https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/8190

Omoga v Republic (Criminal Revision E011 of 2026) [2026] KEHC 8190 (KLR) (9 June 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 8190 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Vihiga Criminal Revision E011 of 2026 RN Nyakundi, J June 9, 2026 IN THE MATTER OF MCCR/E559/2024 REPUBLIC Vs SIMEO ONDIGU Between Frank Omoga Applicant and Republic Respondent Ruling Representation:Mr. Leina Davies for the StateM/s Orwa Seda & Co Advocates 1.What is pending before this Honourable Court for determination is Notice of Motion Application dated 4th March 2026 premised under Sections 362 and 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Regulation 21 of the Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations 2020, Articles 50(1), 165(6) & (7) of Constitution of Kenya 2010 where the Applicant is seeking the following orders: -a.That pending the hearing and determination of Criminal Revision, this Honourable Court be pleased to stay further proceedings in Vihiga CMCR Case No. MCCR/E559/2024 before the learned Magistrate at Vihiga.b.That this Honourable Court calls for and examines the record of MCCR/E559/2024 at the Vihiga Law Court to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality and propriety of the ruling delivered on 3rd March 2026.c.That this Honourable Court revises and sets aside the ruling dismissing the Applicant's recusal application.d.That this Honourable Court orders that MCCR/E559/2024 be placed before a different Magistrate for hearing and determination.e.That pending determination of this application, a stay of proceedings in MCCR/E559/2024 be granted.f.That this Honourable Court grants any other orders it deems just and equitable. 2.The Application is made on the following grounds on the face of it among others: -a.The learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in dismissing the recusal application without properly considering the factual grounds presented.b.The learned Magistrate misapplied the objective test for reasonable apprehension of bias, as established in Raila Odinga & Others v IEBC & Others [2013] eKLR and Kaplana H. Rawal v Judicial Service Commission & 2 Others [2016] eKLR.c.The ruling failed to consider the Applicant's constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial under Article 50(1) of Constitution.d.Dismissing the recusal application without proper consideration constitutes a procedural irregularity and risks prejudice to the Applicant.e.The High Court has supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 165(6) and 159(2)(c) of Constitution and Sections 362-364 of the Criminal Procedure Code to correct any illegality, impropriety or incorrectness in lower Court proceedings. 3.The Application is supported by the annexed affidavit sworn by the Applicant who deponed as follows: -a.That I am the 2nd Accused in MCCR/E559/2024.b.That I have personal knowledge of the facts deponed herein, except where otherwise stated, and where so stated, I believe them to be true.c.That I make this affidavit in support of my Criminal Revision application seeking revision of the ruling dated 3rd March 2026, dismissing my recusal application before Hon. P. Karimi, Resident Magistrate, Vihiga Law Court.d.That on 14th January 2026, I filed a recusal application citing reasonable apprehension of bias and supporting it with an affidavit.e.That the Magistrate dismissed my application on 3rd March 2026 without adequately addressing the factual and procedural material presented.f.That trial proceedings are scheduled to continue on 17th March 2026, which creates an imminent risk of continuing before a Magistrate whose impartiality is reasonably questioned.g.That I submit that the following factual circumstances create a reasonable apprehension of bias: -a.Selective Treatment of Applications: My preliminary objections and procedural applications have repeatedly been dismissed on technical or procedural grounds, whereas prosecution applications or similar motions were routinely allowed. This creates a perception of unfair preference.b.Dismissal Without Consideration of Evidence: On 3rd March 2026, my recusal application was dismissed with the statement that it had “not been prosecuted,” even though it had been properly filed and supported by a sworn affidavit. The ruling failed to engage with the specific allegations and evidence I presented.c.Pattern of Rulings Against Me: There have been multiple rulings in MCCR/E559/2024 (including preliminary objection rulings on 4th March 2025, directions, and mentions) where my submissions were not fully considered and matters were expedited or ruled against me, while procedural delays for the prosecution were accommodated.d.Perception Created by Procedural Handling: The consistent dismissal of my filings and the failure to address substantive arguments regarding my role in the business (Vihiga Complex Academy) creates a reasonable apprehension that the Magistrate is predisposed against me.e.Impact on Fair Trial: Unless this Honourable Court intervenes, I risk continuing trial proceedings before a Magistrate whose impartiality is reasonably questioned, which would prejudice my constitutional right to a fair hearing under Article 50(1) of Constitution of Kenya 2010.h.That I rely on the legal principles established in: -a.Raila Odinga & Others v IEBC & Others [2013] eKLR – establishing that a Magistrate must recuse themselves where there is a reasonable apprehension of bias and the test is objective.b.Kaplana H. Rawal v Judicial Service Commission & 2 Others [2016] eKLR – requiring cogent, factual and objective evidence to establish apprehension of bias.c.Regulation 21, Judicial Service (Code of Conduct and Ethics) Regulations 2020 – providing that recusal grounds must be specific and recorded in proceedings.i.That the facts detailed above satisfy the objective test for reasonable apprehension of bias.j.That in view of the above, I respectfully pray that this Honourable Court;a.Call for and examine the record in MCCR/E559/2024.b.Revise and set aside the ruling of 3rd March 2026 dismissing my recusal application.c.Order that the trial proceedings continue before a different Magistrate.d.Stay proceedings pending determination of this Criminal Revision.e.Grant any other orders deemed just and equitable. 4.The Application is opposed by the Respondent vide Grounds of Opposition dated 14th May 2026 which can be summarized as follows: -a.That bias was not demonstrated from the proceedings at the trial Court hence the application is devoid of merit.b.That the applicant fails to state, if anything the Honourable Magistrate did or failed to do as required by her mandate and as such the application lacks merit. Reply to the Grounds of Opposition 5.The Applicant also filed Reply dated 15th May 2026 to the Grounds of Opposition which can be summarized as follows: -a.That the Applicant denies that the application is devoid of merit and reiterates that the application discloses sufficient factual and legal grounds warranting the intervention of this Honourable Court under Sections 362 and 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Articles 50(1), 165(6) and 165(7) of Constitution.b.That the applicable legal test in recusal proceedings is not proof of actual bias, but whether the facts and circumstances disclosed give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias from the perspective of a fair-minded and informed observer.c.That the Applicant specifically identified procedural and factual circumstances demonstrating reasonable apprehension of bias, including: -a.the dismissal of the Applicant's duly filed recusal application on grounds that it had allegedly “not been prosecuted” despite the application being properly on record and supported by affidavit evidence;b.failure by the trial Court to substantively address the factual allegations raised in support of the recusal application;c.procedural handling of the proceedings giving rise to an objective perception of unequal consideration of the parties' applications.d.That the Applicant's complaint is not founded merely on adverse rulings, but on the cumulative procedural conduct and failure to consider material placed before the trial Court, thereby raising legitimate concerns regarding impartial adjudication.e.That Article 50(1) of Constitution guarantees not only actual fairness, but also the appearance and perception of impartiality in judicial proceedings.f.That the Respondent has not controverted the factual matters deponed in the Supporting Affidavit, nor addressed the constitutional and procedural concerns raised by the Applicant.g.That the present application is properly before this Honourable Court and is neither frivolous nor an abuse of the Court process.h.That it is in the interests of justice and preservation of public confidence in the administration of justice that the orders sought be granted. 6.The Application was canvassed by way of written submissions. Applicants Written Submissions 7.I take note that at the time of writing this Ruling, a look at the Case Tracking System (CTS) and record of the Court indicates that the Applicant had not yet filed submissions. I will however determine the application on its merit. Respondents Written Submissions 8.The Respondent filed its written submissions dated 20th May 2026 through the Learned Prosecution Counsel Mr. Cosmas Kilambyo. Counsel submitted that bias was not demonstrated from the proceedings of the trial Court. He stated that a mere suspicion or fear for bias is not a basis enough to warrant a judicial officer to recuse himself or herself in the matter as the Bangalore Principles. He made reference to the case of R v R.D (1997) 118 CCC, 353. Counsel submitted that all Courts have a constitutional duty to undertake and only for good cause should a party apply or move the Court upon reasonable injury to disqualify himself. He made reference to the case of R v Mwalulu & 8 Others (2005) eKLR. 9.Counsel submitted that a look at the supporting affidavit paragraph 7(a) the Applicant stated that the prosecution applications or similar motions were routinely allowed but did not state which applications or motions were allowed by the trial Court. He also added that at paragraph 7(c) procedural delays for the prosecution were accommodated but the same was not specified. It was the Learned Prosecution Counsel’s submission that no reason of impartiality is cited or any other impropriety of the trial Court. He opined that what was in the applicant’s applications are allegations that the applicant is apprehensive that justice may not be done to the various alleged applications and rulings against the applicant by the trial Court. He urged the Court to dismiss the application. Analysis and Determination 10.I have read and considered the Notice of Motion Application, the Grounds of Opposition, the Reply to the Grounds of Opposition and the rival submissions. The only issue by this Honourable Court is: -Whether the Applicant has established grounds warranting the exercise of this Court's revisionary jurisdiction 11.The revisionary jurisdiction of the High Court is donated by Section 362 of the Criminal Procedure Code which provides that: -“ 362.The High Court may call for and examine the record of any criminal proceedings before any subordinate Court for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of any such subordinate Court." 12.It is therefore settled that the jurisdiction of revision is a limited jurisdiction. The Court does not sit as an appellate Court and cannot substitute its own views merely because it would have arrived at a different conclusion. The Court can only intervene where there is demonstrated illegality, impropriety, incorrectness or material irregularity in the proceedings of the subordinate Court. In the case of Joseph Nduvi Mbuvi v Republic [2019] eKLR, Odunga J. (as he then was) held that: -“In my view, the revisionary jurisdiction of the High Court should only be invoked where there are glaring acts or omissions ....As was stated by the High Court of Malaysia in Public Prosecutor v Muhari Bin Mohd Jani and Another [1996] 4 LRC 728 at 734, 735:-“The powers of the High Court in revision are amply provided under Section 325 of the Criminal Procedure Code subject only to subsections (ii) and (iii) thereof. The object of revisionary powers of the High Court is to confer upon the High Court a kind of “paternal or supervisory jurisdiction” in order to correct or prevent a miscarriage of justice. In a revision the main question to be considered is whether substantial justice has been done or will be done and whether any order made by the lower Court should be interfered with in the interest of justice. 13.The Applicant's complaint revolves around the alleged bias of the trial magistrate. The law regarding recusal of judicial officers is now settled. The test is not whether a litigant subjectively believes that a judicial officer is biased. The applicable standard is whether a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered all the facts, would conclude that there exists a real possibility or reasonable apprehension of bias. 14.The test for bias is objective and was framed around the question of whether a reasonable and informed observer, knowing all the relevant facts, would have a legitimate apprehension that a judge was not impartial. That principle has been established and refined through jurisprudence to ensure that the perception of fairness was maintained in the judicial process. The following considerations should be taken into account in examining whether the high threshold for proving bias: -a.Whether there was apprehension of bias, real or perceived.b.Whether a fair minded fully informed observer would reasonably apprehend the Judge might not be impartial.c.Whether there existed logical and sufficient connection between the circumstances and the apprehension.d.Whether the recusal application had been instituted in good faith. 15.It must equally be emphasized that the threshold for proving bias is high and for good reason. In the case of President of the Republic of South Africa v The South African Rugby Football Union & Others Case CCT 16/98 the Constitutional Court of South Africa quoted with approval the following sentiments of Cory J in R v S (RD) [1977] 3 SCR 484: -“Courts have rightly recognized that there is a presumption that judges will carry out their oath of office……This is one of the reasons why the threshold for a successful allegation of perceived judicial bias is high. However, despite this high threshold, the presumption can be displaced with cogent evidence’ that demonstrates that something the judge has done gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.” (Emphasis added) 16.Borrowing from the New Zealand Supreme Court decision in Saxmere Company Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Company Ltd [2009] NZSC 72, [2010] 1 NZLR 35 the Court noted thus;“The standard for recusal [on grounds of bias] is one of “real and not remote possibility”, rather than probability. The test is a two-stage one. The judge must consider: -a.First, what it is that might possibly lead to a reasonable apprehension by a fully informed observer that the judge might decide the case other than on its merits;b.Second, whether there is a “logical and sufficient connection” between those circumstances and that apprehension. 17.So far as concerns the ‘informed and fair-minded observer’ in whose eyes the potential for bias must be determined, the Court in Harb v HRH Prince Abdul Aziz bin Fahd bin Abdul Aziz [2016] EWCA Civ 556, the Court of Appeal (England and Wales) expressed itself thus: -“...We would however, emphasize two important points. First, the opinion of the notional informed and fair-minded observer is not to be confused with the opinion of the litigant. The 'real possibility' test is an objective test. It ensures that there is a measure of detachment in the assessment of whether there is a real possibility of bias….“The apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one held by reasonable and rightminded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information. The test is what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically - and having thought the matter through - conclude. This test contains twofold objective element: the person considering the alleged bias must be reasonable and the apprehension of bias itself must also be reasonable in the circumstances of the case. Further the reasonable person must be an informed person, with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances, including the traditions of integrity and impartiality that form a part of the background and apprised also of the fact that impartiality is one of the duties the judges swear to uphold.The reasonable person should also be taken to be aware of the social reality that forms the background to a particular case, such as societal awareness and acknowledgement of the prevalence of racism or gender bias in a particular community. The jurisprudence indicates that a real likelihood or probability of bias must be demonstrated and that a mere suspicion is not enough. The existence of a reasonable apprehension of bias depends entirely on the facts. The threshold for such a finding is high and the onus of demonstrating bias lies with the person who is alleging its existence." 18.Having examined the material placed before this Court, I am unable to find any factual basis upon which a reasonable apprehension of bias can be sustained. The Applicant alleges selective treatment of applications, yet he has not identified with precision the applications allegedly allowed in favour of the prosecution and those allegedly dismissed against him. No particulars have been provided to enable this Court assess whether the treatment complained of was indeed discriminatory or merely a consequence of the merits of the respective applications. 19.The Applicant further alleges that the trial Court consistently ruled against him. However, adverse rulings, without more, do not constitute evidence of bias. If every unsuccessful litigant were permitted to seek recusal merely because rulings had been rendered against him, the administration of justice would descend into chaos and judicial proceedings would become hostage to the preferences of dissatisfied litigants. 20.Courts have consistently held that a judicial officer's determination of issues before the Court, even where unfavorable to one party, cannot by itself be evidence of prejudice or predisposition. Judicial officers are required to make decisions. Inevitably, some decisions will favour one party and displease the other. Such dissatisfaction does not amount to proof of bias. 21.The Applicant has also complained that his recusal application was dismissed on the basis that it had not been prosecuted. The record reveals that the learned magistrate considered the circumstances surrounding the application and rendered a determination thereon. Whether that determination was correct or otherwise is not the issue before this Court. The question is whether the ruling discloses illegality, impropriety or material irregularity. From the record placed before this Court, no such illegality or impropriety has been demonstrated. 22.It is noteworthy that the Applicant has not pointed to any personal relationship between the judicial officer and any party, witness or advocate. Neither has he identified any extraneous conduct, remarks, interests or circumstances capable of objectively demonstrating partiality. What emerges from the application is a series of complaints arising from procedural and substantive decisions made during the course of the proceedings. 23.The constitutional right guaranteed under Article 50(1) of the Constitution is indeed the right to a fair and public hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. However, allegations that this right has been violated must be grounded upon objective and verifiable facts. The Court cannot infer bias merely because a party perceives the Court to be unfavorable to his case. This Court has also considered its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 165(6) and (7) of Constitution. While the High Court possesses broad supervisory powers over subordinate Courts, such powers are not intended to micro-manage ongoing proceedings or interfere with judicial discretion in the absence of demonstrated illegality or abuse of process. Intervention must be exercised sparingly and only where the interests of justice clearly demand. 24.The Applicant has invited this Court to stay the criminal proceedings pending the determination of the revision. Stay of criminal proceedings is a drastic remedy which ought to be granted only in exceptional circumstances. The Applicant has not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances warranting interruption of the criminal trial. On the contrary, the interests of justice demand that criminal proceedings proceed expeditiously in accordance with Article 159(2)(b) of Constitution which requires that justice shall not be delayed. 25.Upon examining the entire record and the grounds advanced by the Applicant, I am satisfied that the complaints raised amount to dissatisfaction with judicial decisions and case management directions issued by the trial Court. Such matters do not constitute proof of bias nor do they disclose any illegality, impropriety, incorrectness or irregularity capable of invoking this Court's revisionary jurisdiction under Sections 362 and 364 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 26.It is trite law that a Judge or a Magistrate may recuse himself or herself voluntarily but if recusal is demanded by a litigating party without a solid justification, it should be denied. The Applicant moved to the High Court for a plea for this Court to reinforce the aspect that the trial learned Magistrate has demonstrated bias and therefore there was fear of bias giving rise to this Court to review any such orders and order for a recusal and the matter to be placed before another trial Court with competent jurisdiction. The practice of the Court is the law of the Court. Every Court is the guardian of its own record and the master of its own practice and where a practice has existed it is convenient except in cases of extreme urgency and necessity to adhere to it, because it is the practice even though no reason can be assigned for it, for an inveterate practice in law generally stands upon principles that are founded in justice and convenience. (See Broom’s Legal Maxims, 10th Edn. Pg 82). 27.This is what the Supreme Court of the United States in John Patrick Liteky v United States 510 U.S 540 (1994) on the question of recusal based on extra judicial source doctrine. Thus:The judge who presides at a trial may, upon completion of the evidence, be exceedingly ill disposed towards the defendant, who has been shown to be a thoroughly reprehensible person. But the judge is not thereby recusable for bias or prejudice, since his knowledge and the opinion it produced were properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings, and are indeed sometimes (as in a bench trial) necessary to completion of the judge’s task. As Judge Jerome Frank pithily put it: “Impartiality is not gullibility. Disinterestedness does not mean child­like innocence. If the Judge did not form judgments of the actors in those courthouse dramas called trials, he could never render decisions.” In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 654 (CA2 1943). Also not subject to deprecatory characterization as “bias” or “prejudice” are opinions held by judges as a result of what they learned in earlier proceedings. It has long been regarded as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand, and to sit in successive trials involving the same defendant. It is wrong in theory, though it may not be too far off the mark as a practical matter, to suggest, as many opinions have, that “extrajudicial source” is the only basis for establishing disqualifying bias or prejudice. It is the only common basis, but not the exclusive one, since it is not the exclusive reason a predisposition can be wrongful or inappropriate. A favourable or unfavourable predisposition can also deserve to be characterized as “bias” or “prejudice” because, even though it springs from the facts adduced or the events occurring at trial, it is so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment. (That explains what some courts have called the “pervasive bias” exception to the “extrajudicial source” doctrine. See, e.g., Davis v. Board of School Comm’rs of Mobile County, 517 F.2d 1044, 1051 (CA5 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944, 96 S.Ct. 1685, 48 L.Ed.2d 188 (1976). For all these reasons, we think that the “extrajudicial source” doctrine, as we have described it, applies to § 455(a). As we have described it, however, there is not much doctrine to the doctrine. The fact that an opinion held by a judge derives from a source outside judicial proceedings is not a necessary condition for “bias or prejudice” recusal, since predisposition developed during the course of a trial will sometimes (albeit rarely) suffice. Nor is it a sufficient condition for “bias or prejudice” recusal, since some opinions acquired outside the context of judicial proceedings (for example, the judge’s view of the law acquired in scholarly reading) will not suffice. Since neither the presence of an extrajudicial source necessarily establishes bias, nor the absence of an extrajudicial source necessarily precludes bias, it would be better to speak of the existence of a significant (and often determinative) “extrajudicial source” factor, than of an “extrajudicial source doctrine, in recusal jurisprudence. The facts of the present case do not require us to describe the consequences of that factor in complete detail. It is enough for present purposes to say the following: First, judicial rulings along almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S., at 583, 86 S.Ct., at 1710. In and of themselves (i.e., apart from surrounding comments or accompanying opinion), they cannot possibly show reliance upon an extrajudicial source; and can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favouritism or antagonism required (as discussed below) when no extrajudicial source is involved. Almost invariably, they are proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal. Second, opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless the display a deep-seated favouritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favouritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible. An example of the latter (and perhaps of the former as well) is the statement that was alleged to have been made by the District Judge in Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 41 S.Ct.230, 65 L.Ed.481 (1921), a World War I espionage case against German­ American defendants; “One must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not [to be] prejudiced against the German Americans” because their “hearts are reeking with disloyality.” Id., at 28 (internal quotation marks omitted). Not establishing bias or partiality, however, are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display. A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration – even a stern and short­ tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration – remain immune. The term “extrajudicial source,” though not the interpretive doctrine bearing its name, has appeared in only one of our previous cases. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 86 S.Ct.1698, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966). Respondents in Grinnell alleged that the trial judge had a personal bias against them, and sought his disqualification and a new trial under 28 U.S.C. § 144. That statute, like § 455(b)(1), requires disqualification for “bias or prejudice”. In denying respondents’ claim, the Court stated that “[t]he alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.” 384 U.S., at 583, 86 S.Ct., at 1710.” 28.The Applicant in this case moved the High Court to disqualify the trial learned Magistrate from hearing the matter on grounds of bias. This Court had the advantage to look into detail the entire record with scrutiny to establish whether any orders which have been made fall within the ground of bias of a Judicial Officer. In the real sense of the law, bias may bed defined as a preconceived opinion or a predisposition or predetermination to decide a case or an issue in a particular manner so much so that such predisposition does not leave the mind open to conviction. It is in fact a condition of the mind which sways judgments and renders the Judge or the Magistrate unable to exercise impartiality in a particular case. It always believed and truly so that Judicial Officers may it be Magistrates and Judges are bound by the oath of office and the essential requirement of that oath is that they will adjudicate cases with impartiality and neutrality by applying their minds to the facts of the case presented by either the Plaintiff or the Defendant. 29.In this very same subject the persuasive case in Linahan, in re, 138 F 2d 650 Frank J opined as follows: “If however bias and partiality be defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions in the mind of the Judge or Magistrate then no one has had a fair trial and no one will. The human mind, even at infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are born with predispositions, much harm is done by the myth that merely by taking an oath of office as a Judge or Magistrate, a man ceases to be human and strips himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless thinking machine” (See also Griffith and Street, Principles of Administrative Law (1973 Edn.) p 155. 30.What these principles imply is that I find no cogent evidence that the trial Magistrate has prejudged the facts of the case specifically relating to the Applicant and that generally by application of the law, policy or discretion there would be a manifestation of prejudice or injustice to the Applicant. It is a rule of thumb that an institution has to function within certain parameters and that is why there are precedents, rules and conventions. Am therefore unable to find any evidence in which judicial discretion of a Superior Court in which I preside over can disqualify the learned Trial Magistrate on grounds of bias or conflict of interest. 31.Consequently, I find that the Applicant has failed to establish any basis upon which this Court may interfere with the ruling delivered on 3rd March 2026 or order the recusal of the learned trial Magistrate. In the premises the following orders do issue: -a.The Notice of Motion dated 4th March 2026 lacks merit and is hereby dismissed in its entirety.b.The stay of proceedings sought is declined.c.The proceedings in Vihiga CMCR Case No. MCCR/E559/2024 shall proceed before the trial Court before the same Magistrate unless otherwise lawfully directed by this Court.d.Orders accordingly. DATED AND DELIVERED AT VIHIGA VIA CTS THIS 9TH DAY OF JUNE 2026....................R. NYAKUNDIJUDGE