https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/7378

Gebreyesus (Suing as the Legal Representative of the Estate of Stefanos Egzibher) v Kenya Power and Lighting Company Plc & another (Petition E564 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 7378 (KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights) (28 May 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 7378 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts) Constitutional and Human Rights Petition E564 of 2025 LN Mugambi, J May 28, 2026 Between Mehret Gebreyesus (Suing as the Legal Representative of the Estate of Stefanos Egzibher) Petitioner and Kenya Power and Lighting Company Plc 1st Respondent Energy & Petroleum Regulation Authority 2nd Respondent Ruling 1.The Petion dated 12th August, 2025 is supported by the affidavit of Mehret Gebreyesus of even date. 2.The Petition challenges the electricity billing in relation to the Petitioner’s Meter account No. 324863 amounting to Kshs.1,256, 410/00 for her matrimonial home which she describes as unjustified, outrageous and abnormal because she lives alone and her electricity usage is only for cooking and lighting. 3.She avers her electricity was disconnected due to the inflated bill yet she been faithfully and diligently settling all her electricity bills whenever they fall due. 4.She stated that she raised a complaint with the 1st Respondent on grounds that it was “System Error” and her electricity was reconnected but the error was not rectified. Efforts to get accurate information on the billing from the 1st Respondent have been unsuccessful. On 12th of August, 2025 the Petitioner was issued with the electricity bill based on the inflated sum of Kes. 1,256, 410/00 along with the disconnection threat. 5.As a result, the Petitioner alleges that the Respondents have violated her rights under Article 28, 35, 46 and 47 of the Constitution and seeks the following reliefs:a.A declaration that the 1st Respondent by dint of the disconnection of electricity due to an irregularly and erroneous inflated electricity bill imposed on the Petitioner has violated the rights of the Petitioner as provided for under Article 46 of the Constitutionb.A declaration that the 1st Respondent's refusal to supply the Petitioner with the billing details as requested violated the rights of the Petitioner as provided for under Article 35 of the Constitutionc.An order for compensation for violation of the Petitioner's rights.d.An order directing the Respondent to reconnect the the Petitioner's electricity, rectify the billing anomaly due system error at their own expense/s and/ or with no charge to the Petitioner.e.Costs of this petition. 6.In response, the 1st Respondent filed a Preliminary Objection dated 12th September, 2025 objecting to the jurisdiction of the Court to hear and determine the Petition on the following grounds:1.The proceedings are offensive of the doctrine of exhaustion in so far as the matters raised are largely complaints defined under Section 3 of the Energy Act, 2019, the determination of which lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority and/or the Energy and Petroleum Tribunal.2.The Petition does not meet the legal threshold on what constitutes a constitutional petition in as far as the Petitioner alleges the violation of his rights and fundamental freedoms under the Bill of Rights.3.The Petition offends the doctrine of constitutional avoidance by seeking application of the Constitution to matters fully addressed by statute. All the issues arising from the Petition ought to be adjudicated under the Energy Act, 2019 of the Laws of Kenya. 1st Respondent’s Submissions 7.The Respondent filed written submissions dated 12 October 2025, in which it challenged the Petition on the basis that it offends the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies and thus the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the matter. The Respondent submitted that the substratum of the Petition is essentially a disconnection and reconnection of electricity supply, which falls within the jurisdiction of specialized statutory bodies established under the Energy Act, 2019. 8.The Respondent argued that the High Court does not have the primary jurisdiction to entertain the petition because the Energy Act and the regulations thereunder expressly provide for dispute resolution mechanisms through the Energy & Petroleum Regulatory Authority (EPRA) and the Energy & Petroleum Tribunal. 9.To buttress this submission, the 1st Respondent relied sections 3, 9, 10, 11, 23, 24, 25, 36, 40, 42, 159(3), 160(3), and 224(2)(e) of the Energy Act, as well as the Energy (Complaints and Disputes Resolution) Regulations, 2012. Further, Article 159(2)(c) and Article 169(1)(d) of the Constitution of Kenya, which provides for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 10.The 1st Respondent submitted that jurisprudence from Superior Courts is now settled that where a statute provides a clear dispute resolution mechanism, that must be the first port of call in resolution of such a dispute. Relying on the cases such as Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v. Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1, the 1st Respondent reiterated that jurisdiction is everything, and once a court finds it lacks jurisdiction, it must “down its tools.” Further cited was the Court of Appeal decision of Speaker of the National Assembly v. Njenga Karume [1992] KLR 425 where the Court of Appeal held that statutory procedures, where provided must be followed. 11.The Respondent further relied on decisions of the Supreme Court, including Albert Chaurembo Mumbo & 7 others v. Maurice Munyao & 148 others [2019] eKLR and United Millers Ltd v. Kenya Bureau of Standards [2021] eKLR, where the Court emphasized that disputes disguised to attract the constitutional jurisdiction of superior courts ought not to be entertained as they should first be dealt in the initial forums under the statutes. 12.To further reinforce its position on the applicability of the doctrine of exhaustion, the 1st Respondent relied on Section 9 (2) and 9 (3) of the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015 which makes it mandatory for an aggrieved party to exhaust the statutorily provided alternative remedy before turning to the courts. The Respondent argued that the Petitioner deliberately bypassed the statutory mechanisms provided under the Energy Act by filing the petition before this Honourable Court and thus maintained that the proper forum was the Energy & Petroleum Regulatory Authority or the Energy & Petroleum Tribunal, both of which have the power to grant equitable reliefs such as injunctions, damages, and specific performance. 13.Accordingly, the 1st Respondent position was that this must not assume jurisdiction over this petition and should therefore strike it with costs. 2ND RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS 14.The 2nd Respondent Petition also argued that the matter before this Court is expressly regulated by the provisions of the Energy Act, 2019. 15.In its narrative, the 2nd Respondent contended that the gist of the dispute relates to inflated electricity billing and which led to disconnection of electricity supply. According to the 2nd Respondent, the primary forum with the competence over such a dispute is the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority (EPRA) and the Energy and Petroleum Tribunal, both established under the Energy Act, 2019. 16.The 2nd Respondent submitted that the Energy Act governs various aspects including supply, billing, and dispute resolution in matters energy. The Respondent submitted that the Petitioner cannot bypass the statutory mechanisms camouflaging the dispute as constitutional violation yet erroneous billing, disconnection of electricity, and refusal to provide billing details—are matters that squarely lie with the statutory mandate of EPRA’, which inter alia, include to investigate and determine disputes between consumers and licensees. 17.The Respondent argued that the Energy Act and the Energy (Complaints and Dispute Resolution) Regulations prescribe a clear procedure for lodging complaints, and upon resolutions, makes provisions for appeals. The 2nd Respondent submitted that although the Petitioner had indeed initiated under the statutory dispute resolution process, she did not wait for it to be concluded before filing this case yet EPRA, under the law was obligated to deliver a decision within sixty days. If dissatisfied, or in the event of inaction, the Petitioner entitled to take up the matter with the Energy and Petroleum Tribunal within 7 days. The 2nd Respondent argued thus:“The Petitioner, having initiated the dispute Resolution mechanism under the Energy Act No. 1 of 2019 ought to further the same in terms of section 23(5) of the Act which provides that “where the Authority does not make a decision as provided in subsection (1) (within 60 days after receipt of the complaint), the appellant may appeal to the Tribunal within seven days of the expiry of the prescribed period”.Consequently, the Petitioner ought to have lodged this matter as an appeal before the Energy and Petroleum Tribunal within 7 days after the expiry of 60 days since the Lodging of the Complaint before the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority.”. 18.However, according to the 2nd Respondent, the Petitioner avoided this clearly defined statutory path and rushed to file this suit in Court in complete disregard of the doctrine of exhaustion of alternative remedies. In support of these submissions the 2nd Respondent relied on the following judicial precedents- Patrick Musimba vs. National Commission & 4 Others (2016) eKLR and Samuel Kahiu v Muktar Mahat, Deputy Administration Police Commander (D.A.P.C) Athi River & 3 others [2018] eKLR and Geoffrey Muthinja Kabiru & 2 Others vs. Samuel Munga Henry & 1756 Others (2015) eKLR. 19.The Respondent submitted that there were no demonstrable exceptional circumstances that justified the Petitioner’s failure to utilize the primary dispute resolution mechanism provided for under the Energy Act, 2019. 20.The 2nd Respondent therefore urged this Court to uphold the objection and dismiss the Petition with costs. Petitioner’s Submissions 21.The Petitioner filed written submissions dated 27th October 2025 in response to the Preliminary Objection raised by the 1st Respondent. 22.On the question of jurisdiction, the Petitioner relied on the cerebrated case of Owners of Motor Vessel “Lillian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Limited [1989] KLR 1, where the Court of Appeal articulate its legal implications. 23.The Petitioner contended that Article 23(1) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 expressly grants the High Court jurisdiction to hear and determine applications for redress of denial, violation, or infringement of fundamental rights and freedoms. The Petitioner submitted that the Petition raises grave issues of violation of his constitutional rights including human dignity under Article 28, consumer protection under Article 46 and violation to fair administrative action under Article 47, matters the Energy and Regulatory Authority or the Energy Tribunal cannot give remedy. 24.On the question of whether the Preliminary Objection meets the legal threshold, the Petitioner cited the locus classicus case of Mukhisa Biscuit Manufacturers Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, where the Court defined a Preliminary Objection as one that raises a pure point of law and, is argued on the assumption that all pleaded facts are correct. Further, that a Preliminary Objection cannot be sustained where determination requires inquiry into disputed facts or the exercise of judicial discretion. 25.The Petitioner argued that this threshold has not been met by the instant Preliminary Objection as the issues raised by the 1st Respondent cannot be determined without interrogating contested facts, including allegations of harassment, arbitrary disconnection of electricity, unwelcome visits at odd hours, and the issuance of an allegedly outrageous electricity bill amounting to Kshs. 1,256,410. 26.The Petitioner argued that these the core facts upon which the Petition is anchored and reflect violation of rights under Articles 28, 46 and 47 of the Constitution. That accepting these facts as true, as required at this stage, this Honourable Court will find that it is properly seized of jurisdiction, and the Preliminary Objection must thus fail. 27.On the doctrine of exhaustion, the Petitioner contested the submission by the 1st Respondent that the Petitioner should have sought redress before the Energy and Petroleum Tribunal. The Petitioner argued that the dispute transcends a mere billing complaint and reiterated that it involves violations of constitutional rights, including human dignity, consumer rights, and fair administrative action under Articles 28, 46, and 47 respectively. Further that the doctrine of exhaustion is not absolute. The Petitioner argued that Courts have consistently recognised exceptions where the alternative remedy is inadequate, ineffective, or incapable of addressing the grievance and cited the case Mohamed Ali Baadi & Others v Attorney General & 11 Others [2018] eKLR, the Court emphasised that alternative remedies must be accessible, effective, and capable of providing complete redress, hence, where such conditions are absent, litigants are entitled to approach the High Court directly. 28.In the instant matter, the Petitioner argued that the Energy and Petroleum Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to grant the conservatory and constitutional reliefs sought, including protection against ongoing harassment, arbitrary disconnections, and threats to the Petitioner's dignity and security. Furthermore, Section 9(4) of the Fair Administrative Action Act permits exemption from the exhaustion requirement in exceptional circumstances and where it is in the interest of justice. The Petitioner submits that such exceptional circumstances exist, given the repeated disconnections, coercive conduct by the Respondent’s agents, and the urgency of the violations. 29.Further, the Petitioner submitted that she attempted to resolve the matter through the Respondents’ internal mechanisms, including formal complaints and personal visits, which yielded nothing. Crucially, the Respondent’s agents acknowledged that the bill in question was erroneous, yet no corrective action was taken which constitutes a breach of Article 47 and thus justifies recourse to this Honourable Court. 30.The Petitioner argued that this is not a mere a contractual dispute disguised as a constitutional claim for the Petition clearly identifies the rights violated, including human dignity and fair administrative action, and sets out in detail the manner of violation as per the yardstick set out in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (1979) KLR 154. 31.The Petitioner argued that despite regularly paying electricity bills, she was subjected to an abnormal and excessive demand, repeated disconnections, and intrusive, coercive visits by the Respondent’s agents at odd hours. These actions caused distress, embarrassment, and insecurity, thereby undermining her dignity and peaceful enjoyment of her home. 32.On the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Petitioner acknowledged that courts should generally resolve disputes on non-constitutional grounds where possible. However, this principle is not absolute and must yield where constitutional violations are clear and direct. Reliance is placed on Communications Commission of Kenya & Others v Royal Media Services Ltd & Others [2015] eKLR, where the Supreme Court affirmed that constitutional issues should be addressed where necessary. 33.Further guidance is drawn from KKB v SCM & Others [2022] KEHC 289 (KLR), 34.which outlined exceptions to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, including instances where constitutional violations are evident, where no adequate alternative remedy exists, or where pursuing alternative remedies would be futile. 35.In the present case, the Petitioner argued that she is not challenging the Energy Act itself but rather the unconstitutional manner in which the 1st Respondent has exercised its statutory powers. The Respondent, as a public body, is bound to act within the confines of the Constitution, and its actions, characterized by coercion, harassment, and disregard for procedural fairness, warrant constitutional scrutiny. 36.The Petitioner thus submitted that the Preliminary Objection lacks merit and is merely an attempt to obstruct access to justice. Analysis and Determination 37.The two fundamental issues for determination are whether the Petition offends the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies and whether the Petition meets the threshold required of a Preliminary Objection. 38.What constitutes a preliminary objection was set out in the case of Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd Vs. West End Distributors Ltd (1969) EA 696. Subsequently, the principle was echoed by the Supreme Court in the Hassan Ali Joho & another v Suleiman Said Shahbal & 2 others(2014) eKLR as follows:“(31)To restate the relevant principle from the precedent-setting case, Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co Ltd –vs. - West End Distributors (1969) EA 696:“a preliminary objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings and which if argued as a preliminary point may dispose of the suit. Examples are an objection to the jurisdiction of the court or a plea of limitation or a submission that the parties are bound by the contract giving rise to the suit to refer the dispute to arbitration….a preliminary objection is in the nature of what used to be a demurrer. It raises a pure point of law which is argued on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct. It cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion”. 39.Discussing its nature in Dismas Wambola v Cabinet Secretary, Treasury & 5 others (2017) eKLR, the Court noted as follows:“A preliminary objection must first, raise a point of law based on ascertained facts and not on evidence. Secondly, if the objection is sustained, that should dispose of the matter. A preliminary objection is in the nature of a legal objection not based on the merits or facts of the case, but must be on pure points of law. It may be noted that preliminary objections are narrow in scope and cannot raise substantive issues raised in the pleadings that may have to be determined by the court after perusal of evidence….” 40.A court’s jurisdiction is a foundational issue that must be ascertained before embarking on determination, particularly, when it has been challenged. 41.The question to be asked is, how does the principle of exhaustion of remedies come into play as a jurisdictional issue? This doctrine is based on recognition that even though the Court may potentially exercise jurisdiction over the matter, where there is an alternative forum provided for in law, it will generally defer to the alternative forum that has been clothed with the primary mandate except if there are exceptional circumstances to warrant an immediate and express intervention by the Court. The Court therefore will not assume jurisdiction if there an alternative forum specifically required to adjudicate over the matter before it finds it way into Court unless exceptional circumstances are demonstrated.Blacks Law Dictionary 10th Edition explains the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies as follows:“The doctrine that if an administrative remedy is provided by a Statute, a claimant must seek relief first from the administrative body before judicial relief. The doctrine’s purpose is to maintain comity between the courts and administrative agencies and to ensure courts will not be burdened by cases in which judicial relief is unnecessary.” 42.The Supreme Court in Albert Chaurembo Mumba & 7 others (sued on their own behalf and on behalf of predecessors and or successors in title in their capacities as the Registered Trustees of Kenya Ports Authority Pensions Scheme) v Maurice Munyao & 148 others (suing on their own behalf and on behalf of the Plaintiffs and other Members/Beneficiaries of the Kenya Ports Authority Pensions Scheme) (2019) eKLR held thus:“… the Court must exercise restraint in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 165. Where there exist alternative methods of dispute resolution, the Court must exercise deference to the bodies statutorily mandated to deal with specific disputes in the first instance…. The foregoing verdict also finds support in an adage principle in administrative law of “Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies” and from the jurisprudence emanating from this Court and the lower Courts, which has been restated with notoriety to the effect that, where there exists an alternative method of dispute resolution established by legislation, the Courts must exercise restraint in exercising their Jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and must give deference to the dispute resolution bodies established by statutes with the mandate to deal with such specific disputes in the first instance …In the pursuit of such sound legal principles, it is our disposition that disputes disguised and pleaded with the erroneous intention of attracting the jurisdiction of superior courts is not a substitute for known legal procedures. Even where superior courts had jurisdiction to determine profound questions of law, first opportunity had to be given to relevant persons, bodies, tribunals or any other quasi-judicial authorities and organs to deal with the dispute as provided for in the relevant parent statute… Such a deferred jurisdiction and the postponement of judicial intervention and reliefs until the mandated statutory or constitutional bodies take action rests, not alone on the disinclination of the judiciary to interfere with the exercise of the statutory or any administrative powers, but on the fact of a legal presumption that no harm can result if the decision maker acts upon a claim or grievance. Such formulation underlies the analogous cases, frequently cited for the exhaustion doctrine, in which the court refuses to enjoin an administrative official from performing his statutory duties on the ground that until he has acted the complainant can show no more than an apprehension that he will perform his duty wrongly, a fear that courts will not allay. Such cases may be expressed in the formula that judicial intervention is premature in the absence of administrative action.” 43.Instances where an exception to the application of this doctrine may be justified also exist. The Court of Appeal in Fleur Investments Limited vs Commissioner of Domestic Taxes & another [2018] eKLR stated thus:“22.For this proposition the appellant called in aid this Court’s finding in the case of Speaker of National Assembly vs Njenga Karume (1990-1994) EA 546 where the Court expressed itself in relevant part as follows: -“…where there was an alternative remedy and especially where parliament has provided a statutory procedure, it is only in exceptional circumstances that an order for judicial review would be granted, and that in determining whether an exception should be made and judicial review granted, it was necessary for the court to look carefully to the suitability of the statutory appeal in the context of the particular case and ask itself what, in the context of the statutory powers, was the real issue to be determined and whether the statutory appeal procedure was suitable to determine it…”23.… Whereas courts of Law are enjoined to defer to specialised Tribunals and other Alternative Dispute Resolution Statutory bodies created by Parliament to resolve certain specific disputes, the court cannot, being a bastion of Justice, sit back and watch such institutions ride roughshod on the rights of citizens who seek refuge under the Constitution and other legislations for protection. The court is perfectly in order to intervene where there is clear abuse of discretion by such bodies, where arbitrariness, malice, capriciousness and disrespect of the Rules of natural justice are manifest. Persons charged with statutory powers and duties ought to exercise the same reasonably and fairly.” 44.The Court also in Krystaline Salt Limited vs Kenya Revenue Authority (2019)eKLR on this issue opined as follows:“What constitutes exceptional circumstances depends on the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the administrative action at issue. Thus, where an internal remedy would not be effective and/ or where its pursuit would be futile, a court may permit a litigant to approach the court directly. So too where an internal appellate tribunal has developed a rigid policy which renders exhaustion futile.…this court interprets exceptional circumstances to mean circumstances that are out of the ordinary and that render it inappropriate for the court to require an applicant first to pursue the available internal remedies. The circumstances must in other words be such as to require the immediate intervention of the court rather than to resort to the applicable internal remedy.” 45.The question thus becomes, does the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies apply in the present Petition? 46.However, I deal with whether the Preliminary Objections has met the legal threshold required for raising it. The Petitioner argued that the Petition raises factual matters relating to violation of the Constitution in particular violations under Article 28, 46 and 47 of the Constitution, hence this Preliminary Objection cannot stand. 47.My view is that in any Petition has a true substratum or the foundation upon which the entire grievances rest. Consequently, while the Petitioner may be having other claims, they do not become the core or the underlying trunk. In this Petition, the gist of the Petitioner’s grievance flows from the following material circumstance.“The Petitioner is a consumer of electricity under Meter account No.324863. She was billed Kshs. 1,256, 410/00, an amount she describes as unjustified, outrageous and abnormal because she lives in her matrimonial house alone and her electricity is only used for cooking and lighting. Subsequently, her electricity was disconnected due to the inflated bill yet she has always faithfully and diligently settled all her electricity bills whenever they fall due. She stated that she raised a complaint with the 1st Respondent on grounds that it was “SYSTEM ERROR” and her electricity was reconnected but that the error was not rectified. Efforts to get accurate information on the billing from the 1st Respondent have been unsuccessful. On 12th of August, 2025 the Petitioner was issued with the electricity bill based on the inflated sum of Kes. 1,256, 410/00 along with another disconnection threat.” 48.The real issue underlying the instant Petition is discernibly the alleged inflated and outrageous billing and disconnection of the electricity supply to the Petitioner. The other claims that the Petitioner is advancing are thus secondary to this core issue. The core issue, for purposes of raising the Preliminary Objection, was uncontested. My finding therefore is that the Preliminary Objection satisfies the legal threshold of a pure preliminary objection. 49.The alleged inflated billing and disconnection of the electricity being the gist of the Petitioner’s grievance, the 1st Respondent argued that the Petitioner was statutorily bound to utilize the procedure specified under the Energy Act, 2019 instead of invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. 50.The issue therefore becomes whether the Petitioner’s grievances can be adjudicated upon by this Court as a constitutional question or whether it ought to have been pursued under the relevant provisions of the Energy Act, 2019 and the Regulations thereunder. 51.The Energy Act 2019, among others makes provision for regulating the relationship between a licenced supplier of electricity and a consumer. Section 160(3) of the Act enumerates disputes that may be resolved by referring the matter to the Authority. Under section 2 of the Act, ‘Authority’ refers to the ‘Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority (EPRA) established under Section 9 of the Act’. states:“If any dispute arises as to—(a)any charges;(b)the application of any deposit;(c)any illegal or improper use of electrical energy;(d)any alleged defects in any apparatus or protective devices; or(e)any unsuitable apparatus or protective devices, it shall be referred to the Authority.’ 52.Part of the powers of the 2nd Respondent under Section 11 (k) of the Energy Act is to “issue orders or directions to ensure compliance with the Act” 53.Section 25 of the Energy Act on the other hand provides for the Establishment of the Energy and Petroleum Tribunal in the following terms:Establishment of the Energy and Petroleum Tribunal“There is established the Energy and Petroleum Tribunal, hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal", for the purpose of hearing and determining disputes and appeals in accordance with this Act or any other written law.’Section 30 sets out the jurisdiction of the Tribunal as follows:Jurisdiction of the Tribunal(1)The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters referred to it, relating to the energy and petroleum sector arising under this Act or any other Act.(2)The jurisdiction of the Tribunal shall not include the trial of any criminal offence.(3)The Tribunal shall have original civil jurisdiction on any dispute between a licensee and a third party or between licensees.(4)The Tribunal shall have appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the Authority and any licensing authority and in exercise of its functions may refer any matter back to the Authority or any licensing authority for re-consideration.(5)The Tribunal shall have power to grant equitable reliefs including but not limited to injunctions, penalties, damages, specific performance.(6)The Tribunal shall hear and determine matters referred to it expeditiously. 54.Under Section 37 (3) Appeals from the Tribunal are to be made to the High Court. It states:“Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Tribunal may, within thirty days from the date of the decision or order, appeal to the High Court.”Under Section 40 the Tribunal is empowered to hear appeals from the Energy and Regulatory Authority or any licensing authority. The Section states:Appeals from decisions of the Authority“40.Where under this Act the provision is made for appeals from the decisions of the Authority or any licensing authority, all such appeals shall be made to the Tribunal, in accordance with the provisions of this Act.’ 55.Having regard to the above provisions and bearing in mind the nature of the dispute upon which this Petition is primarily grounded, namely, outrageous billing and disconnection of electricity supply, it is my considered opinion that such a complaint is a dispute involving charges in respect of electricity consumption, a matter that squarely falls within the ambit of Section 160 (3) of the Energy Act. 56.As such, the compliant should have been directed to the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority (EPRA) (2nd Respondent) for resolution. If dissatisfied with EPRA’s decision, or incase of inertia in addressing the complaint, the prescribed procedure would have been to appeal to the Energy and Petroleum Tribunal by dint of Section 30(4) of the Act. 57.In any case, it is also permissible to approach the Tribunal directly under section 30 (3) of the Act which provides that the ‘The Tribunal shall have original civil jurisdiction on any dispute between a licensee and a third party or between licensees,’ 58.Further, a careful examination of key prayers in the Petition, confirm that they are materially within the purview of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction as under Section 30 (5) of the Energy Act, the Tribunal ‘has the power to grant equitable reliefs including but not limited to injunctions, penalties, damages, specific performance’. This effectively defeats the Petitioners contention that that the alternative forum is not efficacious on the basis that she cannot get an injunctive relief under the statutory forum. 59.In the light of the provisions set out in the foregoing, this Honourable Court finds that there is an elaborate dispute settlement mechanism under the Energy Act which the Petitioner failed to utilize when she filed this Petition. The instant Petition thus offends the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies. This preliminary objection is therefore upheld. 60.The upshot is that the Petition is struck out with costs to the Respondents. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI THIS 28TH DAY OF MAY, 2026.……………………………………L N MUGAMBIJUDGE