https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/948

De Larue Currency & Security Print v Nthenge (Civil Appeal E437 of 2021) [2026] KECA 948 (KLR) (15 May 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KECA 948 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Court of Appeal at Nairobi Civil Appeal E437 of 2021 PO Kiage, LA Achode & AO Muchelule, JJA May 15, 2026 Between De Larue Currency & Security Print Appellant and David Nzioka Nthenge Respondent (Being an appeal from the Judgment of the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi (Sergon J), dated 17th July 2020 in Milimani HCCC NO. 541 of 2009) Judgment 1.David Nzioka Nthenge the respondent herein, filed a Plaint dated 12th October 2009 against De Larue Currency & Security Print the appellant, seeking the following orders:a.General damages for pain and suffering;b.General damages for loss of earning capacity;c.Future medical expenses as follows:i.Implant ……. Kshs 300,000;ii.Hospital admission ksh.300,000;iii.Homecare service ….. Kshs 180,000;iv.Review per month for 32 years being,….ksh.10,000 x 12 x 32 = kshs3,840,000;v.In-patient fee …… Kshs. 2,000,000;vi.Surgery fee …… Kshs 256,000/=TOTAL ……………. Kshs 7,876,000/=d.Costse.Interest 2.In the plaint, the respondent averred that he was lawfully employed by the appellant. In the course of his employment, he sustained a serious back injury on 12th October, 2006, while he was performing assigned duties involving the manual handling of heavy materials. He contended that the injury occurred when he was required to lift and stack reams of paper in the appellant’s vault using a counting machine, without adequate training, proper supervision, or the provision of appropriate mechanical lifting equipment. 3.The respondent asserted that because of the said injury, he suffered severe physical harm, including a prolapsed intervertebral disc, necessitating surgical intervention, and resulting in permanent incapacity. He averred that he had continued to experience pain and functional limitation, rendering him unable to engage in gainful employment and resulting in the subsequent termination of his employment, on medical grounds, without adequate compensation. 4.In a statement of defence dated 4th December 2009, filed in response to the Plaint, the appellant admitted the existence of an employer–employee relationship, but denied that it breached any duty of care owed to the respondent. It contended that it had in place proper safety protocols, including employee training programmes and access to medical care through an in-house clinic, and that it took all reasonable steps to ensure the safety and welfare of its employees. Further, that the respondent was duly trained in the performance of his duties and that appropriate lifting equipment was available to employees. It disputed the allegation that the respondent was exposed to unsafe working conditions, or that there was any failure on its part to provide a safe system of work. 5.The appellant attributed the respondent’s condition to a pre- existing medical, or degenerative condition, including spinal abnormalities such as disc disease and haemangioma, which it argued were unrelated to the alleged accident. It maintained that any injury or incapacity suffered by the respondent was either not sustained in the course of employment, or was the result of natural causes, aging, or underlying medical conditions rather than workplace negligence. 6.The appellant also challenged causation, asserting that there is no credible evidentiary link between the alleged lifting of moderate weight and the severe injuries claimed. It relied on medical testimony suggesting that a healthy individual could safely lift the weight in question and that diagnostic imaging did not conclusively support a traumatic workplace injury. 7.During the hearing, the respondent’s case was supported by two witnesses. While the appellant’s defence was supported by four witnesses. 8.The respondent’s case sought to establish the occurrence of the accident, the appellant’s negligence, and the extent of the injuries sustained. The respondent (PW1), testified that he was employed by the appellant and was injured on 12th October 2006 while performing his assigned duties in the appellant’s strong room. He stated that the injury occurred when he lifted a ream of paper onto a pallet while operating a counting machine. He maintained that he had not been trained in proper manual handling techniques and that no lifting equipment had been provided at the time. 9.The respondent testified that although he initially received treatment at the appellant’s clinic, his condition deteriorated, necessitating referral to specialists and ultimately surgical intervention. He asserted that prior to the accident he had no pre-existing back condition, as confirmed by his pre- employment medical report. He also stated that the appellant issued a safety notice only after the accident, which he relied on to demonstrate the absence of prior safety measures. The respondent emphasized that the injury left him in persistent pain, physically incapacitated, and unable to work, and that he was subsequently terminated on medical grounds without adequate compensation. 10.Prof. David Livingstone Oluoch Olunya (PW2), a Consultant Neurosurgeon, provided expert medical evidence. He testified that he examined and treated the respondent, including performing surgery, and diagnosed him with a serious spinal condition consistent with injury from lifting heavy loads. He assessed the respondent as having suffered 100% permanent incapacity, rendering him unfit for any physical work. PW2 further stated that the respondent would require ongoing medical care, including additional surgical procedures, implants, pain management, and long-term follow-up treatment. He also quantified the anticipated future medical expenses. In his view, the respondent’s injuries were consistent with trauma caused by lifting heavy objects and were not attributable to any minor or unrelated pre-existing condition. 11.The defence testimony sought to demonstrate that the appellant had fulfilled its duty of care and that the respondent’s condition was either not work-related, or arose from pre-existing or natural causes. 12.James Mbugua (DW1), the appellant’s Human Resource officer, confirmed that the respondent had been employed by the appellant for several years and had risen through the ranks to the position of Vault Porter. He testified that the appellant maintained structured training programmes and that the respondent had undergone training in the course of his employment. Further, that employees were provided with appropriate lifting equipment and the workplace complied with safety requirements. However, he acknowledged that he did not possess documentary proof of the respondent’s specific training and confirmed that the accident occurred while the respondent was on duty. He also indicated that the respondent’s insurer declined liability based on an alleged pre- existing medical condition. 13.Nelly Nyamunga (DW2), a clinical officer at the appellant’s clinic, testified that the respondent reported to her on the material date complaining of lower back pain after lifting a load weighing approximately eighteen kilograms. She stated that such weight was within acceptable limits for a healthy adult under occupational safety standards. She expressed the opinion that the respondent’s condition could have arisen from degenerative or natural causes, including fibromyalgia and disc-related conditions, rather than from a specific workplace injury. She also suggested that diagnostic imaging did not conclusively support a traumatic injury and indicated that some of the respondent’s conditions could be hereditary or pre-existing. 14.Dr. Peter Wambugu (DW3), a Consultant Surgeon, examined the respondent on 9th September 2010, and made a diagnosis of a prolapsed intervertebral L4/5 and a pre-existing spinal lesion and haemangioma (blood tumor), not caused by any injury. While he acknowledged that the respondent’s injuries could be consistent with lifting heavy loads, he maintained that there was evidence of an underlying condition that may have contributed to, or caused the respondent’s symptoms. 15.Dr. Henry Welligton Alupe (DW4), a General Medical Practitioner and a visiting doctor at the appellant’s clinic, testified that he treated the respondent on 14th October 2006. He confirmed that the respondent complained of severe back pain associated with a spinal disc problem and was referred to a specialist for further treatment. He stated that the precise cause of the respondent’s condition was uncertain and could be linked to fibromyalgia, whose etiology is not clearly defined. He had no knowledge of any pre-existing condition, but he acknowledged that such injuries could arise from lifting heavy loads. 16.Upon considering the evidence before him, Sergon. J delivered a judgement dated 17th July, 2020 at Milimani High Court in favour of the respondent and awarded him as follows:i.General damages for pain and suffering Kshs. 1,500,000/=ii.General damages for loss of earning capacity Kshs. 10, 798,128/=iii.Future medical expenses Kshs. 6,876,000 Total Kshs. 19,174,128iv.The aforesaid amounts to attract interest at court rates from the date of judgment until full payment.v.Costs of the suit. 17.Aggrieved by the judgment and decree, the appellant filed the present appeal, raising twenty-one (21) grounds in its memorandum of appeal, dated 4th August 2021. In summary the appellant faulted the trial Judge for:i.Finding that the respondent’s injury was work- related and caused by lifting activities, contrary to the evidence.ii.Relying on the respondent’s visit to the staff clinic on 12th October 2006 as proof that the injury occurred in the course of employment.iii.Failing to properly evaluate the evidence, wrongly relying on the respondent’s account and disregarding defence and medical evidence, including evidence of a pre-existing or congenital condition.iv.Holding that the appellant breached its duty of care by failing to provide training and equipment, despite evidence to the contrary.v.In the assessment of damages, including findings on incapacity, comparability of injuries, and use of an incorrect multiplier.vi.Comparing the respondent’s injuries with precedent and awarding excessive general damages for pain and sufferingvii.Misapprehending the respondent’s age at the time of the accident, leading to an erroneous multiplier in calculating loss of earning capacity.viii.In assuming jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter contrary to constitutional and statutory provisions governing labour disputes. 18.The firm of M/S Daly Inamdar Advocates LLP, filed submissions dated 3rd July 2024, on behalf of the appellant. The appellant concedes that it owed the respondent a duty of care as an employer but contends that no breach of that duty was established. It submits that the respondent had been duly trained in manual handling and provided with appropriate equipment and a safe system of work. In this regard, it relies on documentary evidence such as training records, safety policies, and internal safety communications, and emphasizes that the respondent had worked in the same role for several years and was experienced in performing his duties. 19.On causation, the appellant submits that the respondent failed to discharge the legal burden of proof. It argues that there was no credible evidence linking the alleged injury to the workplace incident. Instead, the appellant relies on medical evidence to demonstrate that the respondent suffered from a pre-existing or congenital condition, including haemangioma, disc degeneration, and fibromyalgia, attributable to natural causes such as aging and wear and tear. 20.In support of this position, the appellant relies on the authority of Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] 1 All ER 871, for the proposition that where an injury may be attributable to multiple possible causes, the plaintiff must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the defendant’s negligence was the operative cause. It also cites Obwogi v Aburi [1995–1998] EA 255, to underscore that liability in negligence only arises where the defendant’s breach is the proximate cause of the damage, and not where there is a break in the chain of causation. 21.In addition, the appellant relies on Statpack Industries v James Mbithi Munyao [2005] eKLR, to emphasize that the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to establish a causal link between the alleged negligence and the injury, and that not every injury is necessarily attributable to negligence. Similarly, reliance is placed on Cummings (McWilliams) v Sir William Arrol & Co Ltd [1962] AC 623, for the principle that even where there is a breach of duty, liability does not arise unless it is shown that the breach caused the injury. 22.The appellant further faults the trial court for misapprehending and improperly weighing the medical evidence, arguing that undue reliance was placed on the respondent’s expert, while disregarding consistent medical opinions by the defence, pointing to a pre-existing condition. It submits that the trial court failed to properly interrogate inconsistencies in the expert evidence and thereby reached erroneous conclusions on the nature and extent of the injury. 23.On quantum, the appellant contends that the damages awarded were excessive and based on erroneous findings, particularly regarding the degree of incapacity and the computation of loss of earning capacity. Further that the respondent continued working after the alleged injury, thereby undermining the finding of total incapacity. 24.The firm of M/S Kilonzo & Company Advocates filed submissions dated 9th February 2023 on behalf of the respondent urging that the trial court correctly established, on the evidence, that he sustained injuries on 12th October 2006 in the course of his employment while lifting a heavy ream of paper. It is argued that this evidence was corroborated by the appellant’s own clinic records and was never controverted. The respondent maintains that the appellant failed to provide prior training, or adequate safety measures, thereby exposing him to a foreseeable risk of injury, in breach of statutory and common law duty of care under Section 6(1) as read with Section 10(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 2007. 25.The respondent urges that he discharged the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities and his evidence was not rebutted. He invoked the provision of Sections 107–109 of the Evidence Act to underscore that the burden lay with the appellant to prove allegations of a pre-existing condition, which it failed to do. That the evidence of injury and causation was consistent and supported by both his own testimony and medical evidence. 26.Regarding liability, the respondent relies on Spin Knit Limited v Benard Kinoti Muigua [2022] eKLR and the principles in Halsbury’s Laws of England to submit that an employer owes a duty to take reasonable care for the safety of employees and not to expose them to unnecessary risk. He also cites Kretav Resources Ltd v Peter Kerubo Sumo [2014] eKLR, which affirms that an employer is liable for injuries sustained in the course of employment where reasonable safety measures are not taken. 27.Regarding medical evidence, the respondent contends that there was no credible proof of a pre-existing condition and that the trial court properly relied on the evidence of his expert witness, which was corroborated in material respects. He argues that the appellant’s medical evidence did not displace his case. 28.With respect to quantum, it is submitted that the awards made were justified and based on established principles. He relies on Mumias Sugar Company Ltd v Francis Wanalo [2007] eKLR for the principles governing loss of earning capacity, emphasizing that such damages compensate for diminished future earning ability. He further relies on Emmanuel Kombe Nzai (Kombe Emmanuel) v Basari Company Ltd & another [2017] eKLR, to support the award of general damages for pain and suffering as being within comparable ranges. 29.He cited the decision in Tracom Limited & another v Hassan Mohamed Adan [2009] eKLR, and Kenya Bus Services Ltd v Gituma [2004] EA 91, to submit that future medical expenses are recoverable where specifically pleaded and proved, as was done through medical evidence in this case. 30.The respondent contends that the High Court properly exercised its jurisdiction. That in any case, the issue of jurisdiction was previously determined and cannot be re- opened on appeal. 31.When the appeal came before Court on 4th November 2025, for hearing in plenary, Mr. Ombeva, learned counsel appeared for the appellant and reiterated their written submissions. Mr. Makori, learned counsel held brief for Mr. Oyieko learned counsel for the respondent and also reiterated the written submissions. 32.The mandate of this Court in this first appeal is to be found in rule 31 (1) (a) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2022 as follows:“On appeal from a decision of a superior court acting in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the Court shall have power to re-appraise the evidence and to draw inferences of fact.” 33.The expanse of the mandate defined above was explained by this Court in Kenya Ports Authority v Kuston (Kenya) Limited [2009] 2 EA 212 as follows:“On a first appeal from the High Court, the Court of Appeal should reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowance in that respect. Secondly that the responsibility of the court is to rule on the evidence on record and not to introduce extraneous matters not dealt with by the parties in the evidence”. 34.In the discharge of the said mandate, we are also mindful of the timeless caution by the predecessor of this Court in Peters v Sunday Post Ltd (1958) EA 424 where it was observed as follows:“It is a strong thing for an appellate court to differ from the finding, on a question of fact, of the judge who tried the case and who has had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. An appellate court has, indeed, jurisdiction to review the evidence in order to determine whether the conclusion originally reached upon that evidence should stand. But this is a jurisdiction which should be exercised with caution. It is not enough that the appellate court might itself have come to a different conclusion.” 35.Guided by the foregoing principles and having considered the record and memorandum of appeal, the rival submissions, and the law, we discern the issues for determination to be the following:i.Whether the respondent sustained a work-related injury, caused by the appellant’s negligence, or breach of duty;ii.Whether the respondent had a pre-existing condition that affected causation and liability;iii.Whether the trial court properly evaluated the evidence;iv.Whether the award of damages and costs was justified; and,v.Whether the High Court had jurisdiction. 36.We begin by examining whether the respondent sustained a work-related injury, caused by the appellant’s negligence, or breach of duty. Section 10 (2) of the Work Injury Benefits Act stipulates that:“An employer is liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act to an employee injured while at work.” 37.Section 10 (4) of the Work Injury Benefits Act provides as follows:“For the purposes of this Act, an occupational accident or disease resulting in serious disablement or death of an employee is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of employment if the accident was due to an act done by the employee for the purpose of, in the interests of or in connection with, the business of the employer despite the fact that the employee was, at the time of the accident acting—a.in contravention of any law or any instructions by or on behalf of his employer; orb.without any instructions from his employer.” 38.A workers’ compensation is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary 11th ed. 2019, as an injury arising out of, and in the course of employment. 39.For an injury to qualify as work-related it must arise out of the course of employment and occur within the scope of the employment. An injury arising out of the course of employment is one that is incidental to the work and a reasonable result of the work. For an injury to be in the scope of employment on the other hand, means that it occurred within the period of employment and at a place where the employee is reasonably in the performance of their duty. 40.It is not in dispute that the respondent herein was an employee of the appellant and that on 12th October 2006, he was at work and was instructed by the appellant’s agents to carry out the duty of counting papers in the counting machine in the vault. This included lifting the lower ream onto a pallet, during which process the respondent was injured. The appellant does not dispute the occurrence of the incident, but contests liability and causation. 41.The superior court in its finding that the respondent sustained the injury at work observed as follows:“27.In fact Dr. Nelly Nyamunga (DW2) confirmed that the plaintiff visited her clinic on 12.10.2006 complaining of a lower back pain which occurred when the plaintiff lifted a load of paper weighing 18kgs. After weighing the competing evidence I am convinced that plaintiff told the truth that he suffered the injuries particularized in the plaint while working at the defendant’s factory on 12th October 2006. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff at the material time was instructed by the defendant’s agents and or servants to carry out the duty of counting papers in the counting machine in the vault and to put a lower ream onto a pallet and in the process of doing so he got injured.28.The defendant is categorical that the plaintiff had a pre-existing medical condition. However, the defendant failed to prove that assertion. It is clear from the evidence of Prof. Oluoch (PW2) and from the medical report, PW2 prepared, that the plaintiff was injured while lifting loads which evidence corroborated the plaintiff’s assertion that he was injured as a result of lifting and putting a ream of papers weighing 18kgs onto a pallet. Dr. Wambugu (DW1), the defendant’s own witness stated in cross-examination that he did not have any medical reports showing that the plaintiff had a pre-existing condition.” 42.There is therefore, from the totality of the record, no doubt that the respondent sustained injury in the course of employment. His testimony that he injured his lower back while lifting a ream of paper in the appellant’s vault was consistent, cogent, and remained unshaken on cross- examination. Additionally, this account was materially corroborated by the appellant’s own medical evidence. In particular, the appellant’s clinic records confirmed that the respondent presented on the same day at the clinic with complaints of lower back pain arising from lifting a load. 43.The more irksome question is where to apportion fault. Did the appellant fail to provide a safe system of work, including adequate training and equipment, thereby exposing the respondent to foreseeable risk, or was the respondent the author of his own misfortune? On this question the House of Lords in Haley v London Electricity Board [1965] AC 778, had this to say:“….. negligence requires that fault be proved against the defendant. Proof cannot be implied by the fact that an accident occurred.” 44.Consequently, the applicable principle is that an employer owes a duty to take reasonable care for the safety of its employees, but is not an insurer against all injuries. This was affirmed in Timsales Limited v Stanley Njihia Macharia [2016] KECA 554 (KLR), where this Court persuaded by the decision in Statpack Industries Limited vs. James Mbithi Munyao, HCCA No. 152 of 2003 (UR), pronounced itself thus:“It is trite law that the burden of proof of any fact or allegation is on the plaintiff. He must prove a causal link between someone's negligence and his injury.The plaintiff must adduce evidence from which, on a balance of probability, a connection between the two may be drawn. Not every injury is necessarily as a result of someone's negligence.” 45.From other jurisdictions we considered the decision in the English case of Blyth vs. Birmingham Waterworks Company [1856]11 Ex Ch 781 where the court held that:“….the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The Defendants might have been liable for negligence, if, unintentionally, they omitted to do that which a reasonable person would have done, or did that which a person taking reasonable precautions would not have done.” 46.The respondent’s evidence was that he was not trained in safe manual handling techniques and that no mechanical lifting equipment was provided at the time of the accident. This assertion was not effectively rebutted. Although the appellant alleged that training had been conducted, no documentary proof was produced to demonstrate that the respondent had in fact undergone such training. Significantly, the evidence revealed that a safety notice, or “safety flash” addressing proper lifting procedures was issued only after the respondent was injured. This sequence of events supports the inference that adequate safety measures were not in place prior to the accident. 47.Applying the principle in Statpack Industries Limited and Blyth (supra), an employer is under a duty to provide a safe system of work, including proper training and equipment. In the absence of such measures, the risk of injury from manual handling of heavy loads was clearly foreseeable. We, therefore, have no basis to fault the trial court’s finding that the appellant breached its duty of care, and that such breach exposed the respondent to the very injury that occurred. 48.Turning to the second issue, the appellant’s principal appeal was that the respondent’s condition arose from a pre-existing, or congenital spinal disorder. The respondent on the other hand maintained that the appellant failed to prove the allegation of pre-existing conditions. 49.Where a plaintiff’s injury is attributable to a number of possible causes, one of which is the defendant’s negligence, the combination of the defendant’s breach of duty and the plaintiff’s injury do not automatically give rise to a presumption that the defendant caused the injury. We find this in the holding of the often-cited decision of the House of Lords in Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1998] 1 ALL ER 871, cited by the appellant. 50.The manner in which the question of negligence may be assessed and apportioned was discussed in Masembe vs. Sugar Corporation and Another [2002] 2 EA 434 as follows:“Negligence is not actionable per se but is only actionable where it has caused damage and in that regard the primary task of the Court in a trial of a negligence suit is to consider whether the act or acts of negligence caused the damage or injury complained of; and where the damage was caused by the negligent acts of different persons, to assess the degree of their respective responsibility and blameworthiness, and apportion liability between or among them accordingly…There is no act or omission that has static blameworthiness and therefore each case must be assessed on its own circumstances and the apportionment ought to be a result of comparing the negligent conduct of the tort- feasors, to determine the degree to which each one was in fault, both in regard to causation of the wrong and unreasonableness of conduct.” 51.In the present case, while the appellant alluded to a degenerative condition and possible congenital abnormalities in the respondent, no conclusive medical evidence was tendered to establish that such conditions existed prior to the accident or, that they were the proximate cause of the respondent’s incapacity. On the contrary, the respondent produced a pre-employment medical report indicating that he had no pre-existing back condition at the time of engagement. Additionally, PW2 demonstrated that the injuries sustained were consistent with trauma resulting from lifting heavy loads and DW3 and DW4 also conceded that such injuries could arise from heavy lifting. 52.It is our view that the evidentiary foundation that the respondent’s condition arose from a pre-existing, or congenital spinal disorder is tenuous. Even assuming the existence of an underlying degenerative condition, (which we find is not the case), the employee should be taken as they are. The evidence would then support the conclusion that the workplace activity triggered, or materially aggravated the condition, thereby rendering it symptomatic and disabling. In such circumstances, causation is not broken. 53.The appellant having not established that it trained the respondent and provided him with equipment to ensure safety at work, and that the respondent failed to use the equipment, or acted contrary to the training he had, there is no ground for apportioning blame to him. Accordingly, we find that the respondent established, on a balance of probabilities, that the injury was causally connected to the appellant’s breach of duty, and the defence of a pre-existing condition cannot avail the appellant. 54.On whether the trial court properly evaluated the evidence, we have independently reviewed the record and we are satisfied that the learned trial Judge carefully analyzed the evidence from both sides. He evaluated the competing medical opinions and gave cogent reasons for preferring the respondent’s evidence, particularly considering its consistency and corroboration. 55.The fourth issue is whether the award of damages and costs was justified. The principles on when this Court can interfere with the quantum of damages awarded by the court below are settled. This Court in Jackline Mueni Nzioka v Jethat Ramji Kerai [1996] KECA 200 (KLR), held that:“The principles to be observed by an appellate court in deciding whether it is justified in disturbing the quantum of damages awarded by a trial judge are that it must be satisfied that either the judge, in assessing the damages, took into account an irrelevant factor, or left out of account a relevant one, or that, short of this, the amount is so inordinately low or so inordinately high that it must be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage. See Iianga v Manyoka, (1961) E.A. 705 at pages 709 and 713.” 56.In the present case, the trial court in awarding damages to the respondent pronounced itself as follows:“45.The medical evidence presented shows that the plaintiff suffered injuries and as a consequence he cannot walk and will never work. In fact, the plaintiff was subsequently dismissed by the defendant on medical grounds.46.Prof. Oluoch (PW2) assessed the plaintiff as having suffered 100% incapacity. PW2 observed that the plaintiff will be required to undergo future surgeries and projected future medical costs at kshs.7,620,000/=. The figure proposed by Prof. Oluoch (PW2) is not controverted therefore the plaintiff is entitled to claim.47.The plaintiff has further beseeched this court to award him ksh.10,000,000/= as general damages for pain and suffering. He relied on the case of Emmanuel Kombe Nzai aka Kombe Emmanuel =vs= Basari Co. Ltd & Another (2017) eKLR where the claimant was awarded 6,000,000/= for pain and suffering having suffered 80% incapacitation due to spinal injury.48.I have however looked at the case of David Omutelema Opondo =vs= Dela Rue Currency & Security Printing Ltd (2017) eKLR where the claimant was awarded ksh.1,200,00/= for pain and suffering for lumbar lordosis injury resulting from muscle spasm. The claimant like in this case was later declared redundant.49.I find the injuries in the case of David Omutelema Opondo =vs= Dela Rue Currency & Security Printing Ltd (Supra) to be comparable to those obtained in this case. I however, find the injuries in this case to be more serious, therefore, I will instead award ksh.1,500,000/= as general damages for pain and suffering. 50.The plaintiff has also asked to be awarded general damages for loss of earning capacity calculated as follows: 40,902 (monthly salary) x22 (years) x12 = ksh.10,798,128/= 51.It is not in dispute that at the time of the accident, the plaintiff was aged 38 years. Were it not for the injuries he sustained he would have worked up to the age of 60 years. Therefore, a multiplier of 22 years is reasonable. At that time, the plaintiff earned a monthly salary of 40,902/=. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff became 100% incapacitated. 52.I am convinced he is entitled to be paid for general damages for loss of earning capacity. Consequently, I award him ksh.10,798,128/= as proposed and tabulated as follows: 40,902x22x12=10,798,128/ 57.The respondent was injured at work on 12th October 2006 and terminated from employment through a letter dated 8th April 2009. The award was computed from the date of termination and not from the date of injury. The appellant has not demonstrated that the trial court applied wrong principles, or that the awards were excessive. We find that the awards fall within the range of comparable authorities and are justified by evidence. 58.The last issue for consideration is whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain this claim. The locus classicus on jurisdiction is this Court’s decision in Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1 where it was held (per Nyarangi, JA) that:“Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to make one more step. Where a court has no jurisdiction, there would be no basis for continuation of proceedings pending other evidence. A court of law downs tools in respect of the matter before it the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction.” 59.Upon perusing the record of appeal, we note that the appellant filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 7th December 2015 on a point of law, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain this suit. In reply, the respondent filed grounds of opposition dated 29th January 2016. The learned Judge, L. Njuguna (as she then was) considered the application, and in her ruling dated 9th June 2016, found that the court had jurisdiction to determine the matter. This ruling was not appealed and cannot be introduced for determination at this point. 60.For the foregoing reasons, we find that this appeal has no merit and dismiss it with costs to the respondent.It is so ordered. DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 15TH DAY OF MAY, 2026.P. O. KIAGE......................................... JUDGE OF APPEALL. ACHODE.........................................JUDGE OF APPEALA.O. MUCHELULE.........................................JUDGE OF APPEALI certify that this is a true copy of the original.SignedDeputy Registrar.