the extent to which it has been 'mingled' with matrimonial property and the length of time over which that 'mingling' has taken place: per Mostyn J in N v F (Financial Orders: Pre-acquired Wealth) [2011] EWHC 586 (Fam), [2011] 2 FLR 533. In other words, the way in which such property has been used over the course of the marriage has the potential to affect whether it remains 'separate' property: Miller/McFarlane (above) at para [25]. There may be cases where, over the course of a long marriage, the importance of the source of a significant element of one party's wealth, or even the entire wealth, has been maintained through ring-fencing in one party's name, kept safely and left to grow in value: K v L (above) at para [17] per Wilson LJ.iv.Assets or property which are matrimonial in character will be captured by the 'sharing principle' and divided equally between the parties. Matrimonial property is now recognised as being property which is the product of, or reflective of, marital endeavour or 'generated during the marriage otherwise than by external donation': Charman v Charman (No 4) (cited above) at para [66]; Jones v Jones [2011] EWCA Civ 41, [2012] Fam 1, [2011] 1 FLR 1723 at para [33]; Hart v Hart [2017]EWCA Civ 1306, [2018] 2 WLR 509, [2018] 1 FLR 1283 at paras [67] and [85]; and Waggott v Waggott [2018] EWCA Civ 727, [2019] 2 WLR 297, [2018] 2 FLR 406 at para [128].v.The application of the sharing principle impacts, in practice, only on the division of marital property and not on non-marital property: Scatliffe v Scatliffe [2016] UKPC 36, [2017] AC 93, [2017] 2 FLR 933 at para [25] Waggott at para [128], and XW v XH 20 (Financial Remedies: Business Assets) [2019] EWCA Civ 2262, [2020] 1 FLR 1015, para [136].vi.The application of the sharing principle will not always lead to an arithmetically equal division of the marital wealth. In appropriate circumstances factors such as risk and liquidity may impact the means by which sharing is achieved: XW v XH (above) at para [136]. 39.This summation although drawn largely from comparative dicta and jurisprudential proposition its characteristics and manifestation of the law as envisaged in the Matrimonial Property Act of 2013 of Kenya applies in equal measure when it comes to exercising judicial discretion as to which of the nonfinancial and financial parameters which carries more weight in determining the distribution matrix as between one spouse to another. 40.It follows in the premises that despite the constitutional requirement that parties in a marriage have equal rights, each party must prove either monetary or non-monetary contribution lest a party will not be entitled to any share in the matrimonial property. The onus squarely falls on the party who alleges contribution to prove such contribution in the acquisition of the subject property, be it monetary or non-monetary. In my view, monetary contribution ought not to be simply pegged on documentary evidence but on any viable proof that this Court may find irrefutably convincing. The Court may, based on the evidence presented before it be able to ascertain whether or not there was in fact any monetary contribution which was due to the fact that the spouses never contemplated that the marriage would go south, never documented. 41.This degree of proof is well enunciated in the case of Miller Vs Minister of Pensions [1947] cited with approval in D.T. Dobie Company (K) Limited Vs Wanyonyi Wafula Chabukati [2014] eKLR where the Court stated: -That degree is well settled. It must carry a reasonable degree of probability, but not so high as is required in a criminal case. If the evidence is such that the tribunal can say ‘we think it more probable than not’, thus proof on a balance or prepotency of probabilities means a win however narrow. A draw is not enough. So, in any case in which the tribunal cannot decide one way or the other which evidence to accept, where both parties’ explanations are equally unconvincing the party bearing the burden of proof will lose, because the requisite standard will not have been attained. 42.It is trite law that he who alleges must prove. Section 107 (1) of the Evidence Act, Cap 80 Laws of Kenya, provides that: -Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist. 43.In Anne Wambui Ndiritu Vs Joseph Kiprono Ropkoi & another [2005] 1 EA 334, the Court of Appeal held that: -As a general proposition under Section 107 (1) of the Evidence Act, Cap 80, the legal burden of proof lies upon the party who invokes the aid of the law and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue. There is however the evidential burden that is case upon any party the burden of proving any particular fact which he desires the Court to believe in its existence which is captured in Sections 109 and 112 of the Act. 44.The Court now turns to examine the evidence placed before it regarding contribution. The most significant documentary evidence produced by the Petitioner is the Sale Agreement dated 25th January 2013 between James Ratemo Onsase as Vendor and DC as Purchaser. A close scrutiny of the agreement reveals that DC was the sole purchaser named therein and that the purchase price of Kshs. 370,000/= was paid by her. The Court attaches considerable weight to this document because it constitutes contemporaneous evidence made at the time of acquisition of the property. 45.The Petitioner further produced Standard Chartered Bank statements tracing the source of funds utilized in purchasing the property. Additionally, she produced KCB Bank statements demonstrating financial transactions relating to the development and construction of the matrimonial home. The Petitioner also produced M-Pesa statements demonstrating payment of utility bills and receipts evidencing payment of school fees for the children. Taken collectively, these documents paint a consistent and credible picture of a spouse who bore the overwhelming financial responsibility for acquiring the property, constructing the matrimonial home and maintaining the family. 46.The Court is persuaded that the Petitioner 's evidence is not merely oral but is supported by documentary proof which directly traces her financial contribution to the acquisition and development of the suit property. The Court therefore finds that the Petitioner proved substantial direct monetary contribution towards the acquisition of the land, construction of the matrimonial home, Payment of utilities, Education of the children and general maintenance of the household. 47.The Respondent contended that he contributed funds towards the purchase of the land and development of the house by periodically handing over cash to the Petitioner. While the Court does not dismiss this assertion outright, it must be remembered that he who alleges must prove. Sections 107, 108 and 109 of the Evidence Act place the burden of proof upon the party asserting a fact. The Respondent did not produce any documentary evidence demonstrating the alleged contributions. For instance, no bank statements were produced, no receipts were tendered, no invoices were produced, no independent witness was called to corroborate the alleged financial contributions. The Respondent's assertion therefore remains largely unsubstantiated. 48.This is a classic example of a case which paints a scenario where one spouse essentially was riding on the other in acquisition of assets, development of it to enhance the value and failed to show what he did in all those years as the head of the family to provide leadership and prudent management for each of the members of the company limited by guarantee in which one plays a pivotal role for its survival. During the trial of this case, it was time to take a roll call of each of the spouse towards a score card in consonant with the provisions of Section 2 as read with Section 7 of the Matrimonial Property Act 2013. This is one of the more complex situation of cases in which the man of the house fails to score above average on the set percentages of 50:50% within the envisioned constitutional imperative in Article 45 of our charter. 49.In the case at bar, the Court was placed at the position and the necessity to analyze carefully whether the evidence on record would support a finding that the property which is now called matrimonial or dealt with as such can be brought within the sharing claim made by the other spouse being the Respondent. Unfortunately, the evidence leads this Court to conclude that one of the spouses now referred as ex-wife has indeed through words, action or deeds manifested herself to the extent that the property in question is all her sweat for there is sufficient documentary evidence to demonstrate that it is almost 100% acquisition and development from her purse. If indeed the husband now Respondent and ex-husband to that marital union invested anything in the property that evidence is in the realm of remoteness. 50.Finally, in terms of factual question in the court will need to determine in due course is whether there is evidence relating to non-monetary contribution which mixed together within the parameters laid down in Section 2 of the Act the Respondent can find something to hold unto in the distribution formula of this property placed before this Court. The enquiry therefore central to the items on contributions revolve around the following:a.Did the Respondent undertake any farming or business activities for the benefit of the marital union?b.Did the Respondent demonstrate due diligence, accountability, transparency and management of the family unit during the subsistence of the marriage?c.Did the Respondent pass the threshold as a home keeper and companionship?d.Did the Respondent demonstrate that besides non-monetary contribution during the subsistence of the marriage he allocated any financial resources to acquire the virgin or undeveloped property in the first place and later in a family resolution agreed to share monies in their possession in a particular ratio to develop what they now call their matrimonial home?e.Did the Respondent show evidentially that during the subsistence of the marriage since his wife the Petitioner was more endowed with financial resources, his meagre income went towards survival rights of their children as tabulated in the Children’s Act? 51.In my own evidential evaluation of both oral and documentary none of the above questionnaires was answered in the affirmative by the Respondent. 52.Nevertheless, matrimonial property disputes cannot be approached solely from the perspective of financial contribution. Section 2 of the Matrimonial Property Act recognizes non-monetary contribution in the form of domestic work, management of the matrimonial home, child care, companionship, management of family businesses and farm work. The Court accepts that the Respondent participated in family life and undoubtedly made some indirect contribution through companionship, parenting, supervision of family affairs and other domestic responsibilities. However, the Court is unable to place such contribution on the same pedestal as the Petitioner 's documented and traceable monetary contribution. 53.In view of the foregoing, the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the financial foundation upon which the matrimonial property was acquired and developed was laid by the Petitioner. How should the matrimonial property be divided. 54.The Supreme Court of Kenya in the case of Joseph Ombogi Ogentoto Vs Martha Bosire Ogentoto Petition No.11 of 2020 conclusively settled on how matrimonial properties should be divided where it was held as follows: -“…we also find that Article 45(3) acts as a means of providing for equality as at the time of dissolution of marriage but such equality can only mean that each party is entitled to their fair share of matrimonial property and no more. Nowhere in the constitution do we find any suggestion that a marriage between parties automatically results in common ownership or co-ownership of property (hence vesting of property rights) and Article 45(3) was not designed of the purpose of enabling this Court to pass property rights from one spouse to another by fact of marriage only….……our view is that, while Article 45(3) deals with equality of the fundamental rights of spouses during and after dissolution of marriage, we must reiterate that equality does not mean the re-distribution of proprietary rights at the dissolution of a marriage. Neither does our reading of this provision lead to the assumption that spouses are automatically entitled to a 50% share by fact of being married.……….it is our finding that the stated quality under Article 45(3) means that the Courts are to ensure that at the dissolution of a marriage, each party to a marriage gets a fair share of the matrimonial property based on their contribution. This is best done by considering the respective contribution of each party to ensure no party is unfairly denied what they deserve as well as ensuring that no party is unfairly given more than what he or she contributed…….Therefore, in the event that a marriage breaks down, the function of any Court is to make a fair and equitable division of the acquired matrimonial property guided by the provisions of Article 45(3) of the Constitution. To hold that Article 45(3) has the meaning of declaring that property should be automatically shared at the ratio of 50:50 would bring huge difficulties within marriages and Tuiyot, J (as he then was) has explained why above. Noting the changing times and the norms in our society now, such a finding would encourage some parties to only enter into marriages, comfortably subsist in the marriage without making any monetary or non-monetary contribution, proceed to have the marriage dissolved then wait to be automatically given 50% of the marital property. That could not have been the intention of our law on the subject.” 55.In applying the maxim of equity, equality is equity, in which equity is now a constitutional principle in Article 10(2)(b) of the Constitution the Apex Court stated as follows: -“95.As was pointed out by the Court in the English case of Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886, the maxim ‘equality is equity’ has never been truer. To our minds, equity is an important principle when it comes to matrimonial property since what is fair as it relates to equity is not a question of the quantitative contribution by each party but rather the contribution by any party in any form, whether direct or indirect. Any substantial contribution by a party to a marriage that led to acquisition of matrimonial property, even though such contribution is indirect, but nevertheless has in one way or another, enabled the acquisition of such property amounts to significant contribution. Such direct or indirect acts as was discussed by Lord Justice Fox in Burns Vs Burns [1984] 1 All ER 244 may include:a.Paying part of the purchase price of the matrimonial property.b.Contributing regularly to the monthly payments in the acquisition of such property.c.Making a substantial financial contribution to the family expenses so as to enable the mortgage instalments to be paid.d.Contributing to the running of and welfare of the home and easing the burden of the spouse paying for the property.e.Caring for children and the family at large as the other spouse works to earn money to pay for the property.” 56.The Supreme Court of Kenya further stated as follows: -“96.These considerations are in line with the finding of the Court in the English case of White Vs White [2001] 1 AC 596 where Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead held that the Court should always ensure a fair outcome in considering the contribution of spouses by stating:Self-evidently, fairness requires the Court to take into account all the circumstances of the case. Indeed, the statute so provides. It is also self-evident that the circumstances in which the statutory powers have to be exercised vary widely … But there is one principle of universal application which can be stated with confidence. In seeking to achieve a fair outcome, there is no place for discrimination between husband and wife and their respective roles. Typically, a husband and wife share the activities of earning money, running their home and caring for their children. Traditionally, the husband earned the money, and the wife looked after the home and the children. This traditional division of labour is no longer the order of the day. Frequently both parents work. Sometimes it is the wife who is the money-earner, and the husband runs the home and cares for the children during the day. But whatever the division of labour chosen by the husband and wife, or forced upon them by circumstances, fairness requires that this should not prejudice or advantage either party when considering paragraph (f), relating to the parties' contribution.’’ 57.From the foregoing legal provisions and numerous judicial decisions, it is evident that although the Constitution guarantees equal rights to parties in a marital union, each spouse must demonstrate either monetary or non-monetary contribution in order to establish entitlement to a share of the matrimonial property. 58.Having evaluated all the evidence, this Court is satisfied that the Petitioner 's contribution towards acquisition and development of the suit property far exceeded that of the Respondent. The Court is equally satisfied that the Respondent made some indirect and non-monetary contribution which ought not to be ignored, though it fell on the lower threshold set by the law on such cases. The Court must however therefore strike a delicate balance between recognizing the Petitioner's overwhelming financial contribution and acknowledging the Respondent's indirect contribution. To award the Respondent an equal share would amount to unjust enrichment and would disregard the documentary evidence demonstrating the Petitioner 's financial sacrifice. 59.Conversely, to completely exclude the Respondent would amount to ignoring the realities of marriage and the indirect contributions recognized by law. Doing the best justice possible in the circumstances, this Court finds that a 90:10 ratio accurately reflects the parties' respective contributions. 60.Accordingly, Judgment is entered in favour of the Petitioner and the Court makes the following orders: -a.That a declaration is hereby issued that Eldoret Municipality/Block x/2365 together with the matrimonial home erected thereon constitutes matrimonial property.b.That a declaration is hereby issued that the Petitioner DC is the principal beneficial owner of the suit property Eldoret Municipality/Block x/2365.c.That the beneficial interests of the parties are hereby determined as follows: -DC at 90% and Abraham Kipkoech Kibet at 10%.d.That the matrimonial house and all developments standing on Eldoret Municipality/Block x/2365 shall be subjected to valuation by an independent, qualified and licensed valuer agreed upon by the parties within thirty (30) days.e.That upon valuation, either party shall be at liberty to purchase the interest of the other based on the valuation report on a priority basis.f.That in the event neither party elects to buy out the other's interest within thirty (30) days after filing of the valuation report, the property shall be sold in the open market and the proceeds thereof distributed as follows: -Petitioner - 90% and Respondent – 10%.g.That the household goods and effects shall remain part of the matrimonial property and shall be distributed in accordance with the same percentage unless otherwise agreed by the parties.h.That this matrimonial property shall remain as the residence of the Petitioner and their two children guided by the Child Welfare and Best Interests doctrine as espoused under Article 53 of the Constitution and the Children’s Act envisaging conceptually child security, education, health, emotional development, right to life, food and a roof over their head.i.That this multidimensional legal lens guiding the child’s best interest shall remain non-negotiable as between the Petitioner and the Respondent with regard to the interpretation and enforcement of their fundamental rights.j.That in the interim period dependent upon the valuation report the Respondent be and is hereby declared persona non grata in so far as access, occupation, utilization and any other cause which shall permit him to claim any of the declared 10% ratio to this matrimonial property.k.That the Respondent to take cognizance that he no longer has any rights to interfere with the right to life under Article 26, right to dignity and security under Article 26 and right to security under Article 29 and right to privacy under Article 31 of the Petitioner.l.That the Respondent to take cognizance that the marriage was dissolved, his legal status with the Petitioner changed from married to single, terminating mutual rights like companionship and but not limited to conjugal rights. The Court has since declared that what God had joined together it has been put asunder, for the Respondent to carry his bed and leave the matrimonial home in peace so that his children can enjoy the entitlement of welfare and best interests under the leadership of the Petitioner.m.That therefore his presence with the decree nisi absolute legally freeing both parties to reopen a new chapter in their lives classifies him as a trespasser to the matrimonial home now in dispute unless further orders are issued by a Superior Court.n.That the Deputy Registrar of the High Court shall extract part of these orders borne of the judgment of this Court in so far as incursion and intrusion by the Respondent to the property referenced as Eldoret Municipality/Block x/2365 as contempt on the face of the record punishable without any further proceedings.o.That each party shall bear his or her own costs, this being a family dispute. 61.Orders accordingly. DATED AND DELIVERED AT ELDORET VIA CTS AND EMAIL THIS 12TH DAY OF JUNE 2026.…………………………………R. NYAKUNDIJUDGE