https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/7013

E Kinyanjui & Company Advocates v Solza Limited (Civil Miscellaneous E013 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 7013 (KLR) (21 May 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 7013 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Narok Civil Miscellaneous E013 of 2025 CM Kariuki, J May 21, 2026 Between E Kinyanjui & Company Advocates Advocate and Solza Limited Client Ruling A. Introduction And Background 1.This ruling concerns two competing applications arising from the taxation of an Advocate–Client Bill of Costs between the Advocate/Applicant, E. Kinyanjui & Co. Advocates, and the Client/Respondent, Solza Limited. The dispute emanates from legal services rendered by the Advocate/Applicant to the Client/Respondent in Narok Chief Magistrate’s Court Civil Case No. E128 of 2023, namely, Karen Jepkorir Kurui alias Karen Jepkorir Kirui v Brian Kairu Ng’ang’a & Solza Limited. The Advocate/Applicant acted for the Client/Respondent in the subordinate court proceedings and subsequently filed an Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 24th March 2025 seeking taxation of legal fees allegedly due and owing from the Client/Respondent. 2.Upon hearing the parties on the Bill of Costs, the taxing officer delivered a ruling on 13th November 2025 and taxed the Bill at Kshs. 182,480/=. A Certificate of Taxation was thereafter issued on 27th November 2025. Dissatisfied with the taxation, the Client/Respondent lodged a reference before this Court through the Chamber Summons dated 2nd December 2025 pursuant to Rule 11 of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, seeking, inter alia, the setting aside of the taxation and the remission of the Bill of Costs for fresh taxation before another taxing officer. The Client/Respondent contended that the taxing officer committed errors of principle in assessing instruction fees and in relying on the judgment value in the subordinate court proceedings, even though Solza Limited had been struck out of the suit before judgment was delivered. 3.The Client/Respondent’s position was that the Advocate/Applicant had only been instructed to enter an appearance and prosecute an application seeking to strike out Solza Limited from the proceedings on the basis that it was merely a financier and not a proper party to the suit. It was argued that the Advocate/Applicant never filed a defence nor participated in the substantive hearing of the suit and therefore could not properly claim instruction fees as though it had defended the entire matter to conclusion. The Client/Respondent further challenged the taxation on the ground that the taxing officer improperly relied on the final judgment sum and erroneously allowed Value Added Tax (VAT) on the instruction fees. 4.On the other hand, the Advocate/Applicant maintained that the taxation was lawful, regular, and properly grounded on the pleadings, proceedings, and judgment in the subordinate court matter. It was contended that the taxing officer correctly exercised discretion in assessing instruction fees and that no error of principle had been demonstrated to warrant interference by this Court. The Advocate/Applicant further asserted that the Advocate–Client relationship between the parties entitled it to recover all properly incurred legal fees, notwithstanding the subsequent striking out of Solza Limited from the proceedings. 5.Simultaneously with opposing the reference, the Advocate/Applicant filed the Notice of Motion dated 20th January 2026 under Section 51(2) of the Advocates Act seeking entry of judgment against the Client/Respondent for the taxed costs in the sum of Kshs. 182,480/= together with interest at 14% per annum under Rule 7 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. The Advocate/Applicant argued that the Certificate of Taxation had not been set aside and was therefore final and enforceable. 6.The two applications were canvassed together by way of written submissions. The court has carefully considered the pleadings, affidavits, submissions, and authorities relied upon by the parties and now proceeds to determine the issues arising therein. B. Pleadings Chamber Summons dated 2nd December 2025 7.The Chamber Summons dated 2nd December 2025 was filed by the Client/Respondent, Solza Limited, pursuant to Rule 11(2) and (4) of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order, seeking to challenge the ruling of the taxing officer delivered on 13th November 2025 in Narok HCCC Misc. Application No. E013 of 2025. The application sought, in the first instance, certification of urgency and an interim stay of execution of the ruling, and the resultant Certificate of Costs dated 27th November 2025, pending the hearing and determination of the reference. The Client/Respondent further prayed that the court be pleased to set aside the taxing officer’s decision and remit the Advocate/Applicant’s Bill of Costs dated 24th March 2025 back for re-taxation before a different taxing officer. In the alternative, the court was urged to tax item one of the Bill afresh at a reasonable sum. The application also sought leave for the firm of Shisanya & Company Advocates to come on record for the Client/Respondent after the ruling of 13th November 2025, together with costs of the application. 8.The application was grounded on the contention that the taxing officer erred in principle in assessing the instruction fees payable to the Advocate/Applicant, E. Kinyanjui & Company Advocates. The Client/Respondent argued that the taxing officer failed to consider the actual record and nature of proceedings in Narok MCCC No. E128 of 2023, namely, Karen Chepkorir alias Karen Chepkorir Kirui v Brian Kairu Ng’ang’a & Solza Limited. It was contended that the Advocate/Applicant had only been instructed to enter an appearance and prosecute an application seeking to strike out Solza Limited from the proceedings on the basis that it was merely a financier and not a proper party to the suit. According to the application, the Advocate/Applicant entered an appearance by way of a Memorandum of Appearance dated 29th September 2023 and simultaneously filed an application dated the same day seeking to strike out the suit against Solza Limited. The Client/Respondent maintained that the advocate never filed a defence nor participated in the substantive hearing of the subordinate court matter. 9.The application further stated that the striking-out application was allowed on 31st January 2024, and the suit against Solza Limited was marked as withdrawn. Consequently, the Client/Respondent argued that the Advocate/Applicant’s instructions were limited to prosecuting the striking-out application and not defending the entire suit. It was therefore contended that the taxing officer improperly calculated instruction fees based on the value of the final judgment in the subordinate court, even though Solza Limited had ceased to be a party before judgment was delivered. The Client/Respondent asserted that, if the value of the subject matter was to be derived from the pleadings, the only ascertainable amount at the time Solza Limited exited the proceedings was the pleaded special damages of Kshs. 44,850/-. 10.The Client/Respondent consequently alleged that the taxing officer committed several errors in principle, namely: failing to appreciate that Solza Limited had been struck out at a preliminary stage; failing to identify the subject value from the pleadings correctly; and erroneously applying VAT on the instruction fees. It was argued that the resultant taxation was excessive, unjust, and contrary to the principle that an advocate should only receive reasonable remuneration proportionate to the work actually done. The Client/Respondent therefore urged the court to interfere with the taxation and order a re-taxation before another taxing officer. The Supporting Affidavit sworn on 2nd December 2025. 11.The application was supported by the affidavit of Michael Wanganga, sworn on 2nd December 2025. He described himself as the Country Manager of Solza Limited. He deponed that he was conversant with the facts of the matter and competent to swear the affidavit on behalf of the Client/Respondent. He confirmed that the Advocate/Applicant’s Bill of Costs dated 24th March 2025 had been taxed and a ruling delivered on 13th November 2025, after which the Advocate/Applicant commenced execution by obtaining a Certificate of Taxation. He further deponed that the Client/Respondent had already objected to the taxation through a letter dated 24th November 2025, requesting reasons for the taxation. 12.In reiterating the grounds contained in the Chamber Summons, the deponent maintained that the Advocate/Applicant had only been instructed to seek the striking out of Solza Limited from the subordinate court proceedings because the company was merely a financier of the motor vehicle involved in the accident. He annexed copies of the Memorandum of Appearance, the striking-out application, and the orders issued on 31st January 2024 allowing the withdrawal of the suit against Solza Limited. He asserted that the only work undertaken by the Advocate/Applicant consisted of entering an appearance, filing the striking-out application, and attending court on two occasions. According to the deponent, the Advocate/Applicant neither filed a defence nor participated in the hearing of the substantive dispute. 13.The deponent further averred that the taxing officer wrongly relied on the value of the judgment subsequently entered in the subordinate court to assess instruction fees, notwithstanding that Solza Limited was no longer a party to the suit at that stage. He reiterated that the only discernible value from the pleadings at the time the Client/Respondent exited the proceedings was Kshs. 44,850/- being the pleaded special damages. He therefore maintained that the taxation was excessive and founded on wrong principles. He urged the court to set aside the assessment and remit the Bill of Costs for fresh taxation before a different taxing officer. The Replying Affidavit sworn on 20th January 2026 14.The Replying Affidavit, sworn on 20th January 2026, was deponed by Kevin Michuki, an advocate of the High Court of Kenya and counsel on record for the Advocate/Applicant, E. Kinyanjui & Co. Advocates, in opposition to the Client/Respondent’s application dated 5th December 2025. The deponent stated that he was duly authorised to swear the affidavit on behalf of the Advocate/Applicant and that he had carefully considered the contents of the application before responding thereto. 15.The deponent described the application as grossly misconceived, frivolous, vexatious, scandalous, and an abuse of the court process. He contended that the Client/Respondent, Solza Limited, had failed to establish any prima facie basis or exceptional circumstances warranting the court’s intervention or the exercise of discretion in its favour. According to the deponent, the application constituted a deliberate tactic aimed at delaying and frustrating the enforcement of lawful court orders and avoiding settlement of the taxed costs. 16.It was further deponed that the Advocate/Applicant’s Certificate of Taxation remained wholly unsatisfied and that the Client/Respondent had neither settled the taxed amount nor demonstrated any effort toward partial payment despite court directions. The deponent maintained that the Advocate/Applicant was therefore entitled to commence execution proceedings based on the Certificate of Taxation. While opposing the prayer for stay of execution, he nevertheless stated that the Advocate/Applicant would consent to stay only on condition that the entire decretal amount be deposited in a joint interest-earning account in the names of counsel for the parties. 17.The affidavit further addressed the issue of instruction fees and the value of the subject matter. The deponent averred that, in taxation matters, the value of the subject matter is properly ascertainable from the pleadings, judgment, or settlement and, where not ascertainable, the taxing officer has discretion to assess instruction fees deemed just. He stated that the Advocate/Applicant had filed the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 24th March 2025 pursuant to the advocate-client relationship that existed between the parties in relation to subordinate court proceedings involving a motor vehicle valued at Kshs. 1,250,000/-. He annexed an insurance valuation report to demonstrate the value of the subject motor vehicle and argued that the Client/Respondent’s reliance on the pleaded special damages of Kshs. 35,050/- or Kshs. 44,850/- as the basis for taxation was erroneous and misconceived since those sums represented only special damages and not the actual value of the subject matter. 18.The deponent further stated that the Bill of Costs was properly taxed by the taxing officer, who, after considering the parties’ submissions, assessed the bill at Kshs. 99,972/=. He annexed copies of the ruling delivered on 13th November 2025, together with the Certificate of Taxation. He maintained that the taxation was lawful, properly founded, and consistent with the provisions of the Advocates (Remuneration) Order. 19.In response to the allegation that Solza Limited had ceased being a party to the subordinate court proceedings after being struck out, the deponent maintained that the Client/Respondent had at all material times been properly joined as the second defendant and was therefore bound by the pleadings and proceedings. He argued that the fact that no defence had been filed did not extinguish the advocate-client relationship or the Advocate/Applicant’s entitlement to fees properly incurred in the conduct of the matter. He further deponed that the striking out of Solza Limited from the proceedings did not negate the Advocate/Applicant’s right to instruction fees for work already undertaken before the striking out order was made. 20.The deponent also defended the inclusion of Value Added Tax (VAT) on the instruction fees, contending that such fees constituted taxable income under the applicable tax framework and were therefore properly chargeable. He maintained that the taxing officer correctly exercised her discretion and properly applied the law in assessing the Bill of Costs. 21.In conclusion, the deponent urged the court to dismiss the Client/Respondent’s application dated 5th December 2025 with costs, reiterating that the taxation was lawful, justified, and properly assessed in accordance with the Advocates (Remuneration) Order. Motion dated 20th January 2026 22.The Notice of Motion dated 20th January 2026 was filed by the Advocate/Applicant, E. Kinyanjui & Co. Advocates, against the Client/Respondent, Solza Limited, pursuant to Section 51(2) of the Advocates Act, Rule 7 of the Advocates Remuneration Order, and Order 51 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Through the application, the Advocate/Applicant sought entry of judgment against the Client/Respondent for the sum of Kshs. 182,480/= being taxed costs certified by the Deputy Registrar on 27th November 2025. The Advocate/Applicant further prayed for interest on the taxed amount at the rate of 14% per annum from 26th April 2025, being one month after service of the Bill of Costs, until payment in full. The application also sought the costs of the motion. 23.The application was premised because the Advocate/Applicant’s Bill of Costs dated 24th March 2025 had been duly taxed by the Deputy Registrar through a ruling delivered on 13th November 2025, resulting in taxation in the sum of Kshs. 182,480/=. It was further stated that a Certificate of Taxation had subsequently been issued on 27th November 2025 in accordance with the Advocates Remuneration Order, certifying the costs incurred by the Advocate/Applicant in representing the Client/Respondent in Narok MCCC No. E128 of 2023, namely, Karen Jepkorir Kurui alias Karen Jepkorir Kirui v Brian Kairu Ng’ang’a & Solza Limited. The Advocate/Applicant maintained that it was lawfully entitled to payment of the taxed costs together with accrued interest. 24.The Advocate/Applicant further contended that there was no dispute concerning the existence, correctness, or enforceability of the taxed amount. It was asserted that despite court directions and issuance of the Certificate of Taxation, the Client/Respondent had failed, neglected, or refused to satisfy the taxed costs. According to the application, the Client/Respondent’s failure to pay the taxed sum amounted to disregard of court orders and unlawfully frustrated the Advocate/Applicant’s entitlement to costs. The court was therefore urged to enter judgment for the taxed amount together with interest and costs of the application. Supporting affidavit sworn on 20th January 2026 25.The motion was supported by the affidavit of Kevin Michuki, sworn on 20th January 2026. The deponent identified himself as an advocate of the High Court of Kenya, duly authorised to swear the affidavit in support of the application. He deponed that the affidavit was sworn for purposes of enforcing the Certificate of Taxation issued pursuant to the ruling of the taxing officer in respect of the Advocate/Applicant’s Bill of Costs dated 24th March 2025. 26.The deponent reiterated that the Bill of Costs had been taxed at Kshs. 182,480/= by the Deputy Registrar through the ruling delivered on 13th November 2025, and annexed a copy of the ruling. He further annexed the Certificate of Taxation issued on 27th November 2025 and maintained that there was no dispute regarding the validity, correctness, or enforceability of the taxed amount. 27.The affidavit further stated that under Rule 7 of the Advocates Remuneration Order, the Advocate/Applicant was entitled to interest at the rate of 14% per annum from 26th April 2025, being one month after service of the Bill of Costs upon the Client/Respondent. The deponent averred that the Bill of Costs had been served upon the Client/Respondent by email on 25th March 2025, and annexed an affidavit of service sworn on 15th May 2025 as proof of service. 28.The deponent further averred that the Client/Respondent had failed, neglected, and refused to satisfy the taxed costs or any part thereof, thereby failing to comply with court orders. He maintained that unless the orders sought were granted, the Advocate/Applicant would continue to be deprived of its lawful entitlement to costs, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the taxation process. He consequently urged the court to allow the application as prayed. Replying Affidavit sworn on 12th February 2026 29.The Replying Affidavit, sworn on 20th January 2026, was deponed by Kevin Michuki, advocate for the Advocate/Applicant, E. Kinyanjui & Co. Advocates, in opposition to the Client/Respondent’s application dated 5th December 2025. The deponent averred that he was duly authorised to swear the affidavit on behalf of the Advocate/Applicant and had carefully considered the contents of the reference application. He described the application as misconceived, frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the court process, contending that it was intended to frustrate enforcement of lawful court orders and delay payment of taxed costs. He maintained that the Client/Respondent, Solza Limited, had failed to establish any sufficient basis warranting interference with the taxation or grant of stay of execution. 30.The deponent further stated that the Certificate of Taxation remained wholly unsatisfied and that the Advocate/Applicant was entitled to commence execution proceedings. Although opposing a stay, he indicated that the Advocate/Applicant would only consent to a stay on condition that the entire decretal amount be deposited in a joint interest-earning account in the names of counsel for the parties. He further averred that the value of the subject matter for purposes of taxation could properly be determined from the pleadings, judgment, or settlement and that the taxing officer was entitled to exercise discretion where necessary. 31.The deponent explained that the Advocate/Applicant had represented the Client/Respondent in subordinate court proceedings involving a motor vehicle valued at approximately Kshs. 1,250,000/=. He annexed an insurance valuation report to support that assertion and argued that the Client/Respondent’s reliance on the pleaded special damages of Kshs. 35,050/= as the subject value was erroneous because special damages did not constitute the actual value of the subject matter. He maintained that the Advocate–Client Bill of Costs dated 24th March 2025 had been properly taxed at Kshs. 99,972/= in accordance with the Advocates Remuneration Order. 32.The deponent also disputed the Client/Respondent’s contention that it was no longer a party to the suit, arguing that it had been duly joined as the second defendant and remained bound by the pleadings and proceedings. He maintained that although no defence had been filed, the advocate-client relationship subsisted and the Advocate/Applicant remained entitled to fees lawfully incurred before the striking out of the Client/Respondent from the proceedings. He further defended the imposition of VAT on instruction fees, contending that legal fees constituted taxable income under the law. He therefore urged the court to dismiss the reference with costs. C. Directions of the court 33.Both applications were canvassed by way of written submissions. D. Submissions The Advocate/Applicant’s submissions. 34.The Advocate/Applicant’s submissions dated 15th February 2026 were filed in support of the Notice of Motion dated 20th January 2026 and in opposition to the Client/Respondent’s reference dated 5th December 2025. Counsel submitted that the Advocate/Applicant was entitled to judgment under Section 51(2) of the Advocates Act following taxation of the Bill of Costs at Kshs. 182,480/= and issuance of a Certificate of Taxation on 27th November 2025. It was argued that the taxed costs were undisputed and enforceable and that the court should enter judgment together with interest at 14% per annum under Rule 7 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. 35.On whether the court should interfere with the taxing officer’s discretion, the Advocate/Applicant submitted that the Client/Respondent had failed to demonstrate any error of principle. Counsel argued that the value of the subject matter was ascertainable from the pleadings and judgment in the subordinate court matter and that the taxing officer properly relied on the judgment sum in assessing instruction fees. It was further submitted that the striking out of Solza Limited from the proceedings did not extinguish the Advocate/Applicant’s entitlement to costs incurred while acting for the Client/Respondent. 36.In support of those arguments, reliance was placed on Kipkorir, Tito & Kiara Advocates v Deposit Protection Fund Board [2005] eKLR, where the Court of Appeal held that a judge on reference will not interfere with a taxing officer’s discretion unless there is an error of principle in the assessment of costs. Counsel also relied on Kamunyori & Company Advocates v Development Bank of Kenya Limited, Civil Appeal No. 206 of 2006 [2015] eKLR, where the court emphasised that the value of the subject matter determines instruction fees as ascertainable from the pleadings, judgment, or settlement. 37.Further reliance was placed on First American Bank of Kenya v Shah & Others [2002] 1 EA 64, in which the court held that interference with taxation is only justified where the award is manifestly excessive or based on an error of principle. Counsel also cited Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates [2002] eKLR, where the Court of Appeal held that a taxing master exercises judicial discretion in taxation and such discretion should only be interfered with where exercised capriciously or contrary to legal principles. 38.On the issue of VAT, the Advocate/Applicant submitted that VAT is statutorily chargeable on legal services. Reliance was placed on J.P. Machira t/a Machira & Co. Advocates v MDC Holdings Ltd & 2 Others, where Ringera J held that legal services are chargeable with VAT. Counsel further cited Aoro v Were [2022] KEHC 14628 (KLR), where the court affirmed that VAT is chargeable on instruction fees and disbursements. It was therefore submitted that the taxing officer properly imposed VAT. 39.Regarding interest, counsel relied on Rule 7 of the Advocates Remuneration Order, arguing that the Advocate/Applicant became entitled to interest at 14% per annum one month after delivery of the Bill of Costs, since the Client/Respondent had failed to settle the same. The court was consequently urged to allow the Notice of Motion dated 20th January 2026 and dismiss the Client/Respondent’s reference. The Client/Respondent’s submissions 40.The Client/Respondent’s submissions dated 30th March 2026 were filed in support of the references dated 2nd and 5th December 2025 seeking to set aside the taxation rulings delivered on 13th November 2025 and remit the Bills of Costs for re-taxation. Counsel submitted that the taxing officer erred in principle by failing to properly consider the scope of the Advocate/Applicant’s retainer and by relying on the judgment sum in the subordinate court even though Solza Limited had already been struck out of the proceedings before judgment was delivered. 41.The Client/Respondent argued that the Advocate/Applicant had only been instructed to enter an appearance and prosecute an application seeking to strike out Solza Limited from the proceedings because it was merely a financier. Counsel emphasised that no defence, witness statements, or documents were ever filed on behalf of Solza Limited and that the Advocate/Applicant therefore could not claim fees as though it had defended the entire suit. 42.In support of the argument concerning the scope of the retainer, reliance was placed on Ochieng Onyango, Kibet & Ohaga Advocates v Akiba Bank Limited [2008] 1 EA 380, where the court held that where there is no documentary proof of retainer, and the client disputes instructions, the burden of proving the retainer rests upon the advocate. Counsel submitted that no evidence had been produced to show that the Advocate/Applicant had instructions beyond prosecuting the striking-out application. 43.On the issue of subject value, the Client/Respondent submitted that the only ascertainable figure from the pleadings at the time Solza Limited was struck out was the pleaded special damages of Kshs. 35,050/=. It was argued that the insurance valuation report relied upon by the Advocate/Applicant did not form part of the pleadings and could not constitute the subject value for purposes of taxation. Counsel maintained that the taxing officer therefore erred by relying on the subsequent judgment sum when the Client/Respondent was no longer a party to the proceedings. 44.Reliance was placed on Moronge & Company Advocates v Kenya Airports Authority Civil Appeal No. 262 of 2012 [2014] eKLR, as cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Company Advocates SC Petition No. E011 of 2023, where it was held that where the subject value cannot be determined from the pleadings, judgment, or settlement, the taxing officer should exercise discretion in determining instruction fees. Counsel argued that the valuation report could not be treated as a pleading and therefore could not lawfully form the basis of taxation. 45.The Client/Respondent further relied on Mark Ndumia Ndungu & Another v Nairobi Bottlers Limited SC Petition Application No. E024 of 2023 and Applications Nos. E030, E034 & E038 of 2023, where the Supreme Court reiterated the principles governing interference with taxation decisions, including where the taxing officer commits an error of principle or awards manifestly excessive fees. Counsel argued that the taxing officer committed an error by binding the Client/Respondent to a judgment entered after it had ceased being a party to the proceedings and by awarding fees equivalent to defending the main suit instead of prosecuting a single application. 46.On VAT, the Client/Respondent challenged the taxing officer’s award of VAT and relied on Pyramid Motors Limited v Lang’ata Gardens Limited [2015] eKLR, where Onguto J held that VAT was not chargeable in party-and-party costs unless evidence was tendered that VAT had actually been paid or that the advocate was entitled to indemnity. Counsel argued that no evidence had been produced to demonstrate that the Advocate/Applicant was a VAT-registered entity or had paid VAT. The court was therefore urged to set aside the taxation and remit the Bills of Costs for fresh taxation before the taxing officer. E. Issues for Determination 47.Having carefully considered the two applications, the affidavits filed in support and opposition thereto, together with the rival written submissions and authorities relied upon by the parties, the following issues arise for determination: -i.Whether this Court should interfere with the taxing officer’s ruling delivered on 13th November 2025 and set aside or vary the taxation of the Advocate/Applicant’s Bill of Costs dated 24th March 2025.ii.Whether the taxing officer properly identified the subject matter and correctly assessed the instruction fees payable to the Advocate/Applicant.iii.Whether Value Added Tax (VAT) was properly chargeable on the taxed instruction fees.iv.Whether the Advocate/Applicant is entitled to judgment under Section 51(2) of the Advocates Act for the taxed costs together with interest under Rule 7 of the Advocates Remuneration Order. F. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION 48.The court has considered the rival applications, affidavits, submissions, and authorities cited by the parties. The court shall determine the issues sequentially. I. Whether this Court should interfere with the taxation by the taxing officer 49.The principles governing interference with a taxing officer’s discretion are now well settled. Taxation of costs is a matter within the discretion of the taxing officer, and a judge on reference ought not to interfere merely because they would have arrived at a different figure. Interference is only warranted where the taxing officer acted on a wrong principle, failed to consider relevant factors, considered irrelevant matters, or where the award is so manifestly excessive or low as to amount to an injustice. 50.In the celebrated case of Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates, the Court of Appeal stated that a taxing officer exercises judicial discretion and such discretion can only be interfered with where it is shown that the taxing officer acted on an error of principle or the award is manifestly excessive. Similarly, in Kipkorir, Tito & Kiara Advocates v Deposit Protection Fund Board, the Court held that a judge on reference will not interfere with taxation unless the taxing officer erred in principle. 51.The same position was reiterated in First American Bank of Kenya v Shah & Others, where the court held that interference with taxation is only justified where the award is based on an error of principle or is manifestly excessive. 52.The Client/Respondent’s principal complaint is that the taxing officer erroneously treated the Advocate/Applicant as though it had defended the entire suit in Narok MCCC No. E128 of 2023, whereas, according to the Client/Respondent, the advocate’s instructions were limited to filing and prosecuting an application seeking to strike out Solza Limited from the proceedings. 53.The court has carefully perused the subordinate court proceedings annexed by the parties. The record confirms that the Advocate/Applicant entered an appearance on behalf of Solza Limited and contemporaneously filed an application dated 29th September 2023 seeking to strike out the suit against Solza Limited because the company was merely a financier and not vicariously liable. The said application was eventually allowed on 31st January 2024, and the suit against Solza Limited was marked as withdrawn. 54.It is equally not disputed that the Advocate/Applicant never filed a statement of defence, witness statements, a list of documents, or participated in the hearing of the substantive suit thereafter. Consequently, the scope of the advocate’s retainer, as discernible from the record, was substantially limited to entering an appearance and prosecuting the striking-out application. 55.In Ochieng Onyango, Kibet & Ohaga Advocates v Akiba Bank Limited, the court held that where the scope of instructions is disputed, the burden rests upon the advocate to demonstrate the nature and extent of the retainer. In the present matter, no documentary evidence was produced demonstrating that the Advocate/Applicant had instructions extending beyond the striking-out proceedings. 56.This court therefore agrees with the Client/Respondent that the taxing officer was under a duty to consider the nature and extent of the work actually undertaken by the Advocate/Applicant before assessing instruction fees. II. Whether the taxing officer properly identified the subject matter and assessed instruction fees 57.The next question is whether the taxing officer properly identified the value of the subject matter. 58.The law on ascertainment of subject value is settled. In Joreth Ltd v Kigano & Associates, the Court of Appeal held that the value of the subject matter for purposes of taxation is determined from the pleadings, judgment, or settlement. Where the value cannot be so ascertained, the taxing officer is entitled to exercise discretion, taking into account the nature and importance of the matter. 59.The Supreme Court in Kenya Airports Authority v Otieno Ragot & Company Advocates cited with approval the decision in Moronge & Company Advocates v Kenya Airports Authority. They reaffirmed that where the subject value cannot be determined from the pleadings, judgment, or settlement, the taxing officer should exercise discretion judiciously. 60.In the present case, the taxing officer relied substantially on the judgment sum eventually awarded in the subordinate court proceedings. However, by the time judgment was entered, Solza Limited had already been struck out of the proceedings and was no longer a party to the suit. 61.The court agrees with the Client/Respondent that the taxing officer fell into error by pegging instruction fees on a judgment obtained after the Client/Respondent had ceased participating in the proceedings. The Advocate/Applicant could not properly claim instruction fees as though it defended the substantive suit to conclusion when the record clearly shows otherwise. 62.The court further notes that the insurance valuation report relied upon by the Advocate/Applicant was not part of the pleadings. While such a report may constitute evidence, it does not by itself amount to a pleading for purposes of determining subject value under the principles enunciated in the authorities cited above. 63.At the time Solza Limited exited the proceedings, the only ascertainable figure appearing from the pleadings was the pleaded special damages. In those circumstances, the taxing officer ought either to have relied on the value discernible from the pleadings as at the time the Client/Respondent exited the proceedings or exercised discretion judiciously, having regard to the limited scope of the retainer and the actual work done. 64.By instead relying on the subsequent judgment sum and effectively treating the Advocate/Applicant as having defended the substantive suit to completion, the taxing officer committed an error of principle warranting this court’s intervention. 65.The court is therefore satisfied that the reference has merit to the extent that the taxation on instruction fees cannot stand. 66.The usual practice where an error of principle is established is to remit the Bill of Costs back for re-taxation unless the error is capable of correction by the judge himself. Given the factual issues surrounding the scope of the retainer and the proper basis for assessment of instruction fees, this court is persuaded that the appropriate remedy is to remit the Bill of Costs for re-taxation before a different taxing officer. III. Whether VAT was properly chargeable 67.On the issue of VAT, the parties took divergent positions. The Advocate/Applicant argued that VAT is statutorily chargeable on legal services, while the Client/Respondent contended that no evidence had been produced demonstrating VAT registration or actual payment. 68.The court notes that the present taxation concerns an Advocate–Client Bill of Costs and not a party-and-party bill. The legal position is that VAT is generally chargeable on legal services rendered by advocates where applicable under tax legislation. 69.In J.P. Machira t/a Machira & Co. Advocates v MDC Holdings Ltd & 2 Others, Ringera J held that legal services are chargeable with VAT. Likewise, in Aoro v Were, the court affirmed that VAT is chargeable on instruction fees and disbursements in Advocate–Client Bills of Costs. 70.The authority of Pyramid Motors Limited v Lang’ata Gardens Limited, relied upon by the Client/Respondent concerned party-and-party costs, and is therefore distinguishable from the present Advocate–Client taxation. 71.Consequently, this court finds no error in principle merely because the taxing officer allowed VAT. VAT was, in principle, chargeable subject to proof of applicability under the relevant tax laws. G. Whether the Advocate/Applicant is entitled to judgment under Section 51(2) of the Advocates Act 72.The Advocate/Applicant seeks entry of judgment pursuant to Section 51(2) of the Advocates Act based on the Certificate of Taxation issued on 27th November 2025. 73.Section 51(2) of the Advocates Act provides that where a Certificate of Taxation has not been altered or set aside, the court may enter judgment for the certified sum. 74.In the present matter, this court has found merit in the Client/Respondent’s reference. It has been determined that the taxation on instruction fees was founded on an error of principle, warranting interference. Once the taxation is set aside and remitted for re-taxation, the foundation upon which the Notice of Motion dated 20th January 2026 rests ceases to exist. 75.It therefore follows that the Advocate/Applicant’s application for entry of judgment cannot succeed at this stage pending fresh taxation. 76.On interest under Rule 7 of the Advocates Remuneration Order, the court notes that such interest only becomes payable upon ascertainment of properly taxed costs. Since the taxation is to be reconsidered, the issue of interest shall await the outcome of the fresh taxation. 77.In the premises, the court makes the following orders: -a.The Chamber Summons/Reference dated 2nd December 2025 is hereby allowed.b.The ruling and taxation of the Advocate/Applicant’s Bill of Costs dated 24th March 2025, delivered on 13th November 2025, together with the resultant Certificate of Taxation dated 27th November 2025, are hereby set aside.c.The Advocate/Applicant’s Bill of Costs dated 24th March 2025 shall be remitted for fresh taxation before a different taxing officer other than the one who conducted the impugned taxation.d.The Notice of Motion dated 20th January 2026 seeking entry of judgment under Section 51(2) of the Advocates Act is hereby dismissed.e.Costs of the reference shall abide by the outcome of the fresh taxation. 78.It is so ordered. DATED, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED AT NAROK THIS 21ST DAY OF MAY, 2026………………………………..CHARLES KARIUKIJUDGE