https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/9481

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI** **MILIMANI LAW COURTS** **CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS DIVISION** **PETITION NO. E295 OF 2026** **WAKO ODHA GALGALO…………………………….….1ST PETITIONER** **AUGUSTINE ONDIEKI ANYIEGAH……………….…...2ND PETITIONER** **VERSUS** **ARISTOCARS LIMITED………………………………..1ST RESPONDENT** **NAVICHANDRA JAGJIVAN KHATRI………………..2ND RESPONDENT** **DIRECTOR OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS.……3RD RESPONDENT** **INSPECTOR GENERAL OF** **NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE………………………..4TH RESPONDENT** **DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS……..…….5TH RESPONDENT** **THE HON ATTORNEY GENERAL…………………....6TH RESPONDENT** **RULING** 1. In the petition dated 8th May 2026, the petitioners allege that the 3rd, 4th and 5th respondents have violated the petitioners’ rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Articles 29(a), (b) of the Constitution on the right to freedom and security, by persistently summoning and threatening the petitioners which amounts to harassment and psychological torture; that the threats to charge the 2nd petitioner with the offence of conspiracy to commit a felony if he does not appear before the 2nd Respondent, which, according to the petitioners, is a threat to his right to freedom, threats to violate Article 31 guaranteeing privacy, by forcing the 2nd petitioner to produce private contractual documents without a court order, which violates private property transactions; violation of the right to property guaranteed under Article 40; which alleged threat is intended to defeat the civil claim being ELC E174 of 2024 to undermine the petitioner’s proprietary rights; violation of Article 47 which guarantees the right to fair administrative action which is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair, because, according to the petitioners, the respondents persistently summon the petitioners and that the respondents have refused to conclude investigations since issuing summons on 28th January, 2025. 2. The petitioners also allege that the respondents’ actions violate Article 49(1) (d) which guards against compelling any person to make a confession or admission that could be used in evidence against the petitioners, contrary to Article 50(2) (i). They assert that their right to fair hearing under Article 50(2) is absolute under Article 25 of the Constitution yet it is being violated. 3. The petitioners further accuse the DPP of violating Article 157 (11) of the Constitution by using criminal proceedings to advance civil claims which amounts to abuse of court process. They assert that the investigations being conducted are intended to aid the 1st and 2nd respondents. 4. Additionally, the 3rd and 4th respondents are accused of acting ultra vires Article 245 (4) of the Constitution by taking arbitrary, illegal directives to harass, intimidate and irregularly summon the 1st petitioner and potentially, the 2nd petitioner in a civil matter, which defeats the purpose of their independence. 5. The petitioners therefore seek conservatory orders restraining the respondents, particularly the Directorate of Criminal Investigations, from investigating allegations of forgery and or conspiracy to commit a felony relating to the ownership and transfer of land Reference No. LR No. 18113 and LR No. 18113/114 which the petitioners allege to have lawfully transacted and caused to be conveyed procedurally and lawfully from one Samson Akello Ouno. 6. . The 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th respondents filed grounds of opposition dated 29th May 2026 and a replying affidavit sworn by detective Sergeant Nicolaus Osuri Otieno, one of the investigating police officers in the complaint alongside Inspector Kennedy Ndeto, on 9th June 2026. The deponent asserts that the investigations arise from complaints lodged by lawful registered proprietors of the aforesaid Land reference numbers and the investigations are being conducted under DCI Inquiry File Number 97 of 2024 by the Land Fraud Investigations Unit in accordance with the constitutional and statutory mandates. 7. It is deposed that the petitioners on their part have refused to avail any evidence of their alleged lawful purchase and transfer of the suit property which evidence includes sale agreements, payment and receipts, acknowledgment notes, stamp duty records, title documents and any other proof of lawful ownership. 8. The respondents admit and annex copies of summons issued to the petitioners and one Samson Akello Ouno as well as to the alleged conveyancing advocate Phillip Henry Associates to allow them respond to the complaints raised by the 1st and 2nd respondents who claim to lawfully own the suit properties which the petitioners herein are allegedly to have invaded claiming that the landed properties belong to them. 9. They aver that the issue came to light when on 16th February 2024, the suit property was invaded by persons under instructions of the petitioners herein which led the 1st and 2nd respondents to report to the police leading to investigations which are ongoing, with preliminary results showing that the transfer by Samson Akello Ouno was fraudulent, noting that from the national identity card number of the said Samson, he was born in 1982 meaning he was 11 and 14 years old respectively when he allegedly became the registered owner of the land subject of the investigations, having been registered as proprietor in 1994 and 1997 for the respective parcels of land. 10. Further, that the former Land Registrar who purportedly registered the titles one Rosinah Ndila Mulei denies that the signature used to endorse the registration of the title in favour of Samson Akello Ouno is hers and that she has recorded her statement as annexed, in aid of investigation. That the DCI in the ongoing investigations is to subject the said documentation and statements to forensic examination to establish authenticity, origin and possible falsification of records and fraud through collusion involving certain lands officials. 11. That the strong suspicion is compounded by the fact that although the land in issue is said to have been sold at a consideration of Kshs five million for each parcel, the same is valued at over 45 million at the material time of alleged sale as shown by copies of valuations reports of 12th February 2024 by Shelter M Valuers Limited. The extensive 124 paragraph goes on and on to introduce other parsons said to be witnesses in the investigations which are ongoing and the people include advocates who are alleged to have been involved in or witnessed the impugned transaction. 12. The 1st and 2nd respondents filed a replying affidavit sworn by the 2nd respondent director and shareholder of the 1st respondent and deposing that they are the complainants in the alleged land fraud and that they reported the invasion of their land by the petitioners, which led to the investigations being commenced and that they also filed ELC E174 of 2024 seeking to secure their interests in the said land and that the complaint wa made in good faith as the fraud committed is complex and that the civil suit filed dos not bar the criminal investigations to establish how their land came to be owned by the petitioners herein. 13. The respondents on the whole oppose the grant of conservatory orders contending that they are exercising their statutory and constitutional mandates in investigating alleged fraudulent acquisition of land through a complex scheme by the petitioners and that existence of the civil suit does not bar investigations being undertaken based on the complaint lodged by the 1st and 2nd respondents. 14. Parties filed written submissions to canvass the application for conservatory orders and which submissions I have considered and which replicate the pleadings and depositions as summarized hereinabove. 15. The issue for determination therefore is whether the petitioners are entitled to conservatory orders sought in the notice of motion dated 8th May, 2026. 16. The principles governing the grant of conservatory orders are now well settled. In the Supreme Court of Kenya case of **Gitirau Peter Munya – Versus - Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 Others [2014] eKLR,** the apex Court emphasized that conservatory orders are meant to safeguard constitutional values, including liberty, pending determination of disputes. The Court stated as follows: ***(ii) Should Orders of Stay of Execution be granted?*** ***83.The question as to whether this Court has jurisdiction to grant inter-locutory orders in the nature of a stay of execution was long settled in Board of Governors, Moi High School, Kabarak & Another v. Malcolm Bell, SC Applications Nos. 12 and 13 of 2012, wherein the Court stated as follows (paragraph 33):“It is clear to us that if interlocutory applications are excluded as a necessary step to preserve the subject-matter of an appeal, the Supreme Court’s capability to arrive at a just decision on the merits of an appeal, would be substantially diminished. Both the Constitution and the Supreme Court Act have granted the Court the appellate jurisdiction; and within that jurisdiction, the parties are at liberty to seek interlocutory reliefs, in a proper case.”*** ***84.That leaves pending the main interlocutory matters: whether we should stay the hand of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, and the Speaker of Meru County Assembly, so they do not move to alter the state of affairs at the Meru County gubernatorial office, pending the hearing and determination of the applicant’s appeal.*** ***85.These are issues to be resolved on the basis of recognizable concept. The domain of interlocutory orders is somewhat ruffled, being characterized by injunctions, orders of stay, conservatory orders and yet others. Injunctions, in a proper sense, belong to the sphere of civil claims, and are issued essentially on the basis of convenience as between the parties, and of balances of probabilities. The concept of “stay orders” is more general, and merely denotes that no party nor interested individual or entity is to take action until the Court has given the green light.*** ***86.“Conservatory orders” bear a more decided public-law connotation: for these are orders to facilitate ordered functioning within public agencies, as well as to uphold the adjudicatory authority of the Court, in the public interest. Conservatory orders, therefore, are not, unlike interlocutory injunctions, linked to such private-party issues as “the prospects of irreparable harm” occurring during the pendency of a case; or “high probability of success” in the supplicant’s case for orders of stay. Conservatory orders, consequently, should be granted on the inherent merit of a case, bearing in mind the public interest, the constitutional values, and the proportionate magnitudes, and priority levels attributable to the relevant causes.”*** 1. Thus, an applicant for conservatory orders must demonstrate, among other things, a *prima facie* case with a likelihood of success, that the orders sought are necessary to avert real prejudice such that the substratum of the proceedings should not be rendered nugatory and that the public interest favours the grant of the conservatory relief sought. 2. However, in determining whether those principles have been met, this Court must be careful not to determine the substantive issues reserved for the hearing of the main petition. In **Law Society of Kenya -vs- Attorney General & Judicial Service Commission (2020) eKLR**, it was stated that: “***At this stage I am alive to the fact that the court is not supposed to examine the merits of the petition but has to consider whether the petitioner has established a prima facie case to warrant interim orders of protection in order to secure the substratum of the suit and not to redder the petition herein nugatory and become a mere academic exercise.”*** 1. In proceedings such as these, an application for conservatory orders also requires the Court to maintain the delicate constitutional balance between the protection of individual rights and the discharge of statutory duties by investigative agencies. This is because, the Constitution of Kenya guarantees every person the right to equal protection of the law and freedom from arbitrary State action. Equally, the Constitution obligates investigative agencies who are the National Police Service, to receive complaints, investigate suspected criminal conduct and, where appropriate, present the results of those investigations to the prosecutorial authority, the Director of Public Prosecutions. 2. These constitutional mandates are complementary rather than competing. However, protection of constitutional rights cannot be achieved by disabling institutions lawfully established to investigate alleged criminal conduct. 3. It is for this reason that courts have always exercised restraint before interfering with criminal investigations. In Isaac **Tumunu Njunge v Director of Public Prosecutions & 2 others [2016] eKLR**, the court held that: ***“It is however my view that the police are clearly mandated to investigate the commission of criminal offences and in so doing they have powers inter alia to take statements and conduct forensic investigations. In order for the applicant to succeed he must show that not only are the investigations which were being done by the police are being carried out with ulterior motives but that the predominant purpose of conducting the investigations is to achieve some collateral result not connected with the vindication of an alleged commission of a criminaloffence. It must always be remembered that the motive of institution of the criminal proceedings is only relevant where the predominant purpose is to further some other ulterior purpose and as long as the prosecution and those charged with the responsibility of making the decisions to charge act in a reasonable manner, the High Court would be reluctant to intervene.”*** 1. As stated in the above ***Njunge*** decision, judicial intervention is warranted only where it is demonstrated that the investigative process is undertaken without jurisdiction, in bad faith, for an ulterior purpose or in a manner that plainly violates the Constitution. It follows therefore, that the mere possibility that investigations may culminate in prosecution does not, of itself, constitute an abuse of power. To hold otherwise would transform constitutional petitions into safe havens against legitimate criminal investigations whenever allegations of wrongdoing are made. 2. The two Petitioners contend that the Respondents have violated their constitutional rights by summoning them to record statements explaining how they acquired the suit property. They characterise the summons as harassment and contend that being required to make statements infringes their constitutional rights to a fair hearing, privacy, property, liberty and protection against self-incrimination (Article 50(2) (i)), noting that the right to fair hearing cannot be limited. 3. The commencement point is that the National Police Service is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to prevent, detect and investigate crime. That mandate would be rendered meaningless if investigators were denied the power to require persons who may possess relevant information to attend to summons and assist with investigations. 4. The power of the national police service to conduct investigations is set out in section 24 of the National Police Service Act No 11 A of 2011 which lists the functions of the police as being: ***The functions of the Kenya Police Service shall be the—*** ***(a) provision of assistance to the public when in need;*** ***(b) maintenance of law and order;*** ***(c) preservation of peace;*** ***(d) protection of life and property;*** ***(e) investigation of crimes;*** ***(f) collection of criminal intelligence;*** ***(g) prevention and detection of crime; (h) apprehension of offenders;*** ***(i) enforcement of all laws and regulations with which it is charged; and*** ***(j) performance of any other duties that may be prescribed by the Inspector General under this Act or any other written law from time to time.*** 1. On the role of the police to investigate crimes, I am guided by the decision in **Commissioner of Police & The Director Of Criminal Investigation Department & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 4 others [2013] eKLR** where the Court of Appeal observed: ***“For the purpose of this appeal, we shall focus on the role of police in the investigation of crime and the extent, if at all, to which the court can interfere with this function bearing in mind that policeefforts to investigate crime and collect evidence represent the very foundation of the criminal justice system. Article 157 (4) and (11) of the Constitution underscores this point. It provides*** that:- ***“4. The Director of Public Prosecutions shall have power to direct the Inspector-General of the National Police Service to investigate any information or allegation of criminal conduct and the Inspector-General shall comply with any such direction.*** ***11. In exercising the powers conferred by this Article, the Director of Public Prosecutions shall have regard to the public interest, the interests of the administration of justice and the need to prevent and avoid abuse of the legal process.” (our emphasis supplied). Article 245 (4) (a) of the Constitution on the other hand provides that:-*** ***“245(4)The Cabinet secretary responsible for police services may lawfully give a direction to the Inspector-General with respect to any matter of policy for the National Police Service, but no person may give a direction to the Inspector General with respect tohttps://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2022/12705/eng@2022-06-17 4 The investigation of any particularoffence or offences.”*** 1. A lawful summons issued in the course of an investigations is an ordinary investigative tool and not, without more, evidence of harassment or abuse of power. 2. In the present case, the investigations concern the circumstances under which the Petitioners acquired title to the disputed property which is also being claimed by another set of persons holding what they consider to be the genuine title. It is therefore entirely reasonable for investigators to seek an explanation from those who hold or claim an interest in that property. Such an inquiry is directed at establishing facts. It is neither an accusation of guilt nor a determination of criminal culpability. 3. The Petitioners' argument appears to assume that being asked to explain how they obtained title is equivalent to being compelled to confess to a criminal offence, yet the Constitution in Article 50(2)(i) guarantees then the right not to give self-incriminating evidence. From my assessment of the facts of this case, that proposition has no basis in law. This is because, the constitutional protection against self-incrimination under Article 50(2) (i) exists to ensure that no person is compelled to make an involuntary confession or admission of guilt. It does not prohibit investigators from asking questions, gathering information or requiring persons to account for transactions that are the subject of legitimate investigations. There is an important distinction between a statement made during investigations and a confession within the meaning of the law. Not every statement recorded by the Police is a confession and not every person who records a statement is thereby admitting criminal responsibility. 4. Indeed, if during investigations a person chooses to make a confession, the law has established safeguards governing its admissibility. A confession is only admissible where it is made voluntarily and in accordance with the requirements prescribed by law. The existence of these safeguards demonstrates that the law anticipates investigations to proceed while simultaneously protecting individuals against coercion. It does not follow that investigators are prohibited from interviewing persons merely because those interviews may touch on matters capable of attracting criminal liability. 5. The Petitioners have alleged threats and intimidation but in the context of lawful summons which the police have annexed to the affidavit sworn by one of the investigators. The police are empowered under section 52 of the National Police Service Act to issue summons. The section provides: ***52. Power to compel attendance of witnesses at police station*** ***(1) A police officer may, in writing, require any person whom the police officer has reason to believe has information which may assist in the investigation of an alleged offence to attend before him at a police station or police office in the county in which that person resides or for tbe time being is.*** ***(2) A person who without reasonable excuse fails to comply with a requisition under subsection (1), or who, having complied, refuses or fails to give his correct name and address and to answer truthfully all questions that may be lawfully put to him commits an offence.*** ***(3) A person shall not be required to answer any question under this section if the question tends to expose the person to a criminal charge, penalty or forfeiture.*** ***(4) A police officer shall record any statement made to him by any such person, whether the person is suspected of having committed an offence or not, but, before recording any statement from a person to whom a charge is to be preferred or who has been charged with committing an offence, the police officer shall warn the person that any statement which may be recorded may be used in evidence.*** ***(5) A statement taken in accordance with this section shall be recorded and signed by the person making it after it has been read out to him in a language which the person understands and the person has been invited to make any correction he may wish.*** ***(6) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, the powers conferred by this section shall be exercised in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 75), the Witness Protection Act (Cap. 79) or any other written law.*** ***(7) The failure by a police officer to comply with a requirement of this section in relation to the making of a statement shall render the statement inadmissible in any proceedings in which it is sought to have the statement admitted in evidence***. 1. There is at this stage, no evidence of torture orcoercion or any other unlawful means intended to force the petitioner to confess. Their complaint is simply that they have been summoned to explain the acquisition of their title to land which the 1st and 2nd respondents also lay claim to and have complained to the DCI, recorded statements and availed witnesses who include advocates and former land registrar. That complaint, standing on its own, cannot amount to a violation of the petitioners’ guaranteed Constitutional rights. 2. The Petitioners likewise invoke the rights to privacy, property, liberty and a fair hearing. Those rights are undoubtedly fundamental, but none of them creates immunity from lawful criminal investigations. he right to privacy cannot be interpreted to shield transactions whose legality is under investigation. Where allegations of fraud have been raised, investigators are entitled to examine the documentation, transactions and circumstances surrounding the acquisition of property. Such scrutiny is an incident of lawful investigation and cannot, without more, be characterised as an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. 3. Similarly, the right to property protects interests that are recognised and protected by law. It cannot be invoked to prevent competent authorities from investigating allegations that property may have been acquired through fraud, forgery or other unlawful means. Whether the Petitioners' title is lawful is precisely one of the questions that the investigations seek to establish. To hold that investigators may not inquire into that question because the Petitioners invoke the right to property would effectively place every disputed title beyond lawful scrutiny. 4. The Petitioners' reliance on the right to a fair hearing is equally baseless. Investigations are not trials. A police officer recording a witness or suspect's statement is not determining rights, imposing criminal liability or adjudicating disputes. The right to a fair hearing becomes operative when legal rights and obligations fall for determination before a competent tribunal or court. It cannot be invoked to halt investigations before they are completed. 5. The Petitioners have not demonstrated any unlawful interference with their liberty. Being summoned to assist investigations is not the same as being arbitrarily arrested or detained. The law recognises the power of investigators to require attendance where necessary for purposes of investigating alleged criminal conduct. Seen objectively, the Petition reveals an attempt to use constitutional litigation to prevent investigators from carrying out their statutory mandate. It is worth noting that the Constitution was enacted to safeguard fundamental rights, not to insulate individuals from legitimate investigations into allegations of criminal conduct. 6. Thus, if every person under investigation were permitted to challenge a police summons on the ground that answering questions might expose them to criminal liability, the investigative function of law enforcement agencies would be substantially undermined. Criminal investigations necessarily involve asking questions, examining documents and requiring explanations from persons connected to the matters under inquiry. These investigative steps cannot, by themselves, constitute constitutional violations. 7. It is also noteworthy that the Petitioners maintain that they lawfully acquired the suit property. If that is indeed the case, the investigative process affords them the opportunity to present the documents and explanations that support their claim. A lawful investigation is capable of exonerating as well as implicating. Refusing to participate in that process while simultaneously asking this Honourable Court to prohibit investigators from making further inquiries suggests that the Petition is directed less at protecting constitutional rights and more at frustrating investigations into alleged fraud. 8. This Court has consistently recognised that it should exercise restraint before interfering with ongoing criminal investigations unless there is clear evidence of bad faith, abuse of process, malice or conduct that is plainly inconsistent with the Constitution. The Petitioners have placed no such evidence before Court. Their allegations rest solely upon the fact that they have been summoned to explain matters that are central to the investigations. Respectfully, that is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. 9. The Respondents urge this Honourable Court to find that the impugned summons constitute a lawful exercise of investigative powers, that no constitutional right of the Petitioners has been infringed and that the Petition is an attempt to obstruct lawful investigations under the guise of constitutional enforcement. 10. Having considered all the above, I am unable to find, at this stage, that the complaint lodged before the DCI is frivolous nor speculative. A claimant asserting ownership of the suit property alleges that title documents were forged and that the subsequent transfers were fraudulent. Those allegations concern the integrity of the land registration system, a matter of considerable public importance. They deserve careful, impartial and professional investigation. Whether they will ultimately be substantiated is not a question presently before this Court. It is precisely the question the investigative process is intended to answer. 11. The material placed before this Court further demonstrates that the complaint as lodged cannot simply be dismissed as fanciful. Among the matters requiring clarification is documentation indicating that the transferee, Samson Akello Ouno, according to records held by the National Registration Bureau, was aged 11 and 14 years old in 1994 and 1997 respectively at the time he is alleged to have acquired the suit property which he later passed onto the petitioners herein through the impugned transfer. 12. This Court deliberately refrains from drawing any adverse inference from that fact. It is neither evidence of fraud nor proof of criminal responsibility. It is, however, an objective circumstance that reasonably calls for investigation. Ordinarily, a minor does not become the sole registered proprietor of land except through legally recognised arrangements such as trusteeship or other protective legal mechanisms. Whether such an arrangement existed, whether the records relied upon are accurate, whether the transfer occurred as alleged, or whether the transaction was tainted by forgery or fraud are all matters that can only be resolved through proper investigations. 13. Therefore, to restrain the investigators from pursuing those inquiries would be to require the Court to substitute speculation for investigation. Such an approach would undermine, rather than uphold, the administration of justice. Courts are not investigative bodies. Their constitutional role is to adjudicate disputes upon evidence properly presented before them. They should therefore be slow to halt investigations that are lawfully commenced on the basis of a credible complaint unless it is plainly demonstrated that the investigative process itself has become unconstitutional, laced with malice. 14. The petitioners urge this Court to find that the intended investigations are malicious and intended only to harass and intimidate them. Allegations of malice, however, cannot rest upon assertion alone. They must be supported by cogent evidence demonstrating that the criminal process is being employed for an ulterior purpose rather than for the enforcement of the law. No such evidence has been placed before this Court. The existence of competing civil claims over ownership of land does not preclude criminal investigations where the complaint discloses possible offences relating to forgery or fraud and of a complex nature requiring forensic investigations as is deposed by the investigator. Civil disputes and criminal investigations may legitimately proceed concurrently where the facts disclose both private rights and possible criminal conduct, as provided for under section 193 A of the Criminal Procedure Code, Cap 75 Laws of Kenya. 15. I am fortified on this point by the holding in**Thomas Nyakambi Maosa v Kibera Chief Magistrate & 3 others [2015] eKLR** where Odunga J held: ***“Therefore the concurrent existence of the criminal proceedings and civil proceedings would not, ipso facto, constitute an abuse of the process of the court unless the commencement of the criminal proceedings is meant to force the applicant to submit to the civil claim in which case the institution of the criminal process would have been for the achievement of a collateral purpose other than its legally recognised aim. section 193A of the Criminal Procedure Code on this issue provides: Notwithstanding the provisions of any other written law, the fact that any matter in issue in any criminal proceedings is also directly or substantially in issue in any pending civil proceedings shall not be a ground for any stay, prohibition or delay of the criminal proceedings.”*** 1. Nor is this Court persuaded that the mere fact of being investigated constitutes a violation of constitutional rights. The Constitution guarantees due process, fair administrative action and fair trial. It does not guarantee immunity from lawful investigations. Every person against whom a complaint is made is entitled to have the investigation conducted fairly, impartially and within the confines of the law. Equally, every complainant is entitled to have allegations of criminal conduct investigated without unwarranted interference. This Court's supervisory jurisdiction remains available should the investigative agencies exceed their constitutional mandate or employ unlawful methods. At this stage, however, the complaint is directed at the very existence of the investigations rather than at any demonstrated abuse in the manner they are being conducted. 2. More so, the public interest strongly favours permitting investigations into allegations of forgery of land documents to proceed unhindered. Fraud relating to land transactions strikes at the integrity of the land registration system and, if left unchecked, it undermines public confidence in one of the country's most important legal institutions. Equally important is the public interest in ensuring that persons against whom allegations are made are investigated fairly and objectively before any decision is taken to prosecute them. Halting investigations at their inception would defeat both objectives. 3. This Court therefore finds that the petitioners have failed to establish a *prima facie* case warranting the grant of conservatory orders. Neither have they demonstrated that they stand to suffer prejudice incapable of being remedied through the ordinary processes of the law. On the contrary, the public interest lies in permitting the 3rd to 6th respondents to discharge their constitutional and statutory mandate while remaining bound to respect the petitioners' constitutionally guaranteed rights through out the investigative process. 4. Accordingly, the Notice of Motion dated 8th May, 2026 seeking conservatory orders is dismissed. The Directorate of Criminal Investigations is at liberty to continue with its investigations expeditiously, professionally and strictly within the confines of the Constitution and the law. Should those investigations disclose evidence warranting further action, the relevant constitutional and statutory processes shall take their course. Should the respondents, in conducting those investigations, exceed the limits of their lawful authority or threaten to violate or violate the petitioners' constitutional rights, this Court remains open and available to grant appropriate relief. 5. Nothing in this ruling should be understood as expressing any view on the merits of the allegations under investigation, those being matters reserved for determination, if necessary, before the appropriate forum upon completion of the investigative process. 6. In the end, I dismiss the notice of motion dated 8th May, 2026 with no orders as to costs. 7. I will now proceed, in the usual procedural manner, to give directions for the disposal of the main petition. **Dated, Signed and Delivered at Nairobi this 2nd Day of July, 2026** **R.E. ABURILI** **JUDGE**