https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/10798

Executive Committee, Seventh Day Adventist Church Central Rift Valley Conference & 2 others v Mbugua & 3 others (Civil Appeal E226 & E227 of 2025 (Consolidated)) [2026] KEHC 10798 (KLR) (16 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 10798 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Thika Civil Appeal E226 & E227 of 2025 (Consolidated) BW Murunga, J July 16, 2026 Between Executive Committee, Seventh Day Adventist Church Central Rift Valley Conference 1st Appellant Executive Committee, East Kenya Union Conference Of The Seventh-Day Adventists 2nd Appellant Samwel Makori, Executive President, East Kenya Union Conference Of The Seventh-Day Adventist Church 3rd Appellant and Dedan Mbugua 1st Respondent Simion Kariuki 2nd Respondent Richard Nyaata 3rd Respondent Samwel Mwirigi Kenda 4th Respondent (Being an appeal from the Ruling and Orders of Hon. Maureen Nabibya (SPM) uploaded in the Court's Case Tracking System on 29th August 2025 in Thika CMCC No. E157 of 2025) Judgment 1.A house divided against itself cannot stand. The house in this case is metaphorically the House of God. This appeal brings to the fore a deep-seated administrative rather than ecclesiastical dispute within the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, a global institution whose internal mechanisms for dispute resolution appear to have been bypassed from the aisle of the altar in favour of the corridors of justice. 2.The corridors of justice are often pristine with abundant natural light and a fine balanced mix of wood and stone but there may be certain horses before the carts that are placed to someone before approach to the corridor. That avoids the proverbial putting the cart before the horse a saying particularly apropos to the question of jurisdiction, which lies at the very heart of this consolidated appeal. 3.Before this Court is a consolidated first Appeal, Civil Appeal No. E226 of 2025 and Civil Appeal No. E227 of 2025, challenging the Ruling and Orders of the learned Senior Principal Magistrate at Thika, Hon. Maureen Nabibya, delivered on 29th August 2025 in Thika CMCC No. E157 of 2025. 4.In the impugned ruling, the trial court found the 3rd Appellant, Samwel Makori in contempt of court, annulled the decisions and deliberations of a meeting held on 23rd March 2025 by the 1st Appellant and dismissed a Preliminary Objection challenging the court's jurisdiction. Background and Record of Appeal 5.The genesis of this dispute traces back to a Plaint dated 21st March 2025 filed by the Respondents herein (as Plaintiffs) at the Chief Magistrate's Court in Thika. The Respondents alleged that the 3rd Appellant, being the Executive President of the 2nd Appellant, had attained the mandatory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years and was therefore holding office illegally and unlawfully drawing a salary from church offerings and tithes. 6.They sought, inter alia, an order compelling the refund of salaries and a permanent injunction restraining him from dealing with the affairs of the 2nd Appellant. 7.Contemporaneously, the Respondents filed an application under a Certificate of Urgency. On 21st March 2025, the trial court issued ex parte interim orders restraining the 3rd Appellant, his agents, or servants from "accessing, entering into, conducting business meetings and/or executing any cheques, accessing bank accounts, withdrawing funds and/or in any way dealing with the 2nd Defendant (2nd Appellant herein)." 8.Subsequently, the Respondents filed a Contempt of Court application dated 25th March 2025, alleging that the 3rd Appellant had flagrantly disobeyed the interim orders by chairing a meeting of the Central Rift Valley Conference, the 1st Appellant on 23rd March 2025, during which certain administrative decisions including the suspension of the Executive President of the 1st Appellant were made. 9.In staunch opposition, the 2nd and 3rd Appellants filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 7th August 2025. They averred that the Thika Magistrate's Court lacked jurisdiction as the matter fundamentally pertained to an employment dispute (retirement age), which squarely falls within the exclusive purview of the Employment and Labour Relations Court. 10.They further contended that the suit was an abuse of the court process, that the 3rd Appellant had not attained the age of 65 (being born in 1962) and that internal dispute resolution mechanisms had not been exhausted. 11.In her ruling delivered on 29th August 2025, the learned trial magistrate dismissed the Preliminary Objection, found the 3rd Appellant in contempt of the ex parte orders of 21st March 2025 and proceeded to annul the meeting of 23rd March 2025. Aggrieved by these findings, the Appellants filed the present appeal. Grounds of Appeal 12.The Appellants' Memorandum of Appeal raises several weighty grounds, which can be summarized as follows:a)That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact by dismissing the Preliminary Objection on jurisdiction without considering the substantive merits of the grounds raised.b)That the trial court erred in allowing the contempt of court application without proof of personal service, penal notice, or wilful disobedience to the required standard.c)That the trial court erred in misinterpreting and impermissibly expanding the scope of the injunctive orders to cover the operations, meetings and mandate of the 1st Appellant, who was not a party to the initial proceedings.d)That the trial court erred in annulling the internal decisions of the 1st Appellant, thereby unlawfully interfering with the autonomy and distinct legal persona of the institution.e)That the impugned ruling uploaded on the Judiciary portal was undated, lacked an electronic timestamp, and bore no particulars of the judicial officer, contravening Order 21 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Submissions of the Parties 13.This Court gave directions to the parties and the parties agreed thereto to canvass the Appeal by way of written submissions. I have perused the Record of Appeal and the comprehensive submissions filed by the Appellants. 14.Regrettably, despite service, the Respondents did not file their submissions to counter the appeal, leaving the Appellants' submissions largely uncontroverted. Nevertheless, even without the Respondents' submissions, it falls on the Court to do justice with what is before it and that justice must not only be done, but must also be seen to be done. 15.It is the duty of this first appellate Court to re-evaluate the entire evidence and record of the trial court and draw its own independent conclusions, bearing in mind that it did not have the advantage of seeing or hearing the witnesses. 16.The Appellants submitted that jurisdiction is a threshold issue. By alleging that the 3rd Appellant had surpassed his retirement age and drawing a salary, the Respondents had instituted an employment dispute. 17.Under Article 162(2)(a) of the Constitution and Section 12 of the Employment and Labour Relations Court Act, such matters are the exclusive reserve of the ELRC. They argued that the Magistrate's Court lacked the pecuniary and subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain the plaint. 18.On contempt, the Appellants submitted that contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal and require a standard of proof higher than a mere balance of probabilities. They argued that there was absolutely no evidence of personal service of the ex parte orders upon the 3rd Appellant, nor was there a penal notice endorsed on the face of the order. 19.Furthermore, the meeting held on 23rd March 2025 pertained to the 1st Appellant (Central Rift Valley Conference), an autonomous entity that was not restrained by the orders directed at the 2nd Appellant (East Kenya Union Conference). Thus, no deliberate or wilful disobedience occurred. Issues for Determination 20.Having considered the grounds of Appeal, the record and the submissions, the following issues crystallize for the determination of this Court:i.Whether the trial court had the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit.ii.Whether the trial court erred in citing the 3rd Appellant for contempt of court.iii.Whether the trial court erred in annulling the meeting and resolutions of the 1st Appellant.iv.Whether the impugned ruling met the procedural thresholds of a valid judgment/ruling. Analysis and Determination Issue I: Jurisdiction of the trial court 21.It is a cardinal principle of law that a court without jurisdiction acts in vain. Jurisdiction is the foundation upon which the entire edifice of a judicial process rests; it cannot be assumed, implied, or conferred by the consent of the parties. If a court lacks jurisdiction, any orders issued, no matter how elegantly crafted, are a nullity ab initio. 22.In Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lillian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd. [1989] eKLR the Court stated as follows:'I think that it is reasonably plain that a question of jurisdiction ought to be raised at the earliest opportunity and the court seized of the matter is then obliged to decide the issue right away on the material before it. Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to make one more step. Where a court has no jurisdiction, there would be no basis for a continuation of proceedings pending other evidence. A court of law downs tools in respect of the matter before it the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction.' 23.This principle has since been reaffirmed at the highest level. In Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 others [2012] eKLR, the Supreme Court held that:“a court’s jurisdiction flows from either the Constitution or legislation or both. Thus, a court of law can only exercise jurisdiction as conferred by the Constitution or other written law. It cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that which is conferred upon it by law.” 24.That holding binds this Court and every subordinate court in the land, and it is against that constitutional and statutory yardstick that the jurisdiction of the trial court in the present matter falls to be measured. 25.A plain reading of the Respondents' Plaint dated 21st March 2025 reveals that the core of their grievance was that the 3rd Appellant had allegedly reached the mandatory retirement age of 65 years and was unlawfully occupying office and drawing a salary. The reliefs sought included the refund of the said salary. 26.Article 162(2)(a) of the Constitution establishes the Employment and Labour Relations Court (ELRC) with the exclusive original and appellate jurisdiction to hear and determine all disputes relating to employment and labour relations. This is echoed in Section 12(1)(a) of the ELRC Act, which grants the ELRC exclusive jurisdiction over disputes relating to or arising out of employment between an employer and an employee. 27.The dispute regarding the retirement age and salary of the 3rd Appellant is to my mind an employment dispute. 28.While certain Magistrates have been gazetted to hear employment matters where the gross monthly pay does not exceed Kshs. 80,000/=, the pleadings herein involved claims for salary refunds exceeding Kshs. 100,000/= and pertained to officers ordinarily based in Nairobi and Nakuru, stretching beyond the territorial and pecuniary scope of the Thika Magistrate's Court. 29.The learned trial Magistrate fell into grave error by assuming jurisdiction over a matter strictly reserved for the ELRC. On this ground alone, the entire suit in the lower court, and all interlocutory orders emanating therefrom, suffer the fatal blow of nullity. Issue II: The finding of contempt of court 30.He who comes to equity must come with clean hands and he who seeks to commit another to civil jail must strictly prove the elements of contempt. Contempt of court proceedings, by their very nature, are quasi-criminal because they involve the deprivation of liberty. 31.As such, the standard of proof is higher than a mere balance of probabilities. 32.In Samuel M. N. Mweru & Others v National Land Commission & 2 others [2020] KEHC 9233 (KLR), the court outlined the four essential elements that must be proved to make a case for civil contempt as follows:“There are essentially four elements that must be proved to make the case for civil contempt. The applicant must prove to the required standard (in civil contempt cases which is higher than civil cases) that:-a.the terms of the order (or injunction or undertaking) were clear and unambiguous and were binding on the defendant;b.the defendant had knowledge of or proper notice of the terms of the order;c.the defendant has acted in breach of the terms of the order; andd.the defendant's conduct was deliberate.” 33.This elevated standard is not a recent innovation. In Gatharia K. Mutitika v Baharini Farm Limited [1985] eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that where the liberty of the subject is in issue, the standard of proof required in contempt proceedings must be higher than proof on a balance of probabilities, coming close to, but not exactly, “beyond reasonable doubt”. It is against this exacting, quasi-criminal standard, and not the ordinary civil standard of a mere balance of probabilities, that the finding of contempt against the 3rd Appellant falls to be tested. 34.Upon examining the record, it is evident that the ex parte order of 21st March 2025 specifically restrained the 3rd Appellant from dealing with the affairs of the 2nd Appellant. 35.The contempt application, however, alleged that the 3rd Appellant breached this order by chairing a meeting of the 1st Appellant on 23rd March 2025. The 1st Appellant is an autonomous entity with a distinct legal persona, separate from the 2nd Appellant. 36.By extending the scope of the injunction to cover meetings of an entity that was neither a party to the suit nor explicitly mentioned in the orders, the learned magistrate impermissibly rewrote her own orders. 37.Furthermore, there is a glaring lack of evidence demonstrating that the 3rd Appellant was personally served with the orders or that the orders bore the mandatory penal notice. Without proof of personal service or an endorsed penal notice, the contempt application was fundamentally incurably defective. The trial court's finding of contempt was therefore completely unfounded in law and in fact. Issue III: Annulment of the 1st Appellant's Decisions 38.A court of law is bound by the pleadings before it. The nullification of the internal decisions and deliberations of the 1st Appellant, an entity that was not even a party to the proceedings when the interim orders were issued amounts to a classic case of judicial overreach. The autonomy and mandate of the 1st Appellant were trampled upon without affording it a right to be heard, violating the cardinal rule of natural justice: audi alteram partem. 39.This Court is further fortified in this view by the Court of Appeal's decision in Geoffrey Muthinja Kabiru & 2 others v Samuel Munga Henry & 1756 others [2015] eKLR, itself a leadership dispute within a church, where the Court held that courts ought to be “fora of last resort and not the first port of call the moment a storm brews” within a voluntary association, and that a dispute resolution mechanism established within such an association must ordinarily be exhausted before the jurisdiction of the courts is invoked. 40.The 1st Appellant, as the constituted governance organ of the Church, was entitled to have its internal decisions respected unless and until its own dispute resolution mechanisms had first been engaged and exhausted, which was not demonstrated to be the case here. 41.Fittingly, in a dispute of this nature involving a church, it may be recalled that the principle of audi alteram partem — listen to the other side — finds one of its earliest illustrations in the biblical account of the Garden of Eden, where even the Almighty is said to have first called Adam to account before pronouncing judgment upon him. The lesson has endured through the centuries: no one, however humble or however exalted, ought to be condemned unheard. 42.The decision to annul these meetings lacked justifiable reason and comprehensible justification. As held in Republic v Deputy County Commissioner Lower Yatta Sub-County & another [2022] KEELC 2722 (KLR), a decision is irrational if it is unreasoned and lacks ostensible logic. The court succinctly stated:“Although the terms irrationality and unreasonableness are these days used interchangeably, irrationality is only one facet of unreasonableness. A decision is irrational in the strict sense of that term if it is unreasoned; if it is lacking ostensible logic or comprehensible justification.” 43.The trial court failed to articulate how a meeting of an autonomous, non-party entity breached an order directed at a completely different entity. Issue IV: Procedural defects of the impugned ruling 44.The Appellants have raised a serious grievance that the ruling uploaded to the Judiciary portal was undated, lacked an electronic timestamp and did not bear the name of the judicial officer delivering it. 45.Order 21 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules strictly mandates that judgments and rulings must be dated and signed at the time of pronouncing them. 46.This is not a mere technicality. In Musa Hassan Bulhan v Kenya Airways Limited & another [2006] KECA 98 (KLR), the Court of Appeal found that a judgment which was wrongly dated and left unsigned at the time of its delivery, in breach of Order XX Rule 7(1) of the then Civil Procedure Rules, the precursor to the present Order 21 Rule 3, was a nullity. 47.That position was reaffirmed in Captain Musa Hassan Bulhan v Kenya Airways Limited & Official Receiver [2018] KECA 68 (KLR), where the Court of Appeal treated an unsigned judgment as no judgment at all. 48.An unauthenticated, unsigned and undated ruling is a procedural anomaly that goes to the root of the document's validity and enforceability. While courts embrace the digital transition via the Case Tracking System, the fundamental tenets of authenticating judicial decisions remain sacrosanct. Conclusion 49.Having carefully considered the submissions of the parties, the grounds in the Memorandum of Appeal and the Record of Appeal, it is the inescapable conclusion of this Court that the trial court ventured into an arena where it lacked jurisdiction. The proceedings were inherently flawed and the subsequent findings of contempt and the annulment of the 1st Appellant's meetings were unsupported by the law, the facts and the basic principles of natural justice. The trial court failed in its duty to properly address and balance the submissions made by the Appellants, leading to an outcome that cannot be allowed to stand. 50.Courts exist to serve as guardians of legality, and where jurisdiction is wanting, no amount of sympathy for a party's cause can supply what the law withholds. This dispute touches on deeply personal and institutional interests bound up with faith and vocation, but it is precisely because of that sensitivity that the Constitution and the law entrust its resolution, in the first instance, to the specialised forum of the Employment and Labour Relations Court, and to the internal mechanisms which the Church itself has established, and not to a court that lacks the jurisdiction to entertain it. 51.As it is often said, where a statute dictates a specific procedure, it must be followed. The Respondents' grievances regarding employment and retirement ought to have been channeled to the Employment and Labour Relations Court and only after exhausting the robust internal dispute resolution mechanisms inherent within the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. Disposition 52.For the foregoing reasons, the Appellants' Consolidated Appeal succeeds in its entirety. I make the following final orders:a.The Consolidated Appeal is hereby allowed.b.The Ruling and Orders of the lower court delivered on 29th August 2025 in Thika CMCC No. E157 of 2025 are hereby set aside, vacated and quashed in their entirety.c.The suit in Thika CMCC No. E157 of 2025 is hereby struck out for want of jurisdiction.d.The costs of this Appeal and the costs in the lower court are awarded to the Appellants, to be borne by the Respondents jointly and severally.It is so ordered. DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 16 TH DAY OF JULY, 2026. BENARD WAFULA MURUNGA JUDGE Delivered on virtual platform in the presence of:Matoke instructed by Nyagaka SM for the 1 st AppellantRachuonyo instructed by Rachuonyo & Rachuonyo for the 2 nd and 3 rd AppellantOgado & Co. instructed for the Respondents (N/A)Kevin Babu - Court Assistant