https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1199

Pukose v Okembo (Civil Appeal E075 of 2021) [2026] KECA 1199 (KLR) (26 June 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KECA 1199 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Court of Appeal at Eldoret Civil Appeal E075 of 2021 PM Gachoka, WK Korir & L Ndolo, JJA June 26, 2026 Between Dr. Robert Pukose Appellant and Lillian Okembo Respondent (An appeal arising from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Kenya at Kitale (Chemitei, J.) dated 5th November 2019 in HCCC No. 9 OF 2019 Civil Case 9 of 2017 ) Judgment 1.Before us is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Kenya at Kitale (Chemitei, J.) delivered on 5th November 2019. In the judgment, the learned Judge found that the appellant, Dr. Robert Pukose, had defamed the respondent, Lillian Okembo, and awarded the respondent general damages in the sum of Kshs. 2,000,000 plus interest and costs. The appellant, being dissatisfied, has appealed to this Court against the whole of the judgment. In the memorandum of appeal, the appellant raises the following five grounds:“i.The learned Judge of the High Court erred in law and fact in holding that the letter dated 18th May, 2017, authored by the appellant as a complaint against the respondent in the course of discharging her duties could be termed as publication subject of a defamation suit.ii.The learned Judge of the High Court erred in law and fact in holding that the letter dated 18th May, 2017 was defamatory of the respondent in the absence of evidence from a third party to that effect.iii.The learned Judge erred in law and fact in arriving at the decision that the letter dated 18th May, 2017 was defamatory of the Respondentbased on the Judge’s own opinion instead of the evidence on record.iv.The learned Judge of the High Court erred in law and fact in failing to consider all the defences that had been raised by the Appellant.v.The learned Judge of the High Court erred in law and fact in awarding the respondent Kshs. 2 million without considering the authorities that had been referred to him.” 2.Before we delve into the appeal proper, it is necessary that we appreciate the background of the disagreement giving rise to the appeal. The dispute between the parties arose from a letter dated 18th May 2017, written by the appellant who was then a candidate for the position of Member of the National Assembly, Endebess Constituency. The letter was addressed to the Inspector General of Police and copied to the Speaker of the National Assembly, the National Police Service Commission, and the Regional Police Commander. 3.In the said letter, the appellant complained about security incidents during the campaign period and made certain allegations concerning the respondent who was, at the material time, the Police Commandant for the County of Trans Nzoia. The letter stated in part:“I also wish to bring to the attention of your office that several incidents have been happening that have posed a threat to my security and the entire supporters caused by my said opponent and no action has been taken by the County Commander of Police Ms. Lilian Okembo who is a close ally of my opponent. They are business partners and have commercial farming at Salama area. Reportedly, many of my supporters have been assaulted and beaten but no action has ever been taken by the Police who have been receiving instructions from County Commander. I request your office to transfer the County Commander and make a reshuffle of the sub-county Police Security team so that we can have smooth and neutral officers at the station...” 4.Immediately after the letter was written, the respondent was transferred to the Police Headquarters in Nairobi. She subsequently filed suit against the appellant in the High Court, claiming that the letter was defamatory of her. 5.Before the trial court, the respondent testified as PW1, stating that she was a Commissioner of Police. She recalled that in July 2017,she was the County Police Commander, Trans Nzoia, a position she had held since 2013. Her testimony was that she was first employed as a police constable on 25th March 1989 and was promoted to an inspector of police after six months. She served in the rank for 10 years at various stations, including Nyanza, Kisii, Kisumu, Nairobi and Machakos. She then served as a Chief Inspector for about 5 years, thereafter as a Superintendent of Police, then a Senior Superintendent of Police, and finally a Commissioner of Police. She testified that by 2017, she was due to be promoted to the position of Assistant Inspector General of Police. Her testimony was that she had received several awards due to her exemplary service, including the 2016 Security Award for Outstanding Police Woman, and was later awarded the Moran of the Burning Spear by the President in December 2018. She stated that apart from the appellant’s complaint, she was not aware of any other complaint concerning her work. 6.The respondent further testified that on 11th May 2017, the appellant published a letter to the Inspector General of Police containing defamatory statements about her, which was also shared with other officials. She averred that the letter depicted her as corrupt and unprofessional. The respondent denied any truth in the allegations, stating that she was not a business partner of the appellant's rival, Alwin Sasia. According to the respondent, the appellant’s letter led to a request for her response from the Regional Commander on 16th June 2017, and on 3rd July 2017, she received a letter transferring her from Trans Nzoia County to Police Headquarters, which she viewed as a demotion. Although she acknowledged her rank remained unchanged and that transfers are normal, she averred that her transfer was sudden and linked to the appellant's letter, which she described as defamatory due to its circulation and tabling in Parliament. 7.The respondent’s witness Alwin Chepyagan Sasia (PW2) testified that he was a farmer, businessman and politician who vied for the Endebess Member of the National Assembly seat in 2017 against the appellant. He confirmed that there were incidents of attacks during the campaigns, and the police investigated and warned both sides to maintain peace. PW2 testified that he had never been a business associate of the respondent, had never leased land with her at Salama area, and had never had any business dealings with her. He stated that he did not know the respondent personally.PW2 confirmed that the pistol of the appellant's bodyguard was withdrawn. In cross-examination, he admitted that he was not aware of the appellant's letter and only came to know of it on the day of the trial, having been called two weeks earlier by the respondent's advocate to make a statement. 8.In his defence, the appellant testified as DW1 and adopted his witness statement dated 27th February 2019. He stated that he authored the letter dated 18th May 2017 which was addressed to the Inspector General of Police and copied to the Speaker of the National Assembly, the Chairperson of the National Police Service Commission and the Regional Police Commander. His evidence was that prior to the nominations, there were several incidents of insecurity during the campaigns. The respondent specifically referred to an incident on 13th April, 2017 when his campaign team was attacked by supporters of his arch rival, Alwin Sasia, at a place called Toboo, and his campaign truck damaged. As a result, his bodyguard was forced to shoot in the air to disperse the crowd. Subsequently, his bodyguard's pistol was withdrawn, without justification, by Endebess Police Station, only to be returned in July 2018. He stated that he knew as a fact that the respondent and Alwin Sasia were business associates leasing land at Salama area. According to the appellant, he had a reasonable belief that the respondent failed to act on his complaints because of her association with his opponent. 9.In cross-examination, the appellant admitted that he had no proof of any business dealings between the respondent and Alwin Sasia, that he never sought to verify the allegations before publishing them, that he never lodged any complaint with the Sub-County DCIO or the OCS Endebess, that he did not write to the DCC who was the chairman of the Security Committee, that he did not know whether the contents of the letter were true, and that he was not aware at the time of the publication that the letter was defamatory. He also conceded that Alwin Sasia had testified and denied having any business dealings with the respondent. 10.In the impugned judgment, the learned Judge found that the last paragraph of the letter, which stated that the respondent was a business partner and did commercial farming with the appellant's political opponent, was an unconfirmed lie which was malicious, as the respondent was portrayed as a corrupt senior police officer who shields criminals and other lawbreakers, and was biased in favour of the appellant's political opponent. The Judge found that the defence of justification and fair comment could not stand, as no material evidence was produced to support that line of argument. The Judge also held that the published letter, to the extent that it referred to the respondent as a farming partner of PW2, was defamatory. The Judge, nevertheless, found that the other portions of the letter relating to the respondent's transfer were not defamatory, as they were matters of administration. On quantum, the Judge awarded the respondent Kshs. 2,000,000 in general damages but declined to award exemplary damages, holding that the threshold had not been met. 11.When this appeal was placed before us for hearing on 20th April 2026, learned counsel Mr. Matio held brief for Ms. Ngania for the appellant. On the other side, learned counsel Ms. Arunga appeared for the respondent. Counsel opted to rely on their already filed written submissions. 12.In the submissions dated 8th April 2026, counsel for the appellant argued that defamation was not proved. Counsel relied on the decisions of the Court in Patani & Another vs. Patani [2019] KECA 480 (KLR) and Patrick Nyaga & Another vs. Sanitam Services (EA) Limited [2021] eKLR in support of the proposition that a person’s own view about his or her reputation is not material in a claim for defamation and that there must be evidence from a third party that the standing and reputation of the claimant has been lowered as a result of the defamatory publication. Counsel submitted that the respondent did not call any third party to confirm that they received the letter and found it defamatory. Counsel asserted that the evidence of PW2 could not aid the respondent’s case because he testified that he was unaware of the letter. It was counsel’s submission that the respondent's career was not affected, as she was commended for her work and later recognized through a presidential award. Counsel therefore urged that the appeal be allowed and the suit dismissed. 13.For the respondent, counsel argued through submissions dated 3rd April 2026 that the respondent had demonstrated all the essential ingredients of the tort of defamation as set out in Wycliffe A. Sanya vs. Toyota East Africa Ltd & Another [2009] eKLR. She maintained that the letter complained of was defamatory in character and that it was maliciously published by the appellant. Counsel submitted that the letter was published to the Inspector General of Police, the Speaker of the National Assembly, the chairperson of the National Police Service Commission and the Regional Police Commander, who were all third parties. According to counsel, the respondent testified that the letter was acted upon as she was transferred and that PW2 denied any business dealings with her, thereby confirming the falsity of the allegations. Counsel argued that the defence of justification and fair comment failed for lack of evidence. He consequently urged that we dismiss the appeal. 14.This is a first appeal, and, as the Court has held in numerous decisions, in such an appeal the Court is enjoined to re-evaluate the evidence on record and draw its own conclusions. Suffice to refer to Abok James Odera T/A A. J. Odera & Associates vs. John Patrick Machira T/A Machira & Co. Advocates [2013] eKLR, where the Court restated that a first appellate court has the jurisdiction to re-evaluate the evidence that was tendered before the trial court and come up with its own findings. The only limitation to be taken into consideration is that, unlike the trial court, the first appellate court never saw or heard the witnesses testify so as to gauge their demeanour. In line with this mandate, we have carefully reviewed the record and considered the submissions of both parties. The main issue in this appeal is whether the tort of defamation was proved against the appellant. 15.The essential elements to be proved in a tort of defamation were summarized by the Court in Swanya vs. Toyota East Africa Ltd & Another [2009] KECA 379 (KLR) as follows:“For the purpose of deciding a case of defamation, the Court is called upon to consider the essentials of the tort generally and to see whether these essentials have been established or proved. It is common ground that in a suit founded on defamation the plaintiff must prove:(i)That the matter of which the plaintiff complains is defamatory in character.(ii)That defamatory statement or utterance was published by the defendants. Publication in the sense of defamation means that the defamatory statement was communicated to someone other than the person defamed.iii.That it was published maliciously.iv.In slander, subject to certain exceptions, that the plaintiff has suffered special damage.”” 16.The foregoing authority cements the test or standard by which we must assess the evidence on record to determine whether the tort of defamation was established. In the present case, there is no dispute that the appellant authored and published the letter of 18th May 2017. The letter was addressed to the Inspector General of Police and copied to the Speaker of the National Assembly, the Chairperson of the National Police Service Commission and the Regional Police Commander. Publication to third parties was therefore clearly established. Indeed, the appellant admitted in his evidence that he addressed the letter to the Inspector General of Police and copied it to the listed parties. 17.In the first ground of appeal, the appellant contends that the learned Judge erred in holding that the letter could be termed as a publication subject of a defamation suit. We find no merit in this ground. Publication in the context of defamation means that the defamatory statement was communicated to someone other than the person defamed. The letter was communicated to the Inspector General of Police, the Speaker of the National Assembly, and other persons. This constituted publication. The fact that the letter was written as a complaint does not immunise the appellant from a claim for defamation where the contents are defamatory. The defence of qualified privilege may be available in certain circumstances, but that defence is not absolute and can be defeated by proof of malice. 18.The second and third grounds of appeal, which are core to the appellant's case, are that the learned Judge erred in finding the letter defamatory in the absence of third-party evidence and that the Judge relied on his own opinion instead of evidence. 19.The importance of availing third-party evidence to confirm injury to reputation was stressed in Patrick Nyaga & Another vs. Sanitam Services (EA) Limited [2021] eKLR as follows:In the case of Selina Patani and Another vs. Dhiranjiv.Patani (supra) this Court explained that:“As to whether the appellants character and reputation was destroyed, there is no evidence on record from a third party stating that as a result of reading the impugned letter, the appellants’ reputation and standing in society was injured. It is in this context that we agree with the learned Judge that a person’s own view about his/her reputation is not material in a claim for defamation; there must be evidence from a third party to the effect that the standing and reputation of the claimant has been lowered as a result of the defamatory publication”.As such, to prove its claim, the respondent ought to have called evidence from the third parties to whom the letters were addressed to prove that the statements contained diminished its reputation in their minds. As seen above, only the Managing Director of the respondent testified. And in his evidence he made a passing mention of the letters, but did not specify how they had defamed him. Furthermore, no third party evidence was called that pointed to damage of reputation or that depicted a lowering of the respondent’s reputation in the customers’ minds as a consequence of the letters. In effect, the evidence in its totality fell far short of the standard required to prove defamation. Absent such evidence, as was the case here, there would be no basis for a court to reach a finding that the claimant was defamed. Such was the case in Daniel N. Ngunia vs. KGGCU Limited [2000] eKLR where this Court observed that the claimant having been the only person who testified in support of his claim for defamation, the claim could not possibly succeed. We therefore find that, contrary to the conclusions reached by both the trial court and the High Court, the claim for defamation was not properly made out.” 20.Similarly, in Rutto vs. Langat & Another [2025] KECA 1276 (KLR), the Court reiterated the importance of third-party evidence when it held that:“39.The elements of the tort of defamation are that the words must be defamatory in that they must tend to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the estimation of right-minded persons or must tend to cause him to be shunned or avoided. One must therefore prove that his reputation has been lowered in the estimation of right-minded persons or that the publication has tended to cause him to be shunned or avoided. Accordingly, it is necessary to call, as witnesses, right thinking members of the society to testify as to that fact. This is because reputation is not what one thinks about oneself but what others think of him.” 21.However, the requirement for third-party evidence in defamation claims must be understood in its proper context. The requirement is aimed at ensuring that the plaintiff has proved the injury suffered to reputation for purposes of assessing the appropriate damages to be awarded for, without evidence of injury to reputation, it would be difficult to assess the damages to be awarded. The principle enunciated in the cited decisions was better explained by the Court in Selina Patani & Another vs. Dhiranji vs. Patani [2019] eKLR thus:“26.The other issue for our consideration is whether the Judge erred in finding it was imperative to call a third party to prove the appellants claim for defamation. In principle, defamation is actionable per se. This does not mean the ingredients of the tort must not be proved. It simply means you must prove the elements of the tort of defamation; what need not be proved is the damage suffered. If no damage is proved, a claimant may be entitled to nominal damages. In this case, the legal issue is whether the appellants proved there was publication to a third party and injury or damage suffered to their reputation.27.The evidence on record is the testimony by the 2nd appellant that her boss read the letter. The alleged boss was never called to testify. No other third party was called to testify as to the publication and injury to reputation. As to whether the appellants character and reputation was destroyed, there is no evidence on record from a third party stating that as a result of reading the impugned letter, the appellants reputation and standing in society was injured. It is in this context that we agree with the learned Judge that a person’s own view about his/her reputation is not material in a claim for defamation; there must be evidence from a third party to the effect that the standing and reputation of the claimant has been lowered as a result of the defamatory publication. In the absence of third party evidence, we find no error of law on the part of the Judge in arriving at the determination that the appellants did not prove their claim for defamation.” [Emphasis ours] 22.Unfortunately, the respondent’s counsel did not address these two crucial grounds of appeal. That notwithstanding, our understanding is that although defamation is actionable per se, a claimant is required to call evidence demonstrating that their reputation has been lowered in the eyes of third parties. Failure to do so would result in the award of nominal damages to the plaintiff. Such evidence cannot come from the plaintiff himself but from a third party. So, what is needed is evidence that the plaintiff has, since the publication, suffered injury to their reputation. We would opine that a plaintiff can prove injury to reputation by, for instance, producing admissible video evidence of people discussing him negatively based on the defamatory material in question. We will examine this appeal along those lines. 23.In this case, the respondent testified that the letter was published to the Inspector General of Police, the Speaker of the National Assembly, the National Police Service Commission, and the Regional Police Commander. The publication was admitted by the appellant himself. The Regional Commander's letter dated 16th June 2017 was produced as an exhibit, confirming that the Deputy Inspector General had received the appellant’s complaint letter and needed the respondent’s response to the allegations. This independent documentary evidence not only corroborated the respondent’s testimony on publication but also the impact of the publication on her image. Additionally, the deployment letter dated 3rd July 2017 and the release letter dated 6th July 2017 were produced, demonstrating that the letter was acted upon by the respondent’s superiors who swiftly transferred her. While no individual third party was called to testify that their opinion of the respondent was lowered, the combination of the respondent’s testimony, the appellant’s admission of the unverified nature of his allegations against the respondent, and the documentary evidence sufficiently established that the published material ruined the respondent’s reputation. Notwithstanding the respondent’s concession that transfers are normal in the public sphere, her testimony that her transfer was linked to the letter was not displaced by the appellant. The action of transferring the respondent is independent evidence that her reputation was lowered in the eyes of her bosses. 24.The respondent submitted before us that she considered her transfer from Trans Nzoia, where she served as County Commander, to the Police Headquarters, as a demotion. This was despite the fact that she did not lose in rank or salary credits. In interrogating the respondent’s grievance in this regard, we take cognizance of the fact that she had risen through the ranks, to the position of a senior police officer operating in the field. Her recall to Police Headquarters, coming on the heels of a complaint against her to her bosses alongside other parties, was therefore a blot on her otherwise steady rise in the disciplined force. 25.Moreover, the principle that a person's own view of his reputation is not material does not mean that the evidence of the plaintiff alone cannot support a defamation case. The respondent was competent to testify about the fact of publication, the circumstances surrounding the publication, and the effects she suffered as a result. In this case, the respondent testified that the letter was circulated within Trans Nzoia County and presented to Parliament,and that she was abruptly transferred as a result. She testified that she was demoted in terms of power and office, being placed under three bosses who supervised her daily, whereas previously she was in charge of a county. She testified that the letter destroyed her good work of 29 years and caused her extreme mental torture. This was sufficient evidence to prove injury to the respondent’s reputation. 26.The appellant further argued that the respondent’s witness, PW2, was not aware of the letter. While that is true, PW2 was not called to prove publication or injury to reputation; he was called to prove the falsity of the allegation that he was in business with the respondent. He served that purpose by denying any business dealings. The failure to call other third parties is, in the circumstances of this case, not fatal, more so where publication was admitted, and the defamatory nature of the statements is clear from the face of the letter. Further, the injury to the respondent’s standing in society was proved by the fact that her superiors acted on the appellant’s allegations and swiftly transferred her. Consequently, we find the appellant’s second and third grounds of appeal to be lacking in merit. We reject and dismiss these grounds of appeal. 27.On the appellant’s fourth ground that his defence was not considered, we start by appreciating the right to freedom of expression enshrined in Article 33 of the Constitution. However, that right is not absolute. It does not extend to making false and malicious statements that injure another person's reputation. The appellant had every right to raise security concerns, but he crossed the line when he made false and unsubstantiated allegations that the respondent was in a business partnership with his political opponent, thereby imputing bias and corruption on the respondent. He could have complained about the withdrawal of the pistol and the alleged inaction without making that defamatory statement. Having chosen to include it, he must bear the consequences. 28.On the defamatory character of the statements, we agree with the learned trial Judge. The statement that the respondent was a close ally and business partner of the appellant’s political opponent, and that they engaged in commercial farming together, clearly imputes corruption and partiality to a senior police officer. 29.In Graham vs. Standard Group Limited [2023] KECA 649 (KLR), the Court held that:“In this respect, a defamatory statement is defined in Halsburys Laws of England, fourth edition, volume 28 (Reissue) at paragraph 10 as “a statement which tends to lower a person in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally or to cause him to be shunned or avoided, or to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to disparage him in his office, profession, calling, trade or business”.” 30.Similarly, in Rutto vs. Langat & Another (supra), the Court appreciated that:“The elements of the tort of defamation are that the words must be defamatory in that they must tend to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the estimation of right-minded persons or must tend to cause him to be shunned or avoided.” 31.A reasonable reader of the letter by the appellant would certainly think less of a County Police Commander who is alleged to be in a business partnership with a politician whose opponent is complaining of police inaction. The statement was false, as PW2 denied any such partnership, and the appellant admitted he had no evidence to support it. The falsity of the statement is a strong indicator of malice. 32.Still on malice, the evidence is overwhelming. The appellant admitted that he never sought to verify the allegations before publishing them. He admitted that he had no proof of any business dealings between the respondent and PW2. He admitted that he did not lodge any complaint with the Sub-County DCIO or the OCS before escalating the matter to the Inspector General of Police. The appellant also conceded that he indeed requested for the respondent’s transfer. 33.In Rutto vs. Langat & Another (supra), the Court held that:“46.As regards the defence of fair comment, in order for it to be upheld, it must be shown that the matter commented on was a matter of public interest in the sense that the public is legitimately interested and that they are matters in which it is legitimately concerned. Secondly, it must be an expression of opinion and not an assertion of fact. Thirdly, the comment must be fair in the sense that it must first of all be based upon true facts in existence when the comment was made. That defence only avails a person where it is proved that the facts are true and the matter is of public interest and the opinion is honestly held. In other words, one cannot invent a non-existent state of affairs and purport to fairly comment on them…” 34.As noted above, for the defence of fair comment to succeed, the comment must be based on true facts and made in good faith. The appellant’s failure to verify the facts before publishing the defamatory letter, and his admission that he had no evidence, demonstrates recklessness that amounts to malice. The defence of justification and fair comment therefore fails. 35.Based on the foregoing analysis, it would follow that the appellant’s fourth ground of appeal lacks merit. The trial Judge, as we have also found, considered the defences of justification and fair comment and found that they could not stand because there was no material evidence to support the assertion that the respondent worked closely with PW2. We therefore uphold the learned Judge in that finding. 36.The fifth ground of appeal challenges the award of Kshs. 2,000,000 as excessive. Assessment of damages in defamation is an exercise of discretion by the trial court. This Court will not interfere with an award of damages unless the trial court acted on a wrong principle of law or the award is so inordinately high or low as to be an entirely erroneous estimate of the damages. This principle was reiterated in Johnson vs. Mbugua & Another [2024] KECA 1445 (KLR) where the Court held that an appellate court will not disturb an award of damages unless it is demonstrated that the trial court acted on a wrong principle or the award is manifestly excessive or so low as to be an erroneous estimate. The respondent was a senior police officer who had served for 29 years. The imputation of corruption and partiality was serious. The letter was published to her superiors and other unconcerned offices like that of the Speaker of the National Assembly. She was transferred abruptly, which she perceived as a demotion. In the circumstances, an award of Kshs. 2,000,000 cannot be said to be unreasonable. 37.In Nation Media Group Ltd, Mutegi Njau & Bob Kioko vs. John Joseph Kamotho, Charles Githii Kamotho, James Kamotho & David Kamotho [2010] KECA 360 (KLR), the Court pointed out that:“We have earlier on in this judgment set out the criteria for interfering with an award of damages. We would add that the successful plaintiff in a defamation action is entitled to recover as general compensatory damages, such sum as will compensate him for the damage to his reputation; vindicate his good name; and take account of the distress, hurt and humiliation which the defamatory publication has caused. See John v MGN Limited [1966] 2 All 35 at page 47. Again:“In assessing the appropriate damages for injury to reputation the most important factor is the gravity of the libel; the more closely it touches the Plaintiff’s personal integrity, professional reputation, honour, courage, loyalty and the core attributes of his personality, the more serious it is likely to be. The extent of publication is also very relevant; a libel published to millions has greater potential to cause damage than a libel published to a handful of people. A successful litigant may properly look to an award of damages to vindicate his reputation: but the significance of this is much greater in a case where the Defendant asserts the truth of the libel and refuses any retraction or apology than in a case where the Defendant acknowledges the falsity of what was published and publicly expresses regret that the libelous publication took place.” 38.Whereas the publication of the defamatory material was not nationwide, we have no difficulty in finding that the trial Judge took all the relevant factors into account. The appellant contends that the respondent's career was not affected because she received commendations and an award. We do not accept this argument. The fact that the respondent continued to perform well and received recognition does not negate the injury she suffered from the defamatory publication. The continued excellence of the respondent did not wipe the damage already done to her reputation. Moreover, the commending letters came from superiors who may have later realized that the allegations were false. The award of MBS was made in December 2018, well after publication of the defamatory letter, and does not erase the harm caused. The fifth ground of appeal therefore fails. 39.For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in this appeal, and its fate is dismissal, which we hereby do. Consequently, the judgment of the High Court is hereby upheld. 40.In relation to costs, the general rule is that costs follow the event.We perceive no circumstances in this appeal to warrant our departure from that norm. Since the appeal has been dismissed, the appellant shall bear the costs of this appeal. 41.It is so ordered. DATED AND DELIVERED AT ELDORET THIS 26TH DAY OF JUNE 2026.M. GACHOKA C.Arb, FCIArb......................................JUDGE OF APPEALW. KORIR......................................JUDGE OF APPEALL. M. NDOLO......................................JUDGE OF APPEALI certify that this is a True copy of the originalSignedDEPUTY REGISTRAR