[2020] KEHC 8534 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS

CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3 OF 2020

(Coram: Odunga, J)

GABRIEL MWAKA MUSAU……....…………………………..APPLICANT

VERSUS

REPUBLIC….…………………………………………………RESPONDENT

JUDGEMENT

1. The applicant herein, Gabriel Mwaka Musau,was charged before Machakos CM’s Court in Criminal Case No. 1657 of 2008 with the offence of Defilement contrary to section 8(1) as read with section 8(3) of the Sexual Offences Act (the Act). He was convicted and sentenced to serve 25 years imprisonment. In imposing the said sentence, the trial court noted that the offence with which he was charged carries a minimum sentence of 20 years. The Court however took into account the fact that sexual offences were rampant in Machakos County.

2. The Applicant appealed to this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 65 of 2016 and after hearing the said appeal, Muriithi, J found that the offence that was proved by the prosecution was defilement contrary to section 8(1) as read with section 8(4) of the same Act which carries a minimum of 15 years. He therefore quashed the conviction of the Applicant under section 8(3) of the Act and substituted therefor a conviction under section 8(4) thereof. He proceeded to sentence the Applicant to serve 15 years from 4th April, 2014, the date of the sentence before the trial Court.

3. The only issue before this court in this application is whether in meting the sentence against the applicant the period when the applicant was in custody ought to have been taken into account.

4. In his judgement the learned judge did not mention the duration the applicant had been in custody in meting out the sentence. The proviso to section 333(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code provides as hereunder:

(1) A warrant under the hand of the judge or magistrate by whom a person is sentenced to imprisonment, ordering that the sentence shall be carried out in any prison within Kenya, shall be issued by the sentencing judge or magistrate, and shall be full authority to the officer in charge of the prison and to all other persons for carrying into effect the sentence described in the warrant, not being a sentence of death.

(2) Subject to the provisions of section 38 of the Penal Code every sentence shall be deemed to commence from, and to include the whole of the day of, the date on which it was pronounced, except where otherwise provided in this Code.

Provided that where the person sentenced under subsection (1) has, prior to such sentence, been held in custody, the sentence shall take account of the period spent in custody.

5. It is therefore clear that it is mandatory that the period which an accused has been held in custody prior to being sentenced must be taken into account in meting out the sentence. While the court may in its discretion decide that the sentence shall run from the date of sentencing or conviction, it is my view that in departing from the above provisions, the court is obliged to give reasons for doing so. However, where the sentence does not indicate the date from which it ought to run the presumption must be in favour of the accused that the same will be computed inclusive of the period spent in custody.

6. I associate myself with the decision in Ahamad Abolfathi Mohammed & Another vs. Republic [2018] eKLR where the Court of Appeal held that:

“The second is the failure by the court to take into account in a meaningful way, the period that the appellants had spent in custody as required by section 333(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. By dint of section 333(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the court was obliged to take into account the period that they had spent in custody before they were sentenced. Although the learned judge stated that he had taken into account the period the appellants had been in custody, he ordered that their sentence shall take effect from the date of their conviction by the trial court. With respect, there is no evidence that the court took into account the period already spent by the appellants in custody. “Taking into account” the period spent in custody must mean considering that period so that the imposed sentence is reduced proportionately by the period already spent in custody. It is not enough for the court to merely state that it has taken into account the period already spent in custody and still order the sentence to run from the date of the conviction because that amounts to ignoring altogether the period already spent in custody. It must be remembered that the proviso to section 333(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code was introduced in 2007 to give the court power to include the period already spent in custody in the sentence that it metes out to the accused person. We find that the first appellate court misdirected itself in that respect and should have directed the appellants’ sentence of imprisonment to run from the date of their arrest on 19th June 2012. ”[Emphasis mine].

7. The same Court in Bethwel Wilson Kibor vs. Republic [2009] eKLR expressed itself as follows:

“By proviso to section 333(2) of Criminal Procedure Code where a person sentenced has been held in custody prior to such sentence, the sentence shall take account of the period spent in custody. Ombija, J. who sentenced the appellant did not specifically state that he had taken into account the 9 years period that the appellant had been in custody. The appellant told us that as at 22nd September, 2009 he had been in custody for ten years and one month. We think that all these incidents ought to have been taken into account in assessing sentence. In view of the foregoing we are satisfied that the appellant has been sufficiently punished. We therefore allow this appeal and reduce the sentence to the period that the appellant has already served. He is accordingly to be set free forthwith unless otherwise lawfully held.”

8. According to The JudiciarySentencing Policy Guidelines:

The proviso to section 333 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code obligates the court to take into account the time already served in custody if the convicted person had been in custody during the trial. Failure to do so impacts on the overall period of

detention which may result in an excessive punishment that is not proportional to the offence committed. In determining the period of imprisonment that should be served by an offender,

the court must take into account the period in which the offender was held in custody during the trial.

9. From the record the applicant was arrested on 4th December, 2012 and though he was admitted to bail on 5th December, 2012, he was not released on bond until 1st March, 2013 when his surety was approved. He was on bond until 4th April, 2014 when he was sentenced.

10. In the circumstances, I direct that in computing the 15 years that the Applicant was sentenced to serve, the period between 4th December, 2012 and 1st March, 2013 shall be taken into account.

11. It is so ordered.

Judgement read, signed and delivered in open Court at Machakos this 12th day of February, 2020.

G V ODUNGA

JUDGE

Delivered in the presence of:

Applicant in person

Ms Mogoi for the Respondent

CA Geoffrey