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Kinyua v Republic (Criminal Appeal E105 of 2024) [2026] KEHC 11991 (KLR) (24 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 11991 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Meru Criminal Appeal E105 of 2024 RA Oganyo, J July 24, 2026 Between Frankline Kinyua Appellant and Republic Respondent (Being an appeal against the Judgement and Sentencing of Hon E. K Chesoni (RM) delivered on 15th October 2024 in the Chief Magistrate Court at Maua in Criminal Case No MCSO E041 of 2022) Judgment 1.This is an appeal by the appellant against the conviction and sentence from the decision of the Magistrate Court at Maua before Hon E. K. Chesoni in which the appellant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for the offence of Incest contrary to Section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act No. 3 of 2006 2.Being aggrieved by the entire judgment of the trial court, the appellant lodged the present appeal through the Amended Supplementary Grounds of Appeal dated 12th September 2025, setting out the following grounds of appeal:1.That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to note that the charge sheet is defective2.That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to inform the appellant his right of representation as enshrined in Article 50(2)(g)(h) of the constitution, thus the appellant was not accorded a fair trial.3.That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to note that the sentence is harsh and excessive in the circumstances of this case. The offenc3 of incest does carry mandatory sentence, the words used is “liable to”.4.That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to note that the prosecution failed to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt.5.That the learned magistrate erred in both matters of law and facts by failing to consider the appellant defense. Background 3.The facts giving rise to this appeal is that the Appellant was charged with the offence of incest contrary to section 20(1) of the sexual offences act and an alternative offence of committing an indecent act with a child contrary to section 11(1) of the sexual offences act. The Appellant pleaded not guilty and the case proceeded to hearing. 4.The prosecution called six witnesses in support of its case. PW1, Belinda Gachui, the complainant, gave unsworn evidence after a voire dire examination. She testified that the accused, who was her biological father, repeatedly defiled her by undressing both of them at night before inserting his penis into her vagina. She stated that the abuse began before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and continued on several occasions over an extended period. According to PW1, the accused threatened to beat her and kill her with a panga if she disclosed the abuse to anyone. She further testified that she eventually disclosed the incidents to PW4, PK, after PW4 noticed that she appeared withdrawn and in low spirits and enquired about her wellbeing. During cross-examination, PW1 denied that she had been coached or influenced to falsely implicate the accused and maintained that the abuse had commenced before the COVID-19 pandemic. In re-examination, she reiterated that she had not been forced or coached to testify against the accused and affirmed that she was giving a truthful account of the events. 5.PW2, Monicah Kaliungu, testified that she learnt of the matter from PW4 before personally interviewing the complainant. The child narrated that the accused would undress her, apply oil to her private parts, and thereafter penetrate her. The complainant also informed PW2 that the accused had threatened to beat and kill her if she reported the abuse. PW2 reported the matter to the area Chief and subsequently to the police before accompanying the complainant to Nyambene Sub-County Hospital for medical examination. PW3, Rebecca Maula, corroborated the complainant's account, stating that the child informed her that the accused would give her food, instruct her to undress, apply Vaseline to both their private parts, penetrate her, and thereafter pour water on her private parts. PW3 assisted in reporting the matter to the authorities and later identified and produced the complainant's treatment notes, PRC Form, P3 Form and age assessment report before the court 6.PW4, PK, testified that on 29 August 2022 the complainant visited her home looking weak, sleepy and in pain. Upon inquiry, the child disclosed that her father had been lying on top of her and inserting his penis into her vagina. PW4 gave the child food and pain medication before informing PW2, who assisted in reporting the matter to the police. PW5, Rose Kambura, a Clinical Officer at Nyambene Sub-County Hospital, testified that she examined the complainant on 6 September 2022. The complainant reported that the accused had sexually abused her for approximately two years, the last incident having occurred on 31 August 2022. On examination, PW5 observed bruises on the complainant's genitalia and bloody vaginal discharge. She completed the treatment notes, PRC Form and P3 Form, while the age assessment established that the complainant was eight years old. She clarified that although the medical findings confirmed sexual assault, she could not identify the perpetrator through medical examination because the accused had not been examined. 7.PW6, Police Constable Agnes Kawira, testified that she received the complaint from the complainant and the accompanying witnesses, recorded the report, facilitated the complainant's medical examination, and subsequently arrested and charged the accused with incest. She further testified that investigations did not reveal any prior disagreement between the accused and the prosecution witnesses that could have motivated a false accusation. The prosecution marked its case closed. 8.The learned trial magistrate delivered a ruling on 21st March 2023, holding that the prosecution had established a prima facie case against the Appellant and accordingly placed him on his defence. 9.When placed on his defence, the appellant gave sworn testimony denying the allegations. He contended that the complainant had been coached by PW4 and the child's mother to falsely implicate him. He further alleged that the charges were fabricated because of disagreements with PW4 concerning the complainant's care and school attendance and were also intended to deny him his alleged inheritance from his late maternal grandmother. During cross-examination, however, he conceded that he had never reported these alleged disputes to either the Chief or the police. The Appellant did not call any other witness, and the defence case was accordingly closed. 10.The trial court found that the prosecution had proved all the essential ingredients of the offence of incest. It was satisfied that the prosecution had established the relationship between the Appellant and the complainant, penetration, the identity of the Appellant as the perpetrator, and the age of the complainant. The court further found that the Appellant's defence did not displace the prosecution's case and consequently convicted him. 11.The learned trial magistrate went to hold on as follows:“The present court finds the prosecution case credible and corroborated by medical evidence. I find the accused’s evidence unconvincing and it did not shake or weaken the overwhelming prosecution evidence. I do therefore find that the prosecution has proved it’s case to the standard beyond reasonable doubt and proceed to convict him under Section 215 Criminal Procedure Code for the offence of incest contrary to section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act No. 03 of 2006.” Appellant’s Submissions 12.The Appellant submits that the learned trial magistrate erred in both law and fact by failing to find that the charge sheet was defective. He argues that whereas the charge sheet stated that the offence was committed on 27th August 2022, the prosecution evidence, particularly that of the clinical officer, indicated that the last alleged incident occurred on 31st August 2022. The complainant also failed to state the exact date of the alleged offence in her testimony. The Appellant contends that the prosecution ought to have amended the charge under Section 214 of the Criminal Procedure Code to reflect that the offence occurred on diverse dates between 2020 and 31st August 2022. He relies on Isaac Omambia v Republic [1995] eKLR, arguing that the variance between the charge and the evidence prejudiced his defence, rendered the charge incurably defective, and occasioned a miscarriage of justice. 13.The Appellant further contends that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial because the trial court failed to inform him of his right to legal representation under Article 50(2)(g) and (h) of the Constitution and the Legal Aid Act, 2016. Relying on Pett v Greyhound Racing Association Ltd (1968) 2All ER 545 Association, he submits that legal representation is essential to ensure a fair trial, particularly in serious criminal cases where substantial injustice may arise. He also argues that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt as required under Article 50(2)(a) of the Constitution and the principles set out in Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] All ER 373, and that the trial court failed to properly consider his defence before convicting him. 14.On sentence, the Appellant argues that the learned trial magistrate misdirected herself by treating life imprisonment under Section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act as mandatory. He submits that the phrase "liable to imprisonment for life" confers judicial discretion and does not require the imposition of the maximum sentence in every case. In support of this position, he relies on Kichanjale S/O Ndamungu v Republic (1941) 8 EACA 64, Opoya v Uganda [1967] EA 752, and Shadrack Kipchoge Kogo v Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 253 of 2003. The Appellant maintains that, being a first offender and there being no aggravating circumstances to justify the maximum penalty, the life sentence imposed was harsh and excessive, and therefore urges the Court to quash both the conviction and sentence and set him at liberty. Points of Determination 15.I have carefully considered the record of appeal, the grounds of appeal, the written submissions by the Appellant, the judgment of the trial court, and the applicable law. In my view, the following issues arise for determination:i.Whether the charge sheet was defective.ii.Whether the Appellant's right to a fair trial, particularly the right to legal representation under Article 50(2)(g) and (h) of the Constitution, was violated.iii.Whether the prosecution proved the offence beyond reasonable doubt and whether the trial court properly considered the Appellant's defence.iv.Whether the sentence of life imprisonment was lawful, appropriate, and proportionate in the circumstances. Analysis and Determination 16.This being a first appellate court, the Court is duty-bound to re-evaluate and re-analyse the evidence adduced before the trial court and arrive at its own independent conclusions, while bearing in mind that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses testify and must therefore give due allowance for that fact. This principle was enunciated in Okeno v Republic [1972] EA 32, where the Court held as follows:“An appellant on a first appeal is entitled to expect the evidence as a whole to be submitted to a fresh and exhaustive examination (Pandya v. R., [1957] E.A. 336) and to the appellate court's own decision on the evidence. The first appellate court must itself weigh conflicting evidence and draw its own conclusions (Shantilal M. Ruwala v. R., [1957] E.A. 570). It is not the function of a first appellate court merely to scrutinize the evidence to see if there was some evidence to support the lower court's findings and conclusions; it must make its own findings and draw its own conclusions. Only then can it decide whether the magistrate's findings should be supported. In doing so, it should make allowance for the fact that the trial court has had the advantage of hearing and seeing the witnesses, see Peters v. Sunday Post, [1958] E.A. 424.” 17.The Appellant was charged with and convicted of the offence of incest contrary to Section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act, which provides that:“Any male person who commits an indecent act or an act which causes penetration with a female person who is to his knowledge his daughter, granddaughter, sister, mother, niece, aunt or grandmother is guilty of an offence termed incest and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years:Provided that, if it is alleged in the information or charge and proved that the female person is under the age of eighteen years, the accused person shall be liable to imprisonment for life and it shall be immaterial that the act which causes penetration or the indecent act was obtained with the consent of the female person.” 18.We now turn to the first point of determination namely, on whether the charge sheet was defective. 19.The Appellant submitted that the charge sheet was defective on the ground that the date of the alleged offence as stated in the particulars was inconsistent with the evidence adduced at the trial. He contended that whereas the charge sheet alleged that the offence was committed on 27th August 2022, the evidence of the prosecution, particularly that of the clinical officer, indicated that the complainant reported that the last alleged incident occurred on 31st August 2022. It was therefore the Appellant's contention that the prosecution ought to have amended the charge sheet to reflect that the offence was committed on diverse dates between 2020 and 31st August 2022 pursuant to Section 214 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 20.The charge sheet dated 7th September 2022 charged the Appellant with the offence of Incest contrary to Section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act. The particulars of the offence stated as follows:“Kinyua Frankline: On the 27th day of August 2022 at unknown hours at Kalaone Village, Thitha Location, Athiru Ruujine, Igembe Central, Meru County, wilfully and unlawfully caused penetration of his penis to penetrate the vagina of a seven (7) year old girl.” 21.Section 134 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that:“Every charge or information shall contain, and shall be sufficient if it contains, a statement of the specific offence or offences with which the accused person is charged, together with such particulars as may be necessary for giving reasonable information as to the nature of the offence charged." 22.The Court of Appeal in Bernard Ombuna v Republic [2019] eKLR underscored the rationale behind this provision in the following terms:“It is trite that an accused person is entitled to not only be charged with an offence recognized under the law but also to be furnished with all the necessary details of the offence so as to enable him appreciate the nature of the charge(s) against him and to prepare an appropriate defence. The converse would prejudice an accused person's right to a fair trial contrary to Article 50(2)(b) of the Constitution. This is the rationale behind Section 134 of the Criminal Procedure Code which stipulates: 'Every charge or information shall contain, and shall be sufficient if it contains, a statement of the specific offence or offences with which the accused person is charged, together with such particulars as may be necessary for giving reasonable information as to the nature of the offence charged.'" 23.Section 214(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code further provides that a variance between the charge and the evidence adduced in support thereof with respect to the time at which the alleged offence was committed is not material and the charge need not be amended if it is proved that the proceedings were instituted within the time prescribed by law. Similarly, Section 382 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides:“Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on appeal or revision on account of an error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, charge, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during the trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under this Code, unless the error, omission or irregularity has occasioned a failure of justice. Provided that in determining whether an error, omission or irregularity has occasioned a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the question whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings." 24.I have carefully considered the Appellant's contention alongside the evidence on record. The complainant testified that the acts of sexual abuse occurred over a period of time, while the clinical officer testified that the complainant reported that the last incident occurred on 31st August 2022. In my view, the variance between the date stated in the charge sheet and the date emerging from the evidence did not alter the nature of the charge facing the Appellant. The charge clearly disclosed the offence of incest contrary to Section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act and sufficiently informed the Appellant of the case he was required to answer. The record further demonstrates that the Appellant understood the charge, pleaded to it, actively participated in the trial by cross-examining the prosecution witnesses, and tendered his defence. He has not demonstrated how the discrepancy in the dates prejudiced the preparation or conduct of his defence or occasioned a failure of justice. 25.The statutory curative position under Section 382 of the Criminal Procedure Code is replicated in Section 214(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which expressly provides that a variance between the charge and the evidence as to the time when the alleged offence was committed is not material and does not necessitate an amendment of the charge, provided the proceedings were instituted within the time limited by law. I am therefore of the considered view that the discrepancy in the dates as contained in the charge sheet and as disclosed by the evidence did not occasion a miscarriage of justice. 26.Consequently, I find that this ground of appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed. 27.Turning now to the second point of determination namely, on whether the Appellant’s right to a fair trial, particularly the right to legal representation under Article 50(2)(g) and (h) of the Constitution, was violated. 28.The Appellant submitted that the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to inform him of his right to legal representation as guaranteed under Article 50(2)(g) and (h) of the Constitution. He contended that he was neither informed of his right to choose and be represented by an advocate nor informed of his right to have an advocate assigned to him by the State at State expense where substantial injustice would otherwise result. It was his contention that this omission infringed his constitutional right to a fair trial. 29.Article 50(2)(g) and (h) of the Constitution provides that every accused person has the right to a fair trial, which includes the right—“(g)to choose, and be represented by, an advocate, and to be informed of this right promptly; and(h)to have an advocate assigned to the accused person by the State and at State expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly." 30.The Court of Appeal in David Njoroge Macharia v Republic [2011] eKLR held that the right to legal representation at State expense is not absolute and only arises where substantial injustice would otherwise result. The Court stated:“State funded legal representation is a right in certain instances... We are of the considered view that in addition to situations where substantial injustice would otherwise result, persons accused of capital offences where the penalty is loss of life have the right to legal representation at State expense. We would not go so far as to suggest that every accused person convicted of a capital offence since the coming into effect of the new Constitution would automatically be entitled to a retrial where no such legal representation was provided." 31.Similarly, in Karisa Chengo & 2 Others v Republic, Criminal Appeals Nos. 44, 45 & 76 of 2014, the Court emphasised that although the right to legal representation is fundamental, State-funded legal representation is only mandatory where substantial injustice would otherwise be occasioned. The Court observed that substantial injustice does not arise merely because an accused person faces a serious charge, but where the absence of legal representation compromises the fairness of the trial. 32.I have carefully considered the record of the trial court. While the record does not indicate that the Appellant was expressly informed of his rights under Article 50(2)(g) and (h) of the Constitution, that omission, by itself, is not sufficient to vitiate the proceedings. The court must determine whether the omission occasioned substantial injustice or otherwise prejudiced the Appellant's right to a fair trial. 33.The record demonstrates that the Appellant understood the charge facing him and actively participated throughout the trial. He cross-examined all the prosecution witnesses and gave a sworn defence. There is nothing on record to suggest that he was unable to understand the proceedings or that his defence was compromised by the absence of legal representation. Although the offence carried the possibility of life imprisonment, the Appellant has not demonstrated that the trial court's failure to inform him of his rights under Article 50(2)(g) and (h) occasioned substantial injustice or prejudiced his defence. The record shows that he fully participated in the proceedings and understood the case he was required to answer. 34.Although this Court reiterates that trial courts ought to comply with Article 50(2)(g) and (h) of the Constitution by promptly informing every accused person of the right to legal representation, the omission in the present case did not occasion a miscarriage of justice or render the trial unfair. 35.Accordingly, I find that this ground of appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed. 36.Moving to the third point of determination namely whether the prosecution proved the offence beyond reasonable doubt and whether the trial court properly considered the Appellant’s defence. 37.It is trite law that the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution throughout the trial, and the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. In Republic v Koech & Another (Criminal Case No. 63 of 2019) [2024] KEHC 13581 (KLR), while reiterating the English law position on reasonable doubt, the Court stated:“It is the business of the prosecution to bring home the guilt of the accused to the satisfaction of the minds of the jury; but the doubt to the benefit of which the accused is entitled must be such as rational thinking, sensible men fairly and reasonably entertain, not the doubt of a vacillating mind that has not the moral courage to decide but shelters itself in a vain and idle skepticism. There must be doubt which a man may honestly and conscientiously entertain.” 38.Similarly, in Kioko v Republic (1983) KLR 289, the Court of Appeal held that the law does not require an accused person to prove his innocence except in the limited circumstances provided under Section 111 of the Evidence Act. The prosecution must prove every essential ingredient of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. 39.Section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act defines the offence of incest as follows:Any male person who commits an indecent act or an act which causes penetration with a female person who is to his knowledge his daughter, granddaughter, sister, mother, niece, aunt or grandmother is guilty of an offence termed incest and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years: Provided that, if it is alleged in the information or charge and proved that the female person is under the age of eighteen years, the accused person shall be liable to imprisonment for life, and it shall be immaterial that the act which causes penetration or the indecent act was obtained with the consent of the female person. 40.In FOD v Republic [2014] eKLR, the Court held that, unlike the offence of defilement where penetration must be proved, the offence of incest is established by proving either penetration or an indecent act together with the prohibited relationship between the accused and the complainant. 41.Further, in MG v Republic (Criminal Appeal E051 of 2021) [2022] KEHC 14454 (KLR), the Court held that the prosecution must prove the following ingredients of the offence of incest: i. That the offender is a relative of the victim; ii. Penetration or an indecent act; iii. Identification of the perpetrator; and iv. The age of the victim. 42.The Appellant contended that the prosecution failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt and that the trial court failed to properly evaluate his defence. He argued that the prosecution evidence was inconsistent and insufficient to sustain a conviction. 43.As a first appellate court, I have independently re-evaluated the entire evidence on record. The complainant gave clear, consistent and credible evidence that the Appellant, who was her biological father, repeatedly sexually abused her. Her testimony was corroborated by the medical evidence, which confirmed penetration, as well as by the evidence of the other prosecution witnesses. The relationship between the Appellant and the complainant was not disputed, thereby satisfying the relationship element under Section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act. 44.The evidence on record also established the identity of the Appellant as the perpetrator. The complainant positively identified him as her father, and this was corroborated by the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. In addition, the Appellant himself admitted in his defence that the complainant was his biological daughter. There was therefore no possibility of mistaken identity. 45.The prosecution also proved the age of the complainant. The evidence adduced at trial established that she was below the age of eighteen years at the time of the commission of the offence, thereby bringing the case within the proviso to Section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act. 46.I have also considered the Appellant's defence. The trial court properly analysed the defence and correctly found that it amounted to a mere denial, which did not displace the cogent and consistent evidence adduced by the prosecution or raise any reasonable doubt. 47.Having independently re-evaluated the entire evidence, I am satisfied that the prosecution proved all the essential ingredients of the offence of incest beyond reasonable doubt. I find no basis to interfere with either the conviction or the findings of the trial court on this issue. 48.Accordingly, this ground of appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed. 49.Lastly, the issue for determination is whether the sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon the Appellant was lawful, appropriate, and proportionate in the circumstances of the case. 50.The Appellant submitted that the sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the trial court was harsh and excessive. It was his contention that although Section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act provides that where the victim is below the age of eighteen years the accused person shall be liable to imprisonment for life, the provision does not prescribe a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment but instead grants the court discretion in determining an appropriate sentence. 51.The proviso to Section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act provides as follows:“Provided that, if it is alleged in the information or charge and proved that the female person is under the age of eighteen years, the accused person shall be liable to imprisonment for life and it shall be immaterial that the act which causes penetration or the indecent act was obtained with the consent of the female person.” 52.The Court of Appeal in MK v Republic [2015] eKLR considered the interpretation of the phrase “shall be liable to imprisonment for life” under Section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act. The Court held that the proviso does not create a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, but merely provides the maximum sentence that may be imposed by the court. The Court observed that the use of the words “shall be liable” does not remove the court’s discretion in sentencing. 53.The Court of Appeal further considered the meaning of the phrase “shall be liable” in Opoya v Uganda (1967) EA 752, where it interpreted the words “shall be liable on conviction to suffer death.” The Court held that, in the construction of penal provisions, the words “shall be liable” do not impose a mandatory sentence but prescribe the maximum penalty available. The court therefore retains discretion to impose an appropriate sentence depending on the circumstances of each case. 54.In AIN v Republic [2021] KEHC 2388 (KLR), the High Court considered a similar case involving the offence of incest contrary to Section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act where the Appellant had been sentenced to life imprisonment. The Court held that life imprisonment was not mandatory and substituted the sentence with a definite term of imprisonment, taking into account the circumstances of the offence. 55.In the present case, it is not disputed that the Appellant was convicted of the offence of incest contrary to Section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act involving his biological daughter, who was below the age of eighteen years. The offence was serious and involved a violation of the trust and protection expected within a parent-child relationship. The tender age of the complainant and the circumstances surrounding the offence called for a severe and deterrent sentence. 56.However, the trial court was required to exercise its sentencing discretion judiciously and consider all relevant factors, including the circumstances of the offence, the mitigation by the Appellant, and the principle of proportionality in sentencing. The maximum sentence of life imprisonment ought to be imposed only after due consideration of all the circumstances of the case. 57.This being an appellate court, its power to interfere with a sentence imposed by the trial court is limited. The Appellant must demonstrate that the trial court acted on wrong principles, failed to consider relevant factors, or that the sentence imposed was manifestly harsh and excessive. 58.Having considered the seriousness of the offence, the age of the complainant, the circumstances under which the offence was committed, and the applicable principles of sentencing, I find that although the Appellant deserved a severe sentence, life imprisonment was not the only sentence available under Section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act. 59.Guided by the decision of the Court of Appeal in MK v Republic [2015] eKLR, and considering the indeterminate nature of a life sentence as considered in Evans Nyamari Ayako v Republic, Kisumu Court of Appeal Criminal Appeal No. 22 of 2018 (UR), I find that the sentence of life imprisonment ought to be substituted with a definite term of imprisonment that is proportionate to the circumstances of this case. 60.Accordingly, the appeal against sentence succeeds to the limited extent that the sentence of life imprisonment is set aside and substituted with a term sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment.Orders Accordingly. Disposition1.The appeal against conviction is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.2.The conviction of the Appellant for the offence of incest contrary to Section 20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act is hereby upheld.3.The appeal against sentence is allowed to the limited extent that the sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the trial court is set aside and substituted with a term of thirty (30) years’ imprisonment.4.The sentence of thirty (30) years’ imprisonment shall take effect from the date of sentencing by the trial court.Right of appeal 14 days. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY ON TEAMS AT NAIROBI ON THIS 24TH DAY OF JULY, 2026.……………………………HON. R. A. OGANYO, MRS.JUDGE.In the Presence of; -Court Assistant…E, SanaCourt Prosecutor……Appellant…….