https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/3351

Karanja (Suing on behalf of the Estate of James Kianja Karanja) v Agricultural & Industrial Holdings Ltd & 3 others (Land Case Appeal E027 of 2025) [2026] KEELC 3351 (KLR) (Environment and Land) (4 June 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELC 3351 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Environment and Land Court at Naivasha Environment and Land Land Case Appeal E027 of 2025 MC Oundo, J June 4, 2026 Between Eliud Githua Karanja (Suing On Behalf Of The Estate Of James Kianja Karanja) Appellant and Agricultural & Industrial Holdings Ltd 1st Respondent Phyllis Wangari Njoroge, Simon Muhia & Joseph Kuria (Being sued on behalf of the Estate of Eliud Njoroge Kuria) 2nd Respondent Naivasha Lands Registrar 3rd Respondent Peter Kuria 4th Respondent (Being an Appeal from the judgment of Honourable J. Ndengeri (PM) Delivered on 28th day of October 2025) Ruling 1.Before me for determination is a Notice of Motion Application dated 12th February 2026 brought under the provisions of Sections 1A, 1B & 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 2 rule 14 and 15, Order 42 rule 4 and 6 (1) and (2) and Order 51 rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Articles 27, 40, 50 & 159 (2) (b) and (d) of the Kenya Constitution 2010 and all other enabling provisions of the law wherein the 4th Respondent/Interested Party herein seeks for the following orders:i.Spent.ii.That the Honourable Court be pleased to set aside the order for status quo dated 8th November 2025, which was extended on 27th January 2026 and issue a status order based on the findings of the Judgment of Honourable J. Ndengeri via her Judgment dated 28th October 2025 in the Chief Magistrate Court at Naivasha via ELC Case No. E003 of 2024 with regard to the occupation of the suit property until the Appellant is able to prove to the court that the learned Magistrate erred in her Judgment.iii.That as an alternative to Prayer (ii), the Honourable Court issues an order that the Appellant continues to occupy the suit property but that in the event that he is unable to prove that Honourable J. Ndengeri erred in her Judgment dated 28th October 2025 with regard to occupation of the suit property, then the Estate of James Kianja Karanja be liable to compensate the Estate of Eliud Njoroge Kuria for illegal occupation and use of the suit property as from the date of delivery of the said Judgment for hindering its sale as has been ordered by the Family Court Division of the Milimani High Court in Nairobi via Succession Cause No. 2423 of 2010.iv.That the compensation stipulated in Prayer (iii) be deemed to be security against illegal occupation and use of the suit property by the Appellant and it be determined by a registered valuer appointed by the court and that the cost of the said valuer be borne by the Appellant based upon the fact that he has informed the court that he is ready to abide with any condition that this honourable court may set regarding security.v.That the costs of the application be in the cause. 2.The Notice of Motion is premised on the grounds set out therein, as well as on the Supporting Affidavit of equal date, sworn by Joseph Peter Kuria, the 4th Respondent/Interested Party herein, who deposed that he is the administrator of the Estate of Eliud Njoroge Kuria, which comprises two families/houses. He explained that, whereas the parties had agreed by consent not to address the issues raised in the application dated 6th November 2025 and in his grounds of opposition dated 18th November 2025, and instead to proceed to the hearing of the Appeal, on the basis that the court had deemed the said application to be compromised, he had agreed to that position under duress after the advocate of the 2nd Respondent/Interested Party herein, Mr. Julius Muthanwa, had subjected him to unwarranted attacks and humiliation on the ground that he was not a trained advocate. 3.He argued that, whilst he was not an advocate by profession, he was a member of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, where he holds the title of MCiarb, through which he has, over the last 10 years, received extensive training on various aspects of the law. That he had also, in the past, served as a Member of the Mediation Accreditation Council (MAC) and as a Mediator of the Commercial Division of the High Court of Kenya. That, over the last fourteen (14) years, he had been acting in person and had appeared in numerous matters before Judges at both the Family and Commercial Court Divisions of the Milimani High Court in Nairobi, as well as at the Thika Land and Environment Court, during which time he had virtually owned all the matters and there had never been a single occasion on which he had been subjected to any attacks and humiliation by any of the advocates involved in the pertinent matters on the ground that, to that effect, he was not a trained advocate. That, further, whereas he is not a litigation advocate, litigation is an adversarial process, which implies that one party wins and the other loses, irrespective of how well trained the advocates involved in a matter are, because the crucial significance is the evidence presented to the court, which, although presented by advocates, does not originate from them. 4.He admitted that whilst the issue he had raised in his grounds of opposition dated 18th November 2025 with regard to the Memorandum of Appeal was wrong, this did not mean that all the other issues were automatically wrong, thus negating his right to be heard by the court on all such issues, as the focus of the court should be on substantive justice. That he should not be prevented from presenting evidence to the court by being attacked and humiliated on the grounds that he is not a trained advocate, since this not only impedes his right to be heard by the court but is an act of outright discrimination. 5.He contended that after Honourable J. Ndengeri had delivered her Judgment on 28th October 2025, the Appellant had moved to the suit property shortly thereafter, taken photographs, attached them to his application dated 6th November 2025, and then claimed that the beneficiaries of James Kianja Karanja (deceased) had been in occupation of the suit property for forty-eight (48) years, seeking a stay of execution of the said Judgment on that basis. That, whereas the court did not grant the order for stay, it had granted an ex parte order for status quo on 8th November 2025 based on the said application dated 6th November 2025, which was unjust because the Appellant had used the said application as the basis for occupying the suit property, where he was currently engaged in farming activities for economic gain. Thus, his apprehension was that the Applicant intended to employ delaying tactics to enjoy the said gains for as long as possible. 6.That on 27th January 2026, the Appellant’s advocate had been directed by the court to file an Amended Memorandum of Appeal within fourteen (14) days, which had since passed; hence, he deemed the Appellant’s request to the court to do so to be nothing but a delaying tactic in the hearing of the Appeal herein, as he had undertaken to do so within three (3) days. That he had in the past complained at the lower court about the then advocate of the Appellant and Mr. Julius Muthanwa deploying delaying tactics by failing to comply with directions issued by the court. Further, that whilst no Record of Appeal had been filed in the court, the Judgment of Honourable J. Ndengeri dated 28th October 2025 had been filed in the court via the Application dated 6th November 2025 and annexed to the said application as ‘Annexure EGK-1’, which makes it possible for the court to determine what the position with regard to occupation of the suit property was at the time that the same had been delivered and to issue a status quo order based on the same. 7.That it was in the interest of justice that he be heard by the Court without being subjected to unwarranted attacks by Mr. Julius Muthanwa. 8.In response to and in opposition to the said Application, the Appellant filed his Replying Affidavit, dated 9th March 2026, sworn by Eliud Githua Karanja, the administrator of the estate of the late James Kianja Karanja, who confirmed that the family of the late Eliud Njoroge Kuria had never been on the suit property herein, being Gilgil/Gilgil Block 1/4288 (Kikopey), and had never been in any occupation there, as they did not have any house therein. He contended that Mr. Peter Kuria, the Interested Party/Applicant herein, did not approach the court with clean hands, since he does not even know the area elder, area assistant chief, or the area chief, as he had never lived in the suit property. He further contended that very little is known about the estate of the late Eliud Njoroge Kuria, as there is no record of when he or his family ever lived in the suit property or anywhere within the Kikopey area in Gilgil. He contended that the scanty information about their place of abode indicates that Mr Peter Kuria and his family reside in Rironi, within Kiambu County. 9.That the Applicant has unwarrantedly attacked the counsel for the 2nd Respondent, Mr. Muthanwa, yet if the court were to visit the suit property, it would establish that Mr. Kuria’s application is deceitful and misleading. That, indeed, Mr. Peter Kuria cannot even point to the boundaries of the suit property if requested to do so by the court. He argued that the family of the late James Kianja Karanja has bananas and vegetables planted on the suit property, which are mature and were planted more than 4 years ago. That there is also a house constructed by the late James Kianja Karanja, where some of his family members reside to date. 10.He thus deposed that the instant Application is an abuse of the court process and thus the same should not be allowed. 11.Another Replying Affidavit of even date, sworn by Alice Muthoni Kianja, the wife of the late James Kianja Karanja, who died domiciled in Kenya on 19th October 2020 in Gilgil sub county, was to the effect that she married her late husband, James Kianja Karanja, in the year 1976 at Ol’kalou town, and that in the year 1978 they relocated to Gilgil in Kikopey, where the suit land, Gilgil/Gilgil Block 1/4288 (Kikopey), is located. 12.She explained that her husband had been allocated the suit property by Agricultural and Industrial Holdings Ltd (formerly known as GEMA) because he was a shareholder. However, since they relocated to the suit property, she had never seen the said Eliud Njoroge Kuria (Deceased) or the purported interested party herein, Mr Peter Kuria. Indeed, the family of the said Eliud Njoroge Kuria is not even known to the village elders, the assistant chief, or the area chief, as they had never lived at the suit property. She contended that the Applicant herein has been giving the court false information, as he did not even know his neighbors in that area. She further contended that the fence erected by her late husband was still intact and had not been interfered with to date. 13.The Notice of Motion Application dated 12th February 2026 was canvassed by way of written submissions, which I shall summarize as follows: 4th Respondent/Interested Party/Applicant’s Submissions. 14.In his submissions dated 9th March 2026 in support of his application dated 12th February 2026, the 4th Respondent/Interested Party/Applicant clarified that the official administrators of the Estate of Eliud Njoroge Kuria were himself, Bernard Waititu Njoroge, Phyllis Wangari Njoroge, and Simon Muhia. Joseph Kuria was a beneficiary, not an administrator. He then noted severe hostility and a lack of communication between himself and the co-administrators, Phyllis Wangari and Simon Muhia, stating that advocate Mr. Julius Muthanwa receives instructions from them, not from the Applicant. 15.That due to ongoing fraud and theft allegations within the estate (Milimani High Court Succession Cause No. 2423 of 2010), High Court Judge Hon. Justice Chemitei authorized the Deputy Registrar to execute orders in the Confirmed Grant (evidenced by Form LRA 42). This internal friction left the estate temporarily unable to hire a physical caretaker for the suit property. However, the property was legally occupied and administered by the Estate of Eliud Njoroge Kuria, as confirmed in the lower court judgment. 16.The Applicant argues that the Appellant took advantage of the estate’s temporary lack of a caretaker to sneak onto the suit land immediately after Hon. J. Ndengeri delivered her judgment on 28th October 2025. He admitted that although the Appellant's photos (Annexure EGK-2) depict the suit land, they do not prove the duration of residency, pointing out that 48 years ago (1977), the Appellant was a minor, yet in the photographs, he appeared to be an adult. The Applicant contended that the ex parte status quo order granted on 8th November 2025 erroneously legitimised this sudden, illegal occupation. 17.He then formulated the issues for determination as follows:i.Whether the court is legally obligated to explicitly ascertain and describe the true state of the subject matter (the suit property) before issuing a status quo order.ii.Whether the photographs annexed by the Appellant can legally serve as proof of long-term residence on the suit property. 18.On the first issue for determination, he placed reliance on the decision in the case of Northwest Capital Apartments Limited v Ohuru (Environment & Land Case E213 of 2023) [2024] KEELC 1181 (KLR) (5 March 2024) (Ruling), and emphasized that status quo orders must clearly outline and define the exact state of affairs being preserved to prevent prejudice. He went on to submit that in an appellate court, the baseline for ‘’status quo’’ must automatically align with the findings of the trial court (Hon. J. Ndengeri's Judgment), which established that the Estate of Eliud Njoroge Kuria lawfully acquired and possessed the property. 19.He was apprehensive that, should the current status quo remain unchanged, the Appellant would exploit the lengthy judicial system, potentially appealing through the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court, which would take from 5 to 10 years, while illegally profiting from farming on the land. 20.He reiterated that he only agreed to compromise his previous application because of distressing, personal humiliations targeted at his lack of formal legal training by advocate Mr Muthanwa and sought the court to either:i.Set aside the current status quo order and issue a new one reflecting the trial court's judgment, forcing the Appellant to vacate immediately.ii.Allow the Appellant to remain conditionally, provided the Estate of James Kianja Karanja is legally bound to financially compensate the Estate of Eliud Njoroge Kuria for illegal occupation and loss of use if the appeal fails. That the compensation be verified by a court-appointed valuer. Appellant/Respondent’s Submissions. 21.The Appellant’s submissions dated 23rd March 2026 clarified that the status quo order issued on 8th November 2025 was designed to preserve the existing factual position at the time of the application. Therefore, whoever was physically on the land as of 6th November 2025 is legally permitted to remain there pending the appeal. He then pointed out that all parties, including their respective legal counsel and the Applicant himself, albeit reluctantly, had consented to compromise the Appellant's stay application in favour of maintaining this status quo. Consequently, the Applicant’s current motion was vexatious, illogical, and an abuse of the court process. 22.That the annexed photographs showing an established residential house and mature, perennial crops such as bananas, were conclusive proof of long-term occupation, as they could not have been instantaneously planted or built after the October 2025 judgment. 23.The Appellant contended that the trial court did not pronounce itself on the issue of physical occupation, asserting that the lower court litigation strictly centred on ownership and the validity of the Title Deed, not on the immediate use and possession of the land. He characterised the Applicant as an Interested Party who has no specific prayers of his own but merely echoes the 2nd Respondent’s case; therefore, since he did not offer distinct legal value to the appeal, he was merely a ceremonial Respondent. 24.The Appellant highlighted two major contradictions in the Applicant's own pleadings that confirm the Appellant as the party in physical possession:i.The Applicant openly complains that the Appellant is currently farming the land for economic gain.ii.The Applicant’s own alternative prayer (Prayer iii) asks that the Appellant be allowed to continue occupying the suit land subject to future financial compensation. 25.It was the Appellant’s submission that the court exercised its judicial discretion soundly when granting the status quo order, which decision cannot be faulted. He then argued that, to vacate a discretionary status quo order, the Applicant had to demonstrate that it was obtained through fraud, material misrepresentation, or lack of jurisdiction, or that it has become fundamentally inequitable due to changed circumstances. The Appellant maintains that circumstances have remained entirely unchanged since the lower court's judgment and that the Applicant failed to demonstrate any substantial hardship. 26.In conclusion, the Appellant submitted that the Applicant’s application lacked merit, failed to meet the legal threshold required to upset a discretionary interim order, and should be dismissed with costs. 27.In rejoinder, the Applicant, in his further submissions, maintained that his initial consent to the status quo order was obtained under duress, following targeted courtroom attacks on his lack of formal legal training, a fact he notes the Appellant’s counsel does not dispute. 28.He vehemently rejected the characterization of him as a ceremonial party, arguing that while he wanted the appeal concluded swiftly, it must be grounded in law, given that the appellate process could drag on for years up to the Supreme Court. 29.He then proceeded to accuse the Appellant's counsel of misleading the court by claiming the trial court did not rule on land occupation. He cited paragraph 7 of Hon. J. Ndengeri’s judgment as follows:‘’In summary, the evidence collectively establishes a clear pattern: the Plaintiff’s claim rests on uncorroborated and inconsistent receipts and a title deed whose lawful acquisition cannot be demonstrated. Conversely, the 1st Defendant’s records, the 2nd Defendant’s witness testimony, and the Interested Party’s documents consistently show that the property was allocated to, occupied by, and administered under the Estate of Eliud Njoroge Kuria. The cross-examination of witnesses reinforced the reliability and credibility of the Defendants’ evidence while exposing gaps and contradictions in the Plaintiff’s case’’. 30.The Applicant then clarified that he did not dispute the Appellant's current physical presence, but asserts that it only began after the October 2025 judgment, whereby the Appellant had allegedly exploited internal management friction among the late Kuria’s administrators, who had been temporarily unable to hire a physical caretaker. 31.He argued that the Appellant committed material misrepresentation by claiming 48 years of continuous residency and highlighted that photographs featuring the Appellant as an adult could not legally prove the duration of occupancy or land ownership. 32.He then challenged the Appellant to provide verifiable root-of-title documentation, specifically, the original purchase records for Plot No. A2/280, which gave rise to Title Deed No. Gilgil/Gilgil Block 1/4288, detailing the purchase date and vendor, rather than relying on photographic snapshots. 33.The Applicant clarifies that he did not object to the mechanism of a status quo order in theory, arguing that it was procedurally unfair to issue it ex parte on 8th November 2025 without granting the Estate of Eliud Njoroge Kuria an initial hearing. To cure the ongoing prejudice against his estate, the Applicant concluded by submitting that the court must implement one of two equitable safeguards:i.Order the Appellant to vacate the suit property immediately.ii.Allow conditional, temporary occupation anchored by a strict legal indemnity requiring the Estate of James Kianja Karanja to financially compensate the Estate of Eliud Njoroge Kuria for unlawful use, if the appeal fails. Determination. 34.I have considered the Application and the response, the proceedings herein, the written submissions by the Applicant and Respondent’s Counsel, as well as the applicable law. The Applicant’s (4th interested party) application seeks to set aside the current status quo order dated 8th November 2025 and extended on 27th January 2026, and have it replaced with a status order based on the findings of Hon. J. Ndengeri’s Judgment dated 28th October 2025 in Naivasha ELC Case No. E003 of 2024, and that the same remains in effect until the Appellant proves the trial magistrate erred. In the alternative, should the Appellant be allowed to continue occupying the suit property and thereafter lose the appeal, the Estate of James Kianja Karanja must compensate the Estate of Eliud Njoroge Kuria for illegal occupation, use, and hindering the property's court-ordered sale in Milimani High Court Succession Cause No. 2423 of 2010, which compensation would be deemed as security against illegal occupation, to be determined by a court-appointed registered valuer at the Appellant's expense. 35.In response to the Application, the Respondent (Appellant) contended that the late Eliud Njoroge Kuria’s family has never occupied, built a house on, or lived near the suit property (Gilgil/Gilgil Block 1/4288 - Kikopey). They reside in Rironi, Kiambu County. He asserted that the Applicant did not approach the court with clean hands, stating that the Karanja family had mature crops, such as bananas and vegetables, planted over 4 years ago, as well as a permanent residential house where family members currently live. He also defended his counsel, Mr. Muthanwa, against the Applicant's personal attacks and asked the court to dismiss the application as an abuse of the court process. 36.Going by the proceedings on record, vide a certificate of urgency dated the 6th November 2025, (the notice of motion was dated 7th November 2025), the Applicant (Appellant) sought an order to stay execution of a judgment delivered on the 28th October 2025 in the Chief Magistrate’s Court at Naivasha in case No. MCELC E003 of 2024, pending the hearing and determination of their intended appeal, wherein the court directed service of the said application and granted interim orders of status quo pertaining as of the date of the order. 37.On the 27th November 2025, when the matter came up for mention inter-parties to confirm compliance with the court's directions, the 4th interested party, Respondent herein, submitted as follows:‘’I filed grounds of opposition dated 18th November 2025 and served to both counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondents. I also served the applicant’s counsel and the response is on the CTS. I request to dispense the application by way of written submissions after the other parties have filed their responses. The applicant went to the ground on 29th October 2025.’’ 38.There had been no objection raised to the ex parte interim orders issued. Directions were taken inter partes, wherein the matter was to be mentioned to confirm compliance and to fix a date for the ruling on the 27th January 2026 with an extension of the interim orders. 39.Come the 27th January 2026, the proceedings on record reflect as follows:‘’Mr. Muthanwa Advocate:The hearing of the application in my opinion will not help parties. I propose that we dispense with the main appeal instead.Mr. Kuria:I filed my grounds of opposition, I have filed my written submissions and served. I am of the view that we deal with the application so that the court doesn’t go blindly into the appeal.On second thoughts, I am in agreement with the advocates. I seek that we go straight to the hearing of the appeal.’’ 40.Pursuant to the above submissions, the court directed as follows:‘’The court having sought views of the counsel and 4th respondent on how to proceed and there having been consensus that it would be on the best interest to dispose of with the main appeal. It is herein directed as follows:By consent, the application dated the 6/11/2025 is herein compromised in favour of hearing and determination of the main appeal. ‘’ 41.Having produced what transpired in court verbatim, and considering the Application dated 12th February 2026 and the response herein, I find the issues that arise for my determination as follows;i.What constitutes the status quo to be preserved pending the Appeal?ii.Whether the Court can vacate or set aside a Consent Order.iii.Whether the Applicant is estopped from challenging the interim order of status quo. 42.On the first issue for determination, ideally, a status quo order is an order issued based on the existing state of affairs so as to preserve the subject matter in a condition that ensures the intended appeal is not rendered nugatory. A status quo order is deeply flawed if the judge does not explicitly frame what is being preserved. 43.The Black’s Law Dictionary, Butter Worth’s 9th Edition, defines status quo as a Latin word which means ‘the situation as it exists’. 44.The purpose of an order of status quo has been reiterated in a number of decisions. In the case of Republic v National Environment Tribunal, Ex parte Palm Homes Limited & Another [2013] eKLR, Odunga J. (as he then was stated as follows: -“When a court of law orders or a statute ordains that the status quo be maintained, it is expected that the circumstances as at the time when the order is made or the statute takes effect must be maintained. An order maintaining status quo is meant to preserve the existing state of affairs...Status quo must therefore be interpreted with respect to existing factual scenario...” 45.In the present case, the court issued an order on 8th November 2025, granting:“...interim orders of status quo pertaining as at the date of this order.” 46.By phrasing it this way, the court anchored the status quo to the date of the order (8th November 2025), when the matter was first brought before the court, rather than the date of the judgment of the 28th October 2025. This approach looks strictly at the material reality on the ground at the exact time the court order was extracted and/or applied for, with the sole purpose of interim protection to prevent chaos, self-help, and breaches of the peace. If a party is already on the land, evicting them via an interim order before the appeal is heard could cause substantial disruption and irreversible hardship and therefore an eviction is generally treated as a final remedy that must await the determination of the main appeal, unless it can be proven that the possession was obtained through blatant fraud or material misrepresentation designed to deceive the court. 47.Indeed, on 27th November 2025, the Applicant stated in court that the Appellant ‘’went to the ground on 29th October 2025.’’ This means the Applicant was fully aware of the Appellant's physical presence. Despite this knowledge, on 27th January 2026, the parties entered into a consent order to compromise the stay application and proceed directly to the main appeal, thereby leaving the existing order intact. 48.By consenting to freeze the litigation in that exact position, the parties implicitly accepted the physical reality on the ground as of January 2026 as the baseline status quo that would govern them until the appeal is concluded. 49.On the second issue for determination as to whether the Court can vacate or set aside a Consent order, it is trite that indeed a court can vacate or set aside a consent order, but after extreme caution, because it is a binding contract between the litigants that has been clothed with the authority of the court. The court will not disturb a consent order simply because a party later regrets their decision or realises they made a strategic error. To vacate a consent order, an applicant must satisfy the strict legal grounds that would invalidate a standard commercial contract. These grounds include, but are not limited to, fraud, collusion, illegality, mistake, an agreement being contrary to the policy of the Court, absence of sufficient material facts and ignorance of material facts. 50.Hancox JA (as he then was) in the case of Flora Wasike v. Destimo Wamboko (1982 -1988)1 KAR 625, held as follows:“It is now settled law that a consent judgment or order has contractual effect and can only be set aside on grounds which would justify setting a contract aside, or if certain conditions remain to be fulfilled, which are not carried out." 51.The Court of Appeal in the case of Brooke Bond Liebig v. Mallya 1975 E.A. 266 held as follows:-“A consent judgment may only be set aside for fraud collusion, or for any reason which would enable the Court to set aside an agreement.” 52.In his application, the Applicant based his reason for seeking to have the consent recorded by the parties set aside for the reason that the same had been under duress after he was subjected to unwarranted attacks and humiliation by the 2nd Respondent’s counsel on the ground that he was not a trained advocate. However, looking at the verbatim transcript provided on the record, as herein above stated, the same is descriptive of an active, alternating dialogue. The Applicant initially pushed his viewpoint ‘’I am of the view that we deal with the application...’’, processed the advocate's proposal, and then explicitly declared, ‘’On second thoughts, I am in agreement...’’. 53.To satisfy the court that he was under duress, the Applicant ought to demonstrate that the advocate’s prior conduct constituted severe, unlawful intimidation that completely paralysed his independent judgment. Courts routinely hold that robust legal posturing or aggressive advocacy by an opponent does not constitute legal duress. 54.Because the Applicant explicitly stated his agreement in open court, allowed the court to record the compromise, and accepted directions for the main appeal, the doctrine of estoppel heavily limits his ability to single-handedly undo that agreement two weeks later without clear, unassailable evidence of fraud or structural illegality. 55.In this regard, I find that the Applicant did not unearth a fundamental flaw, such as proven fraud, mutual mistake, illegality, or absolute legal duress, that destroyed the underlying contract. Indeed, the court record reflects a conscious, face-to-face compromise. In this regard, I uphold the consent order to protect the integrity of judicial agreements and to enforce the overriding objective of delivering swift, final justice. 56.Lastly, as to whether the Applicant (Peter Kuria) is estopped from challenging the interim status quo order, a look at his conduct on the record between November 2025 and January 2026 reveals that the Applicant had full, explicit knowledge that an ex parte status quo order had been granted on 8th November 2025 and even noted the factual reality on the ground (that the Appellant had taken possession). Crucially, he did not object to the order; instead, he asked the court for a timeline for filing written submissions to argue the application in due course. 57.During that same appearance on 27th November 2025, directions were taken by all parties to fix a compliance and ruling date for 27th January 2026. The court explicitly extended the interim orders of status quo. By participating in this exercise and taking a mention date, the Applicant implicitly accepted the extension of the freeze on the land. Rather than arguing his grounds of opposition to overturn the status quo, the Applicant explicitly shifted his strategy in open court by agreeing with the advocates that the matter proceeds straight to the hearing of the appeal. By consenting to compromise the Appellant's motion dated 6th November 2025, the Applicant effectively agreed to let the interim status quo remain in place until the final determination of the main appeal. 58.It is trite that the doctrine of estoppel by conduct (or waiver) dictates that if a party has, by their words or actions, accepted a certain state of affairs or a procedural position in court, they cannot later turn around and challenge that very position to the prejudice of the other party. To this effect, even if the ex parte order of 8th November 2025 was procedurally flawed or based on misrepresentation, as the Applicant claims, nothing stopped him (Applicant) from immediately moving the court to discharge it. By choosing instead to compromise the application on 27th January 2026, he legally waived his right to complain about its ex parte origin. 59.The Applicant's Application to set aside the Court-recorded Consent Order dated 27th January 2026 and the interim status quo order dated 8th November 2025 is hereby denied with costs DATED AND DELIVERED VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS AT NAIVASHA, THIS 4TH DAY OF JUNE 2026.M.C. OUNDOENVIRONMENT & LAND COURT– JUDGE