Dr Magare-gikenyi B & 3 others v Presidential Taskforce on Technical Working Group on Gender-Based Violence (GBV) including Femicide & 55 others

Magare-Gikenyi B & 3 others v Presidential Taskforce on Technical Working Group on Gender-Based Violence (GBV) including Femicide & 55 others (Constitutional Petition E027 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 13446 (KLR) (14 September 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 13446 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nakuru Constitutional Petition E027 of 2025 PN Gichohi, J September 14, 2026 IN THE MATTER OF: THE ILLEGAL, IRREGULAR AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL ESTABLISHMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL TASKFORCE ON TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP ON GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE (GBV) INCLUDING FEMICIDE THROUGH EXECUTIVE ORDER & GAZETTE NOTICE NO. 109 VOL. CXXVII—NO. 3 9TH JANUARY, 2025 & GAZETTE NOTICE NO 3862 OF 28/3/2025. IN THE MATTER OF: ARTICLES 1, 2, 3 (1), 10, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,59 (4), 73, 75, 129, 130, 131,132,159,165 (1), (3)(A,B & (D) (I–III)), 201,232 (1&2),248,249 (1&2),250, 252, 253, 254, 258 (1&2(C),259(1)AND260 OF THE CONSTITUTION (2010) IN THE MATTER OF: ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OR THREATS OF VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 1, 2 (1,2&4), 3(1), 10, 59(4), 73, 74, 75[1], 129, 131, 132, 159, 201, 232, 248, 249, 250, 254(2&3), 259 AND 260 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA (2010). IN THE MATTER OF: RULE 4, 10, 11, 13 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA (SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION AND PROTECTION OFFUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS) - HIGH COURT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE RULES 2013). IN THE MATTER OF: NATIONAL GENDER AND EQUALITY COMMISSION ACTCAP 7K OF THE LAWS OF KENYA. IN THE MATTER OF: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF TECHNICALWORKING GROUP ON GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE (GBV) INCLUDING FEMICIDE THROUGH EXECUTIVE ORDER & GAZETTE NOTICE NO. 109 VOL. CXXVII—NO. 3 OF 9TH JANUARY, 2025 & NO 3862 OF 28/3/2025. IN THE MATTER OF: DOCTRINES OF SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION OFKENYA, BILL OF RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONALISM, RULE OF LAW AND LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS Between Dr Magare-gikenyi B 1st Petitioner Eliud Karanja Matindi 2nd Petitioner Dishon Keroti Mogire 3rd Petitioner Philemomon Abuga Nyakundi 4th Petitioner and Presidential Taskforce On Technical Working Group On Gender-based Violence (GBV) including Femicide 1st Respondent Hon Attorney-General 2nd Respondent National Gender And Equality Commission 3rd Respondent Principal Secretary Gender 4th Respondent Principal Secretary Internal SecurityAnd National Admnistration 5th Respondent Principal Secretary Social Protection 6th Respondent Principal Secretary Diaspora Affairs 7th Respondent Principal Secretary Tourism 8th Respondent Principal Secretary Cabinet Affairs 9th Respondent Principal Secretary Devolution 10th Respondent Principal Secretary HigherEducation And Research 11th Respondent Principal Secretary TechnicalVocational Education And Training 12th Respondent Solicitor General 13th Respondent Nancy Baraza 14th Respondent Dr Ruth Aura Odhiambo 15th Respondent Mohammed Washala Abdi 16th Respondent Linah Kilimo 17th Respondent Dr Edna Ngare Ngeno 18th Respondent Dr Linda Musumba 19th Respondent Nobert Talam 20th Respondent Michael Kariuki 21st Respondent Charles Ismael Otieno Otiende 22nd Respondent Diana Christine Nanjala 23rd Respondent Peter Mwangi Kamau 24th Respondent Anthony Nzioki 25th Respondent Surum Ipato Korema 26th Respondent Anne Ngetich 27th Respondent Dr Wangu Kanja 28th Respondent Franklin Wallah 29th Respondent James Nombi 30th Respondent Kizito Wangalwa 31st Respondent Harleen Kaur Jabbal 32nd Respondent Dr Bashir Isaak 33rd Respondent Valentine Chepkoech Simei 34th Respondent Shem Nyakutu 35th Respondent Janey Leakey 36th Respondent Beatrice Karwitha 37th Respondent Lucy Njeri Mwaniki 38th Respondent Dr Purity Ngina 39th Respondent Dr sam Thenya 40th Respondent Susan Ndanyi 41st Respondent Antonia N'gabala Sodonon 42nd Respondent Dr Mercy Karanja 43rd Respondent Gloria Wawira 44th Respondent Faith Odhiambo 45th Respondent Ann Ireri 46th Respondent Seth Masese 47th Respondent Mashetti Masinjila 48th Respondent Dr Tecla Chebet 49th Respondent Caroline Jerono Kibiwott 50th Respondent Jessica Achieng Omundo 51st Respondent Geoffrey Rotich 52nd Respondent Baldwin Anyiga 53rd Respondent Rosemary Muriungi 54th Respondent Kepha Onyiso 55th Respondent Philomena Loitarengan 56th Respondent Judgment Introduction 1.On 9th January, 2025, the President through Executive Order and Gazette Notice No. 109 Vol. CXXVII-No. 3 and on 28th March 2025 vide and subsequently Gazette Notice No. 3862 of appointed a Technical Working Group on Gender Based Violence (GBV) (herein Taskforce) for a duration of ninety (90) days to asses review and recommend measures to strengthen the institutional, legal and policy response to gender-based violence and femicide in the country. 2.The Petitioners moved this Court by way of Petition dated 5th April, 2025 seeking to challenge the legality and constitutionality of the President’s decision regarding the Taskforce. The Parties 3.The Petitioners are Kenyan citizens who have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 22, 23, and 165 of the Constitution and have filed this Petition on their behalf and on behalf of the general public as matter of public interest. 4.The 1st Respondent is an ad-hoc administrative and advisory body established by the President of the Republic of Kenya on 9th January, 2025 to asses review, and recommend measures to strengthen the institutional, legal and policy response to Gender Based Violence and femicide in the country. 5.The 2nd Respondent is the principal legal adviser to the Government under Article 156 of the Constitution. 6.The 3rd Respondent is a Constitutional Commission established under Article 59(4) of the Constitution and the National Gender and Equality Commission Act mandated to promote gender equality and freedom from discrimination. 7.The 4th to 12th Respondents are the Principal Secretaries heading the said Respondent State Departments appointed as the Principal Secretaries’ Oversight Committee. 8.The 13th Respondent is the deputy to the Attorney General and the Chief Administrator of the State Law Office. 9.The 14th to the 56th Respondents are the chairperson, deputy char person, members, joint secretaries and secretariat appointed to serve in the Taskforce. The Petitioner’s case 10.Specifically, the Petitioners question whether the President had authority to create such a Taskforce, whether its composition and mandate usurp the powers of the 3rd Respondent and whether the resultant actions contravene the Constitution and statutory framework. 11.The Petitioners maintain that duplicating roles is a waste of scarce public resources since the task force will be essentially be performing roles of existing of existing public offices, contrary to Article 201(d) of the Constitution. 12.It is further the Petitioners’ case that the chairperson of the Taskforce, the 14th Respondent raises a question of integrity and maintains she was removed from public office as the Deputy Chief Justice due to misconduct. 13.The Petitioners contend that Kenyans had a legitimate expectation that State Officers and organs would act within the Constitution and law without encroaching on the functions of independent commissions. They contend that the Respondents’ actions breached this expectation and eroded public confidence in governance. 14.It is the Petitioners’ case that the President acted ultra vires to the powers granted to him by the Constitution and that the 3rd Respondent has failed to protect itself from its mandate being usurped. 15.The Petitioners thus seek the following orders:a.That a declaration be and is hereby issued that H.E. the President of The Republic of Kenya, could not legally and constitutionally establish a Presidential Taskforce on Technical Working Group on Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Including Femicide through Executive Order and Gazette Notice No. 109 Vol. CXXVII-No. 3 of 9th January, 2025 or any other document to look in Gender issues in the manner, composition and terms as set out In Executive Order & Gazette Notice No. 109 VOL. CXXVII-NO. 3 of 9th January, 2025 and Gazette Notice No. 3862 of 28th March 2025.b.That declaration be and is hereby issued that Presidential Taskforce on Technical Working Groupon Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Including Femicide through Executive Order & Gazette notice No. 109 Vol. CXXVII-No. 3 of 9th January, 2025 and Gazette Notice No 3862 of 28th March 2025 or any other document of any other date is unconstitutional, null and void.c.That a declaration is hereby issued that the establishment of Presidential Taskforce on Technical Working Group on Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Including Femicide through Executive Order & Gazette Notice No. 109 Vol. CXXVII-No. 3 of 9th January, 2025 and Gazette Notice No. 3862 of 28th March 2025 and/or any other document contravened inter alia, Articles 1, 2(1), (2) and (4), 3(1), 10, 59(4), 73, 74, 75(1), 129, 131, 132, 159, 201, 232, 248, 249, 250, and 254 2 and 3 of the constitution of Kenya (2010), National Gender and Equality Commission Act CAP 7K of the Laws of Kenya by usurping the powers of the National Gender and Equality Commission (NGEC) and a result that the Task force and its resultant report/recommendations(if any) and any subsequent actions/omissions are unconstitutional, null and void.d.That Judicial review orders of Certiorari be and is hereby issued quashing the executive Order and Gazette Notice No.109 Vol. CXXVII—No. 3 of 9th January, 2025 and/or any other document dated any other date purporting to establish a Presidential Taskforce on Technical Working Group on Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Including Femicide through Executive Order & Gazette notice no. 109 vol. CXXVII—No. 3 of 9th January, 2025 and Gazette Notice No. 3862 of 28th March 2025 and/or any other document of any other date.e.That a declaration be and is hereby issued that any report/recommendations and or any activities borne out of the above impugned gazette notice(s)/executive order is unconstitutional, null and void.f.That this Honourable Court be pleased to issue a judicial review orders of Prohibition, prohibiting the Respondents, either by themselves, anyone else acting at their behest, instructions or directions or any other person whosoever, from taking any action whatsoever pursuant to or in reliance on or in fulfilment of any duty or obligation or implementation of Gazette notice no. 109 vol. CXXVII—No. 3 of 9th January, 2025 and Gazette Notice No 3862 of 28th March 2025 and/or any other document and or any report/recommendations and/or any subsequent actions and/omissions based on the Presidential Taskforce on Technical Working Group on Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Including Femicide through Executive Order & Gazette Notice No. 109 vol. CXXVII—No. 3 9th January, 2025 and Gazette Notice No 3863 of 28th March 2025 and/or any other document date of any other date.g.That an order hereby issues that the President is personally liable for creation of the impugned unconstitutional taskforce, him having known or ought to have known the same and order that any money spent which might have been spent on the impugned taskforce be refunded to the Kenya people through depositing the same in the consolidated fund.h.That Judicial orders of Mandamus be and is hereby issued compelling the respondents to comply with relevant constitutional provisions and/or any other law.i.That any other appropriate relief the court may deem just to grant for the sake of justice for all Kenyansj.This being a public interest Petition filed in defence the Constitution, the respondent be ordered to pay costs of the Petition n. The Respondents’ case 16.Through the office of the 2nd Respondent, the Respondents opposed the Petition by way of Grounds of Opposition dated 12th May, 2025. It is the Respondents’ case that as the Head of State and Government under Article 131 of the Constitution, the President has authority and mandate to take necessary steps and measures to ensure the safety and wellbeing of the citizens including constituting a taskforce on need basis. 17.The Respondents further argue that the mandate of the Taskforce does not in any way usurp the mandate of the 3rd Respondent as the Taskforce was mandated to identify trends, hotspots and causes contributing to gender-based violence and Femicide which is becoming rampant and a great concern to the Nation of Kenya. 18.Further , it is argued that the President acted within constitutional authority in establishing the Taskforce under Article 129 which vests executive power in the President and Article 21(3) which obligates the State to address the needs of vulnerable groups. In their view, the Taskforce was a lawful measure to confront the growing problem of gender‑based violence and femicide. 19.The Respondents maintain that the professional competence and expertise of the Taskforce Chairperson, the 14th Respondent, cannot be impugned on account of her prior resignation from the office of Deputy Chief Justice. They argue that her departure did not compromise her professional ability and further note that no Court or tribunal has issued any decision barring her from holding public office or performing professional duties and remains competent to serve as Chairperson of the Taskforce. 20.The Respondents contend that the Petitioners have not demonstrated any violation or threat to their constitutional rights arising from the establishment of the Taskforce. They argue that the Petition has failed to set out with sufficient clarity the manner in which the cited constitutional provisions were infringed and that no prima facie case has been established. Petitioners’ Submissions 21.In support of their Petition, the Petitioners filed their Submissions dated 7th July, 2025 and the Supplementary Submissions dated 20th July, 2025 and framed the flowing issues identified for determination: -i.What are the settled guiding principles used by Courts in interpreting and construing the constitution especially when constitutional violations are alleged?ii.Whether the President’s action of purporting to establish the Taskforce on behalf or whose functions or roles is to be performed by an independent office of the National Gender and Equality Commission (NGEC), DCI, ODPP, NPS is legal and constitutional legal? Does the constitution envisage usurpation, control and direction of independent offices by the executive?iii.Whether appointments & remuneration of members of the task force did adhere to constitutional safeguards as provided inter alia in article 10, and 232 of the constitution as read with Public Service Commission Act 2017, PSC regulations 2020 and other statutory provisions.iv.Whether the 14th Respondent is constitutionally disqualified from chairing the Taskforce or holding public office, appointments or functions or rolesv.Whether the President can be held personally liable for any monies spent on the Taskforce .vi.What orders on costs should the Court issue? 22.It is the Petitioners’ submission that interpretation of the Constitution should be done in a manner contemplated under Article 259 of the Constitution. In support of the argument, they rely on the Court’s analysis of the same in Institute of Social Accountability and Another v National Assembly & 4 Others [2015] eKLR. 23.They submit that the Respondents have acted in contravention of common law principle established in Entick vs Carrington (1965) 2 WILS to the effect that the State or State agencies can only do what is permitted by the law. The Petitioners cite Salaries and Remuneration Commission & another v Parliamentary Service Commission & 15 others; Parliament & 4 others (Interested Parties) [2020] eKLR, to emphasize on the importance of the rule of law. 24.On whether the Constitution envisages usurpation, control and direction of independent offices by the executive, it is argued that the Respondents’ action is contrary to Articles 1, 2(2) 3(1) 10(2), 73, 94, 59(4), 132(2)(f) 232(1)(g), 249(2), 252(1) and (2), 254 (2) of the Constitution thus illegal, unconstitutional and amounts to interference of independent institutions. 25.The Petitioners have cited Azimio La Umoja One Kenya Coalition Party v President of Kenya & 9 others; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (Interested Party) (Petition E153 of 2023) [2024] KEHC 8251 (KLR) to argue that the Executive cannot arrogate to itself powers that compromise the independence of constitutional commissions and offices. 26.The Petitioners submit that the 3rd Respondent abdicated its constitutional authority by allowing its own Chief Executive Officer, the 39th Respondent, be part of an ad hoc committee. It was argued that the duty of the 3rd Respondent in fulfilment of Article 249 of the Constitution cannot be upheld when the 39th Respondent reports to someone else other than the Commission. 27.As to whether executive policy formulation powers extend to formation of taskforces for and on behalf of independent commissions, it is the Petitioners ‘ submission that Article 132 of the Constitution does not give the President power to establish a task force on behalf of the 3rd Respondent which is established by the Constitution. 28.To underscore the alleged illegality of the impugned process, the Petitioners placed reliance on Republic v Vice Chancellor Moi University & 2 others Ex parte Benjamin J. Gikenyi Magare [2019] eKLR, AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v Micro Finance Regulatory Council and another and Republic v Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & 2 others Ex-Parte Rongo University [2018] eKLR to argue that legality exists to ensure that the repository of public power stays within the vital limits of the power conferred and being exercised. 29.The Petitioners contend that the terms of reference, particularly clause (f), unlawfully conferred upon the members of the Taskforce functions ordinarily performed by the National Police Service and its Directorate of Criminal Investigations by assuming investigative roles. 30.The Petitioners further argue that the 4th to 56th Respondents have not demonstrated, through fair competition and merit as required by Article 232(1)(g), that they meet the qualifications for appointment and that the appointments are not in conformity with Section 36 of the Public Service Act and Regulation 16 of the Public Service Commission (Regulations) 2020 (L.N. No. 3/2020). 31.It is submitted that the members of impugned Taskforce are Public Officers for purposes of the Constitution and the law. For that line of argument, reliance is placed on National Hospital Insurance Fund Management Board v Kenya Union of Commercial Food and Allied Workers & another; Attorney General (Interested Party) (Petition E024 of 2024) [2025] KESC 37 (KLR). That their appointment ought to adhere to principles as outlined under Article 232 of the Constitution. 32.The Petitioners have also argued that there was no public participation on the decision to establish the Taskforce and on the Terms of Reference thus violating the constitutional principles of transparency, openness and accountability as provided under Articles 10, 73 and 232(1)(e). 33.As to the competence of the 14th Respondent, the Petitioners argue that her appointment as Chairperson of the Taskforce is an affront to the values and principles enshrined in Chapter Six of the Constitution on Leadership and Integrity. It is their argument that after the recommendation that she be removed from that office, her resignation had no effect on the Tribunals recommendations. That prohibited her from holding a public office under Article 75(3) of the Constitution. 34.It is the Petitioners further assertion of a legitimate expectation that independent offices would be respected; and that taxes would be applied to improve the lives of citizens, rather than remunerating members of the impugned Taskforce. In support, they rely on Oindi Zaippeline & 39 others v Karatina University & another [2015] eKLR, where the Court of Appeal affirmed that the principle of legitimate expectation. 35.According to the Petitioners, there has been no legal or justifiable reasons given by Respondents and/ or the Executive in utilizing scarce public financial resources. They therefore argued that this Petition is of public interest as since it involves use or misuse of public funds. 36.As to whether the President can be held personally liable, the Petitioners submit that under though Article 143(2) no Civil Proceedings can be instituted against the President, Article 226(5) holds all Public Officers accountable for misuse of public funds. The Petitioners therefore submit that a holistic interpretation of the Constitution leads to the conclusion that the President can personally be liable for the loss of any public money. Respondents’ Submissions 37.In their submissions dated 18th July 2025, the Respondents framed the following issues: -i.What are the principles and approaches applicable in interpreting constitutional provisions?ii.Whether the President's decision to appoint the Taskforce on Technical Working Group on Gender Based Violence including Femicide was an Executive decision or administrative action.iii.Whether the Mandate, duties and functions of the Taskforce usurp and coincide with the mandate and functions of the National Gender and Equality Commission.iv.Whether the President can be held personally liable for executing his executive powers.v.Whether the current Chairperson of the Taskforce is competent to be the Chair.vi.Whether the petitioners are entitled to the prayers and reliefs sought.vii.Who should bear the costs? 38.As regards the first issue, that is, the principles and the approach applicable in interpretation of constitutional provisions, the Respondents argue that Article 131 of the Constitution should be interpreted to prove that the President has no powers of his own as all his powers stems from the Constitution of Kenya and therefore, he cannot act ultra vires. 39.Further, it is submitted that Article 259 of the Constitution introduced a new approach to the interpretation of the Constitution obligating Courts to construe the Constitution in a manner that promotes its spirit, values and principles, advances the rule of law, secures human rights and fundamental freedoms and fosters good governance. The Respondents therefore contend that constitutional provisions must be read together, not in isolation, so that interpretation advances the overall purpose and coherence of the Constitution. 40.On the second issue, that is, whether the President's decision to appoint is the Taskforce was an Executive decision or administrative action, the Respondents maintain that the President’s appointment of the Taskforce constituted an exercise of his executive powers rather than mere administrative action and therefore, the decision was in accordance with the Constitution. 41.It is the Respondents’ submissions that as the Chief Executive, the President acted within his constitutional duty by appointing the Taskforce reason being that he is mandated to safeguard citizens’ welfare and may establish such bodies when necessary to address pressing national concerns and ensure public safety. 42.It is further argued that Article 131 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the President whereas Article 129 stipulates the principles of executive authority. Additionally, Article 132 of the Constitution empowers the President to appoint such bodies to advice on matters of national importance. 43.The Respondents argue that the establishment of the Taskforce was against the backdrop of alarming statistics on Gender Based Violence and Femicide and aligns with national priorities, particularly in addressing high rising cases of Femicide and Gender Based Violence. In support of their argument, reliance is placed on Thirdway Alliance Kenya & another v Head of the Public Service-Joseph Kinyua & 2 others; Martin Kimani & 15 others (Interested Parties) Constitutional Petition 451 of 2018) [2020] eKLR. 44.The Respondents further argue that by virtue of Kenya’s commitments under International Treaties, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Maputo Protocol, the President was justified in establishing the Taskforce on Gender‑Based Violence and Femicide as these instruments oblige the State to adopt measures to prevent, respond to and eliminate violence against women and girls making the initiative consistent with both national and international obligations. 45.As regards the third issue as to whether the mandate, duties and functions of the Taskforce usurp and coincides with the mandate and functions of the 3rd Respondent, the Respondents submitted that the Taskforce has no coercive or decision-making powers as it was constituted as merely an advisory body. 46.The Respondents submit that while the 3rd Respondent deals with gender equality and non-discrimination pursuant to Section 8 of the National Gender and Equality Act , the Taskforce was constituted specifically to handle matters on Gender Based Violence and the rising cases of Femicide in the country. The taskforce further becomes fanctus officio once it achieves its mandate. 47.On the Fourth issue, that is, whether the President can be held liable personally for executing the executive powers, it is submitted that a sitting President generally enjoys immunity from legal proceedings as provided for under Article 143 of the Constitution. The Respondents place relies on the case of Katiba Institute v President of Republic of Kenya & 2 others; Judicial Service Commission & 3 others (Interested Parties) (Petition 206 of 2020) [2020] КЕНC 9226 (KLR) and also Julius Nyarotho vs. Attorney General & 3 others [2013] eKLR which affirm that the President cannot be held personally liable for actions conducted in his executive capacity. 48.Further, it is submitted that no orders can be issued against the President as he has not been included as a party to this suit either in his official capacity as the President or personal capacity. The Court orders cannot apply to anybody who is not a party to the matter which led to the issuance of the court orders. 49.Regarding the fifth issue, that is, whether the current Chairperson of the Taskforce is competent to be the Chair, it is submitted that that the Chairperson was never dismissed from office as the Deputy Chief Justice. Rather, she tendered her letter of resignation. 50.It is further the Respondent’s stand that as a retired Judge, she has proceeded to work in other sectors both public and private. She participated in the drafting of the Sexual Offences Act and Protection from Domestic Violence Act. It is therefore the Respondent’s case that the process outlined in Article 168 of the Constitution on the removal of a Judge from office was not followed. 51.The Respondents argue that legal status of members of a Taskforce does not fall under the category of Public or State Officers in Kenya as defined under Article 260 of the Constitution. Hence, any person appointed as a member of a Taskforce or committee is not subject to the Public Service Commission employment rules as they are not State Officers. 52.The Respondent maintain that the 14th Respondent was competent to be appointed as a Chairperson of the Taskforce as a Taskforce. That a Taskforce may constitute a group of consultants or experts appointed temporarily by the government the composition depends on its mandate and the expertise required. 53.On the Sixth issue, that is, whether the Petitioners are entitled to the prayers sought , it is argued that the Taskforce has a time limit and has concluded its mandate making in functus officio. Therefore prayers (a) (b) (c) and (f) have been overtaken by events. 54.As for Payer (e), it is submitted that the President’s decision was an executive function and the report is constitutionally formulated. As concerns Prayer (g), it is submitted that a sitting president cannot be sued. Consequently, the Respondents argued that the doctrine of presumption of constitutionality is applicable in this matter. 55.Lastly, on the issue of costs, it is submitted that the Petitioners are in abuse of the Court process and as such, the Petition ought to be dismissed with costs. Analysis and determination 56.Having considered the pleadings and the parties’ respective submissions, his Court is persuaded that the broad issues crystallizing for determination are:-1.Whether the President had legal and constitutional authority to establish the Presidential Taskforce on Technical Working Group on Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Including Femicide.2.Whether the Presidential Taskforce on Technical Working Groupon Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Including Femicide through Executive Order & Gazette notice No. 109 Vol. CXXVII-No. 3 of 9th January, 2025 and Gazette Notice No 3862 of 28th March 2025 or any other document of any other date is unconstitutional, null and void.3.Whether specific terms of reference of the Taskforce duplicate or encroach upon the statutory functions of the 3rd Respondent hence the Taskforce and its resultant report/recommendations(if any) and any subsequent actions/omissions are unconstitutional, null and void.4.Whether Judicial Review orders of Certiorari should issue quashing the Executive Order and Gazette Notice No.109 Vol. CXXVII—No. 3 of 9th January, 2025 and/or any other document purporting to establish a Presidential Taskforce on Technical Working Group on Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Including Femicide through Executive Order & Gazette Notice No. 109 vol. CXXVII—No. 3 of 9th January, 2025 and Gazette Notice No. 3862 of 28th March 2025 and/or any other document of any other date.5.Whether the 14th Respondent is constitutionally disqualified from chairing the Taskforce or holding public office, appointments or functions or roles.6.Whether the President can be held personally liable for any monies spent on the Taskforce .7.What orders on costs should the Court issue? Whether the President's decision to appoint the Taskforce on Technical Working Group on Gender Based Violence including Femicide was an Executive decision or administrative action and the scope thereof. 57.The Petitioners challenge the President’s authority arguing that the Constitution does not contemplate the creation of ad hoc Taskforces by Executive Order, and that such appointments undermine the autonomy of Independent Commissions established under Article 59(4) and (5) of the Constitution. For emphasis, Article 59 which is on Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission provides:-(4)Parliament shall enact legislation to give effect to this Part ,and any such legislation may restructure the Commission into two or more separate Commissions.(5)If Parliament enacts legislation restructuring the Commission under clause (4) –(a)that legislation shall assign each function of the commissions mentioned in in this Article to one or the other of the successor commissions.(b)each of the successor commissions shall have powers equivalent to the powers of the commission under this Article; and(c)each successor commission shall be a commission within the meaning of Chapter Fifteen , and shall have status and powers of a commission under that chapter. 58.On the other hand, the Respondents argue that as Head of State and Government, the President derives executive authority from Article 129, 131 and 132 of the Constitution. 59.They argue that this authority includes the power to coordinate government functions and to establish temporary advisory mechanisms to address urgent national concerns. In their view, the President’s duty to safeguard citizens’ welfare necessarily encompasses discretion to constitute Taskforces where immediate executive attention is required. The Respondents further contend that the scope of this discretion is not unlimited but it is broad enough to permit the creation of advisory bodies. 60.From the rival position in regard to the principle of Constitutional interpretation, it is noted that the office of the President is anchored within the broader framework of Article 129, which establishes the guiding principles of executive authority. It provides that:1.Executive authority derives from the people of Kenya and shall be exercised in accordance with this Constitution.2.Executive authority shall be exercised in a manner compatible with the principle of service to the people of Kenya, and for their well-being and benefit. 61.Further, Article 131(1) (b) and (e) of the Constitution stipulate that:“The President—(a)…(b)exercises the executive authority of the Republic, with the assistance of the Deputy President and Cabinet Secretaries.(c)….(d)…(e)ensure the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. 62.Further at Article 131 (2) states that:-“The President shall—a.respect, uphold and safeguard this Constitution;” 63.Further, Article 132 (4) (a) stipulates that:“The President may—a.perform any other executive function provided for in this Constitution or in national legislation and, except as otherwise provided for in this Constitution, may establish an office in the public service in accordance with the recommendation of the Public Service Commission;” 64.Regarding the principle of Constitutional interpretation, this Court is guided by the decision Supreme Court in Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Ltd & 5 others [2014] KESC 53 (KLR) where it emphasized the need for a holistic interpretation of the Constitution thus:-.(137)…This court has in the past set out guidelines for such matters of interpretation. Of particular relevance in this regard, is our observation that the Constitution should be interpreted in a holistic manner, within its context, and in its spirit. In the Matter of the Kenya National Human Rights Commission, Sup. Ct. Advisory Opinion Reference No. 1 of 2012; [2014] eKLR, this Court [paragraph 26] had thus remarked:“But what is meant by a holistic interpretation of the Constitution? It must mean interpreting the Constitution in context. It is the contextual analysis of a constitutional provision, reading it alongside and against other provisions, so as to maintain a rational explication of what the Constitution must be taken to mean in light of its history, of the issues in dispute, and of the prevailing circumstances. Such scheme of interpretation does not mean an unbridled extrapolation of discrete constitutional provisions into each other, so as to arrive at a desired result” [emphasis supplied].(138)In Speaker of the Senate & Another v Attorney-General & 4 Others, Sup. Ct. Advisory Opinion No. 2 of 2013; [2013] eKLR, [paragraph 156], this Court further explicated the relevant principle:The Supreme Court of Kenya, in the exercise of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, has a solemn duty and a clear obligation to provide firm and recognizable reference-points that the lower Courts and other institutions can rely on, when they are called upon to interpret the Constitution. Each matter that comes before the Court must be seized upon as an opportunity to provide high-yielding interpretative guidance on the Constitution; and this must be done in a manner that advances its purposes, gives effect to its intents, and illuminates its contents. The Court must also remain conscious of the fact that constitution-making requires compromise, which can occasionally lead to contradictions; and that the political and social demands of compromise that mark constitutional moments, fertilize vagueness in phraseology and draftsmanship. It is to the Courts that the country turns, in order to resolve these contradictions; clarify draftsmanship gaps; and settle constitutional disputes. In other words, constitution making does not end with its promulgation; it continues with its interpretation. It is the duty of the Court to illuminate legal penumbras that Constitutions borne out of long drawn compromises, such as ours, tend to create. The Constitutional text and letter may not properly [capture] express the minds of the framers, and the minds and hands of the framers may also fail to properly mind the aspirations of the people. It is in this context that the spirit of the Constitution has to be invoked by the Court as the searchlight for the illumination and elimination of these legal penumbras”[emphasis supplied]. 65.Applying this interpretive approach in Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others, and the constitutional provisions in this matter, this Court is satisfied the Constitution confers upon the President a general discretion to perform executive functions necessary to implement existing laws. That discretion extends to constituting ad hoc Taskforces. 66.In this case, Article 21 (3) of the Constitution provides that: -“All State organs and all public officers have the duty to address the needs of vulnerable groups within society, including women, older members of society, persons with disabilities, children, youth, members of minority or marginalised communities, and members of particular ethnic, religious or cultural communities.” 67.Consequently, women and victims of rampant gender-based violence and femicide fall within the vulnerable category contemplated under Article 21(3) of the Constitution. Therefore, being the Head of State and Government, the President has a duty to protect this vulnerable group. That obligation flows directly from the text of the Constitution. 68.Flowing from the above, the question is whether, with the obligations imposed upon the President by the Constitution in discharging the functions of that office, the President has authority to create such a Taskforce and if so, what are the limits of that authority. 69.In construing the scope of presidential authority, this Court is guided by Article 259 of the Constitution which requires that the Constitution be interpreted in a manner that: -a.promotes its purposes, values and principles;b.advances the rule of law, and the human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights;c.permits the development of the law; andd.contributes to good governance. 70.The office of the President is anchored within the broader framework of Article 129, 131(1) (b), ( e) and (e), 132 (4) (a) of the Constitution. Applying the interpretive approach, and reading the provisions alongside and against each other, the Constitution confers upon the President a general discretion to perform executive functions necessary to implement existing laws. That discretion extends to constituting Taskforces including the instant Taskforce where the President’s immediate attention is required. 71.More so, the President has an obligation under International Treaties including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Maputo Protocol, to adopt measures to prevent, respond to and eliminate violence against women and girls by making the initiative consistent with both national and international obligations. 72.The issue then is whether the scope of the Taskforce should in substance, usurp or duplicate functions expressly vested in independent commissions or offices. The answer is the negative. Indeed, the Court in Benjamin v Attorney General & 6 others; Maraga & 23 others [2025] KEHC 4645 (KLR) held that the President could not assign to a Taskforce functions expressly vested in the National Police Service Commission under Article 246(3). 73.In the present case however, it is important to appreciate that the reason behind the establishment of the Taskforce was the alarming statistics on Gender Based Violence and Femicide in this country. The findings were to align with national priorities, particularly in addressing high rising cases of Femicide and Gender Based Violence. 74.It is from the Terms of Reference that the Petition argue that some mandates overlap those of other bodies. As stated in this Ruling delivered on 19th May 2025, it may appear like there was some duplication of roles in some Terms of Reference. 75.A reading of Gazette Notice No. 109 Vol. CXXVII-No. 3 of 9th January, 2025 identifies the terms of Reference as follows: -(a)Identify trends, hotspots, and causes contributing to GBV and Femicide;(b)Analyse the adequacy of current legal and policy frameworks in addressing GBV and Femicide;(c)Propose amendments to strengthen laws, improve enforcement, and close existing legislative gaps;(d)Evaluate resource allocation, training levels, and operational effectiveness in managing prevention, response, support and investigations related to cases on GBV and Femicide;(e)Conduct community engagements to gather input on solutions to combat GBV and Femicide; -(f)Provide actionable recommendations on prevention, investigation, prosecution, and survivor support mechanisms in GBV and Femicide cases;(g)Examine the role of social media coverage in GBV and Femicide, including its influence on public perception, awareness, and policy-making;(h)Identify psychological issues related to the commission of crimes associated with GBV and Femicide;(i)Establish socioeconomic challenges contributing and exacerbating to the commission of GBV and Femicide; and(j)Recommend proposals to strengthen family ties, foster harmonious co-existence among family members, and develop social structures that support the resolution of domestic disputes;” 76.It is notable that Section 8 of the National Gender and Equality Commission Act sets out the functions of the Commission thus: -The functions of the Commission shall be to—(a)Promote gender equality and freedom from discrimination in accordance with Article 27 of the Constitution;(b)monitor, facilitate and advise on the integration of the principles of equality and freedom from discrimination in all national and county policies, laws, and administrative regulations in all public and private institutions;(c)act as the principal organ of the State in ensuring compliance with all treaties and conventions ratified by Kenya relating to issues of equality and freedom from discrimination and relating to special interest groups including minorities and marginalised persons, women, persons with disabilities, and children;(d)co-ordinate and facilitate mainstreaming of issues of gender persons with disability and other marginalised groups in national development and to advise the Government on all aspects thereof(e)monitor, facilitate and advise on the development of affirmative action implementation policies as contemplated in the Constitution;(f)investigate on its own initiative or on the basis of complaints, any matter in respect of any violations of the principle of equality and freedom from discrimination and make recommendations for the improvement of the functioning of the institutions concerned;(g)work with other relevant institutions in the development of standards for the implementation of policies for the progressive realization of the economic and social rights specified in Article 43 of the Constitution and other written laws;(h)co-ordinate and advise on public education programmes for the creation of a culture of respect for the principles of equality and freedom from discrimination;(i)conduct and co-ordinate research activities on matters relating to equality and freedom from discrimination as contemplated under Article 27 of the Constitution;(j)receive and evaluate annual reports on progress made by public institutions and other sectors on compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements on the implementation of the principles of equality and freedom from discrimination;(k)work with the National Commission on Human Rights, the Commission on Administrative Justice and other related institutions to ensure efficiency, effectiveness and complementarity in their activities and to establish mechanisms for referrals and collaboration in the protection and promotion of rights related to the principle of equality and freedom from discrimination;(l)prepare and submit annual reports to Parliament on the status of implementation of its obligations under this Act;(m)conduct audits on the status of special interest groups including minorities, marginalised groups, persons with disability, women, youth and children;(n)establish, consistent with data protection legislation, databases on issues relating to equality and freedom from discrimination for different affected interest groups and produce periodic reports for national, regional and international reporting on progress in the realization of equality and freedom from discrimination for these interest groups;(o)perform such other functions as the Commission may consider necessary for the promotion of the principle of equality and freedom from discrimination; and(p)perform such other functions as may be prescribed by the Constitution and any other written law. 77.In light of the above, the TORS and Section 8 of the National Gender and Equality Commission Act should be taken holistically and in the context of the composition of the members of that Taskforce brought in pursuant to their respective areas of engagement and expertise so as to complement each other on the issues at hand but not in any way meant to encroach or usurp the role of independent commissions including Nationa Gender and Equality Commission ( 3rd Respondent) or even role National Police Service and its Directorate of Criminal Investigations by assuming investigative roles as alleged by the Petitioners. The Taskforce was constituted to advise the President as per the Terms of Reference (TOR) but with no powers in regard to decision-making. 78.In the circumstances, the 3rd Respondent cannot be said to have abdicated its constitutional authority by allowing its Chief Executive Officer ( 39th Respondent) be part of Taskforce report to someone else other than the commission. 79.On the same breath, the mere fact recommendations from the Taskforce touch on prosecutions whose mandate belongs to the Director of Public Prosecutions established under Article 157 (6) of the Constitution does encroach or usurp its mandate. 80.The Terms of Refence do not intrude into the domain of the National Police Service pursuant to Section 35 of the National Police Service Act either, merely because it touches on matters prevention, investigation of crimes and enforcement of criminal law. 81.On the issue as to whether Judicial Review orders of Certiorari should issue quashing the Executive Order and Gazette Notice No.109 Vol. CXXVII—No. 3 of 9th January, 2025 and/or any other document purporting to establish a Presidential Taskforce on Technical Working Group on Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Including Femicide through Executive Order & Gazette Notice No. 109 vol. CXXVII—No. 3 of 9th January, 2025 and Gazette Notice No. 3862 of 28th March 2025 and/or any other document of any other date. 82.This court is satisfied that flowing for the above analysis, that the terms of Reference did not violate the Constitution. Consequently, the prayer for Judicial Review Orders fails. 83.On Whether the 14th Respondent is constitutionally disqualified from chairing the Taskforce or holding public office, appointments or functions or roles, the Petitioners challenge the 14th Respondent eligibility to chair the Taskforce contending that her resignation in 2012 followed adverse findings of a Tribunal recommending removal from office , permanently tainted her integrity and created a constitutional bar under Chapter Six of the Constitution. 84.The broader question in this regard is whether the 14th Respondent who voluntarily resigns from office prior to formal dismissal, is constitutionally disqualified from holding subsequent public, offices appointments or functions. 85.Chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya sets out the leadership and integrity standards governing public officers. Article 75(3) stipulates that:-“A person who has been dismissed or otherwise removed from office for a contravention of the provisions specified in clause (2) is disqualified from holding any other State office.” 86.It is uncontroverted that the 14th Respondent voluntarily resigned, thereby vacating office before the Tribunal’s recommendation was acted upon. Consequently, the 14th Respondent was not dismissed or removed from office. In short, Article 75(3) of the Constitution was never activated and therefore, in the absence of a formal dismissal, statutory bar or decree of a competent Court declaring her unfit, the 14th Respondent cannot be said to be constitutionally disqualified from subsequent public appointments. 87.On whether the President can be held personally liable for any monies spent on the Taskforce , the Petitioners argue that the immunity has been pierced and for that argument, invoked Article 226(5) of the Constitution which provides“The accounting officer of a national public entity is accountable to the National Assembly for its financial management, and the accounting officer of a county public entity is accountable to the county assembly for its financial management.” 88.On the other hand, the Attorney General maintains maintained that the President is immune from Civil proceeding pursuant to Article 143 (2) of the Constitution which provides that:-“Civil proceedings shall not be instituted in any court against the President or the person performing the functions of that office during their tenure of office in respect of anything done or not done in the exercise of their powers under this Constitution.” 89.In Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 4 others v Ndii & 312 others; Kenya Human Rights Commission & 4 others (Amicus Curiae) [2021] KECA 363 (KLR), each of the three Judges of the Court of Appeal made a finding in regard to Article 143 (2) of the Constitution. On his Part, Per Kairu Gatembu JA stated:-“[297]It was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to limit the extent of the President’s immunity in civil proceedings to only those instituted while he or she was in office. That intent was evident from the difference in construction between article 143 (1) and article 143 (2) of the Constitution. Whereas article 143 (1) expressly prohibited institution or continuance of criminal proceedings once the President assumed office, under article 143 (2) the immunity in civil proceedings was limited to only those suits instituted against the President during the term of office in respect of anything done or not done in the exercise of power as the President of Kenya. Acts or omissions that gave rise to civil proceedings instituted prior to assuming office were not covered by the prescribed immunity. “As per F. Tuiyot JA ;“[345]Read together, articles 143(2) and 143(3) of the Constitution struck a balance by giving functional immunity to a sitting President during the tenure of office but left it open for him/her to still be held personally accountable, once out of office, for any act or omission done or not done in official name or under official badge yet in gross or egregious violation of the Constitution. The breadth of the protection offered by article 143(2) in respect to civil litigation was as follows: -…”As per Sichale JA“[432]Whatever the President was alleged to have done was in the exercise of his powers, conferred to him by the Constitution. Therefore, he could not be sued in his personal capacity. Article 143 afforded immunity to a sitting President for anything done or omitted to be done in the discharge of their constitutional mandate. However, if the action complained of was not as a result of the discharge of official duties, then the President was open to civil proceedings even during the term of his office.” 90.In this case, the President is not a party in these proceedings and even if he were, it is clear from the above decision that Article 143(2) of the Constitution grants functional immunity to a sitting President during tenure but leaves open the possibility of accountability once out of office for egregious constitutional violations. 91.Notably, the President does not serve as an accounting officer under the Public Finance Management Act and therefore, the Petitioner’s invoking Article 226(5) is misconceived. What orders on costs should the Court issue? 92.Guided by the apex Court’s finding in Rai & 3 others v Rai and 4 others [2014] KESC 31 (KLR ) this Court due to the public interest nature of this matter each party should bear its costs. 93.In conclusion therefore, this Court finds no merit in this Petition and therefore makes the following orders:1.The Petition is dismissed in its entirety.2.Each party shall bear its own costs. DATED AND SIGNED AT NAIROBI THIS 11TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026..................................PATRICIA GICHOHJUDGEDELIVERED AT NAKURU THIS 14TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026..................................DR. JOSEPH SERGONJUDGE