https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/9887

Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission v Irina Health and Motor Vehicle Insurance Company Limited & 6 others (Civil Suit E033 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 9887 (KLR) (Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes) (2 July 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 9887 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts) Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Civil Suit E033 of 2025 REA Ougo, J July 2, 2026 Between Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Plaintiff and Irina Health and Motor Vehicle Insurance Company Limited 1st Defendant Akimata Limited 2nd Defendant Abenyo Amatwel Etiir 3rd Defendant Chris Locheria 4th Defendant Michael Ate Logilae 5th Defendant James Illikwel Cyrus 6th Defendant Janerose Tioko 7th Defendant Ruling 1.The Plaintiff filed a Notice of Motion application dated 1st September 2025 under Certificate of Urgency pursuant to Section 1A, 1B, 3A of the Civil procedure Act, Order 40 (1), 51 (1) of the Civil Procedure Rules and all other enabling provisions of the law. 2.The Plaintiff seeks for the following orders:1.Spent2.Spent (Pending inter parties hearing and determination of this application the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Respondents by themselves, their agents, servants and/or employees or any other person whosoever be restrained from withdrawing, transferring, disposing of, wasting or in any other way dealing with the funds in the following bank accounts:i.Fixed Deposit A/C No. 0990385712105 Equity Bank Lodwar Branchii.Fixed Deposit A/C No. 0990385449323 Equity Bank Lodwar Branch)3.Pending inter parties hearing and determination of this suit the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants/Respondents by themselves, their agents, servants and/or employees or any other person whosoever be restrained from withdrawing, transferring, disposing or in any other way dealing with funds held in the bank accounts listed in prayer (2) above.4.The costs of this application be provided for. 3.The application is based on the affidavit of Felix Asete and on the ground that the Plaintiff, acting under its statutory mandate under the EACC Act and ACECA, investigated allegations of embezzlement of public funds from the County Government of Turkana. The investigations revealed that the Defendants allegedly orchestrated a fraudulent procurement scheme through which the 1st and 2nd Defendants unlawfully obtained Kshs. 282,484,033.80, disguised as payments for procurement contracts. 4.The Plaintiff established that the 1st Defendant received Kshs. 85,131,890 despite neither participating in any tender nor providing, or having the capacity to provide, insurance services to the County Government of Turkana. The 2nd Defendant allegedly received Kshs. 197,352,143.50 through procurement fraud by submitting forged tender documents and failing to supply any goods. Investigations further traced Kshs. 180,000,000 of the alleged proceeds to two fixed deposit accounts held by the 1st Defendant at Equity Bank. Consequently, in ACEC Misc. Application No. E009 of 2025, the Plaintiff obtained preservation orders under Section 56 of ACECA on 3rd March 2025 to preserve the funds pending investigations. 5.The Plaintiff stated that they have since instituted civil recovery proceedings seeking the full sum of Kshs. 282,484,033.80 in restitution and expressed apprehension that the Defendants may withdraw, transfer, or otherwise dissipate the preserved funds to frustrate enforcement of any judgment. Accordingly, the Plaintiff seeks orders restraining the Defendants from dealing with the funds pending the hearing and determination of the suit. The Responses 6.The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants opposed the application through their Replying Affidavit, sworn on 26th October 2025 by Meshack Ambuso, the senior employee and operations manager at the 1st and 2nd Defendants. He deposed that preservation orders cannot be granted indefinitely and that the six-month period granted on 4th March 2025 was sufficient for the Plaintiff to complete its investigations. He further deposed that the continuation of the civil recovery suit does not justify extending the preservation orders, which should therefore be set aside. 7.It was further averred that the funds in the Defendants’ accounts were lawfully acquired through a proper procurement process, including tendering, contract execution, service delivery, and payment. It was also averred that the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any ongoing investigations warranting the continued preservation of the funds, and that no criminal culpability has been established against any of the Defendants. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants therefore urged the court to dismiss the application for an extension of the preservation orders to avoid undue prejudice and injustice. 8.The 4th, 5th and 7th Defendants, in opposition to the application, also filed a Replying Affidavit, sworn on 27th October 2025 by Michael Ate Logilae, the 5th Defendant, with the authority of the 4th and 7th Defendants. It stated that the application is legally untenable and infringes the 1st to 3rd Defendants' constitutional rights to the presumption of innocence under Article 50 and to protection of property under Article 40 of the Constitution. It was deposed that the Plaintiff's allegations remain unverified and that the legitimacy of the impugned funds can only be determined after a full trial. It was further deposed that extending the preservation orders would unjustly deprive the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants of their livelihoods based on unproven evidence. 9.It was further deposed that the application seeks no substantive relief against the 4th, 5th and 7th Defendants, discloses no reasonable cause of action against them, and should therefore be dismissed. They denied any involvement in or knowledge of the alleged misappropriation of funds or fraudulent procurement transactions, and urged the court to dismiss the application against them, with costs to the 5th Defendant. 10.In his Replying Affidavit, sworn on 14th October 2025 in opposition to the application, the 6th Defendant stated that the application is misconceived, incompetent, and an abuse of the court process, as it seeks no substantive relief against him. He further stated that prayers 2 and 3 are directed solely at the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Defendants, and therefore disclose no cause of action or justiciable claim against him. 11.The 6th Defendant denied any involvement in or knowledge of the alleged embezzlement or fraudulent procurement scheme, stating that he served the County Government of Turkana solely in his official capacity, performing administrative and procedural duties within the scope of his employment. He further stated that he neither owned nor operated the bank accounts in question, nor was he a director, shareholder, signatory, or beneficiary of the 1st or 2nd Defendant companies. He maintains that the Plaintiff has produced no evidence linking him to the disputed funds, the bank accounts, or any alleged transfers. 12.The 6th Defendant further deposed that any documents he handled were processed in the ordinary course of his official duties and do not demonstrate fraudulent intent or personal benefit. He contended that his inclusion in the proceedings is speculative and prejudicial, intended to lend credibility to an otherwise unsustainable claim against him, thereby violating his constitutional rights to fair administrative action and a fair hearing under Articles 47 and 50 of the Constitution. He therefore urged the court to dismiss the application against him with costs. 13.In rebuttal, the Plaintiff filed a Further Affidavit, sworn on 10th November 2025 by Felix Asete, an investigator with the Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission, stating that the Replying Affidavit filed on behalf of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Defendants is incompetent because its deponent, Meshack Ambuso, has not demonstrated that he is an authorised representative of the companies. It further states that the companies have no known physical offices, staff, or operational presence; their directors or shareholders cannot be traced; and no board resolution, written authority, or employment documents have been produced to establish Meshack Ambuso’s authority or employment. Consequently, the affidavit should be disregarded for lack of authority and credibility. 14.It was further deposed that the deponent misunderstood the nature of the application, treating it as seeking an extension of preservation orders, whereas it seeks injunctive relief pending the determination of the suit after the investigations had been concluded. According to the deponent, the Defendants’ assertion that the impugned funds can be lawfully explained is unsupported by any documentary evidence, such as bank statements, contracts, or transaction records, and therefore fails to rebut the Plaintiff’s prima facie case. 15.Regarding the affidavits filed by the other Defendants, the deponent stated that the application does not seek to restrain their assets and therefore does not directly affect them. It was deposed that their reliance on the constitutional rights to the presumption of innocence and the protection of property is misplaced, as the application is a civil proceeding for the preservation of assets, not a criminal prosecution, and Article 40 does not protect property reasonably suspected to be proceeds of corruption. He further maintained that the Defendants were properly joined to the proceedings because they allegedly participated in approving unlawful payments under fictitious procurement contracts. He therefore urged the court to disregard the Replying Affidavits as defective, irrelevant, and lacking probative value, and to allow the application. Submissions 16.The application was canvassed by way of written submissions. The Plaintiff filed Submissions dated 14th November 2025, arguing that they had established a prima facie case with a probability of success warranting the grant of an interlocutory injunction, relying on the principles set out in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd & another (1973) EA 358 and Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others (2003) eKLR, which require an applicant to demonstrate a prima facie case before the court considers irreparable harm and the balance of convenience. 17.The Plaintiff submitted that its investigations established a prima facie case by showing that the 1st Defendant neither bid for nor was awarded the motor vehicle insurance tender, lacked the legal capacity to provide insurance services, and was neither a licensed insurer nor an insurance broker, yet received Kshs. 85,131,890 from the County Government. That the 2nd Defendant fraudulently obtained Kshs. 197,352,143.50 by submitting forged tender documents for several procurement contracts, despite not being a pre-qualified supplier or delivering the contracted goods. That the impugned funds were traced to two fixed deposit accounts held by the 1st Defendant at Equity Bank, with balances of Kshs. 70,000,000 and Kshs. 110,000,000. That the 1st to 3rd Defendants have failed to provide any documentary evidence explaining the lawful source of the funds, relying instead on bare assertions that the money can be accounted for. That the Plaintiff has therefore demonstrated a nexus between the preserved funds and the alleged proceeds of corruption, thereby establishing a prima facie case under EACC v Obado & 19 others (Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Civil Suit E010 of 2021) [2022] KEHC 10296 (KLR) (Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes). 18.Regarding irreparable harm, the Plaintiff argued that unless restrained, the Defendants may transfer or dissipate the funds, rendering any eventual recovery or forfeiture proceedings nugatory and causing losses that cannot be adequately compensated by damages. The Plaintiff relied on EACC v Moses Kasaine Lenolkulal (2019) eKLR, where the court held that failure to preserve disputed assets could defeat recovery proceedings. 19.Regarding the balance of convenience, the Plaintiff submitted that preservation of the funds is favoured because the suit concerns public funds allegedly lost through corruption. If the injunction is refused, the Plaintiff and the public would incur substantial expense in tracing dissipated assets, whereas the Defendants would suffer little prejudice if the funds remain preserved pending determination of the suit. The Plaintiff relied on authorities including EACC v Jimmy Mutuku Kiamba, Nairobi HCCC No. 33 of 2016; Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission v Stanley Mombo Amuti (2011) eKLR; Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission v Benson Muteti Masila & 6 others (2022) eKLR; and Shivabhai Nathabhai Patel v Manibhai Hathibhai Patel (1959) EA 907, which emphasised that courts should preserve disputed property where there is a risk of dissipation and where the public interest demands protection of assets pending determination of the suit. 20.The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants filed submissions dated 12th December 2025, arguing that the Plaintiff has not justified the continuation of the preservation orders merely because it has filed a civil recovery suit. They argued that once recovery proceedings have been instituted, the preservation orders should lapse, since the suit provides the legal mechanism for recovery should the Plaintiff ultimately succeed. They contended that continued freezing of the funds unfairly cripples the operations of the 1st and 2nd Defendant companies, preventing them from meeting operational expenses, paying employees, and discharging tax obligations. 21.The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants further argued that the inclusion of the 4th to 7th Defendants is unwarranted, as they are County Government employees who merely performed their official duties. They maintained that there is no evidence of a money trail linking the company accounts to those officers and that their joinder is intended only to create the impression of a coordinated fraud, without evidential basis. 22.They submitted that preservation orders substantially interfere with constitutional property rights and a party's livelihood, and should therefore be granted only on cogent evidence, not mere allegations. Relying on the Evidence Act, Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Volume 17 at 14, and Raila Odinga & another v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 2 others; Aukot & another (Interested Parties); Attorney General & another (Amicus Curiae) (Presidential Election Petition 1 of 2017) [2017] KESC 42 (KLR), they contended that the burden rests on the Plaintiff to prove the factual basis for the continued preservation of the funds. 23.The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants further submitted that although Section 56(3) of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act empowers the court to extend preservation orders, that discretion must be exercised judiciously. They relied on Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) v Beatrice Kagwiria Mugambi [2018] KEHC 3342 (KLR) and Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission v Njehia (Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Miscellaneous E028 & E040 of 2021 (Consolidated)) [2022] KEHC 13067 (KLR) (Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes), in which the courts emphasised that preservation orders are intended to facilitate investigations and should not subsist indefinitely, as prolonged freezing of assets may infringe constitutional rights. They argued that, in the present case, the Plaintiff has already had sufficient time to investigate and has filed the recovery suit, making further preservation unnecessary. 24.Accordingly, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants contended that the Plaintiff's application is based on unsubstantiated allegations, fails to meet the threshold for extending preservation orders, and prayed that the interim preservation orders be discharged. 25.In their submissions dated 13th December 2025, the 4th, 5th and 7th Defendants contended that the Plaintiff has not demonstrated sufficient grounds to justify extending the preservation orders. They argued that the mere filing of a civil recovery suit cannot, by itself, warrant the continued freezing of the company accounts, as the recovery proceedings provide the lawful mechanism for determining whether the funds were unlawfully acquired and, if necessary, for recovering them. 26.They submitted that the continued preservation of the accounts for over a year is unjust and prejudicial, as it prevents the companies from meeting statutory obligations, including payment of taxes, filing statutory returns, and paying employees' salaries, thereby disrupting their operations and livelihoods. They further maintained that the Plaintiff's allegations remain unproven and that the legitimacy of the impugned funds can only be determined after a full hearing. Consequently, extending the preservation orders would amount to prematurely presuming the liability of the 1st to 3rd Defendants. 27.The 4th, 5th and 7th Defendants also challenged their joinder to the proceedings, arguing that they are County Government employees who merely discharged their official duties and that there is no evidence linking them to the funds, which were paid directly into the companies' accounts. They contended that their inclusion is unwarranted and unsupported by any evidence of personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing. 28.On the burden of proof, they relied on the Evidence Act, Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Volume 17, page 14, and on Raila Odinga & another v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 2 others; Aukot & another (Interested Parties); Attorney General & another (Amicus Curiae) [2017] KESC 42 (KLR) to submit that the Plaintiff bears both the legal and evidential burden of proving the allegations and of demonstrating, through cogent evidence rather than speculation, that the continued preservation of the funds is justified. 29.Regarding Section 56 of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (ACECA) on preservation orders, they acknowledged that the court has discretion to extend such orders but argued that this discretion must be exercised judicially. Citing Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission v Beatrice Kagwiria Mugambi [2018] KEHC 3342 (KLR) and Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission v Njehia [2022] KEHC 13067 (KLR), they submitted that preservation orders are intended to facilitate investigations, cannot subsist indefinitely, and must be balanced against the constitutional rights of affected parties. They further argued that, since the Plaintiff has already instituted recovery proceedings and had ample time to investigate, the threshold for extending the preservation orders has not been met. 30.The 6th Defendant also filed his submissions dated 5th December 2025, in which he argued that the Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the principles for the grant of an interlocutory injunction as set out in Giella v Cassman Brown Co. Ltd & anor [1973] EA 358, as cited in East African Development Bank v Hyundai Motors Kenya Limited [2006] KECA 369 (KLR), namely the existence of a prima facie case, irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience. 31.Regarding the prima facie case, the 6th Defendant argued that the application is incompetent because no substantive orders are sought against him. He contended that the Plaintiff's allegations relate exclusively to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants and fail to establish any nexus between him and the disputed funds. Citing Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya & 2 others (2003) eKLR, Travel House Limited & another v Chase Bank (Civil Appeal 143 of 2018) [2024] KECA 602 (KLR), and Joseph Muchina Kamau v National Housing Corporation Limited [1996] KECA 120 (KLR), he submitted that a prima facie case requires evidence of an arguable right infringed by the opposite party. Since no evidence links him to the alleged proceeds of corruption or the frozen accounts, the Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case against him. He distinguished the decision in EACC v Obado & 19 others (Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Civil Suit E010 of 2021) [2022] KEHC 10296 (KLR) (Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes), arguing that, unlike in that case, the Plaintiff has not demonstrated any connection between him, the Respondent companies, and the impugned funds. 32.Regarding irreparable harm, the 6th Defendant argued that the Plaintiff has not shown that he poses any risk of dissipating or interfering with the preserved assets. He maintained that there is no evidence linking him to the funds or accounts in question, and therefore no basis for granting injunctive relief against him. He further submitted that the public interest cannot override his constitutional rights to a fair hearing and fair administrative action, relying on Alnashir Popat and 7 others v Capital-Markets Authority, Petition No. 29 of 2019 (2020), which cited with authority the High Court decision in Republic v County Government of Mombasa Ex parte Outdoor Advertising Association of Kenya (2014) eKLR and the Court of Appeal in Capital Markets Authority v Jeremiah Kiereini & another (2014) eKLR, which affirmed that the public interest must be exercised within constitutional limits. 33.On the balance of convenience, the 6th Defendant submitted that this consideration arises only where a prima facie case has first been established. Since the Plaintiff has failed to meet that threshold, the court should decline the injunction. He further argued that the balance of convenience favours him because he has not been shown to have any involvement with the disputed funds, and that restraining him would amount to an unjustified infringement of his rights. He relied on Paul Gitonga Wanjau v Gathuthi Tea Factory Company Ltd & 2 others (2016) eKLR, which emphasised that the balance of convenience depends on the comparative prejudice to the parties. 34.Finally, the 6th Defendant submitted that the application should be dismissed with costs. Citing Rai 3 others v Rai 4 others (Petition 4 of 2012) [2014] KESC 31 (KLR), he argued that costs follow the event and are intended to compensate a successful litigant. He further submitted that, since no substantive relief is sought against him and he has been unnecessarily joined in the application, he be awarded costs for having been compelled to defend the proceedings. Analysis And Determination 35.I have considered the Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion application dated 1st September 2025, the Defendants’ Reply Affidavits, the Plaintiff’s Further Affidavit, and the parties’ submissions. The issues for determination are:a.Whether the Plaintiff has established a case warranting the grant of an interlocutory injunctionb.Who should bear the costs of the application 36.Whether the Plaintiff has established a case warranting the grant of an interlocutory injunction is governed by well-settled principles in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358, as amplified in Nguruman Limited v Nielsen & 2 others [2014] KECA 606 (KLR). An applicant must establish a prima facie case with a probability of success, that it stands to suffer irreparable injury incapable of compensation by damages if the injunction is withheld, and that, if the court is in doubt, the application is determined on a balance of convenience. 37.Regarding whether a prima facie case has been established, the term was defined in Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others [2003] KECA 175 (KLR) as follows:“…a case in which on the material presented to the Court a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter.” 38.The Plaintiff has submitted that investigations allegedly established that the 1st Defendant received Kshs. 85,131,890 despite lacking the capacity or authority to provide insurance services, while the 2nd Defendant allegedly received Kshs. 197,352,143.50 through procurement supported by forged tender documents and without delivery of the contracted goods. The Plaintiff further traced Kshs. 180,000,000 into the two fixed deposit accounts which are the subject of this application. 39.At this interlocutory stage, this court is not required to make definitive findings on the legality of the procurement process or to determine whether the funds constitute proceeds of corruption. Those matters are reserved for trial. This court is only required to determine whether the material presented discloses an arguable case that should be preserved pending hearing. 40.The Defendants maintained that the funds were lawfully acquired, but beyond those assertions, they have yet to produce documentary material capable of explaining the specific transactions traced by the Plaintiff or of rebutting the Plaintiff's tracing evidence. 41.This court is persuaded that the Plaintiff has established an arguable and prima facie case against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants. The same reasoning was applied in Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission v Obado & 19 others [2022] KEHC 10296 (KLR), where evidence tracing public funds into identifiable accounts was held sufficient to establish a prima facie case pending trial. 42.The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants' arguments that investigations have been completed and that a recovery suit has already been filed do not, without more, disentitle the Plaintiff from seeking interlocutory preservation orders. The filing of the substantive suit does not eliminate the risk that assets may be dissipated before judgment. 43.As regards the 4th to 7th Defendants, no injunctive orders are sought against their personal assets. Their joinder in the suit is based on allegations of participation in the procurement process. Whether they bear eventual liability is an issue for determination at trial and does not affect the propriety of preserving the disputed funds presently held in the accounts of the 1st Defendant. 44.Equally, the objection that Meshack Ambuso lacked authority to swear the Replying Affidavit need not be conclusively determined for the purposes of this application, because even when the Defendants' response is considered in its entirety, the Plaintiff has established a prima facie case. 45.Regarding irreparable harm, the Plaintiff seeks to preserve public funds allegedly obtained through corruption. If the funds are withdrawn, transferred or dissipated before trial, any eventual decree for recovery may be rendered ineffective. 46.Courts have consistently recognised that recovery proceedings involving suspected proceeds of corruption would be rendered nugatory if the subject assets are dissipated before determination, as held in Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission v Moses Kasaine Lenolkulal [2019] KEHC 1159 (KLR) and Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission v Stanley Mombo Amuti [2011] KECA 248 (KLR). 47.Although the Defendants argued that the freezing orders interfere with business operations, the prejudice caused by temporary preservation is outweighed by the risk that public funds, if ultimately found to have been unlawfully acquired, may become irrecoverable. 48.On balance of convenience, the same also favours the preservation of the funds pending trial. The accounts contain specifically identified monies traced by the Plaintiff during investigations. Their preservation maintains the status quo and safeguards the subject matter of the litigation. 49.Public interest is an important consideration in matters involving alleged loss of public funds. This court agrees with the reasoning in Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission v Benson Muteti Masila & 6 others [2022] KEHC 2368 (KLR) that preserving assets serves both the public interest and the administration of justice where allegations of corruption are pending determination. 50.The authorities relied on by the Defendants, including Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission v Beatrice Kagwiria Mugambi [2018] KEHC 3342 (KLR) and Ethics & Anti-Corruption Commission v Njehia [2022] KEHC 13067 (KLR), correctly state that preservation orders should not subsist indefinitely. However, those decisions also recognise that the court retains discretion to preserve assets where circumstances justify it. In the present case, the Plaintiff has already instituted substantive recovery proceedings and now seeks preservation pending the determination of that suit, rather than an extension for the purposes of investigations. The considerations are therefore materially different. 51.This court is satisfied that the Plaintiff has met the threshold for the grant of an interlocutory injunction. 52.Consequently, the Notice of Motion dated 1st September 2025 is merited and is allowed on the following terms: -a.Pending the hearing and determination of this suit, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants, whether by themselves, their agents, servants or any other persons acting on their behalf, are hereby restrained from withdrawing, transferring, disposing of, wasting or in any other manner dealing with the funds held in: -i.Fixed Deposit Account No. 0990385712105, Equity Bank, Lodwar Branch; andii.Fixed Deposit Account No. 0990385449323, Equity Bank, Lodwar Branch.b.For avoidance of doubt, the orders herein relate only to the funds held in the above accounts and do not constitute injunctive orders against the personal assets of the 4th, 5th, 6th or 7th Defendants.c.The costs of this application shall abide the outcome of the main suit. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY THIS 2ND DAY OF JULY 2026.R.E. OUGOJUDGEIn the presence of: -Miss Wambugu -For the Plaintiff/ApplicantMr. Omamo -For the 1st, 2nd, 3rd DefendantsMr. Muga - For the 4th, 5th, 7th DefendantsMiss Chitechi - For the 6th DefendantAdan/ Minah - C/A