Gachuba v Kenya Institute of Supplies Management & 2 others (Petition E551 of 2021) [2026] KEHC 10749 (KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights) (9 July 2026) (Judgment)

Gachuba v Kenya Institute of Supplies Management & 2 others (Petition E551 of 2021) [2026] KEHC 10749 (KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights) (9 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 10749 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts) Constitutional and Human Rights Petition E551 of 2021 RE Aburili, J July 9, 2026 IN THE MATTER OF: ARTICLE 22 (1) (2) (b) (c), 23 (1) (3), 48, 50 (1),159 (2) (e), 165 (3) (a) (b) (6) & (7) AND 258 (1) (2) (b) (c) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010 AND IN THE MATTER OF: RULE 10 (1) (2) AND 11 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS) PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE RULES, 2013 AND IN THE MATTER OF: SECTION 5, 13, 15 (3), 16, 20 AND 36 OF THE SUPPLIES PRACTITIONERS’ MANAGEMENT ACT, 2007 AND IN THE MATTER OF: SECTION 5 (1) (g) OF THE UNIVERSITIES ACT, 2012 AND IN THE MATTER OF: SECTION 8 (1) (k) OF THE KENYA NATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS FRAMEWORK ACT, 2014. AND IN THE MATTER OF: SECTION 2 (1) AND 47 (1) OF THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND ASSET DISPOSAL ACT, 2015ANDIN THE MATTER OF: REGISTERED AND LICENSED SUPPLIES PRACTITIONERS AND IN THE MATTER OF: THE ALLEGED CONTRAVENTION OF ARTICLE 1 (1) (2), 3 (1), 10 (1) (2) (a) (c), 27 (1), 35 (1) (b) (2), 36 (1), 46 (1) (3), 47 (1) (2) AND 232 (1) (a) (c) (e) (f) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010 Between Mwaniki Gachuba Petitioner and Kenya Institute of Supplies Management 1st Respondent Kenya Institute of Supplies Examinations Board 2nd Respondent Cabinet Secretary, National Treasury & Planning 3rd Respondent Judgment The parties 1.The Petitioner is Mr. Mwaniki Gachuba presents the Petition on his own behalf, on behalf of all members of the 1st Respondent and in public interest, the Kenya Institute of Supplies Management. 2.The 1st Respondent Kenya Institute of Supplies Management is a body corporate established under Section 3 of the Supplies Practitioners Management Act, 2007. 3.The 2nd Respondent, Kenya Institute of Supplies Examinations Board is a body corporate established under Section 12 of the Supplies Practitioners Management Act, 2007. 4.The 3rd Respondent is the Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Finance & National Treasury of National Treasury & Planning. 5.Summative, the Petitioner’s claim is that the professional, regulatory and training structures of the supply chain management sector in Kenya are chaotic, uncoordinated and constitutionally invalid. 6.The Respondents oppose the Petition in its entirety and contend that the modern regulatory framework is robust, actively operationalized and that the Petition represents a highly personalized grievance disguised as a public interest suit, designed to circumvent ongoing administrative reform processes. The Petition 7.The amended Petition is dated 31st December 2021 and is anchored on the grounds on the face thereof, supported by the Petitioner’s affidavit sworn on even date. The Petitioner seeks the following reliefs:1.Declaration that the Respondents abrogated the rule of law and fair administrative action under Article 10 (2) (a) and 47(1) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 by failing to perform their respective functions particularized under Section 5, 13, 15(3), 16 and 36 of the Supplies Practitioners Management Act, 2007.2.Declaration that Diplomas awarded by the Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply of UK or any other foreign institution are academic qualifications and registration and licensing based on such qualification alone is invalid.3.Declaration Diplomas awarded by the Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply of UK or any other foreign institution require recognition and equation by the Commission for University Education before they are admitted in Kenya.4.Declaration that any registration and licensing of members by the 1st Respondents based on Diplomas awarded by the Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply of UK or any other foreign institutions or universities without recognition and equation by the Commission for University Education is unlawful and invalid.5.Declaration that the registration and licensing of members based on academic qualifications only is invalid.6.Declaration that the Certified Procurement and Supply Professionals of Kenya (CPSP-K) and Associate in Procurement and Supply of Kenya (APS-K) training courses and examinations conducted by the 2nd Respondent and the certificates issued thereof are unlawful and invalid.7.Declaration that the registration and licensing of members without ascertaining the genuineness of their academic qualifications, moral fitness and technical capacity is unlawful and invalid.8.Declaration that the registration and licensing of supplies practitioners is inconsistent with Section 13 (1) and 16 of the Supplies Practitioner Management Act, 2007 and Section 2(1) and 47 (1) of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2015 and is therefore invalid.9.Declaration that the List of Procurement Members and the List of Procurement Licensed Practitioners issued by the 1st Respondent are unlawful and invalid.10.Declaration that all Certificates of Registration and all Practice Licences issued by the 1st Respondent are invalid and set aside.11.Declaration that Gazette Notice No. 14138 dated 24th December 2021 is invalid.12.An order of judicial review to quash the List of Procurement Members as at 30th September 2021; the Updated List of Procurement Licensed Practitioners as at 30th September 2021 and the Gazette Notice No. 14138 dated 24th December 2021.13.An order of judicial review to prohibit the 1st Respondent and or its Registration Committee from receiving any registration and licensing applications and fees thereof, considering, approving, registering and licensing supplies practitioners until the enabling regulations are made by the 3rd Respondent.14.An order of judicial review to compel the 3rd Respondent to initiate the process of making all the regulations required under the Supplies Practitioners Management Act, 2007 within three months.15.An order of judicial review to prohibit the 2nd Respondent from admitting any students, conducting training courses, examinations, issuing certificates and collecting fees until the enabling advisories and regulations provided for under the Supplies Practitioners Management Act, 2007 are made by the 1st and 2nd Respondents.16.The Respondents, jointly and severally, compensate the Petitioner for breach of his rights to the benefit of the law, information, participate in the affairs of the 1st and 2nd Respondents, consumer rights and fair administrative action.17.The Petitioner shall have the costs of the Petition plus interest until paid in full. 8.The Petitioner alleges a wholesale failure by the Respondents to perform their statutory functions under the Supplies Practitioners Management Act, 2007. He asserts that under the Act, the 1st Respondent (KISM) and its Registration Committee are mandated to establish professional standards, process registrations and issue practicing licenses, while the 2nd Respondent (KISEB) is responsible for regulating syllabuses and conducting professional certification examinations. He avers that to support these bodies, the 3rd Respondent, the Cabinet Secretary for National Treasury and Planning is legally required under Section 36 of the Act to formulate enabling regulations governing training, fees and licensing conditions. 9.However, the Petitioner alleges that the implementation of the Act was initially paralyzed by an Interim Council that illegally remained in office for years and that the current Council has spent two years failing to operationalize the Act, choosing instead, to prioritize election regulations and a new Bill, while actively ignoring the Petitioner’s motions to kickstart the regulatory process. 10.The Petitioner asserts that as a result of this regulatory vacuum, the ongoing operations of the Respondents are unlawful, unprocedural and contrary to public policy. Specifically, the petitioner claims that the 2nd Respondent is running un-accredited, purely academic CPSP-K and APS-K courses without public participation, while the Registration Committee is said to be illegally registering ineligible students, associate members and corporate firms. 11.The Petitioner further contends that the existing registrations and licenses are treated as invalid because they rely entirely on academic qualifications such as un-equated foreign credentials from the United Kingdom without KISM conducting any due diligence or verification to weed out potential fraudsters. That this lacks compliance with the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2015, which dictates that public sector procurement professionals must undergo both formal academic and professional training, including practical learning through apprenticeship or tutelage under an experienced practitioner, a threshold that no current member satisfies. 12.The Petitioner consequently alleges violations of multiple constitutional provisions, including Article 10 on national values and the rule of law, Article 35 on the right to information, Article 46 or the consumer rights, Article 47 of the fair administrative action, and Article 232 on values of public service. 13.The Petitioner avers in the grounds of the Petition and his supporting affidavit that an Interim Council illegally stayed in office until 10th January 2020, effectively suspending the implementation of the Supplies Practitioners Management Act, 2007 (hereinafter, “the Act”). That the current Council has spent two years in office without operationalizing the Supplies Practitioner Management Act, leaving it in abeyance and denying him and other members the benefits and protection of the law. 14.It is averred that the 3rd Respondent has failed to issue critical regulations under Section 36 of the Act governing training, examinations, fees and licensing conditions. Instead, KISM has prioritized council election regulations and the drafting of a new Bill. 15.The Petitioner alleges illegal training and examinations stating that KISEB purports to run the CPSP-K and APS-K courses and collects fees without a regulatory framework, public participation, or accreditation from the Ministry of Education. The Petitioner argues that these are purely academic rather than technically professional courses and that standards of proficiency to be gained are unknown to him and other members of the 1st Respondent. 16.He deposes that the KISM Registration Committee is illegally registering ineligible "Associate" and "Student" members, as well as licensing nine corporate firms. That the purported training courses and examinations were not subjected to members and public participation. Further, the Petitioner avers that registrations including his own are invalid because they rely solely on academic qualifications, such as those from the Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply (CIPS-UK), which have not been formally recognized or equated by the Commission for University Education (CUE) or the Kenya National Qualifications Authority (KNQA). 17.The Petitioner emphasizes that Section 47(1) and Section 2(1) of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2015 require public sector procurement professionals to hold recognized professional qualifications that include practical learning, apprenticeship, or tutelage. He states that neither he nor any other member satisfies this definition because KISM and KISEB do not provide or regulate practical tutelage. That accordingly, KISM has no verification mechanism, thereby creating a risk of admitting unqualified individuals or fraudsters. 18.It is contended that in the absence of regulations, the Chairmen of the KISM Council and the Registration Committee have bypassed corporate governance principles by signing practice licenses themselves and that in doing so, they have usurp the executive roles of the Registrar and Chief Executive Officer of the 1st Respondent. He claims that therefore, the licensing of members is unprocedural, unlawful and irrational and creates public anxiety in view of the pervading fraud and corruption that has hamstrung supply chain management in Kenya. 19.The Petitioner contends that he requested the 3rd Respondent to make regulations pursuant to Section 36 of the Act, which they undertook to do but are yet to make regulations. further, that KISM refused to provide him with the information used as the basis for the 2021 member registrations and licenses despite giving an explanation for the reasons for this information through a letter dated 29th July 2021 which went un-responded to. 20.He deposes that KISM’s lack of due diligence, absence of verification mechanisms and irregular licensing of corporate entities have compromised the integrity of the profession, created public anxiety and provided succour and comfort to quacks and morally unfit persons to infiltrate supplies practice with the disastrous result of incompetence and unbridled corruption. 21.The Petitioner asserts that he has completely exhausted all administrative and internal avenues to correct these statutory lapses, leaving him with no other option but to seek the intervention of the High Court. Responses 22.The 1st Respondent Kenya Institute of Supplies Management—KISM filed a lengthy elaborate replying affidavit dated 2nd March 2022 urging this Court to dismiss the Petition with costs on several grounds. It contends that the Petition is not filed in the public interest or on behalf of KISM members but instead, is characterized as a bad-faith, premature action driven by a disgruntled, embittered member whose legal advisory services and committee roles were terminated by the KISM Council due to his egotism and high-handedness. 23.The 1st Respondent posits that this Petition has been presented and/or filed prematurely and in bad faith and is purely about the Petitioner attempting to bungle and mangle the profession of thousands of Procurement and Supply Chain practitioners to satisfy his unregulated ego. It is contended that the Petitioner filed the petition barely a month after receiving written assurances from the Cabinet Secretary for the National Treasury that consultations regarding the drafting of regulations were actively ongoing. 24.The 1st Respondent asserts that the Petitioner relies on blanket, vague and rhetorical declarations without pleading specific constitutional violations or providing proof of any fraudulent or unprocedural member registrations. 25.It is asserted that the current KISM Council was elected in January 2020 as the first substantive Council since the 2007 Act. That despite losing months of active operations to the COVID-19 pandemic shortly after taking office, the Council immediately began implementing the Act. That the Council advertised for and fully constituted the Registration, Disciplinary, Legislation and Examination Board committees by mid-2020. 26.It is asserted that the foundational purpose of the Supplies Practitioners Management Act, 2007 is to provide a robust framework for the training, registration and licensing of supplies practitioners, as well as to regulate their professional practice. That following the election of the current Council of the 1st Respondent on 10th January 2020, and its subsequent gazettement on 21st February 2020, the body immediately commenced implementing the Act as the first substantive Council since the enactment of the legislation. 27.The 1st respondent states that within a week of gazettement, the Council aggressively pursued its mandate by advertising for expressions of interest to seat critical statutory organs, including the Registration and Disciplinary Committees, alongside several co-opted panels like the Legislation Committee and that by March 2020, the Council expanded its efforts to establish the Kenya Institute of Supplies Examination Board, the 2nd Respondent herein, successfully appointing members to these various committees and fully constituting the Board by July 2020 after consulting with the Office of the Attorney General and securing nominations from diverse statutory bodies. 28.It is further asserted that concurrently, the Council sought legal guidance from the Solicitor General to navigate its dual mandate as both a regulatory body and a welfare institution. That acting on the 15th April 2020 advisory from the Attorney General highlighting legislative gaps, KISM prioritized a comprehensive statutory overhaul to align the pre-2010 Act with the Constitution. 29.the 1st respondent avers that in the final quarter of 2020, KISM’s Legislative Committee, into which the Petitioner was co-opted as a key legal advisor, formed a Taskforce to review the Act and its enabling regulation. 30.It is stated that this initiative was further formalised in April 2021 when the National Treasury nominated Ministry officials to the review task force, culminating in the submission of the Draft Supply Chain Management Professionals Bill, 2021 and the Draft Council Elections Regulations, 2021 to the Cabinet Secretary on 1st August 2021. 31.That following a robust public participation phase in December 2021, these drafts were submitted to the State Law Office and the National Assembly for ongoing review, legally demonstrating that the 1st Respondent actively and extensively operationalized the Act despite losing critical months to the COVID-19 pandemic. 32.KISM denies that a regulatory vacuum exists. It asserts that key regulations promulgated in 2015 specifically governing Examinations, Registration and Licensing, Discipline and Elections remain active and operational. further, that acting on an advisory from the Attorney General to align the pre-2010 Act with the Constitution, KISM partnered with the National Treasury to draft the Supply Chain Management Professionals Bill, 2021 and new Council Election Regulations aimed at decentralizing voting via online systems and devolving representation of members in the council. That both drafts underwent public participation in late 2021 as demonstrated in annexture “KISM-41” which is a copy of the communication of the members of the 1st Respondent. 33.KISM denies that the Chairman frustrated the Petitioner’s Notice of Motion at the 30thApril 2021 AGM, noting that the issues raised primarily concerned making regulations that were already being handled by the Legislation Committee, which the Petitioner was a member of. It is Further contended that the Petitioner did not actually attend the AGM demonstrating that the Petition has been brought in bad faith. 34.KISM defends the Certified Procurement and Supply Professional of Kenya (CPSP-K) and Associate Procurement and Supply of Kenya (APS-K) courses administered by the 2nd Respondent (KISEB), stating that they were formulated by a highly qualified 11-member professional board, subjected to public participation and formally accredited by the Kenya National Qualifications Authority (KNQA). It is stated that the Petitioner has no capacity or mandate to prescribe the curriculum and examination of the 2nd Respondent as he is not its board member. 35.KISM refutes the claim that the courses lack practical training, pointing to an established 12-week Industry Based Learning (IBL) Policy prepared by the 2nd Respondent in consultation with the 1st Respondent. 36.It also maintains that the Council holds the discretion to waive this for practitioners with vast field experience. That the Petitioner cannot police the Council of the 1st Respondent and the Board of the 2nd Respondent and dictate to them what kinds of contents he deems as professional training and professional examinations and what kinds of contents in the training or examinations that he feels are non-professional. 37.It is asserted that Prescription of training and examination is a mandate that is given to the Board of the 2nd Respondent and the Council of the 1st Respondent. That the Petitioner may only suggest areas in the syllabus where he feels should be amended, or expunged or included and persuade the Board to amend, expunge or include his suggestions in the syllabus. 38.KISM affirms that Section 16 of the Act permits the Council to recognize and register individuals holding local or foreign qualifications such as those from the Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply—CIPS deemed equivalent to KISEB certifications. KISM points out that the Petitioner himself is a primary beneficiary of this provision, having been registered and employed for years using CIPS qualifications without a KISEB certificate. 39.KISM maintains that the Universities Act, 2012 applies strictly to academic programs and does not supersede KISM’s statutory mandate to register professional supplies practitioners. It is asserted at paragraph 89 of the Response that professional certification does not mandatorily require a university degree as long as the individual attained a C+ overall grade in their Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE). 40.The 1st Respondent rejects the Petitioner’s assertion that there is no single qualified person or member of the 1st Respondent to be a qualified procurement professional and KISM asserts that registration of Associate and Student members is justified as a lawful transitional mentoring mechanism under the Act. 41.Additionally, that the licensing of corporate firms is explicitly permitted under Section 20(2) of the Act and the 2015 Regulations. 42.KISM asserts that the signing of licenses by the Council and Registration Committee Chairmen is a proper administrative exercise under the Common Seal of the Institute and that application forms mandatorily require certified documents and background checks. 43.It also stated that the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act is a purely procedural law governing public sector procurement methods and is subservient to the Supplies Practitioners Management Act, 2007 regarding who qualifies as a procurement professional, with KISM’s membership cutting across public, private and NGO sectors. 44.The 1st Respondent points out to the Court that the Petitioner has also filed a case in the Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi Case No. ELRCPET/E 4/2022, challenging and praying for nullification of the appointment of the Board of the 2nd Respondent by the 1st Respondent, with some of his key averments being that the Members of the Board of the 2nd Respondent who were appointed by the 1st Respondent pursuant to Section 12 (2) (a)of the Supplies Practitioners Management Act, are not qualified supplies practitioners as they were registered and licensed by the 1st Respondent without being examined by the 2nd Respondent. 45.That the Petitioner claims in the said petition that the said members of the Board are not qualified supplies practitioners as their academic qualifications, professional qualifications, moral fitness, registration and licensing cannot be vouched in the absence of the regulations required under Section 36 of the Supplies Practitioners Management Act, 2007. 46.It is the 1st Respondent’s further case that the Petitioner has not demonstrated a single set of facts or incident where the 1st Respondent violated any Article of the Constitution, or any section of the Supplies Practitioners Management Act, 2007 or any other laws, regulations or policies nor violated any of the Petitioner’s rights. 47.It is also affirmed that the Petitioner has not established any cause of action against the 1st Respondent and that his intention of dragging the Respondents to Court through this petition is an attempt to disrupt the operations of the 1st Respondent, to ruin their reputation and create havoc between them and their members, simply for his own selfish, self-serving gains. 48.Finally, it is the 1st Respondent’s contention that this Petition has been brought prematurely and in bad faith because the Petitioner is simply attempting to attack the Council of the 1st Respondent after the Council disagreed with him on how he was handling various issues pertaining to the operations of the Institute, which prompted the 1st Respondent to progressively discontinue the Petitioner’s services both as a Legal Advisor and as a co-opted and/or invited member of their Legislative Committee. 49.Equally opposing the Petition, the 2nd Respondent, filed a replying affidavit sworn on 19th March 2022 in which it is explained that it operates under the statutory framework of the Supplies Practitioners Management Act and acts on regular policy and standards advice from KISM per Section 5(d) of the Act as demonstrated by the Advisory issued on 28th May 2020 from the 1st Respondent to establish curricula, examination calendars, rules and certification policies. 50.KISEB systematically details how it fulfills its explicit statutory duties regarding professional certification specifically the Certified Procurement and Supply Professional of Kenya [CPSP-K] and Associate in Procurement and Supply of Kenya [APS-K]. It states that it prepares standard operating procedures, examination rules and syllabuses incorporating mandatory Industry-Based Learning (IBL) to realign skills with industry needs; and it structures budgets to remit at least 30% of examination fees back to KISM to support professional development, satisfying Section 13 (h) of Act. 51.The 2nd respondent asserts that its certifications are recognized globally via affiliations with the International Federation of Purchasing and Supply Management (IFPSM). 52.It states that Section 13 of the Act does not explicitly or implicitly mandate public participation for its operations. However, it still holds stakeholder workshops for curriculum development such as the validation workshop of 28th February, 2020. The 2nd Respondent maintains that under Regulation 10 (1), the Board determines examination fees based strictly on operational expenses, with no legal obligation to subject these fee structures to public participation. 53.The 2nd Respondent states that the alleged violations under Section 15(3) and Section 16 regarding professional registration are misdirected, as registration is purely a function of KISM’s Council, not KISEB. It asserts that it is not a university and therefore does not fall under the statutory jurisdiction of the Universities Act, 2012. 54.KISEB also contends that it has been formally accredited by the Kenya National Qualifications Authority (KNQA) as a National Qualification Awarding Institution in the TVET sector Certificate Serial No. KNQA/QAI/8/2021, valid from 11th March 2021 to 11th March 2025. That owing to this state of accreditation, KISEB maintains full legal authority to evaluate, recognize and equate foreign supply chain qualifications such as CIPS-UK or CILT-UK). Consequently, members holding equated certificates are recognized as bona fide. 55.KISEB denies violating the Constitution, stating that its strict administrative protocols adhere to Article 10 of the Constitution on National Values and Principles of Governance and Article 47 on the Right to Fair Administrative Action. 56.Accordingly, the 2nd Respondent urges the Court to dismiss the Petition, stating that it has comprehensively executed its legal mandate, maintained proper separation of powers and acted fairly and judiciously within its statutory bounds. 57.The 3rd Respondent filed Grounds of Opposition dated 2nd March 2022 opposing the Petition on the following grounds:1.That the amended Petition has failed to raise any constitutional questions for determination by the Court.2.That the Petition herein lacks the requisite specificity in drafting as required by the provision of the law and as outlined by the Court in the Mumo Matemu case.3.That the amended Petition has misapprehended the roles of the 3rd Respondent with regard to the making of the Regulations herein.4.That the nature of the orders sought by the Petitioner are in violation of the principle of separation of powers.5.That the Petition herein is premised on conjecture and the Petitioner has failed to provide any evidence of the allegations herein.6.That the Petitioner lacks the appropriate qualifications to make the allegations within the Petition herein. 58.The 3rd Respondent also filed a Replying Affidavit sworn by Dr. Julius Muia, the Principal Secretary of the National Treasury on 23rd March 2022 in which the 3rd Respondent firmly refutes the Petitioner’s claim that there is a regulatory vacuum by detailing a comprehensive suite of active regulations. He notes that Regulations 3 to 38 of the Supplies Practitioners Management (Registration & Licensing) Regulations, 2015 were officially promulgated on 31st December, 2015, via Legal Notice No. 259, that govern professional training, conditions for member registration, standards of practice and requisite fees; and the Examinations Regulations, Legal Notice No. 258, which establish curricula, academic records, exemptions and institutional accreditations and the Disciplinary & Elections Regulations Legal Notices No. 246 and 247. That all these provide the necessary frameworks for professional oversight and democratic council transitions. 59.It is averred that the Kenya Institute of Supplies Examinations Board (KISEB) was successfully operationalized in June 2020 through a transparent, fair and constitutionally sound recruitment process. That under its statutory mandate, KISEB collaborated with Kenya Accountants and Secretaries National Examinations Board (KASNEB) and the Kenya Institute of Curriculum Development (KICD) to roll out a pioneer Supply Chain curriculum. 60.That its professional courses specifically the CPSP-K and APS-K are fully registered and accredited by the Kenya National Qualifications Authority (KNQA). Furthermore, KISEB has implemented clear standard operating procedures handling everything from exam security and grading to irregularities and exemptions. 61.The deponent clarifies that the state is actively working to modernize the legal landscape and that the 1st Respondent KISM through its joint Legislative Taskforce comprising representatives from KISM, the National Treasury, KISEB, the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA), and the Kenya Law Reform Commission has already developed the draft Supply Chain Management Professional Bill, 2021 and draft Council Elections Regulations, 2021, which are currently undergoing formal consideration by the National Treasury and the State Law Office to align the framework with the Constitution. 62.The deponent contends that the Petitioner is entirely misguided regarding the status of rule-making within the profession. Backed by legal advice from State Counsel, the Principal Secretary asserts that the Petition fails to raise any legitimate constitutional questions but is instead, characterized as a collection of unproven allegations and conjecture brought forth by an individual who lacks the requisite qualifications to make such sweeping legal conclusions. The Petitioner’s Rejoinders 63.The Petitioner filed several responses to the responses filed by the Respondents as above. In response to the 1st Respondent’s response of 2nd March 2022, the Petitioner filed a replying affidavit sworn on 20th March 2022 in which he reiterates the averments in his amended petition and contended that the Supplies Practitioners Management Act, 2007 has not been fully operationalized since it took effect on 1st October 2007. He emphasizes that the 3rd Respondent the Cabinet Secretary has failed to make mandatory statutory regulations regarding training syllabi, examination proficiencies, registration and licensing criteria under Section 36 of the Act. 64.The Petitioner asserts that the only operational regulations passed since 2017 are restricted to elections and basic discipline (Legal Notices 246 and 247 of 2015). Further, that pursuant to Section 58 of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act (Cap 2), where no time is prescribed, duties must be performed without unreasonable delay. The Petitioner argues that a 14-year gap constitutes a severe, unfair administrative action violating Articles 47 and 232 of the Constitution. 65.The Petitioner contends that because no formal statutory regulations exist to outline academic, professional and moral vetting matrices, all currently registered and licensed members of KISM including himself are technically unqualified under strict statutory terms. He raises concerns that unqualified individuals are actively operating within the public sector, drawing taxpayer-funded salaries and potentially abetting public procurement corruption. 66.The Petitioner notes that KISM has unlawfully registered corporate/inanimate firms, associate members and students as practitioners without any enabling statutory criteria or legal framework under the 2007 Act. He contends that KISM has improperly equated or approved foreign qualifications such as those from the Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply - CIPS without statutory backing. He insists that under Kenyan law, only the Commission for University Education (CUE) and the Kenya National Qualifications Authority (KNQA) possess the sole mandate to recognize, equate and authenticate foreign degrees and qualifications. 67.The Petitioner challenges the composition of the 2nd Respondent’s (KISEB) Board of Directors and states that five specific Board members were un-procedurally appointed by the Chairman of the KISM Council, thereby usurping powers legally reserved for the President or Cabinet Secretary under the State Corporations Act. 68.The Petitioner further notes that these individuals violate Mwongozo the Code of Governance for State Corporations because they are concurrent full-time employees of various national government institutions. 69.The Petitioner strongly denies KISM’s allegations that his lawsuit is a malicious, vindictive act triggered by a bruised ego after KISM stopped utilizing him as an ad-hoc legal advisor. He maintains the petition is entirely in the public interest with no personal gain sought. He claims that KISM deliberately withheld his virtual login link for the December 2020 Annual General Meeting (AGM) and restricted the stream to a passive, non-interactive format to prevent him from tabling his motions under Any Other Business (AOB). 70.The Petitioner points out that KISM repeatedly references internal institutional policies such as CPD or Disciplinary Policies and statutory correspondence in its defense, but failed to annex any supportive evidence, minutes or gazetted proof to the court record. He asks the Court to expunge KISM’s Replying Affidavit entirely, asserting that it was filed and served outside of the legally permitted timelines. 71.The Petitioner also filed a Supplementary Affidavit sworn on 20th March 2021 in which he asserts that the Petition is brought on his own behalf, in the interest of other supply practitioners and in the wider public interest to ensure only qualified and morally fit persons are registered as Supplies Practitioners. He notes that no other member has filed an affidavit to denounce the Petition and he rejects allegations that his petition stems from personal ego. 72.The Petitioner contends that the central grievance is that the 3rd Respondent Cabinet Secretary has failed to make crucial regulations required under Section 36 of the Act since it took effect in 2007. That this long-standing failure is characterized as an unfair administrative action. The Petitioner notes that the 3rd Respondent has only ever published two regulations under the Act being the Discipline Regulations (2015) and the Elections Regulations (2015). 73.He asserts that because the statutory regulations governing examinations, training, registration, licensing and continuous professional development CPD were never published in the Kenya Gazette, it is argued that the 1st and 2nd Respondents have no legal mandate to issue internal policies such as the CPD Policy, Disciplinary Policy, or Industry-Based Learning Policy to replace statutory instruments. He deems these internal policies ultra vires and null and void. 74.The Petitioner argues that due to the lack of prescribed statutory standards and examinations, all current members including himself, the Council of the 1st Respondent and the Board of the 2nd Respondent technically lack the formal legal qualifications required under Section 16 of the Act. 75.He asserts that many members hold foreign qualifications such as from the Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply - CIPS UK. He contends that neither the 1st nor the 2nd Respondent has the lawful mandate to equate foreign qualifications, which falls strictly under the Commission for University Education (CUE) or the Kenya National Qualifications Authority (KNQA). 76.The Petitioner challenges the 1st Respondent’s alleged registration of corporate/inanimate firms, students and associate members, stating that the Act does not provide for corporate practitioners and that registering students as members is illegal. He lists 10 specific corporate licensees at paragraph 62 to illustrate this point. 77.He also alleges that five members of the 2nd Respondent’s Board were not competitively or procedurally appointed, a matter that he has actively challenged in a separate suit in ELRCPET/004/2022. He highlights a 12th May 2021 letter from the Solicitor General faulting KISM’s operationalization of KISEB. 78.The Petitioner faults key academic curricula and certifications, including the Certified Procurement and Supply Professional of Kenya (CPSP-K) and Associate Procurement and Supply of Kenya (APS-K) for a total lack of public participation and proper statutory anchoring. He also states that the 1st Respondent suppressed member motions during its Annual General Meeting (AGM) by refusing to discuss them under Any Other Business (A.O.B.) and claims the Chairman tabled outdated Books of Account from 2018 without giving members a fair opportunity to discuss or approve them. 79.The Petitioner objects to the tone of the 1st Respondent's replying affidavit which he views as condescending and disrespectful, characterizing it as an ad hominem attack rather than a factual rebuttal. He concludes that the 1st Respondent's Replying Affidavit was filed and served out of time and requests that the Court expunges and strikes it out from the record. 80.In response to the 3rd Respondent’s replying affidavit of 23rd March 2022, the Petitioner filed a Supplementary Affidavit dated 20th March 2022 in which he reiterates that the case is filed in the public interest under Article 22 of the Constitution to protect the supply chain management sector from unqualified practitioners or quacks. He dismisses claims of personal ego, noting that no fellow professional has denounced the suit. He also clarifies his historical connection to the 1st Respondent, noting that he remains their advocate on record in an independent suit Okiya Omtatah Okoiti v. KISM & 2 Others; and that he only served on their Legislative Committee on an ad hoc basis. 81.The petitioner states that there has been long-term statutory negligence by the 3rd Respondent because The Supplies Practitioners Management Act came into effect on 1st October 2007 with a 12-month transition window. The Petitioner maintains that the 3rd Respondent’s failure to draft and publish the comprehensive regulations mandated by Section 36 of the Act over a 15-year period constitutes an unfair administrative action that violates Articles 47 and 232 of the Constitution. 82.It is contended that the 3rd Respondent has only enacted two regulations since 2007, the 2015 Discipline and 2015 Election Regulations and that no regulations governing examinations or registration have ever been gazetted under the Statutory Instruments Act, 2013. It is stated that because the 3rd Respondent failed to publish proper statutory instruments, the internal policies created by the 1st and 2nd Respondents, for instance, the Continuous Professional Development [CPD] Policy, Disciplinary Policy and Industry-Based Learning Policy are ultra vires, null and void ab initio. 83.Further, that the professional qualifications offered, such as the Certified Procurement and Supply Professional of Kenya (CPSP-K) and Associate Procurement and Supply of Kenya (APS-K), are legally deficient because their underlying syllabuses and practical vocational components were never prescribed by the Cabinet Secretary or subjected to mandatory public participation. 84.It is deposed that there is unlawful equating of degrees because the 1st Respondent has no legal authority to recognize or equate foreign qualification structures, such as United Kingdom CIPS postgraduate diplomas under the law as this mandate belongs strictly to the Commission for University Education (CUE) and the Kenya National Qualifications Authority (KNQA). 85.It is also averred that the Act does not provide for "corporate" or "inanimate" supply practitioners, yet the 1st Respondent has unlawfully issued licenses to 10 distinct corporate consulting and training firms. Furthermore, that registering student and associate members is completely outside the scope of the Act. 86.The Petitioner boldly asserts that due to the structural absence of legal regulations, all current members including himself, the Council of KISM, and the Board of KISEB technically lack valid legal registration, making the current leadership unqualified to hold office. He highlights that the composition of the 2nd Respondent’s Board is under active challenge in court in ELRCPET/004/2022, supported by a 12th May 2021 letter from the Solicitor General faulting KISM’s operational management. 87.The Petitioner avers that at the Annual General Meeting, the Chairman presented outdated 2018 financial statements without permitting standard discussion, showcasing a general lack of corporate governance and asserts that the Respondents failed in their cardinal duty to assist the court by using unpalatable language and engaging in ad hominem personal attacks rather than mounting a factual legal defense. He flags that the 1st Respondent’s Replying Affidavit dated 2nd March 2022, which was filed and served outside of the permitted legal timelines and demands that the Court expunges and strikes it from the official record. Submissions 88.At the close of the pleadings, the parties took directions to canvass the Petition by way of written submissions. The same are all now on record as follows: The Petitioner’s Submissions and Supplementary Submissions are dated 27th day of June 2025 and 8th March 2026 respectively; the 1st Respondent’s submissions are dated 4th November 2022; and the 3rd Respondents’ Submissions are dated 23rd October 2025. The Petitioner’s Submissions 89.On 11th May 2025, the parties appeared before this Court to highlight their written submissions. Mr. Gachuba the Petitioner herein, an advocate of the High Court of Kenya and appearing self-represented submitted reiterating his pleadings, affidavits and written submissions. He maintains that the Petition arose from the Respondents’ failure to perform their statutory duties and that as a result, the supplies practice is chaotic and poorly regulated, in that, the practitioners are not practicing professionally as mandated. 90.It is submitted that the Regulations contemplated in the Section 5, 13, 15 (3), 16, 20 and 36 of the Act have not been made by the Respondents as mandated by the Act. That the Attorney General acknowledges legislative gaps which are to be filled and KISM has been admitting persons not qualified to practice the profession. He also states that there was an attempt by the Respondents to say that there are regulations which they have listed. He however contends that the regulations do not exist except two which are nonetheless unconstitutional. 91.The Petitioner submits that there is violation of Articles 2(4) 10, 36 (1) 47 (1) 118 (1) (b), 232(1) (d) of the Constitution and that none of the allegedly enacted regulations were subjected to public participation & by members of the 1st Respondent. He urges the Court to find that no regulations were made and that the instruments referred to by the 2nd Respondents are null and void as there was no public participation involved in the making of the said regulations. The petitioner cited the case of British American Tobacco Kenya PLC v Cabinet Secretary for the Ministry of Health & 2 others; Kenya Tobacco Control Alliance & another (Interested Parties); Mastermind Tabacco Kenya Limited (Affected Party) [2019] KESC 15 (KLR) cited in his supplementary submissions, Gakuru & others v Governor Kiambu County & 3 others [2014] KEHC 7516 (KLR) at para 75 to 79 and Roads and Civil Engineering Contractors Association & another v Attorney General & another; Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & another (Interested Parties) (Petition E226 of 2020) [2025] KEHC 19224 (KLR) on public participation. 92.It is argued that Article 36 (1) of the constitution entitles members of the 1st Respondent to participate in the affairs of the 1st Respondent and that accordingly, the Petition is justiciable as it seeks to compel the Respondents to perform their statutory duties. That the petition also raises public and general interest neither is it egoistic but affects professionals who need to be properly regulated and vetted. 93.The petitioner cites Article 227 of the Constitution which constitutionalizes public procurement and a submission made that the 5 principles espoused therein can only be operationalized by professionals who are well trained. That at present, the profession is left on auto pilot, making this a justiciable issue. 94.The petitioner further submits that the Respondents have not satisfactorily addressed issues raised in the Petition and that there is no requirement by the 1st Respondent to equate qualifications to tell if all members are qualified as required under section 16 of the Act. He points out that the gap is that there is lack of clarity on professional qualifications for one to be a practitioner and that there is no regulation specifying which degree or diploma or certificate is recognized. 95.It is submitted that Section 36 of the Act provides for minimum requirements to be by way of regulations, but that the Act does not address governance in the conduct of affairs of the 1st and 2nd Respondents. The Petitioner gives the example that a special general meeting cannot be requisitioned because there are no regulations on how to conduct meetings. 96.In the written submissions, the joint issues for determination isolated by the petitioner are:i.Whether the Amended Petition is merited;ii.Whether the Amended Petition is a personal rant that is not justiciable; andiii.Whether Supplies Practitioner Management (Discipline) Regulations, 2015; the Supplies Practitioner Management (Examinations) Regulations, 2015; the Supplies Practitioner Management (Registration and Licensing) Regulations, 2015; the Supplies Practitioner Management (Elections) Regulations, 2015; the Supplies Practitioner Management (Council Elections) Regulations, 2022; and KISEB Professional Certification in Supply Chain Management; Industrial Based Learning Policy; Industrial Based Learning Policy Syllabus; and other statutory instruments made by the Respondents are unconstitutional and null and void ab initio for violating Article 2(4), 10(1)(2)(a)(c), 36(1), 47(1), 118(1)(b) and 232(1)(d) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 97.The Petitioner submits that the petition is a justiciable public interest matter rather than a personal rant, as it targets systemic flaws within the chaotic and uncoordinated supplies practitioner profession, citing the cases of Ashok Kumar Pandey v The State of West Bengal, AIR 2004 Supreme Court 280, 2004 (3) SCC 349 and Okoiti v Cabinet Secretary, National Treasury & 5 others [2025] KEHC 4444 (KLR). Relying on Articles 22 22 (1) (2) (b) (c), 48, 50 (1) and 258 (1) (2) (b) (c) of the Constitution of Kenya, the Petitioner asserts his locus standi to protect a community whose legal rights are directly affected. He cites the case of Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others (2002) 5 LRC 216 and argues that the High Court maintains the jurisdiction and explicit duty to forge new tools and issue judicial review orders such as Mandamus, Certiorari, and Prohibition to check defective administrative actions and enforce constitutional compliance. 98.The Petitioner argues that the various regulations, policies and guidelines are unconstitutional due to a complete lack of public participation. The Petitioner submits that the Respondents failed to provide any concrete evidence demonstrating that KISM members or the general public were notified or given a meaningful opportunity to comment. 99.Relying on the case of British American Tobacco Kenya PLC v Cabinet Secretary for the Ministry of Health & 2 others; Kenya Tobacco Control Alliance & another (Interested Parties); Mastermind Tabacco Kenya Limited (Affected Party) [2019] KESC 15 (KLR), the Petitioner argues that public participation must be qualitative and purposive; therefore, the opaque formulation of these statutory instruments violates Article 10 of the Constitution and the Statutory Instruments Act, a fatal defect that subsequent parliamentary approval cannot cure. 100.It is submitted that there are severe statutory flaws regarding the training, certification, and accreditation processes handled by the Respondents. That the CPSP-K and APS-K courses conducted by the 2nd Respondent are purely academic rather than professional, as they entirely lack the mandatory practical learning, apprenticeship, or tutelage components required by law. 101.Additionally, that the 1st and 2nd Respondents have encroached upon accreditation powers that rest solely with the Commission for University Education, having been stripped of such mandates via the doctrine of implied repeal, while no training institutions have been properly accredited by the Ministry of Education. 102.Finally, the Petitioner challenges the legality of registration and the underlying corporate governance structure, arguing that the 1st Respondent has irregularly registered practitioners based on academic merits alone or unrecognized foreign qualifications that lack validation from competent local qualification authorities. This, he argues, is compounded by a failure of due diligence to verify certificates or vet applicants' characters, alongside corporate governance violations where Chairmen usurped executive roles to illegally sign licenses amidst a dearth of enabling regulations, ultimately leading to the improper registration of statutorily ineligible firms and members. The 1st Respondent’s Submissions 103.The 1st Respondent’s written submissions isolate nine issues for determination being:i.Whether the Petition in incompetent for failing to plead specific constitutional violations;ii.Whether the petition is filed prematurely;iii.Whether the petition is Personal, and Not Public Interest Litigation;iv.Whether the are factual evidence to support the allegations in the Petition;v.Whether the Petition is filled in bad faith;vi.Whether the 1st and 2nd Respondents have neglected their duties, resulting in the lack of critical regulations, such as those governing practitioners;vii.Whether the action of the 1st Respondent to prioritize the Council Election Regulations and a new Act of Parliament over other regulations required by Section 36 of the Supplies Practitioners Management Act, 2007, as advised by the Attorney General constitutes negligence or a legal breach;viii.Whether the examination and training standards set by KISEB lack professionalism or violate the rights of stakeholders; andix.Whether the alleged actions or inactions of the respondents contravene specific constitutional provisions cited by the petitioner, including Articles 10, 27, 35, 46, and 47 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 104.The 1st Respondent argues that the Petitioner merely cites broad provisions under Articles 10, 27, 35, 46, and 47 without detailing how the alleged infringements occurred or proving any actual harm, rendering the Petition legally speculative. It is submitted that the Petition fails to Plead violations with specificity as established in Anarita Karimi Njeru), Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (No. 1) [1979], Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance [2013] eKLR and Nairobi Law Monthly Company Limited v Kenya Electricity Generating Company & 2 others [2013] eKLR on constitutional thresholds. 105.Counsel for the 1st Respondent argues that the Petitioner was explicitly informed that regulatory consultations between the National Treasury and KISM were actively ongoing. That therefore by him rushing to court instead of awaiting the outcome, the Petitioner bypassed established administrative processes, violating the judicial doctrine of exhaustion as espoused in Kenya Bureau of Standards v Geo-Chem Middle East [2014] eKLR and Seaker of the National Assembly v James Njenga Karume [1992] eKLR. 106.Counsel for the 1st respondent submits that the Petitioner has a long-standing professional relationship with the Institute and submits that he is driven by personal dissatisfaction rather than societal welfare. It is submitted that there is no factual evidence as stated by the Court in Consumer Federation of Kenya v Toyota Motors Corporation & 4 Others, High Court Petition No. 455 of 2018, or documentation provided to demonstrate that a significant portion of the public or KISM membership suffers any harm from the alleged regulatory gaps. Counsel cites Okiya Omtatah Okoiti & Another v Attorney General & Another [2020] eKLR, where the court emphasized that Public Interest Litigation (PIL) should not be misused for personal or ulterior motives and the Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance [2013] eKLR case where the Court of Appeal underscored the importance of protecting courts from being used by individuals with personal motives under the guise of public interest litigation. 107.Further submission is that under Article 159 of the Constitution, judicial processes are to be utilized in good faith to promote justice and that the present Petition lacks bona fides, justifying its dismissal. The Supreme Court case of Gatirau Peter Munya v Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 others [2014] eKLR, is cited in support of the argument. 108.The 1st Respondent vehemently denies that it neglected its duties, tabling concrete evidence of an active, comprehensive regulatory framework. Counsel submits that the Supplies Practitioners Management Regulations for Examinations, Registration and Licensing, Discipline, and Council Elections have all been firmly in place since 2015. 109.Further submission is that KISM demonstrates its proactive statutory commitment by showing that it submitted a new Draft Bill and updated election regulations to the National Treasury in August 2021. The 1st respondent urges the Court to dismiss the Petition for lack of specificity or strike it out for being an abuse of the court process and to award them costs. 110.The 2nd Respondent was late in the filing of written submissions and was caught up by the hearing. Its submissions are therefore not on record. The 3rd Respondent’s Submissions 111.The 3rd Respondent submitted relying on Grounds of Opposition dated 2/3/2023 and a Replying Affidavit sworn on 23/3/2022 and submissions dated 23/10/2024. Counsel submits that the Petition was not pleaded with precision particularly on alleged violations by the 3rd Respondent. On whether regulations were enacted, it is submitted that they were properly enacted as shown by the affidavit of Dr. Julius Muia. 112.In their written submissions, Counsel for the 3rd Respondent isolated the following four issues for determination:i.Whether the Petition discloses justiciable constitutional questions warranting adjudication under Article 22 of the Constitution;ii.Whether the Supplies Practitioners Management Act, 2007 and the Regulations made thereunder were enacted and operationalized in compliance with the Constitution and the Statutory Instruments Act;iii.Whether the process of appointing members of the Kenya Institute of Supplies Examinations Board (KISEB) complied with the Constitution and applicable laws; andiv.Whether the limitation of rights alleged by the Petitioner is reasonable and justifiable under Article 24 of the Constitution. 113.Counsel relied on Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance $ 5 Others (2012),eKLR; Susan Wangari Mburu & 5 others v Eldoret Water & Sanitation Company Limited & another [2021] KEELC 1429 (KLR), where the court relied on the case of Japheth Ododa Origa v Vice Chancellor University of Nairobi & 2 others [2018] eKLR, Rono v Insurance Regulatory Authority & 4 others (Constitutional Petition E008 of 2023) [2024] KEHC 11373 (KLR) (26 September 2024) (Judgment); and CNM v WMG [2018] KEHC 8434 (KLR) and submitted that a constitutional petition demands a high degree of factual clarity and precise pleadings. That in this case, the Petitioner broad-blasts various Articles of the Constitution being Articles 1, 10, 27, 35, 36, 46, 47, and 232 but offers only generalized, speculative grievances. Counsel for the 3rd Respondent argues that these are policy and administrative disagreements rather than true constitutional infractions and that the issues raised in the petition are better suited for statutory review under the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015. 114.Counsel for the 3rd respondent strongly refutes the Petitioner’s claim that the Supplies Practitioners Management Act is in abeyance or dormant as asserts that it is actively operationalized. Counsel tables evidence showing a comprehensive suite of regulations published via Legal Notices in 2015 covering Registration & Licensing, Examinations, Discipline, and Elections. 115.It is further submitted that the curriculum for professional certifications (CPSP-K and APS-K) was properly integrated with the Kenya National Qualifications Framework alongside KASNEB and KICD. That continuous improvement is also demonstrated by a legislative taskforce drafting the Supply Chain Management Professional Bill, 2021. 116.The 3rd Respondent submits through Counsel that comprehensive documentation, shortlisting reports, interview results, advertisements prove that the June 2020 operationalization of KISEB was fully compliant with Section 12 of the Act. That the appointments were transparent, merit-based and aligned with Article 232 of the Constitution. It is their contention that under Article 24, constitutional rights are not absolute and can be limited by law to preserve public interest as held in the cases of CM (Suing on her Behalf and on Behalf of PM a Minor) & 8 others v Attorney General & 2 others; Independent Medico-Legal Unit (IMLU) (Interested Party); Makanyengo & another (Amicus Curiae) (Petition 151 of 2020) [2023] KEHC 22332 (KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights) (22 September 2023) (Judgment) and Wanuri Kahiu & another v CEO - Kenya Film Classification Board Ezekiel Mutua & 2 others; Article 19 East Africa (Interested Party) & Kenya Christian Professionals Form (Proposed Interested Party) [2020] eKLR. They argue that regulating the supply chain sector ensures only qualified, ethical professionals handle public procurement which is a vital public purpose. 117.Regarding the allegation that the Petitioner was denied information, it is submitted that the 1st Respondent’s demand for the Petitioner’s membership status was simply a reasonable administrative safeguard, not a constitutional violation. It is urged that since the alleged violations remain entirely unsubstantiated, the Petitioner is not entitled to any of the declarations, monetary compensation or judicial review orders (Mandamus or Prohibition) sought. The 3rd Respondent implores the Court to dismiss the Petition with costs on the grounds that it completely lacks merit and constitutes an abuse of the court process. 118.In a rejoinder, the petitioner submitted that Article 36 (1) of Constitution entitles him to participate in the affairs of the 1st Respondent and that there is no evidence that members of the 1st Respondent participated in the making of those regulations. He maintains that the Petition is specific and complies with Mutunga rules. He also submits that all the Respondents filed detailed responses to the Petition and that it is upon them to prove compliance with the law. He prayed that the Petition be allowed in the interest of the supplies practice. Analysis and Determination 119.From the pleadings, affidavits and submissions by the respective parties, I find the following issues for determination:i.Whether the Petition discloses a justiciable public interest matter or an unprecise personal grievance and whether the Petitioner has locus standi to seek constitutional redress.ii.Whether the Petition meets the constitutional threshold in Anarita, that is, whether it is procedurally incompetent for lack of precision and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.iii.Whether the impugned statutory regulations and practices governing the Supplies Practitioners’ Profession are violate the Constitution and are void ab initio for want of public participation.iv.Whether the 1st and 2nd Respondents have acted ultra vires or neglected their statutory mandates regarding training curriculum, practical tutelage, and the verification of local and foreign qualifications.v.Whether the 1st Respondent's internal operations and execution of practicing licenses infringe on statutory governance boundaries.vi.Whether the reliefs sought are merited and who bears the costs if any? i. Whether the Petition discloses a justiciable public interest matter or an unprecise personal grievance and whether the Petitioner has locus standi to seek constitutional redress 120.Under this first issue, the Court will discuss the Petitioner’s locus standi, the Petition’s justiciability and the threshold for constitutional petitions. 121.On the first issue of locus standi, Articles 22 and Article 258 of the Constitution confer broad standing to enforce constitutional provisions. They provide thus: - 22.Enforcement of Bill of Rights(1)Every person has the right to institute court proceedings claiming that a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights has been denied, violated or infringed, or is threatened.258.Enforcement of this Constitution(1)Every person has the right to institute court proceedings, claiming that this Constitution has been contravened, or is threatened with contravention. (2) In addition to a person acting in their own interest, court proceedings under clause (1) may be instituted by—a.a person acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name;b.a person acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons;c.a person acting in the public interest; ord.an association acting in the interest of one or more of its members. 122.The Court of Appeal in Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 others (Civil Appeal 290 of 2012) [2013] KECA 445 (KLR) (26 July 2013) (Judgment) set out the issue of locus standi in constitutional petitions as follows: -“28.It still remains to reiterate that the landscape of locus standi has been fundamentally transformed by the enactment of the Constitution in 2010 by the people themselves. In our view, the hitherto stringent locus standi requirements of consent of the Attorney General or demonstration of some special interest by a private citizen seeking to enforce a public right have been buried in the annals of history. Today, by dint of Articles 22 and 258 of the Constitution, any person can institute proceedings under the Bill of Rights, on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name, or as a member of, or in the interest of a group or class of persons, or in the public interest. Pursuant to Article 22 (3) aforesaid, the Chief Justice has made rules contained in Legal Notice No. 117 of 28th June 2013 – The Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013–which, in view of its long title, we take the liberty to baptize, the “Mutunga Rules”, to inter alia, facilitate the application of the right of standing. Like Article 48, the overriding objective of those rules is to facilitate access to justice for all persons. The rules also reiterate that any person other than a person whose right or fundamental freedom under the Constitution is allegedly denied, violated or infringed or threatened has a right of standing and can institute proceedings as envisaged under Articles 22 (2) and 258 of the Constitution.29.....30.It is our consideration that in filing the petition the 1st respondent was acting not only on behalf of its members and in accordance with its stated mandate, but also in the public interest, in view of the nature of the matter at hand. The 1st respondent, its members and the general public were entitled to participate in the proceedings relating to the decision-making process culminating in the impugned decision.” 123.The 1st Respondent contends that the Petition is not filed in the public interest or on behalf of KISM members but instead, is characterized as a bad-faith, premature action driven by a disgruntled, embittered member whose legal advisory services and committee roles were terminated by the KISM Council due to his egotism and high-handedness. 124.The 1st Respondent contends that the petition is a bad-faith personal grievance driven by individual dissatisfaction because the Petitioner failed to provide factual evidence of societal harm or regulatory gaps. The Petitioner refutes this claim and asserts that the Petition is a public interest matter rather than a personal rant. 125.The Court of Appeal in the above Mumo Matemu case (supra) went on to caution as follows: -“31.However, we must hasten to make it clear that the person who moves the court for judicial redress in cases of this kind must be acting bona fide with a view to vindicating the cause of justice. Where a person acts for personal gain or private profit or out of political motivation or other oblique consideration, the Court should not allow itself to be seized at the instance of such person and must reject their application at the threshold. The time is now propitious at this stage of our constitutional development where we can state as was stated by the Supreme Court of India in the case of S.P. Gupta v President of India & Others AIR [1982] SC 149 that:The view has therefore been taken by the courts in many decisions that whenever there is a public wrong or public injury caused by an act or omission of the State or a public authority which is contrary to the Constitution or the law, any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest can maintain an action for redressal of such public wrong or public injury. The strict rule of standing which insists that only a person who has suffered a specific legal injury can maintain an action for judicial redress is relaxed and a broad rule is evolved which gives standing to any member of the public who is not a mere busy-body or a meddlesome interloper but who has sufficient interest in the proceeding. There can be no doubt that the risk of legal action against the State or a public authority by any citizen will induce the State or such public authority to act with greater responsibility and can thereby improve the administration of justice. Lord Diplock rightly said in Rex v Inland Revenue Commrs. [1981] 2 WLR 722 at p. 740.‘It would, in my view, be a grave lacuna in our system of public law if a pressure group, like the federation, or even a single public-spirited taxpayer, were prevented by a outdated technical rules of locus standi from bringing the matter to the attention of the court to vindicate the rule of law and get the unlawful conduct stopped… It is not, in my view, a sufficient answer to say that judicial review of the actions of officers or departments of central government is unnecessary because they are accountable to Parliament for the way in which they carry out their functions. They are accountable to Parliament for what they do so far as regards efficiency and policy, and of that Parliament is the only judge; they are responsible to a Court of Justice for the lawfulness of what they do, and of that the Court is the only judge.’This broadening of the rule of locus standi has been largely responsible for the development of public law, because it is only the availability of judicial remedy for enforcement which invests law with meaning and purpose or else the law would remain merely a paper parchment, a teasing illusion and a promise of unreality. It is only by liberalizing the rule of locus standi that it is possible to effectively police the corridors of powers and prevent violations of law.” 126.The underlying consideration is that the Court must be satisfied that the Petitioner has standing to institute proceedings in public interest. I have evaluated the basis of the Petition in which the Petitioner addresses systemic concerns affecting the wider community of procurement professionals and public expenditure security. It is my finding that the issues raised here transcend a simple alleged personal rant by the Petitioner. The Respondents’ allegations are dismissed not only for this reason but also because they did not adduce any cogent evidence to demonstrate that the Petitioner was embittered by the outcome of their internal decisions. 127.Consequently, I find that the Petitioner has the requisite locus standi to appear before this Court by dint of Article 22 and 258 of the Constitution and that his Petition raises a justiciable public interest matter worthy of the Court’s consideration. ii. Whether the Petition is procedurally incompetent for lack of precision and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 128.On the second issue of the Petition being deemed to be premature and not justiciable, the Petitioner maintains that this petition is a justiciable public interest matter targeting systemic flaws, chaotic regulation and a complete lack of public participation in the formulation of statutory instruments within Kenya’s supplies practitioner profession. 129.The 1st Respondent argues that the Petition is procedurally incompetent, speculative and premature, asserting that it fails to plead specific constitutional violations with the required legal precision and improperly bypasses ongoing administrative consultations between the National Treasury and KISM in violation of the doctrine of exhaustion. 130.The 3rd Respondent strongly contends that the Petition lacks the strict legal precision demanded in constitutional litigation, citing the foundational rule in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (1979). They argue that the Petitioner simply lists generic Articles of the Constitution being Articles 1, 10, 27, 35, 36, 46, 47, and 232 of the Constitution without establishing a clear nexus between the Respondents’ actions and an actual constitutional violation. 131.Additionally, they claim the suit violates the doctrine of exhaustion because the Petitioner rushed to court while administrative consultations between KISM and the National Treasury were ongoing. 132.The doctrine of exhaustion finds its cornerstone under Article 159 which provides for other means of dispute resolution other than courts. This doctrine has also been discussed in several authorities by this court and the superior courts. In Geoffrey Muthinja & Another vs. Samuel Muguna Henry & 1756 Others [2015] eKLR, the Court of Appeal provided the constitutional rationale and basis for the doctrine of exhaustion as follows: -“It is imperative that where a dispute resolution mechanism exists outside courts, the same be exhausted before the jurisdiction of the Courts is invoked. Courts ought to be fora of last resort and not the first port of call the moment a storm brews… The exhaustion doctrine is a sound one and serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is first of all diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanisms in place for the resolution of outside the courts...This accords with Article 159 of the Constitution which commands Courts to encourage alternative means of dispute resolution.” 133.In Muthinja & another v Henry & 1756 others (supra), the Court of Appeal further held thus: -“37.It is plain to see then, that the Church did have a place a rather elaborate system for dispute resolution which the plaintiffs in the various suits ought to have had recourse to, and exhausted, before litigating in court. We concur with the learned Judge’s categorical finding at paragraph 75 of his judgment thus;That though the court has jurisdiction to deal with the plaintiff’s complaints it is premature as they did not strictly follow the Church Constitution, providing for dispute resolution mechanism.”38.We see this as the crux of the matter in this and similar cases." 134.The Doctrine of Exhaustion dictates that where a statutory or administrative mechanism for dispute resolution is prescribed by law, a party must fully utilize and deplete those internal channels before invoking the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction of the Court. The 1st and 3rd Respondents have demonstrated through uncontroverted evidence that the supplies regulatory framework was actively undergoing continuous improvement and reform. 135.The 1st Respondent stated in its response on oath that the Petitioner was explicitly informed by the Cabinet Secretary for the National Treasury through a letter dated 15th November 2021 that administrative consultations were underway with the 1st Respondent to address regulatory updates. That rather than awaiting the outcome of these statutory processes, the Petitioner hastily filed the suit, thereby disrupting an ongoing, multi-agency administrative exercise. 136.The doctrine of exhaustion serves as a vital gatekeeping mechanism that prevents courts from being inundated with policy and administrative disagreements that are better handled by specialized executive or statutory taskforces. Rushing to court before administrative remedies are exhausted deprives the statutory bodies of the chance to self-correct or finalize pending regulations. 137.The Petitioner denied the assertions that he rushed to court and that the Petition was premature stating that his Petition was actuated by his realization that the Supplies Practitioners Management Act, 2007 was yet to be fully operationalised some fourteen (14) years since it came into effect and there were no indications that the Respondents were about to operationalise it. 138.I have considered the Petition as a whole and I find that, some of the issues raised by the Petitioner in his Petition relate to the structure of professional examinations, internal institutional vetting and the formulation of regulations. To my mind, these fall under administrative discretion and are pegged on statutory interpretation. They are not constitutional infractions. 139.Further, the Petitioner is seeking constitutional declarations regarding completed and active administrative policies. I find that it was easier for the Petitioner to seek redress under the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015, or to demand through judicial review that he be given access to the relevant information under Article 35 of the Constitution which are less restrictive statutory avenues to seek redress if indeed the Respondents’ failed to act or were sluggish as he claimed. 140.Lastly, this Court also observes that consultations between the National Treasury and KISM were ongoing, a fact that the Petitioner did not controvert. The Respondents deposed that this fact had been communicated to him by the office of the 3rd Respondent. It is contended by the Respondents that the Petitioner filed the petition barely a month after receiving written assurances from the Cabinet Secretary for National Treasury that consultations regarding the drafting of regulations were actively ongoing. He did not offer any material in rebuttal of that position as advanced by the 1st and 3rd respondents. 141.The position of this Court in this regard is that judicial intervention at this stage is premature and contrary to the principle that administrative remedies must first be pursued administratively and only where there is an overreach and or refusal to act that the Court will intervene. Even then, a failure to act in the manner described by the petitioner does not amount to constitutional violation. 142.Further, by ignoring these available internal channels and launching a broad-scale constitutional petition, the Petitioner failed to honor the principle of constitutional avoidance and procedural continuity. The issues he is raising are also not ripe for consideration because the outcome of the consultations is yet to be given. 143.For this reason, I find that the Petition before this Court is procedurally defective for want of exhaustion of available administrative mechanisms, contrary to the principles of the doctrine of exhaustion. It is therefore prematurely filed. 144.I have further considered the constitutional threshold that has often been referenced in several judicial pronouncements, commencing with the old-time case of Anarita Karimi Njeru (1976-1980) 1 KLR 1272 where Justices Trevelyan and Hancox stated that:-“We would, however, again stress that if a person is seeking redress from the High Court on a matter which involves a reference to the Constitution, it is important (if only to ensure that justice is done to his case) that he should set out with a reasonable degree of precision that of which he complains, the provisions said to be infringed, and the manner in which they are alleged to be infringed.” 145.In Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 others (Civil Appeal 290 of 2012) [2013] KECA 445 (KLR) (26 July 2013) (Judgment) the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the principle in the Anarita Karimi Njeru case and held thus: -“42.However, our analysis cannot end at that level of generality. It was the High Court’s observation that the petition before it was not the “epitome of precise, comprehensive, or elegant drafting.” Yet the principle in Anarita Karimi Njeru (supra) underscores the importance of defining the dispute to be decided by the court. ....The principle in Anarita Karimi Njeru (supra) that established the rule that requires reasonable precision in framing of issues in constitutional petitions is an extension of this principle. What Jessel, M.R said in 1876 in the case of Thorp v Holdsworth (1876) 3 Ch. D. 637 at 639 holds true today:The whole object of pleadings is to bring the parties to an issue, and the meaning of the rules…was to prevent the issue being enlarged, which would prevent either party from knowing when the cause came on for trial, what the real point to be discussed and decided was. In fact, the whole meaning of the system is to narrow the parties to define issues, and thereby diminish expense and delay, especially as regards the amount of testimony required on either side at the hearing.” 146.The rule in Anarita Karimi case posits that a party seeking constitutional reliefs such as the Petitioner herein must state the facts of his case with precision, the rights allegedly violated or threatened with infringement and how the said constitutional violations have occurred. 147.The Petitioner herein pleaded under Part E, paragraphs 59 to 70 of the amended Petition the particulars of injuries caused by the Respondents. Although he has structured the claims systematically by identifying statutory failures and attaching constitutional provisions that are allegedly violated, the Petition in itself ultimately fails to meet the legal threshold for a constitutional violation for a number of reasons. 148.Firs, is that at paragraphs 63, 64, and 65 of the amended petition, the Petitioner accuses KISM of registering individuals with foreign degrees like CIPS or without proper local vetting which is a generalized claim. It would have been sufficient for the Petitioner to provide particulars such as the people who were irregularly registered, when they were registered and how that action directly affected his right to administrative action under Article 47 of the Constitutiono or even violated the constitutional provisions. 149.Secondly, the Petitioner claims a violation of Article 10 on National Values and Article 47 on Fair Administrative Action by citing failures by the Respondents to comply with Section 5 (1) (g) of the Universities Act, 2012 and Section 8 (1) (k) of the Kenya National Qualifications Framework Act, 2014. The fact that the Petitioner cited a breach of an Act of Parliament, in this case the Universities Act, does not automatically amount to a breach of the Constitution. A statutory breach must be litigated under statutory judicial review mechanisms, not elevated into a full-blown constitutional violation, unless it is demonstrated that the statutory breach directly decimated a fundamental right under the Bill of Rights. 150.Thirdly, according to the Anarita threshold, a petitioner must show a clear, direct link between the alleged action and a distinct constitutional violation. Paragraphs 59, 69, 61, 62, 68 and 90 of the amended Petition outline typical administrative failures such as failing to establish training standards, failing to recommend training institutions, failing to advise a board and a lack of secondary regulations. The Petitioner claims these allegedly statutory failures injured his legitimate expectation under Article 1 (1) and 3 (1) on sovereignty and the obligation to respect the Constitution. 151.It must be appreciated that Articles 1 and 3 are overarching constitutional principles while legitimate expectation is an administrative law principle. I find that it was a farfetched ground for the Petitioner to aver that a failure to write a training syllabus or a failure of a board to advise another board directly violated national sovereignty. This is not only an extreme legal overreach but as rightfully stated by the 3rd Respondent, policy disagreements and statutory execution gaps which are matters of administrative discretion, not constitutional infractions. 152.The Petitioner also pleads unrelated provisions of the Bill of Rights in a generalized manner and in a sheer demonstration of broad-blasting constitutional Articles. He states that the 1st Respondent refused to give him information that formed the basis of the impugned registration and licensing of supplies and practitioners in violation of his right to Article 35 of the Constitution. A refusal by a professional institute to give a member internal data is a straightforward dispute under Article 35 on Access to Information or Article 47 on Fair Administrative Action. That is a matter that can be dealt with under the Access to Information Act by involving the Commission on Administrative Justice and eventually seeking mandamus to compel submission of such information. 153.It is in now trite that if a public or private entity fails to supply information under Article 35 of the Constitution, the person seeking to access that information must exhaust the statutory dispute resolution process established by the Access to Information Act. Under Section 14 of the Act, the person seeking to access information must first file an internal review or escalate the denied, ignored, or incomplete request to the Commission on Administrative Justice (CAJ) (the Office of the Ombudsman), which has the statutory mandate to review and enforce access to such information, before a court of law can intervene. Whereas this exhaustion may not apply to all cases, the Fair Administrative Action Act at section 9 provides for a person to seek exemption from exhausting those alternative mechanisms.the section provides:9.Procedure for judicial review.(1)Subject to subsection (2), a person who is aggrieved by an administrative action may, without unreasonable delay, apply for judicial review of any administrative action to the High Court or to a subordinate court upon which original jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to Article 22(3) of the Constitution.(2)The High Court or a subordinate court under subsection (1) shall not review an administrative action or decision under this Act unless the mechanisms including internal mechanisms for appeal or review and all remedies available under any other written law are first exhausted.(3)The High Court or a subordinate Court shall, if it is not satisfied that the remedies referred to in subsection (2) have been exhausted, direct that applicant shall first exhaust such remedy before instituting proceedings under sub-section (1).(4)Notwithstanding subsection (3), the High Court or a subordinate Court may, in exceptional circumstances and on application by the applicant, exempt such person from the obligation to exhaust any remedy if the court considers such exemption to be in the interest of justice. 154.The petitioner has not demonstrated that he ever wrote to the CAJ complaining that he was denied any information by the respondents. 155.I also note that the petitioner pleaded consumer rights under Article 46 and freedom of association under Article 36 without explaining the distinct mechanism of how those rights were violated. This not only creates confusion but clearly fails the test of pleading with a high degree of precision as stipulated by the Anarita test. 156.The petitioner has equally sought this court to strike out the reply filed by the respondents on account that they were filed outside the timelines given by the Court. 157.I have considered this argument and noted that the petition has been in this Court since 2021 which is now over four and half years. The petitioner raised the issue of late filing of the reply and in his affidavits in response to the impugned affidavits and after elaborately responding to all the depositions in those responses by the respondents. The question is whether the late filing of the responses to the amended petition was prejudicial to the petitioner. 158.I am fortified on this point by the Supreme Court decision in Petition (Application) No. 13 (E019) of 2020 As Consolidated with Petition No.18 of 2020 in Kenya Railways Corporation & 2 others v Okiya Omtatah & 3 others where the Supreme Court stated as follows in a ruling delivered on 4th November 2022:[10]Having considered the two notice of motion applications filed by the 1st Petitioner and the 1st Respondent on 23rd June 2022 and 5th July 2022 respectively, WE HOLD as follows:i.This Court in Raila Amolo Odinga & another -v- Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 2 others Presidential Petition No. 1 of 2017 [2017] eKLR invoked its inherent jurisdiction and exercised judicial restraint when it was called upon to expunge the Petitioner’s filed documents from the court record in the interest of justice to all parties in that Petition. ii. We are further guided by this Court’s reasoning in Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission -v- Jane Cheperenger & 2 others [2018] eKLR where we emphasized the importance of complying with court orders, rules and practice directions, we observed as follows:“[24]We however acknowledge that the petitioner’s submissions were filed out of time. Whereas this would have given Mr. Ndettoh a basis, if at all, for objecting, it is not upon Mr. Ndettoh to decide on the punitive measure to befall upon a party who fails to comply with the directions 5 of the Court, as every other party has a respective individual obligation to honour Court’s directions. We underscore the importance of complying with Court Orders and directions given especially with regard to filing and service of documents within the requisite time. That notwithstanding, we take cognizance of Rule 53 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2012 which gives us power to extend the time limited by the Rules, or by any decision of the Court. To this extent, therefore, the late filing of submissions is not patently incurable…………. Suffice to add, Mr. Ndettoh’s objection is at the very least an epitome of infringement of Article 159 of the Constitution which not only dissuades us from being tied to the ropes of procedural technicalities but also reminds us that justice delayed is justice denied.” (Emphasis added) iii. Turning to the instant case, we note that the 1st respondent filed its replying affidavit dated 17th May 2022 on 20th May 2022 without leave of the Court and in response to a petition filed on 22nd July 2020, almost two (2) years after the petition was filed. It is our considered opinion that this is inordinate delay and no plausible justification was advanced by the 1st respondent for such delay. Consequently, we expunge the said affidavit from the court record. We however find that the 1st respondent’s written submissions dated 18th May 2022 and 26th May 2022 were filed only a few days past the Court’s direction and the 1st petitioner did not suffer any prejudice therefore, the prayer to expunge the said documents is dismissed. [emphasis mine] 159.In this case, I note that the respondents were given 21 days from 25/1/2022 to file and serve responses to the amended petition and the matter slated for mention on 21st March, 2022. The respective respondents’ counsel had just been instructed to appear and when the matter came up on the mention date, the petitioner indicated to court that he had been served on 17th March, 2022 by the 1st respondent, with long pleadings. He asked for 7 days to file his submissions. it was also acknowledged by the 1st respondent’s counsel, Mr. Ayieko that their documents were bulky, the 2nd respondent’s counsel Ms Muthoni also apologized to court for filing her client’s documents late. 160.The court then gave fresh directions for the filing of submissions. There was no resistance by the petitioner to the requests by the respondent’s counsel and the court’s directions did balance ourt each of the respective parties’ positions. 161.I further note that the petitioner was indisposed on the subsequent date of 17/5/2022 when he ought to have filed his rejoinders and submissions and he was accorded more time to comply. Even on the subsequent date of 19/9/2022, he had not complied with the timelines given by the court and Ms Chichi informed the court that the non-compliance was due to unforeseeable circumstances. 162.In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the 1st respondent’s later filing of the reply to the petition as amended on 31st December, 2021, which reply is dated dated 2nd March, 2022 and which was elaborately responded to by the petitioner, was in any way prejudicial to the petitioner’s case. Neither were the other responses filed by the 2nd and 3rd responses, which were equally responded to by the petitioner, prejudicial to the petitioner. 163.I decline to strike out or to expunge the reply filed by the 1st respondent as the delay was not inordinate and neither has it been shown that there was prejudice occasioned to the petitioner. 164.In the end, this Court’s finding and holding is that by conflating issues of statutory and administrative breaches into constitutional violations, the Petitioner not only failed to meet the threshold of constitutional Petitions as stated in the Anarita test but equally, his pleadings remain legally speculative and unsubstantiated. 165.In the premises, I find that the amended Petition dated 31st December, 2021 lacks precision and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Having reached this finding, I find further that the other issues for my determination are now not necessary. 166.Accordingly, the Petition is dismissed with an order that each party shall bear their own costs. 167.This file is closed. DATED, SIGNED AND VIRTUALLY DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 9THTH DAY OF JULY, 2026R.E. ABURILIJUDGE