https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12131

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MAKUENI** **HIGH COURT CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. E009 OF 2025** **DOMINIC MBONDO MUSYOKA………………………………………..APPELLANT** **VERSUS** **REPUBLIC ……………………………………………………..…….……..RESPONDENT** ***(Being an appeal against the conviction and sentence by Hon. E. Mbicha (PM) in Makindu Senior Principal Magistrate’s Court Criminal Case No. 983 of 2019 delivered on 26 February 2025)*** **JUDGEMENT** 1. The appellant herein, Dominic Mbondo Musyoka, was convicted by the Senior Principal Magistrate’s Court at Makindu for the offence of attempted murder contrary to section 220 (a) of the *Penal Code* and sentenced to serve fifteen (15) years imprisonment. Being dissatisfied with both conviction and sentence, he filed the present appeal. ***Back ground*** 1. The particulars of the offence were that on 25 September 2019 at Kiboko Primary School grounds in Kiboko Location, Makindu Sub-County within Makueni County, jointly with others not before court, the appellant unlawfully attempted to cause the death of Irene Ndinda Kimeu by cutting her on the head, back and arms several times with a panga. He pleaded not guilty prompting the trial where the prosecution called five (5) witnesses to prove its case. 2. PW1, Irene Ndinda Kimeu testified that she knew the appellant who was her former husband having lived together for approximately seven (7) months before separating about two months prior to the incident. She stated that on 25 September 2019 at about 7.00 p.m, she was walking from Emali towards Kiboko after collecting a bag. She was alone and had covered herself with a yellow *lesso*. A motorcycle approached from behind and passed her before stopping. She recognised the motorcycle as one ordinarily used by the appellant because of its make and distinctive writing near the registration plate. She also saw and recognised the appellant, who alighted and spoke to her. 3. According to PW1, the appellant questioned her about following her mother’s advice and about declining to resume the relationship. The appellant then took a panga he was holding in his left hand, cut her on the head, wrists, mouth, middle left finger and legs. She lost the front upper and lower teeth during the attack. She displayed the visible scars which were noted and recorded by the trial court. She lost consciousness and upon regaining it, she found herself naked in a bush near Kiboko Primary School and a church. She walked to the road and met a man she later knew as Mutunga, who gave her clothes, lit a fire to keep her warm, covered her with a blanket and went to seek assistance. 4. She further testified that police officers arrived and took her for treatment. She was first admitted at Makindu Sub-County Hospital, later treated at Makueni County Referral Hospital and subsequently referred to Kenyatta National Hospital. She was pregnant at the time but lost the baby due to her injuries. She identified the P3 Form, discharge summaries from Makindu hospital, Makueni County hospital and Kenyatta National Hospital. She also identified the untra sound report, death abstract, medical report from the newborn Unit Kenya National Hospital, photographs and personal items associated with the investigation. 5. In cross-examination, PW1 maintained that she knew the appellant intimately, saw him when he stopped, spoke with him and recognized his voice. She denied that the allegation arose from bitterness over the failed relationship and maintained that the appellant was the person who attacked her. 6. PW2 Priscillah Mueni Kimeu , the complainant’s mother, testified that she knew the appellant as PW1’s former husband. She stated that the relationship had been troubled and that PW1 had returned home following their separation. On the material day PW2 saw PW1 before she left for Emali. She also noticed that the appellant attempted to call PW1, but PW2 discouraged her from answering. She went on to testified that at approximately 2.00 a.m, she received a telephone call from PC Kosgei informing her that PW1 had been seriously injured. She travelled to Kiboko Police Post and saw PW1 unconscious and covered in a *lesso* before she was taken to hospital. PW2 accompanied and supported her during the subsequent treatment. She described the injuries she observed and the transfers between hospitals. 7. PW2 also testified that she later received a call from a person she believed to be the appellant using PW1’s phone and that she recognised his voice. She subsequently identified a navy-blue Itel phone at the police station. In cross-examination, PW2 admitted that she did not witness the attack. She was challenged on the chronology of the alleged call and on persons who had not been called as witnesses. She denied fabricating the case or influencing PW1’s evidence. 8. PW3, PC Stanley Korir Kosgei attached to Kiboko Police Post gave evidence that on 26 September 2019 at about 1.00 a.m, he received information from a petrol station attendant that a seriously injured woman required assistance. He informed his superior, Inspector Donald Ngoka (PW4), went to the place where PW1 was and found her wrapped in a blanket, bleeding and in a critical condition. He stated that PW1 told the officers that her husband, whom she knew as the appellant, had attacked her following a disagreement. PW3 knew the parties because they had previously attended the police post over domestic disagreements. The following morning he saw the appellant at the Kiboko boda-boda stage with a motorcycle and participated in his arrest. 9. PW4 Inspector Donald Ngoka , officer in charge of Kiboko Police Post, testified that he investigated the case. Upon receiving PW3’s report, he went to the place where PW1 was and found her in a critical condition with multiple injuries. He contacted PW2 and arranged for PW1 to be taken to hospital. The appellant was thereafter arrested and his motorcycle photographed. He further testified that he visited the crime scene, prepared a sketch plan, caused photographs of PW1, the motorcycle and the scene to be taken, handled the the recovery and production of a phone and related receipt. He also referred to a partly burnt yellow *lesso* observed outside the appellant’s home. He went on to say that the panga was not recovered, no forensic examination was done on the lesso, and he did not produce call data. 10. PW5 Dr Dorcas Karui (PW5), a medical officer at Makindu Sub-County Hospital, testified that she examined PW1 and filled the P3 form on 6 November 2019. Her examination established that PW1 had suffered from multiple cut wounds to the head and neck, some deep enough to expose the skull; injury to the upper lip and loose front teeth; fractures of both ulna bones; a degloving injury to the right forearm; a serious fracture and loss of part of the left middle finger; and a deep laceration extending from the left wrist towards the palm. She further stated that PW1 underwent wound care, immobilisation of the fractures, medication and continued treatment. She classified the degree of injury as grievous harm.She produced various exhibits to support her findings. 11. At the close of the prosecution case, the trial court found that a *prima facie* case had been established and placed the Appellant on his defence. The Appellant gave sworn evidence and called one witness. 12. The appellant, Dominic Mbondo Musyoka (DW1) testified that he was married to the complainant but they separated in July 2019. That he worked as a boda-boda rider at Kiboko and ordinarily left the stage at about 6.00 p.m. He stated that on 25September 2019, he went to his parents’ home, arrived before 7.00 p.m, ate supper and remained there. He denied meeting or attacking PW1 and denied using her phone. 13. DW2 Jonathan Musyoka Mutua, the appellant’s father testified that on 25 September 2019 he returned from church at about 6.00 p.m and found the appellant at home. They ate supper and went to sleep. The next morning a village elder informed him that a woman said to be the appellant’s former wife had been seriously injured. He checked the usual parking place and found the motorcycle there. He further testified that the appellant used a motorcycle for his work, although he did not know its registration details or ownership. He confirmed that PW1 had lived in his home as the appellant’s wife and that the relationship had ended. 14. At the close of the case, the trial court rendered judgement where it found the appellant guilty and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. Aggrieved, the appellant filed appeal where he raised the following grounds: 15. That the learned trial court erred in law and fact by failing to find that the prosecution had not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt as required by law. 16. That the learned trial court erred in law and fact by dismissing his defence without reason hence denying the appellant the benefit of doubt and shifting the burden of proof. 17. That the learned trial court erred in law and fact by failing to note that the chargesheet was defective and the charge was not properly prosecuted. 18. That the learned trial court erred in law and fact by failing to consider time spent in custody pending trial during sentencing as required under Section 333 (2) of the *Criminal Procedure Code.* 19. That the learned trial court erred in law and fact by failing to find that proper identification of the perpetrator was not done. 20. That the learned trial court erred in law and fact by failing to note that the prosecution’s case was based on assumptions and riddled with inconsistencies, contradictions and falsehoods. 21. The appeal was canvassed through written submissions which were duly filed by both parties. The Appellant filed and relied on written submissions dated 10 May 2026 while the Respondent filed and relied on written submissions dated 21 May 2026. ***Submissions by parties*** 1. The appellant submitted that the complainant’s attackers were at large and that the prosecution fatally erred by failing to call Mr Mutunga who was a crucial witness and could have identified the attackers. He further argued that PW1 recorded her statement months after the incident which afforded her an opportunity to falsely accused him. He contended that the complainant took advantage of their marital disputes to falsely accuse him of the assault. He further argued that the prosecution deliberately failed to call critical witnesses who were available and urged the court to draw a negative inference in favour of the appellant. 2. The appellant further submitted that no panga was recovered, no call data was produced, the alleged use and recovery of PW1’s phone was inconsistent with the chronology, the lesso was not properly inventoried or forensically examined, and PW4’s statement that other persons must have participated was speculation. 3. The appellant also submitted that the charge sheet stated that the attack was done jointly by others not before the court but no evidence was adduced to support that contention. He made reference to PW 4’s evidence where the witness stated that the attack was carried out by the appellant and others not before the court but no other person was brought and charged. He relied on the case of ***Nyamai Musyoka vs Republic (2014) eKLR*** in support of his submission this the chargesheet offended Section 134 of the *Criminal Procedure Code (CPC)* and was thus fatally defective. 4. On identification, the appellant submitted that there was no proper identification as required by law and that the entire case was hinged on the existing dispute between the him and the complainant's family. He challenged identification based on the sole evidence of PW1 arguing that the incident occurred at night, PW1 did not identify the motorcycle registration number and gave inconsistent descriptions of its colour. He argued that the failed marriage created a motive for false implication, that no identification parade was conducted and that the recognition evidence was unsafe. 5. It was also submitted that the prosecution evidence did not prove a specific intention to kill. The appellant maintained that the trial court relied on assumptions and did not properly evaluate his sworn alibi or the supporting evidence of DW2. He urged the court to allow the appeal, quash the conviction and set aside the sentence. 6. On the sentence, the appellant submitted that the term of fifteen (15) years was harsh and urged the court to revise it downwards. He further submitted that the trial court did not consider the period from his arrest, that is 26 September 2019 and release on bond on 23 June 2021 which translated to 1 year and 8 months during sentencing in contravention of Section 3339 (2) of the CPC. He urged the court to correct the anomaly. 7. The respondent opposed the appeal and submitted that the amended charge was taken before a competent court, the appellant pleaded afresh, expressed no objection and suffered no prejudice because the prosecution hearing had not commenced. The Respondent maintained that PW1 recognised the appellant who was a former husband with whom she spoke before the attack and named him at the earliest opportunity. 8. The Respondent further argued that PW1’s evidence was supported by her prompt report, the condition in which she was found, the medical evidence and the circumstances of the appellant’s arrest. It submitted that the nature, number and location of the injuries and the abandonment of PW1 while unconscious demonstrated an intention to kill. It urged the court to reject the alibi and to treat the discrepancies relied upon by the appellant as minor. 9. On sentence, the Respondent submitted that section 220 of the Penal Code provides for a sentence of life imprisonment and that a term of fifteen (15) years was lawful and proportionate owing to the seriousness of the offence. Further that the trial court had duly considered the mitigation by the appellant and the pre-sentence report before exercising its discretion and that it has not been demonstrated that the sentence is manifestly excessive, harsh and severe to warrant interference. The case of ***Bernard Kimani Gacheru vs Republic (2002) eKLR*** was cited in support thereof. The court was urged to uphold the conviction and sentence. ***Analysis and determination*** 1. This being a first appeal, this court has a duty to reconsider and re-evaluate the evidence, draw its own conclusions and decide whether the findings of the trial court should be supported, while bearing in mind that the trial court had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. See ***Okeno vs Republic (1972) EA 32*** and ***Mark Mose vs Republic (2013) eKLR***. 2. In ***Kiilu & Another vs Republic (2005) 1 KLR 174****,* the Court of Appeal stated: “*An Appellant on a first appeal is entitled to expect the evidence as a whole to be submitted to a fresh and exhaustive examination and to the appellate Court’s own decision on the evidence. The first appellate Court must itself weigh conflicting evidence and draw its own conclusions.* *It is not the function of a first appellate Court merely to scrutinize the evidence to see if there was some evidence to support the lower Court’s findings and conclusions; it must make its own findings and draw its own conclusions. Only then can it decide whether the Magistrate’s findings should be supported. In doing so, it should make allowance for the fact that the trial Court has had the advantage of hearing and seeing the witnesses.”* 1. Having considered the grounds of appeal, the evidence adduced in the lower court, the judgement by the trial court and submissions by the parties, I find the main issues for determination to be; 2. Whether the charge sheet is defective 3. Whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt 4. Whether the defence of alibi was established 5. Whether the sentence was manifestly harsh and excessive 6. ***Whether the charge sheet is defective*** 7. The appellant contended that the charge sheet is defective since the particulars of the offence are at variance with the evidence tendered. He took issue with the fact that whereas the chargesheet stated that he committed the offence with others not before the court, no other person was arrested and charged or that no evidence was tendered to show that other people participated in the commission of the offence. 8. Article 50 (2) (b) of the *Constitution* provides that every accused person has the right to a fair trial, which includes the right to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer it. Section 134 of the *Criminal Procedure Code* on the other hand, provides as follows regarding framing of charge sheets; *“Every charge or information shall contain, and shall be sufficient if it contains, a statement of the specific offence or offences with which the accused person is charged, together with such particulars as may be necessary for giving reasonable information as to the nature of the offence charged.”* 1. Section 137 (f) of the said Act, provides as follows on the general rule as to description; *“subject to any other provisions of this section, it shall be sufficient to describe a place, time, thing, matter, act or omission to which it is necessary to refer in a charge or information in ordinary language so as to indicate with reasonable clearness the place, time, thing, matter, act or omission referred to.”* 1. The form and substance of a charge sheet is provided by law. Consequently, in order to determine if a charge sheet is defective, a court must consider the defect in a charge from a two-step test. First is *to* ***determine whether the charge is defective*** and if so, ***whether such defect can be remedied*.** The court of appeal in ***Peter Ngure Mwangi V Republic [2014] eKLR*** stated thus: *“On the issue of a defective charge sheet, there are two limbs to it. The first one deals with the issue as to whether the charge sheet is indeed defective, whereas the second one deals with the issue as to whether even if a charge sheet is defective, that defect is curable or not.”* 1. In can be deduced from the above that not all defects in a charge sheet are fatal. In ***Bernard Ombuna vs Republic [2019] eKLR***, the court of appeal gave guidance on how to determine whether a defect in a charge is fatal as follows: *“In a nutshell, the test of whether a charge sheet is fatally defective is substantive rather than formalistic. Of relevance is whether a defect on the charge sheet prejudiced the appellant to the extent that he was not aware of or at least he was confused with respect to the nature of the charges preferred against him and as a result, he was not able to put up an appropriate defence.”* 1. Further, in the case of ***Obedi Kilonzo Kevevo vs. Republic (2015)*** the Court of Appeal held: *“The test applicable by an appellate court when determining firstly the existence of a defective charge, and secondly its effect on an appellants’ conviction is whether the conviction based on the alleged defective charge occasioned a miscarriage of justice resulting in great prejudice to the appellant. In the case of JMA v. Republic (2009) KLR 671, it was held inter alia that:“It was not in all cases in which a defect detected in the charge on appeal would render a conviction invalid. Section 382 of the CPC was meant to cure such an irregularity where prejudice to the appellant is not discernible.”* 1. Section 382 of the *Criminal Procedure Code* provides as follows: - * ***“Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on appeal or revision on account of an error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, charge, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during the trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under this Code, unless the error, omission or irregularity has occasioned a failure of justice. Provided that in determining whether an error, omission or irregularity has occasioned a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the question whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.”*** 2. Having set out the law above and the effect thereof, this court will consider whether the charge sheet is defective. The appellant’s main contention is that the evidence on record was at variance with the particulars of the offence which contemplated that there were other people who participated in the commission of the offence together with the appellant but that no such other person was produced in court. 3. **The Phrase ***“jointly with others not before the court”***** does **not** render the charge defective. The prosecution is not required to call, arrest, or even name the other individuals, provided that the evidence proves the appellant personally participated in the offence. The law, under Article 50 (2) (b) of the *Constitution* and *Section 134 of the CPC,* requires a charge to give the accused reasonable information about the nature of the offence (e.g., the specific date, location, and the act committed). Naming unknown or absent co-conspirators is often impossible at the time of charging. 4. Criminal liability is individual. Where the prosecution proves the accused committed the act, even if they acted alone or with uncharged accomplices, a conviction can safely stand. In this case, the appellant was charged individually for an offence, he understood the charge facing him and did not suffer any prejudice or miscarriage of justice to warrant interference. Besides, even if there was a defect, the said defect is curable under section 382 of the CPC. 5. The court notes that the appellant was first charged with assault but the charge was duly amended on amended on 11 November 2019 pursuant to section 214(1) of the *Criminal Procedure Code*. Since the first trial court did not have jurisdiction, the matter was placed the Principal Magistrate’s Court on 13 November 2019 where the appellant appeared, the amended charge was read and explained to him, and he pleaded not guilty and he expressly stated that he had no objection. No prosecution witness had testified. The right to recall witnesses had therefore not arisen in. The court finds that this ground cannot stand. 6. ***Whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt*** 7. The appellant was charged with attempted murder contrary to Section 220 (a) of the *Penal Code .* The said section provides: ***“Any person who attempts unlawfully to cause the death of another is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for life.”*** 1. To sustain a charge of attempted murder, the evidence must show that there was a specific intent to unlawfully cause the death of another. In ***Cheruiyot vs Republic (1976 - 1985) EA 47,*** the court emphasized as follows: * ***“an essential ingredient of an attempt to commit an offence is a specific intention to commit that offence. If the charge is one of attempted murder, the principal ingredient and the essence of the crime is the deliberate intent to murder. It must be shown that the accused person had a positive intention to unlawfully cause death and that intention must be manifested by an overt act”.*** 2. Further, in ***Emmanuel Kipkorir Langat vs Republic (2022) KEHC 761 (KLR)***, the stated as follows; * ***“From the above legal provisions, the main ingredient of an attempted offence is the intention to commit the said offence, whether or not the same is actually carried out to fruition or not. This intention is what constitutes the criminal intent or mens rea of the offence while the actual execution of any act in an attempt to commit the crime is the actus reus.”*** 3. Moreover, in ***Abubakar vs Republic (Criminal Appeal E014 of 2024) (2025) KECA 631 (KLR)***, the court of appeal held that attempted murder requires ***“a specific intent to unlawfully cause the death of another”***. The court, cited with approval the holding in ***Abdi Ali Bare Vs Republic (2015) eKLR****,* where the court stated that ***“the act alleged ... must be sufficiently proximate to murder to be properly described as attempt to commit murder.”*** 4. Thus, in the present case, the main ingredients for attempted murder would be the intention to cause the death of another and the actus reus would be the actual act that would likely to lead to the death, but which subsequently fails. 5. PW1 testified that she was attacked by the appellant on the material day, ie 25 September 2019 at around 7 pm as she was walking from Emali near Kiboko area. The assailant used a panga to cause grievous injuries that made her unconscious, took off her clothes and left her for death. She was thereafter rescued and taken to hospital by PW3 and PW4. She suffered severe injuries which are documented in the P3 Form, discharge summaries from Makindu hospital, Makueni County hospital and Kenyatta National Hospital. 6. The injuries led to the loss of an infant who was prematurely born as demonstrated by the ultra sound report, death abstract, and medical report from the newborn Unit Kenya National Hospital. PW1’s evidence was corroborated by PW5 who classified the harm suffered as grievous harm as well as PW2 who met her in the hospital on the night of the assault. PW5 testified that the injuries were caused by a sharp object (panga) which corroborated PW1 testimony. These facts are not disputed. There is no doubt that taken as a whole, the evidence clearly proves the intention to kill. 7. The appellant’s main contention is that he was not properly identified as the assailant. To determine this issue, it is important to consider the background of the case which gives context. PW1 testified that she was married to the appellant but they had separated for about two months prior to the incident. This was confirmed by the appellant and PW2, the complainant’s mother as well as DW2 the appellant’s father. It also came out that the two, PW1 and appellant had marital disputes which had led them to the Police as attested by PW4. It is thus clear and apparent that the complainant and appellant were well known to each other. 8. PW1 testified that the appellant followed her on the material day in a motor bike as she was walking, engaged her in a conversation before attacking her with a panga which he had on his left hand. Her evidence was corroborated by the evidence of PW5 who established that the injuries were caused by a panga (see P3 form and other medical evidence). Additionally, evidence by DW2 and the appellant himself, testified that the appellant had a motor bike on the material day, providing further credence to the testimony. PW1 further identified the appellant as the assailant immediately after her rescue as was confirmed by PW2, a position she maintained through out the case. This is what led to the arrest of the appellant. 9. The court is cognizant that the evidence in this case is that of a single witness through recognition. In ***Anjononi & Others vs Republic [1980] KLR 59****,* the Court of Appeal stated: ***“Recognition of an assailant is more satisfactory, more assuring, and more reliable than identification of a stranger.”*** 1. Recognition is generally stronger than identification of a stranger, though it can still be mistaken. Since this case was based on recognition, there was no need for an identification parade. The facts and evidence in this case, however, leaves no doubt that despite the time being 7pm, the appellant was properly recognized by PW1 as the assailant. 2. ***Whether the defence of alibi was established*** 3. The appellant in his defence, testified that on the material day, he went home just before 7pm and remained there until morning. This was corroborated by DW2, his father. This effectively raised the defence of *alibi.* Consequently, the appellant averred in his grounds of appeal that the trial court totally disregarded his defence of *alibi*. 4. The court of appeal in ***Erick Otieno Meda vs Republic (2019) eKLR*** had this to say on the defence of *alibi* raised by the accused persons; 5. *An alibi needs to be corroborated by the other witnesses and not just a mere regurgitation of the events from the accused point of view.* 6. *An alibi defence needs to be introduced at an early stage so as to allow it to be tested, especially during cross-examination in trial.* 7. *The alibi defence or evidence may often rest on the credibility of the accused and reliability of the evidence that he or she has presented in court.* 8. *The accused does not need to prove the alibi, but the prosecution must have presented its case that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt so as to allow the alibi to fail.* 9. The Appellant did not raise the defence of *alibi* at any stage during the prosecution’s case so as to provide an opportunity for rebuttal by prosecution witnesses. Despite this, the court has weighed the evidence by the prosecution as against the defence. PW1 was very categorical that she recognized the appellant on the material day and they engaged in a conversation. She had a *lesso* which was subsequently recovered by PW4 partly burnt outside the appellant’s house. Taken as a whole, the evidence by the prosecution proved the offence and outweighs the defence of *alibi.* This ground fails. 10. The court finds that all ingredients of the offence as charged were proved beyond reasonable doubt and uphold the conviction. 11. ***Whether the sentence was manifestly harsh and excessive*** 12. The appellant submitted that the term of 15 years imprisonment was harsh and excessive. He further submitted that this court ought to consider the period from his arrest, that is 26 September 2019 and release on bond on 23 June 2021 which translated to 1 year and 8 months during sentencing as per Section 333 (2) of the CPC. 13. Sentencing is an exercise of discretion by the trial court and the High Court would not interfere with the sentence imposed unless it finds that it was illegal, unlawful or founded on a wrong principle of law. see ***Bernard Kimani Gacheru vs Republic (2002) eKLR.*** 14. The offence of attempted murder under section 220 (a) of the *Penal Code* carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. The trial court, after evaluating all material before it, considered 15 years imprisonment as appropriate. I do not find it excessive or harsh in view of the nature of the offence and the injuries inflicted upon the victim. Additionally, no evidence has been placed before the court to suggest otherwise. In my view, this case called for a higher punishment than what was granted in view of the aggravating circumstances and the long term physical, medical and psychological effect of the offence on the victim. However, the court is also cognizant that enhancing the punishment with notice would offence Article 50 of the *Constitution.* 15. As regards the period served in custody during trial, Section 333 (2) of the *Criminal Procedure Code* is explicit that such a period is to be taken into account in calculating the actual time to be served. The record shows that the appellant was arrested on 26 September 2019 and remained in custody until 21 April 2021 when he was released on bond. This translates to 573 days (1 year, 6 months and 26 days). ***Final Disposition*** 1. In view of the above, the court makes the following orders: 2. The appeal against conviction lacks merit and is dismissed accordingly. 3. The sentence of 15 years imprisonment imposed by the trial court is upheld. 4. The Sentence of imprisonment shall ran from 26 February 2025. 5. The period spent in custody during trial translating to 573 days or 1 year, 6 months and 26 days shall be deducted from the appellant’s sentence. 6. It is so ordered. Dated, signed and delivered virtually at Nairobi this 30th day of July 2026 **JOSEPH KIPKOECH BIOMDO** **JUDGE**