[2008] KEHC 1250 (KLR)
The court found that the Plaintiff's suit, concerning the termination of a contract of service, was improperly commenced by originating summons under Order XXXVI Rules 1(g), 3, and 5 of the Civil Procedure Rules, as none of these provisions cover employment contract disputes. The court held that Rule 10 of Order...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [2008] KEHC 1250 (KLR)
- Parties
- Plaintiff: Rev. Festus Njoroge Njangiru; Defendant: Rt. Rev. Dr. Gideon Gichuhi Githiga; Defendant: Anglican Church of Kenya (Diocese of Thika)
- Court
- High Court
- Court Station
- High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts)
- Jurisdiction
- Kenya
- Case Number
- Civil Suit 286 of 2007
- Procedural Posture
- Civil Suit / Ruling on Preliminary Objection
- Outcome
- Suit struck out with liberty to file afresh by plaint within 30 days; costs to Defendants.
- Judges
- JM Khamoni
- Legal Topics
- Originating Summons Procedure, Striking Out Suit, Employment Contract Termination
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
More case intelligence is available
Unlock the full research layer for this judgment.
Parties
Rev. Festus Njoroge Njangiru
Plaintiff
Rt. Rev. Dr. Gideon Gichuhi Githiga
Defendant
Anglican Church of Kenya (Diocese of Thika)
Defendant
Procedural Posture
Civil Suit / Ruling on Preliminary Objection
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the suit was properly commenced by originating summons instead of plaint.
- 2 Whether the subject matter—termination of a contract of service—falls within the scope of Order XXXVI Rules 1(g), 3, and 5 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
- 3 Whether the court should strike out the suit or allow it to proceed in another form.
Ratio Decidendi
The court found that the Plaintiff's suit, concerning the termination of a contract of service, was improperly commenced by originating summons under Order XXXVI Rules 1(g), 3, and 5 of the Civil Procedure Rules, as none of these provisions cover employment contract disputes. The court held that Rule 10 of Order XXXVI could not be invoked to regularize the proceedings because the originating summons was not properly founded under the relevant rules. Exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, the court struck out the suit but granted the Plaintiff liberty to file a fresh suit by way of plaint within thirty days, emphasizing the interest of justice and...
Court Disposition
Suit struck out with liberty to file afresh by plaint within 30 days; costs to Defendants.
Orders
- The suit is struck out.
- The Plaintiff is granted liberty to institute a fresh suit by way of plaint within thirty (30) days from the date of the ruling.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
26 paragraphs
REPUBLIC OF KENYA IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI (NAIROBI LAW COURTS)
Civil Suit 286 of 2007 (OS)
REV. FESTUS NJOROGE NJANGIRU……….......................…………..PLAINTIFF
-versus-
RT. REV. DR. GIDEON GICHUHI GITHIGA…............................1ST DEFENDANT
ANGLICAN CHURCH OF KENYA (DIOCESE OF THIKA)…..2ND DEFENDANT
R U L I N G
In his preliminary objection dated 30th May 2007 and filed on same date, Mr. Karuga Wandai, Counsel for the Defendants in this suit is saying:
THAT “the suit is wrongfully and unprocedural before the court in that it should be by way of plaint not by way of originating summons.”
Mr. T. Murage, learned Counsel for the Plaintiff does not agree and I have got what was said by each counsel on record and in full consideration in this ruling.
To start with what each side is not saying but which I have noticed is that the filing of the originating summons (O.S.) seems to be attracting issues leading to interlocutory applications or hearings which could perhaps be avoided if the suit were commenced by a plaint. See this preliminary objection dated 30th May 2007, chamber summons by the Plaintiff dated 16th May 2007 and the Defendant’s replying affidavit thereof dated 30th May 2007 all following the questioned other replying affidavit dated 24th April 2007 which the Plaintiff does not clearly identify in the chamber summons aforesaid. Would the proceedings not be straight forward if all those interlocutory issues were avoided?
Concerning what is in the originating summons therefore, the subject matter is Termination of a Contract of Service. The question is whether that termination was wrongful. Looking at the headnotes of the original summons, it is stated to have been brought under Order XXXVI Rules 1(g), 3 and 5of the Civil Procedure Rules. That is a strange combination of rules which may lead to startling results. This is because while Rule 1(g) is concerned with matters relating to claims in an estate of a deceased person; Rule 3 is concerned with matters relating to land transaction and Rule 5 concerns persons claiming interest under deeds or wills or other written instruments” which in my opinion must be construed to be in the group of wills or deeds and not contracts.
That is the kind of diversity that comes out when looking at Rule 1(g), Rule 3 and Rule 5 of Order XXXVI of the Civil Procedure Rules. As such, it is difficult to comprehend a suit which would properly fall under all those three rules or even under only two of them. When this originating summons was filed under all those three rules, the impropriety was clear and ought to be seen by the Plaintiff.
Moreover, this being a case based on a contract of service – an employment contract, I do not see how it fits in any of those three rules.
What I am saying therefore vindicates what Mr. Karuga Wandai was telling this court that the originating summons herein is not covered by the three Rules or any of them contrary to what Mr. Murage was telling the court.
In that situation, again contrary to what Mr. Murage and Mr. Karuga Wandai were saying in their respective opposition to each other, Rule 10 of Order XXXVI does not help us out. That rule is helpful only when the originating summons is properly founded under specified other rule or rules of Order XXXVI. It is in such a situation that the court, looking at the filed originating summons as well as relevant affidavits, may decide to treat those documents as pleadings for the purpose of continuing the proceedings “as if, the cause had been begun”by filing a plaint. As can be deducted from the last part of rule 10, that is done mainly for the purpose of calling witnesses to give evidence to add to what is filed by way of documents. That is not the position in this suit.
In the circumstances, the Plaintiff should be grateful to Mr. Karuga Wandai who was so reconciliatory that he merely asked that the Plaintiff proceeds by way of a plaint. He did not say that the suit be dismissed.
Following upon that reconciliatory note, by Mr. Karuga Wandai, and in the interest of justice and further, not withstanding that Rule 10 does not provide us with a solution out of this situation, I do hereby invoke this court’s inherent power under Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and do order this suit struck out with liberty to the Plaintiff to institute a fresh suit by way of a plaint within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of this ruling.
The Plaintiff to pay costs of this originating summons to the Defendants.
Dated this 17th day of October 2008.
J. M. KHAMONI
JUDGE
Present:
Mr. Murage for the Plaintiff
Mr. Kinyanjui holding brief for Mr. Karuga Wandai for the Defendants
Mr. Kabiru – Court Clerk