Maina v Francis & 10 others (Civil Appeal E593 of 2025) [2026] KECA 1602 (KLR) (31 July 2026) (Judgment)

Maina v Francis & 10 others (Civil Appeal E593 of 2025) [2026] KECA 1602 (KLR) (31 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KECA 1602 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Court of Appeal at Nairobi Civil Appeal E593 of 2025 SG Kairu, GV Odunga & HI Ong'udi, JJA July 31, 2026 Between Dr Samuel Thenya Maina Appellant and Brian Martin Francis 1st Respondent Isaac Njoroge Gitoho 2nd Respondent The Estate of the Late Hiram Ngaruiya 3rd Respondent James Njuguna Gitoho 4th Respondent Krisco Holdings Limited 5th Respondent Muiboro Enterprise Limited 6th Respondent KCB Bank Limited 7th Respondent Bilha W Mwangi & Kemboy Julius Kipkosgei t/a Kemboy Law Advocates LLP 8th Respondent Njeri Benson Ngugi 9th Respondent Igeria Arthur Konye 10th Respondent Njoroge David Ngumbu t/a Igeria & Ngugi Advocates 11th Respondent (An appeal against the Ruling of Hon. Justice Francis Gikonyo delivered on 16th May 2025 in Nairobi High Court Commercial and Admiralty Court, Civil Suit No. E112 of 2021) Judgment 1.The appellant herein, was aggrieved by the ruling rendered by Hon. Justice Francis Gikonyo in Nairobi High Court Commercial and Admiralty Court, Civil Suit No. E112 of 2021) on 16th May 2025. In the said suit, the 1st to 6th respondents had filed a Notice of Motion dated 26th February 2024 seeking an order directing I& M Bank to release the monies and accrued interest held in the joint fixed deposit account number 00xxxxxxxxxxxxx0 deposited in accordance with the court order issued on 19th May 2022 to the firm of Gichuki King’ara & Co. Advocates for onward transmission to them. This was supported by the grounds that the said court order had been overtaken by events because the arbitration between the parties was concluded in April 2023. Further, that the said funds were not subject to the arbitration and were not adjudicated upon by the arbitrator. Additionally, they claimed prejudice due to the six-year delay in receiving the balance of the purchase price despite transferring their shares and assets to the appellant. 2.The appellant filed a replying affidavit sworn on 11th March 2024 opposing the said application. He averred that the funds should be released to him as the successful party in the arbitration. He noted that he had filed a notice of appeal against the ruling dated 31st January 2025 which set aside the arbitral award and therefore the dispute between the parties remained unresolved. 3.In the impugned ruling delivered on 16th May 2025, the learned Judge declined to release funds held in a joint interest-earning account established pursuant to an order made under section 7 of the Arbitration Act. He further found the appellant to be in contempt of court for failure to comply with an earlier order requiring him to deposit Kshs.53,270,698/= into the said account. The learned Judge granted the appellant a reprieve to purge the contempt on the following terms;a.To commence competent arbitration proceedings in accordance with the Arbitration Agreement and Arbitration Act within 21 days of the order and the arbitrator to be appointed within the same period.b.To deposit the sum of Kshs. 53,270,698/= in the joint account within 30 days from the date of the order, failure to which he may be sentenced to a punishment that the Court would determine upon expiry of the period allowed for purging the contempt. 4.This aggrieved the appellant provoking the instant appeal. The 11 grounds as set out in the Memorandum of Appeal dated 21st July 2025, can be summarized as follows;i.The learned Judge erred in law and fact in finding the appellant to be in contempt of court for failure to deposit Kshs. 53,270,698/= into the joint interest-earning account as ordered on 13th July 2022.ii.The learned Judge erred in law and fact in ordering the appellant to deposit Kshs. 53,270,698/= within thirty (30) days without adequately considering the appellant’s financial circumstances, ability to comply, ongoing financial obligations, and evidence of efforts to secure financing, thereby imposing an unreasonable and oppressive timeline.iii.The learned Judge erred in law and fact in failing to consider alternative and realistic modes of compliance, including payment by instalments or within a reasonable period, and in failing to provide sufficient reasons for imposing the thirty-day compliance period.iv.The learned Judge erred in law and fact in failing to properly consider and apply the principles governing interim measures of protection under section 7 of the Arbitration Act, including the fact that the disputed funds remained the subject matter of pending arbitral proceedings following the setting aside of the arbitral award and referral of the dispute to a fresh arbitration.v.The learned Judge erred in law and fact in finding that the circumstances justified the release or lapse of the interim measure of protection, and failed to appreciate that requiring the deposit of the funds prior to the determination of the fresh arbitration would occasion prejudice to the appellant and undermine the purpose of preserving the subject matter of the dispute.vi.The learned Judge erred in law and fact by failing to properly evaluate the pleadings, evidence, and applicable legal principles, thereby arriving at conclusions that were unsupported by the evidence on record. 5.When the appeal came up for plenary hearing on 25th March 2026, learned counsel, Mr. Wena holding brief for Mr. Miller appeared for the appellant, while learned counsel Mr. King’ara represented the 1st to 6th and 8th respondents and Mr. Gichana appeared for the 7th, 9th, 10th and 11th respondents. Mr. Wena adopted his written submissions dated 20th August 2025 and clarified that the ruling they were appealing against is dated 16th May 2025 (page 11 -16 of the record of appeal). Mr. Gichana informed the Court that they were in support of the Appeal. However, they did not dispute the fact that the appellant was ordered to deposit the sum of Kshs. 53,270,698/= in the joint interest-earning account but he had failed to do so. On his part, Mr. King’ara made brief oral highlights of his written submissions dated 11th November 2025. 6.The appellant’s submissions were filed through the firm of Miller & Company Advocates and learned counsel identified three issues for determination. 7.The first issue is whether the learned Judge misdirected himself in principle by conditioning the survival of the interim protection on compressed timelines and immediate cash deposit in a manner that prejudices the arbitral process. Learned counsel submitted that the learned Judge failed to recognize that the funds in question were the subject matter of a lawful interim measure of protection under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act. That imposing a 21- day window to institute fresh arbitration and a 30-day window to deposit Kshs.53,270,698/= defeated the statutory purpose. Additionally, that the High Court erred in fact and law by finding that the arbitral process was no longer pending and directly infringed upon the appellant’s right to appeal. 8.Learned counsel cited the case of Safaricom Ltd v Ocean View Beach Hotel Ltd & 2 Others (Civil Appl. No. 327 of 2009) and submitted that this Court has consistently cautioned that courts when granting interim measures in the aid of arbitration, must avoid prejudice to the arbitral process or outcome. He further submitted that section 7(1) of the Arbitration Act exists to protect the subject matter before or during the arbitral process. He added that the appellant’s financial capability was not taken into consideration when deciding that he was in contempt. 9.The second issue is whether the trial Judge failed to exercise his judicial discretion even though he had clear notice of the appellant's inability to marshal Kshs. 53,270,698 within a mere 30 day window while concurrently facing constraints tied to bank facilities and statutory demands. Thus, by insisting on immediate cash compliance, the Judge’s orders fettered access to a fair arbitral hearing and directly offended the principle of proportionality enshrined under Articles 48 and 50 of the Constitution. 10.Learned counsel cited the case of Mbogo v Shah [1968] EA 93 and Shah v Mbogo [1967] EA 116, where it was established that judicial discretion must be exercised to avoid causing injustice or hardship. He further cited the case of Stanley Kang’ethe Kinyanjui v Tony Ketter & 5 Others [2013] eKLR and submitted that the learned Judge’s approach elevated form over substance, making preservation contingent on logistical ability than legal right, thereby warranting appellate interference. 11.On the last issue, learned counsel submitted that the correct legal course under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act is to maintain neutral preservation of the subject matter pending arbitration while safeguarding both parties’ interests without prejudging the merits of the dispute. He further submitted that the High Court orders were not realistic and must be set aside, or varied in favour of calibrated relief. In conclusion he urged the court to allow the appeal and reinstate the interim protection over the funds and in lieu of the original conditions, to order proportionate measures. 12.The 1st to 6th and 8th respondents’ submissions were filed through the firm of Gichuki King’ara Company Advocates and learned counsel identified six issues for determination. 13.The first issue is on jurisdiction and leave to appeal. Learned counsel submitted that this Court is devoid of jurisdiction to entertain the current appeal because the mandatory statutory prerequisites for appealing matters governed by the Arbitration Act had not been met. He asserted that while the court's general authority is derived from Article 64(1) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, its power to intervene in arbitration disputes is strictly limited. He further asserted that the primary suit involved interim measures of protection under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act. 14.Learned counsel further submitted that section 10 of the said Act prohibits judicial intervention in arbitration matters except where explicitly authorized by the Act. He asserted that section 39 provides that the High Court must grant leave for an appeal of this nature to be filed or this Court itself should have granted such leave within the period stipulated in its Rules. However, no such leave was granted by either of the Courts. He further asserted that the orders sought by the appellant are couched in a manner intended to set aside or review the orders of 31st July 2022, which were unequivocal to the effect that, in the event of non-compliance, execution would issue. 15.The second issue was identified as interim measure of protection and non-compliance with court orders. Learned counsel asserted that the said interim measure was granted on condition that the appellant deposits the balance of the purchase price and accumulated interest into a joint interest-earning account. That obligation arose from a consent order issued on 13th July 2022, which the appellant remained in deliberate, open defiance and in fragrant disobedience of for approximately three years. He further asserted that such defiance of court orders strips a party of the right to be heard until the contempt is purged. Therefore, the High Court’s decision was a discretionary act of grace that merely extended the timelines for compliance to allow the appellant to satisfy his obligations. 16.On whether the Appeal is overtaken by events, learned counsel submitted in the affirmative and added that the orders of 13th July 2022, 19th May 2024 and 31st January 2025 were not made for cosmetic purposes. He further submitted that the appellant had not demonstrated how the intended arbitral proceedings will be affected if the impugned ruling is not set aside. He placed reliance on the case of Castrol Limited v Kobil Petroleum Limited [2013] KECA 160 (KLR) and EZ v FS [2018] KEAC 20 (KLR) and urged the Court to hold that the appeal has been overtaken by events. 17.The fourth issue is whether the learned Judge erred in conditioning survival of interim measure of protection. Learned counsel submitted that the conditions requiring the deposit of funds into a joint account were originally established by orders dated 15th May 2022 and 13th July 2022. He contended that the appellant’s main complaint that he was granted a short time to comply was a deliberate misrepresentation of facts. He further argued that the appellant had already received his bargain in full and there was no longer any subject matter to preserve. He added that conditioning the survival of the interim measure on the deposit of funds was a follow-up and an extension of the grace period. 18.The fifth issue is whether there was disregard of material circumstances. Learned counsel asserted that the learned Judge did not disregard material circumstances but instead properly accounted for existing court orders and the specific legal principles governing interim measures of protection. He added that the appellant had not demonstrated any interest in initiating arbitration despite the court's referral on 31st January 2025. He further asserted that this Court has jurisdiction to order such referrals and to establish strict timelines for compliance pursuant to section 7 of the Arbitration Act. He placed reliance on the case of Space and Style Limited & another v Wambugu & 4 others (Civil Appeal 139 of 2019) [2023] KECA 412. On whether the ruling being appealed against exists, learned counsel submitted that in the Notice of Appeal, Memorandum of Appeal and the Record of Appeal the appellant claims to be appealing against a ruling delivered by the court on 16th May 2025. However, no such ruling was ever delivered by the High Court, nor is any such document contained within the provided Record of Appeal. He asserted that the appeal is fatally defective and the same ought to be dismissed. 19.Lastly, on the orders sought by the appellant, learned counsel submitted that the said orders go beyond the purview of Appellate Jurisdiction Act and intervention under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act. That this Court was being invited to reverse and overturn orders of 13th July 2025, 31st January 2025 in HCCC No. E034 of 2024 and order releasing the funds dated 24th July 2025, yet the said orders are not the subject of the appeal herein. He further submitted that no new intervention under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act can be initiated in this Court as the orders sought go beyond the intervention by the courts in arbitral processes. He placed reliance on the case of Ann Mumbi Hinga v Victoria Njoki Gathara [2009] eKLR. 20.This being a first appeal, this Court is enjoined to re- valuate, re- assess, and re-analyze the evidence on record in order to arrive at its own independent conclusions. This duty was well settled and was succinctly expressed by the Court in the celebrated case of Selle & Another vs Associated Motor Boat Co Ltd & Others [1968]EA 123. 21.However, the Court must exercise restraint in interfering with findings of fact and the exercise of discretion unless it is shown that the trial court misdirected itself in law, took into account irrelevant matters, failed to take into account relevant matters, or arrived at a plainly wrong decision. This approach was enunciated in Mbogo vs. Shah [1968] EA 93 as follows:“A Court of Appeal should not interfere with the exercise of the discretion of a Judge unless it is satisfied that he misdirected himself in some matter and as a result arrived at a wrong decision, or unless it is manifest from the case as a whole that the Judge was clearly wrong in the exercise of his discretion and that as a result there has been misjustice.” 22.We have carefully considered the grounds of appeal, the record of appeal, the rival submissions and the authorities relied upon by the parties. From the grounds of appeal the issues for determination can be condensed are follows;i.Whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.ii.Whether the learned Judge erred in finding the Appellant in contempt of court and ordering the deposit of Kshs. 53,270,698/= within 30 days.iii.Whether the Learned Judge properly considered the evidence and the applicable principles of law governing interim measures of protection and pending arbitral proceedings in making the impugned orders. 23.Regarding the first issue, the 1st to 6th and 8th respondents argued that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. They contended that this Court’s power to intervene in arbitration disputes is strictly limited and that Section 10 of the Arbitration Act prohibits judicial intervention in arbitration matters except where explicitly authorized by the Act. They further contended that section 39 of the said Act provides that the High Court must grant leave for an appeal of this nature to be filed or this Court itself should have granted such leave within the period stipulated in its Rules. However, no such leave was granted by either of the Courts. 24.In the celebrated case of Owners of the Motor Vehicle M.V. “Lillian S” versus Caltex Oil (Kenya) Limited (1989) KLR1. At page 14 line 29-43 Nyarangi JA (as he then was) had this to say:-By jurisdiction is meant the authority which a court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. The limits of this authority are imposed by statute, charter or commission under which the court is constituted and may be extended or restricted by the like mean. If no restriction or limit is imposed, the jurisdiction is said to be unlimited. A limitation may be either as to the kind and nature of the action and matters of which the particular court has cognizance of or as to the area over which the jurisdiction shall extend; or it may partake of both these characteristics. If the jurisdiction of an inferior court or tribunal including an arbitrator depends on the existence of a particular state of facts, the court or tribunal must inquire into the existence of the facts in order to decide whether it has jurisdiction but except where the court or tribunal has been given power to determine conclusively whether the fact exists where a court takes it upon itself to exercise a jurisdiction which it does not possess, its decision a merit to nothing. Jurisdiction must be acquired before judgment. It is for that reason that a question of jurisdiction once raised by a party or by a court on its own motion must be decided forthwith on the evidence before the court. It is immaterial whether the evidence is scanty or limited. Facts constitute the evidence before the court…The moment a court determines that it has no jurisdiction it has to down its tools and proceed no further” 25.Further, in the case of Pepco Construction Company Limited versus Carter & Sons Limited Nairobi CA No. 80 of 1979 (UR) [2000] KECA 275 (KLR) this Court made the following observations: -“A notice of appeal is what gives this court jurisdiction in any appeal. It is a primary document in terms of rule 85(1) of the Rules. A record of appeal must contain a valid copy of the Notice of Appeal. The omission to include such a valid copy renders the appeal incompetent and therefore the “Notice of the Intended Appeal” lodged on 27th November 1992 cannot stand and renders the appeal incompetent.” 26.Applying the above set out principles of law and case law in addressing the issue of jurisdiction, we are satisfied that we have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. The reasons being that the proceedings giving rise to this appeal arose from a notice of motion dated 26th February 2024 whose subsequent decision by a High Court Judge found the appellant to be in contempt of court. Such a decision is appealable to the Court of Appeal as of right under the provisions of section 5(2) of the Judicature Act. We are in the premises satisfied that we are properly seized of this appeal and shall proceed to determine its merits accordingly. 27.On the second issue, the appellant contended that the learned Judge erred in finding him in contempt of court and ordering him to deposit of Kshs. 53,270,698 into the joint interest-earning account within 30 days. It is the 1st to 6th and 8th respondents’ argument that the said obligation arose from a consent order issued on 13th July 2022, which the appellant remained in deliberate, open defiance and in fragrant disobedience of for approximately 3 years. They further argued that such defiance of court orders striped a party of the right to be heard until the contempt is purged. 28.In the impugned ruling the learned Judge held as follows:“45.The law applicable for contempt proceeding is set out in section 5 of the Judicature Act, that;1)The High Court and the Court of Appeal shall have the same power to punish for contempt of court as is for the time being possessed by the High Court of Justice in England, and that power shall extend to upholding the authority and dignity of subordinate courts.46.Jurisprudence has developed to the effect that knowledge of the orders of the court is sufficient for purpose of the contempt.Facts47.The record shows that on 13th July 2022, the court issued an order to the effect that the 1st respondent deposits the sum of Kshs. 53, 270, 698/= in the same joint account. The sum was accumulated interest in respect of the decretal amount.48.The 1st respondent was acutely aware of the order of the court requiring him to deposit a sum of Kshs. 53, 270, 698/= in the same joint account.49.But, the 1st respondent did not make the deposit as was ordered. He purports to provide the reason for non-compliance; that the applicants are not entitled to interest on the deposited sum since they are not entitled to the decretal amount.50.A person cannot unilaterally and without an order of the court discharging the impugned order, determine not to obey a court order. Feeling or holding a view, however strong it may be, that a person is not entitled to the order, are mere excuses which will not avail any relief to the contemnor.51.Accordingly, the 1st respondent is in contempt of court.” 29.The law on contempt of court is settled. We concur with the learned Judge with respect to his statement of the law of contempt in Kenya. Currently, the statutory basis of contempt of court is section 5 of the Judicature Act. In Mutitika v Baharini Farm Ltd [1985] KECA 60 (KLR) this Court held as follows;The jurisdiction of this court is found in section 5(1) of the Judicature Act cap 8 which provides:The High Court and the Court of Appeal shall have same power to punish for contempt of court as is for the time being possessed by the High Court of Justice in England, ...” 30.Further, in Wekesa & 2 Others vs. Munialo [2025] KECA 679 (KLR), this Court approved the ingredients of contempt as stated by Mativo, J. (as he then was) in Samuel M. N. Mweru & Others vs. National Land Commission & 2 Others [2020] eKLR as follows:“32.Regarding the elements of contempt of court, Mativo J., in the same case laid them down as follows:It is an established principle of law that in order to succeed in civil contempt proceedings, the applicant has to prove (i) the terms of the order, (ii) Knowledge of these terms by the Respondent, (iii). Failure by the Respondent to comply with the terms of the order. Upon proof of these requirements, the presence of willfulness and bad faith on the part of the Respondent would normally be inferred, but the Respondent could rebut this inference by contrary proof on a balance of probabilities.Perhaps the most comprehensive of the elements of civil contempt was stated by the learned authors of the book Contempt in Modern New Zealand, who succinctly stated:a.The terms of the order (or injunction or undertaking) were clear and unambiguous and were binding on the defendant;b.The defendant had knowledge of or proper notice of the terms of the order;c.The defendant has acted in breach of the terms of the order; and; there are essentially four elements that must be proved to make the case for civil contempt. The applicant must prove to the required standard (in civil contempt cases which is higher than civil cases) that:d.The defendant’s conduct was deliberate. 31.We fully associate with the foregoing, and the law stated therein forms the basis upon which we will render ourselves on this issue. The appellant has not faulted the learned Judge’s decision for not being in tandem with the above set principles. His main contention is that the trial Judge failed to consider his financial status and giving a 30 day payment period which was unreasonable. The record before the learned Judge disclosed that an order had been issued on 13th July 2022 requiring the appellant to deposit Kshs. 53,270,698/= into the joint interest- earning account established pursuant to the interim measure of protection granted by the court. 32.The appellant does not dispute knowledge of the said order and the fact that he failed to place before the High Court any evidence demonstrating compliance with the order. Further, no evidence was presented to show that compliance was impossible. Furthermore, the order directing the deposit of Kshs. 53,270,698/= did not arise for the first time in the impugned ruling. Instead, the learned Judge was enforcing an existing court order that had not been complied with. The impugned ruling merely afforded the appellant an opportunity to purge the contempt by complying with an obligation already imposed by the court. 33.Contrary to the appellant’s submissions, it is our considered view that the High Court was not required to engage in a speculative inquiry regarding possible reasons for non-compliance when the order was clear, knowledge was admitted and breach was undisputed. The evidentiary burden shifted to the appellant to explain his failure to obey the orders issued earlier by the said Court but he failed to do so. 34.This Court in A.B. & Another v R.B., Civil Application No. 4 of 2016 [2016] eKLR cited with approval the Constitutional Court of South Africa’s decision in Burchell v. Burchell, Case No.364 of 2005 where it was held:“Compliance with court orders is an issue of fundamental concern for a society that seeks to base itself on the rule of law. The the Constitution states that the rule of law and supremacy of the Constitution are foundational values of our society. It vests the judicial authority of the state in the court and requires other organs of the state to assist and protect the court. It gives everyone the right to have legal disputes resolved in the courts or other independent and impartial tribunals. Failure to enforce court orders effectively have the potential to undermine confidence in recourse to law as an instrument to resolve civil disputes and may thus impact negatively on the rule of law.” 35.Consequently, it is our considered view that the learned Judge was therefore entitled to conclude that the appellant’s failure to comply was deliberate and constituted disobedience of a subsisting court order. We find no error in principle, no misdirection and no abuse of discretion warranting appellate interference. 36.On the last issue, the appellant's argument is that the arbitral award having been set aside, the interim measure automatically came to an end. It was further argued that the learned Judge failed to recognize that the funds in question were the subject matter of a lawful interim measure of protection under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act. Thus, by imposing a 21-day window to institute fresh arbitration and a 30-day window to deposit Kshs. 53,270,698/= defeated the statutory purpose. 37.On their part, the 1st to 6th and 8th respondents contended that under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act, measures put in place by the Court are strictly intended to preserve the subject matter of a pending or intended arbitration. Further, that the appellant had not demonstrated any interest in initiating arbitration despite the court's referral on 31st January 2025. 38.It is settled that the grant, variation or maintenance of an interim measure of protection under section 7 of the Arbitration Act is an exercise of judicial discretion. The said section provides as follows:“It is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a party to request from the High Court, before or during arbitral proceedings, an interim measure of protection and for the High Court to grant that measure.” 39.The principles guiding the grant of interim measures under Section 7 were articulated in Safaricom Limited v Ocean View Beach Hotel Limited & 2 Others (supra), where this court held that the court must be satisfied with the following:1.The existence of an arbitration agreement.2.Whether the subject matter of arbitration is under threat.3.The appropriate measure of protection after an assessment of the merits of the application.4.The period for which the measure is to be given. 40.In view of the above, it is evident that Section 7 of the Arbitration Act empowers the superior court to grant interim measures of protection before or during arbitral proceedings. The objective of such measures is to preserve the subject matter of the dispute and ensure that the arbitral process is not rendered nugatory. We note that the learned Judge revisited the reasoning underlying the original preservation order of 19th May 2022 and found that the funds had been ring-fenced precisely because they were connected to the dispute being arbitrated. He therefore rejected the contention that the funds were entirely unrelated to the arbitration. That conclusion in our view, was firmly anchored in the earlier findings of the court and cannot be said to have lacked evidential foundation. We opine that the learned Judge correctly appreciated the legal effect of the ruling delivered by P. J. Otieno, J. 41.Additionally, we equally agree with the learned Judge that the ruling of 31st January 2025 did not resolve the dispute, it merely set aside an award and directed a fresh arbitration. Therefore, since the dispute remained alive, the learned Judge was entitled to preserve the ring-fenced conditions so that the renewed arbitral process would not be rendered nugatory. The preservation order therefore represented a proper exercise of judicial discretion rather than an error of law or fact. 42.We reiterate that an appellate court will not interfere with such discretion unless it is demonstrated that the Judge misdirected himself in law, took into account irrelevant considerations, failed to consider relevant matters, or arrived at a plainly wrong conclusion. The principles governing appellate interference with discretionary decisions were restated in Mbogo v Shah (supra) and have consistently been applied by this Court. 43.Consequently, we find no misdirection in law, no misapprehension of the evidence, and no basis upon which this Court may interfere with the exercise of the learned Judge's discretion. 44.Accordingly, we find no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed with costs to the 1st to 6th and 8th respondents. 45.Orders accordingly. DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 31ST DAY OF JULY, 2026S. GATEMBU. KAIRU, FCIArb, C.Arb (PRESIDENT)………………………………………………JUDGE OF APPEALG.V. ODUNGA………………………………JUDGE OF APPEALH.I. ONG’UDI………………JUDGE OF APPEALI certify that this is the true copy of the originalsignedDEPUTY REGISTRAR