https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/10720

Kikuvi v Kipkosgei (Small Claims Appeal E063 of 2026) [2026] KEHC 10720 (KLR) (Civ) (16 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 10720 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts) Civil Small Claims Appeal E063 of 2026 BW Murunga, J July 16, 2026 Between George Kikuvi Appellant and Doreen Jebet Kipkosgei Respondent (Being an appeal from part of the Judgment of Honourable Adjudicator/Magistrate Ms. J.W. Nasimiyu delivered on 11th August 2025 in SCCCOMM NO. E39746 OF 2025 at the Milimani Small Claims Court) Judgment 1.This is an appeal from the judgment of the Small Claims Court at Milimani (Hon. J.W. Nasimiyu, Adjudicator) delivered on 11th August 2025 in SCCCOMM No. E39746 of 2025, in which judgment was entered for the Respondent (the Claimant below) against the Appellant (the Respondent below) in the sum of Kshs. 120,500/=, together with costs assessed at Kshs. 12,000/= and interest at court rates from the date of filing the claim until payment in full. 2.The dispute has its roots in September 2021, when the Respondent, vide Mpesa transfers of Kshs. 300,000/= on 2nd September 2021 and Kshs. 100,000/= on 3rd September 2021, advanced to the Appellant a total sum of Kshs. 400,000/=. It is common ground that this money changed hands; what the parties fundamentally disagree on is the character of the transaction, the terms, if any, governing its repayment, and, more pertinently for this appeal, whether the Appellant is entitled to certain additional deductions said to extinguish what would otherwise remain outstanding. 3.By a Statement of Claim dated 17th March 2025, the Respondent pleaded that the sum was advanced pursuant to an oral arrangement between business associates, that the Appellant had failed to honour his undertaking to repay it despite demand, including a demand letter dated 23rd January 2025, and sought judgment for Kshs. 400,000/=, costs and interest. 4.The Appellant's Response to the Statement of Claim and Witness Statement, both dated 11th April 2025, denied owing the Respondent anything. 5.He averred that he had repaid Kshs. 279,500/= via Mpesa in various instalments between October 2021 and November 2022; that the Respondent had separately engaged him, on the strength of their friendship, as a debt collector to recover Kshs. 200,000/= owed to her by one Patrick Rono, which sum he recovered in cash and remitted to her, earning an agreed commission of Kshs. 50,000/= to be offset against the balance he owed her; and that the Respondent had introduced her then boyfriend, one Robert Chepkwony, to him for a loan of Kshs. 400,000/=, towards which the Respondent's own contribution, being the balance still owed to her, was Kshs. 70,500/=, which sum was likewise to be offset. On this arithmetic, the Appellant contended that nothing remained owing. 6.The Respondent's rejoinder, filed on 29th April 2025 as a “Reply to the Response” and, the parties having agreed at the hearing that the Small Claims Court Rules, 2019 do not recognise such a pleading, treated thereafter as a further witness statement, gave an altogether different account of the genesis of the transaction. 7.She averred that she and the Appellant had been colleagues at a financial-services company; that the Appellant separately ran a shylock business; that in September 2021 he approached her to advance him Kshs. 400,000/= to on-lend to one of his own clients; that the parties reduced their arrangement to writing, providing for interest of Kshs. 20,000/= per month until full settlement, but that she had since misplaced the signed copy and could only produce an unsigned one; that of the Kshs. 279,500/= the Appellant subsequently paid her, Kshs. 179,500/= represented interest and not principal, while the remaining Kshs. 100,000/=, paid on 15th November 2022, was reimbursement of an entirely unrelated cash advance she had made to him; and that she had never agreed to any commission of Kshs. 50,000/= or to bear Kshs. 70,500/= of the Robert Chepkwony loan, a transaction she said was strictly between the Appellant and Robert Chepkwony, to the point of the two of them instructing lawyers over it. 8.Each party testified as their own sole witness before the trial court and closed their respective cases on 17th July 2025, following which both filed written submissions. 9.In her judgment delivered on 11th August 2025, the learned Adjudicator found, first, that there was no proof of any agreement for the payment of interest, since the loan agreement relied upon, marked CEXH-3, was unsigned by both parties and was, in the circumstances, of no probative value; the sum of Kshs. 179,500/= was accordingly treated not as interest but as part-repayment of the Kshs. 400,000/= principal. Second, she found that the Respondent had failed to prove the existence of any separate transaction accounting for the Kshs. 100,000/= paid on 15th November 2022, and treated that sum too as going towards settlement of the principal, bringing total proven repayment to Kshs. 279,500/=. Third, and determinatively for this appeal, she found that the correspondence relied upon by the Appellant did not disclose the existence of any agreement entitling him to a commission of Kshs. 50,000/=, nor any agreement that the Respondent would contribute, or had agreed to have set off, Kshs. 70,500/= in respect of the Robert Chepkwony loan. On that basis, she held that the Appellant remained indebted to the Respondent in the sum of Kshs. 120,500/=, being Kshs. 400,000/= less Kshs. 279,500/=, and entered judgment accordingly. 10.Aggrieved, solely by the finding that he remained indebted in the sum of Kshs. 120,500/=, the Appellant filed a Memorandum of Appeal dated 20th August 2025, advancing two grounds, namely that the learned Magistrate erred in law and in facti.in finding that the Appellant owed the Respondent Kshs. 120,500/= despite what he describes as overwhelming evidence of communication between the parties by which the said amount was offset, andii.in failing to appreciate the Appellant's evidence. He sought an order allowing the appeal, setting aside the finding of indebtedness and substituting it with a finding that he owes the Respondent nothing, together with costs of the appeal and of the court below, and interest from the date of filing suit.These two grounds were subsequently elaborated upon in the Appellant's written submissions dated 18th March 2026. The Appellant's Case 11.By those submissions mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Appellant restates his defence as two-pronged: direct Mpesa repayments totalling Kshs. 279,500/=, and a residual balance he says was resolved through the two agreed offsets already described. He frames the issues for determination as, first, whether the learned Adjudicator erred in finding him indebted in the sum of Kshs. 120,500/= despite what he calls substantial evidence of applicable set-offs, and, second, whether she erred by failing to properly evaluate, consider and appreciate his evidence on record. 12.On the first issue, he contends that the trial court reached a perverse finding by rejecting the two offsets for lack of proof while, in his submission, simultaneously ignoring the WhatsApp communications and Mpesa statements he tendered to corroborate them. 13.On the second issue, the Appellant advances three further points. First, while accepting, by reference to Waithaka v Wanyoike (Civil Appeal E098 of 2023) [2024] KEHC 14060 (KLR), that the unsigned and undated loan agreement the Respondent relied upon carries no probative value and cannot found liability, he contends that the trial court, having so found, nonetheless erred by, in his words, “still allowing the Respondent to use that same document to re-characterise principal repayments as interest.” 14.Second, relying on Mobipesa Ltd v Amara (Civil Appeal 59 of 2022) [2024] KEHC 1529 (KLR), he submits that a claimant cannot succeed on an internal or self-serving statement alone and must independently prove the debt and its terms. Third, he submits that Sections 107 to 109 of the Evidence Act, Cap. 80, placed the burden of proving the existence and terms of the loan on the Respondent throughout, and that since his own evidence of repayment and the set-offs was “barely challenged,” the trial court impermissibly shifted the burden onto him to disprove a claim resting on no admissible documentary foundation. 15.He prays that the appeal be allowed, the judgment and orders of the Small Claims Court set aside, and a finding substituted that he owes the Respondent nothing, with costs of the appeal and of the court below. The Respondent's Case 16.The Respondent, by written submissions dated 9th April 2026, opposes the appeal in its entirety. 17.She points out that it is not in dispute that she advanced Kshs. 400,000/= to the Appellant, and that the Appellant himself proved, through his own Mpesa records, that he sent back only Kshs. 279,500/=. As to the two alleged offsets, she submits that there is no evidence whatsoever of any agreement fixing a debt-collection commission at Kshs. 50,000/=, and that Robert Chepkwony, a stranger to the suit who was never called as a witness, cannot be used to import a Kshs. 70,500/= liability onto her say-so alone. 18.On the commission claim, the Respondent draws attention to the WhatsApp correspondence exhibited at pages 25 to 27 of the Record of Appeal, which she characterises as chats between the Appellant and Patrick Rono, and separately between the Appellant and herself, none of which, she submits, records any agreement on a debt-collection fee. 19.She points to what she says is the true and unchallenged position: that after the Appellant collected Kshs. 200,000/= in cash from Patrick Rono, she gave the Appellant Kshs. 10,000/= in cash as a token of appreciation, a fact she says was never controverted in cross-examination. 20.On the burden of proof generally, the Respondent invokes Section 107(1) of the Evidence Act, Cap. 80, and the decision of Majanja, J. in Evans Otieno Nyakwana v Cleophas Bwana Ongaro [2015] eKLR, for the proposition that the legal burden lies on the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. 21.She further relies on Mburu & 6 others v Kirubi (Civil Appeal E246 of 2021) [2023] KEHC 3599 (KLR), for the principle that an appellate court will not ordinarily disturb findings of fact made by a trial court save in defined circumstances, and submits that none of those circumstances arise here. 22.Finally, and by way of clarification rather than as a fresh ground, the Respondent addresses the unsigned loan agreement, pointing out, correctly in my view for reasons given below, that the trial court did not rely on that document at all in reaching its decision, still less use it to re-characterise principal repayments as interest; if anything, the rejection of the document told against her own claim to interest. 23.She prays that the appeal be dismissed with costs. Issues For Determination 24.Arising from the pleadings, the record and the rival submissions, the following issues fall for determination:i.Whether, this being an appeal from the Small Claims Court governed by Section 38 of the Small Claims Court Act, 2016, the grounds raised disclose a matter of law properly before this Court;ii.Whether the trial court erred in its treatment of the unsigned loan agreement, or unlawfully shifted the burden of proof onto the Appellant;iii.Whether the Appellant discharged the burden of proving an agreement entitling him to offset Kshs. 50,000/= as commission for the recovery of the Patrick Rono debt;iv.Whether the Appellant discharged the burden of proving that the Respondent agreed to bear, or is otherwise liable to have set off against her claim, the sum of Kshs. 70,500/= in respect of the loan advanced to Robert Chepkwony;v.Whether, in consequence, the finding that the Appellant remains indebted to the Respondent in the sum of Kshs. 120,500/= ought to be disturbed; andvi.Who should bear the costs of the appeal. Analysis And Determination (i) The scope of this appeal 25.It is necessary first to address the character of this appeal, since it colours the intensity of scrutiny this Court may properly bring to bear. Section 38(1) of the Small Claims Court Act, 2016 provides that a person aggrieved by a decision of the Small Claims Court “may appeal against that decision or order to the High Court on matters of law”, and by Section 38(2), the decision of the High Court on such an appeal is final. 26.Both grounds, as pleaded in the Memorandum of Appeal and elaborated in the Appellant's written submissions, are framed in the conventional formula that the learned Magistrate “erred in law and in fact”, a formula that, if read literally, would take the second limb of each ground outside the four corners of Section 38. 27.This is not a new difficulty. The jurisdiction conferred by Section 38 has consistently been held to mirror that of a second appellate court: it “confines itself to matters of law only, unless it is shown that the court below considered matters it should not have considered or failed to consider matters it should have considered or looking at the entire decision, it is perverse” (see Stanley N. Muriithi & Another v Bernard Munene Ithiga [2016] eKLR, applied to Small Claims Court appeals in, among others, Otieno, Ragot & Company Advocates v National Bank of Kenya Limited [2020] eKLR). This difficulty with mixed grounds has recurred in appeals of precisely this kind. 28.In Waithaka v Wanyoike (Civil Appeal E098 of 2023) [2024] KEHC 14060 (KLR), a decision itself arising from a Small Claims Court appeal, Nzioka, J. observed of a similarly mixed Memorandum of Appeal that“the grounds of appeal herein reveal that they relate to matters of fact save for ground (1)… The appellant was duty bound to adhere strictly to the provisions of section 38 and lay out explicitly matters of law relied on”. 29.That observation did not, in Waithaka, result in the summary dismissal of the appeal, and I do not consider it should here either; rather, it is a caution to examine with some rigour whether what is pleaded as fact conceals a genuine question of law. The Respondent herself, in resisting the appeal, invoked Mburu & 6 others v Kirubi (Civil Appeal E246 of 2021) [2023] KEHC 3599 (KLR), in which Mugambi, J. held that“an appellate court will not ordinarily interfere with findings of fact by the trial court unless they were based on no evidence at all, or on a misapprehension of it or the court is shown demonstrably to have acted on wrong principles in reaching the findings”. 30.Read together with the test in Stanley N. Muriithi (supra), the issues raised are properly justiciable before this Court to the extent, and only to the extent, that they contend the trial court considered matters it should not have, failed to consider matters it should have, reached a perverse conclusion, or founded its findings on no evidence, a misapprehension of the evidence, or a wrong principle. I proceed on that footing. (ii) The unsigned agreement, the alleged re-characterisation of principal as interest, and the burden of proof 31.I deal first with the cluster of arguments the Appellant builds around the unsigned loan agreement, since, if well founded, they would undermine the very basis on which the Kshs. 120,500/= balance was computed, quite apart from the two specific set-offs addressed below. It is, in fact, common ground that the unsigned agreement carried no probative value: the Appellant himself concedes as much, and the Respondent's own submissions before the trial court had urged the identical result by reference to the very same authority, Waithaka v Wanyoike (supra). There is, therefore, no live dispute that the document was correctly disregarded. What is disputed is what the Appellant says followed from disregarding it. 32.The Appellant's submission is that the trial court, having rightly found the document valueless, nonetheless went on to use it to “re-characterise principal repayments as interest.” That is not, with respect, a fair reading of the judgment appealed from. The learned Magistrate held, in terms, that “there being no proof of any agreement on interest, I find that the sum of KShs. 179,500.00 was paid towards settlement of the loan of KShs. 400,000.00”. 33.This is the precise opposite of re-characterising principal as interest: it is a refusal to characterise the disputed sum as interest at all, for want of proof of any agreement to that effect, with the result that the whole of it was credited towards the principal. It was, if anyone, the Respondent whose position was worsened by this ruling: her pleaded case had been that Kshs. 179,500/= was interest additional to an undiminished principal of Kshs. 400,000/=, and it was the rejection of the unsigned document that defeated that claim and reduced, rather than inflated, the balance ultimately found due from the Appellant. The premise of this limb of the appeal is accordingly not borne out by the record. 34.Nor, in my assessment, did the trial court misapply the burden of proof under Sections 107 to 109 of the Evidence Act, Cap. 80. Those provisions, read together, do not impose a single, undifferentiated burden resting for all purposes on one party; the burden as to any particular fact rests on whoever wishes the court to believe in that fact's existence, and different facts in the same suit may accordingly attract different burdens. 35.The Respondent's burden extended to proving the advance of Kshs. 400,000/=, and, had it been disputed, the fact and extent of its repayment; that burden was amply discharged, and was, in truth, never seriously contested, since the Appellant himself confirmed receiving Kshs. 400,000/= and repaying only Kshs. 279,500/= of it. It was a separate and additional set of facts, the existence of a Kshs. 50,000/= commission agreement and a Kshs. 70,500/= set-off arrangement, that the Appellant himself introduced into the case as a shield against his conceded liability. 36.As to those specific facts, it is the Appellant who wishes this Court to believe in their existence, and the burden of proving them accordingly remained his throughout. No shifting occurred: the trial court did not call upon the Respondent to disprove the alleged set-offs; it called upon the Appellant to prove them, which is precisely where Sections 107 and 109 place that burden. 37.Mobipesa Ltd v Amara (Civil Appeal 59 of 2022) [2024] KEHC 1529 (KLR), on which the Appellant places reliance, does not, on examination, assist him in my most humble view; if anything, it cuts the other way. There, Otieno, J. held that “the legal burden of proof lies upon the party who invokes the aid of the law and substantially asserts the existence of facts”, and declined to allow a lender's claim to succeed on the strength of its own internal record alone, holding that “if at all the money was remitted to the respondent's phone, then a statement from the mobile service provider used to remit the money ought to have been produced”. 38.The difficulty for the Appellant is that the primary transaction in the present case does not suffer from the defect condemned in Mobipesa: the advance of Kshs. 400,000/= and its subsequent repayment of Kshs. 279,500/= are independently verifiable through Mpesa records generated by a licensed mobile-money system, not through either party's private say-so. 39.If the reasoning in Mobipesa maps onto anything in this appeal, it maps more naturally onto the Appellant's own set-off claims, which rest on his characterisation of WhatsApp exchanges and his own testimony, unsupported by any independent confirmation from either Patrick Rono or Robert Chepkwony, the very species of uncorroborated assertion Mobipesa held insufficient. Properly read, the authority the Appellant cites undercuts rather than advances his case. (iii) The alleged Kshs. 50,000/= debt-recovery commission 40.The Appellant's case is that the Respondent engaged him, informally, to recover Kshs. 200,000/= owed to her by Patrick Rono; that he did so, receiving the money in cash and passing it to the Respondent; and that his commission for this service was fixed at Kshs. 50,000/=, to be deducted from what he owed her. In support, he relies on WhatsApp exchanges with Patrick Rono and with the Respondent, exhibited in his Bundle of Documents and referenced in his Witness Statement. 41.Where a party pleads an agreement as the source of a right, here, a contractual entitlement to a fee that operates, in effect, as a set-off against an admitted advance, the burden of proving that agreement, including its essential term as to quantum, rests squarely on the party asserting it. Section 107(1) of the Evidence Act, Cap. 80, provides that“whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist”. 42.Majanja, J. a great jurist of treasured memories, applying this provision in a strikingly similar dispute over a friendly, undocumented loan, held in Evans Otieno Nyakwana v Cleophas Bwana Ongaro [2015] eKLR that“the legal burden of proof lies upon the party who invokes the aid of the law and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue”.It is the Appellant, not the Respondent, who invokes the existence of a Kshs. 50,000/= commission agreement to reduce his liability; it is accordingly for him to prove it, and to prove it to the ordinary civil standard. 43.The difficulty for the Appellant is that the mere production of correspondence referencing a recovery exercise does not, without more, prove that a specific fee of Kshs. 50,000/= was agreed. 44.The Court of Appeal's guidance in Kenneth Nyaga Mwige v Austin Kiguta & 2 Others [2015] eKLR bears directly on this point, even though it arose in relation to a different document: the Court held that a document, once produced and admitted, does not thereby prove itself, since“mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof… the document becomes proved, not proved or disproved when the court applies its judicial mind to determine the relevance and veracity of its contents and admissibility”. 45.The same discipline applies to correspondence: that the Appellant exchanged messages about recovering money from Patrick Rono does not, by itself, establish that those messages fixed his reward at Kshs. 50,000/=. It was for the trial court, having read the messages, to determine whether they said so, and having read them, the learned Magistrate found that the correspondence tendered “does not reveal the existence of any agreement for him to be paid Kshs. 50,000.00 for services.” That is not the language of a court that ignored the correspondence, as the Appellant now suggests; it is the language of a court that read it and found it wanting. His characterisation of the trial court as having disregarded this evidence is not, on this record, made out. 46.Set against this is the Respondent's own, and by her account uncontroverted, version: that the Kshs. 10,000/= she handed the Appellant in cash was a token of appreciation between former colleagues and friends, not a commission, a considerably more modest figure, and one more consistent with a relationship the Respondent's own pleadings describe as cordial and friendship-based rather than commercial. 47.Nothing placed before this Court on appeal identifies a specific passage in the exhibited correspondence that the trial court is said to have overlooked or misread; the Appellant's submission is pitched, instead, at the general level of “overwhelming evidence”, without particularising the words said to fix the figure of Kshs. 50,000/=. An appellate court confined to matters of law, reviewing a concurrent and reasoned evaluation of primary documents it did not itself have led before it, is poorly placed to substitute its own reading for that of the tribunal that did. (iv) The alleged Kshs. 70,500/= Robert Chepkwony set-off 48.The second limb of the Appellant's case is that the Respondent introduced her then boyfriend, Robert Chepkwony, to him for a loan of Kshs. 400,000/=, and that the Respondent's “contribution” to that loan, in truth the balance she was still owed by the Appellant, was Kshs. 70,500/=, which the Appellant treated as a further set-off. 49.Beyond his own testimony and an Mpesa statement said to have been sent to Robert Chepkwony, no independent corroboration of this arrangement was placed before the trial court. Robert Chepkwony, whose transaction lies at the very heart of this limb of the defence, was neither joined to the suit nor called as a witness by the Appellant, notwithstanding that he alone, besides the Respondent, could have spoken to whether, and on what terms, the Respondent's alleged Kshs. 70,500/= contribution was agreed. 50.The Respondent, for her part, accepts that she introduced Robert Chepkwony to the Appellant, aware that the Appellant lent money commercially, but maintains that what passed between the Appellant and Robert Chepkwony thereafter, said in her submissions to have proceeded even to the instruction of lawyers between the two of them, was a transaction to which she was a stranger in substance, whatever her role in the introduction. 51.An arrangement entered into between the Appellant and a third party cannot, consistently with ordinary principles of proof, be visited upon the Respondent so as to reduce a debt she is admittedly owed, unless it is shown by cogent and specific evidence that she herself agreed to the particular quantification advanced, here, exactly Kshs. 70,500/=. 52.Section 107(1) of the Evidence Act places that burden, once again, on the Appellant as the party asserting the set-off, and the same caution against treating mere production of correspondence as self-proving, drawn from Kenneth Nyaga Mwige v Austin Kiguta & 2 Others (above), applies with equal, if not greater, force where the party whose agreement is said to be recorded actively disputes that any such agreement was reached, and the primary actor on the other side of the alleged arrangement is absent from the proceedings altogether. 53.The learned Magistrate, having considered this material, found that the Appellant did not “tender any proof of an agreement that the Claimant would contribute Kshs. 70,500.00 towards a loan he granted to a 3rd Party”.I am not satisfied that this finding was reached in the absence of evidence, on a misapprehension of it, or upon a wrong principle. 54.It reflects, rather, a permissible, and on this record the more probable, assessment that an arrangement involving a person who was never called to testify, and whom the Respondent maintains dealt with the Appellant independently of her, cannot found a set-off against her claim absent clearer proof of her own assent to the specific sum claimed. (v) Whether the finding of Kshs. 120,500/= indebtedness should be disturbed 55.It bears acknowledging, in fairness to the Appellant, that his account is not wholly unsupported by admissions in the record: the Respondent accepts that the Patrick Rono recovery took place, that money changed hands, that she introduced Robert Chepkwony to the Appellant, and that some payment of appreciation was made. The Appellant's narrative is not, therefore, invented from nothing. 56.But an appeal of this kind does not turn on whether something passed between the parties in relation to Patrick Rono and Robert Chepkwony, that much both sides accept, but on whether the Appellant proved the very specific, quantified terms he pleaded as extinguishing an admitted debt: a commission of precisely Kshs. 50,000/=, and a set-off of precisely Kshs. 70,500/=. 57.On that narrower and decisive question, I am unable to find, on this record, any basis to conclude that the trial court's rejection of either claim was unsupported by the evidence, attributable to a misapprehension of it, or the product of a wrong principle. The concurrent findings of the trial court on both limbs are, in my judgment, ones reasonably open to it on the material before it, and this Court, confined as it is to matters of law under Section 38 of the Small Claims Court Act, has no proper basis to disturb them. 58.It follows that the arithmetic underlying the trial court's judgment survives scrutiny: Kshs. 400,000/= advanced, less Kshs. 279,500/= proved repaid, leaves a balance of Kshs. 120,500/=, undiminished by either of the two additional deductions the Appellant sought. The appeal, in substance, fails. (vi) Costs 59.Costs ordinarily follow the event, and nothing in the conduct of this appeal persuades me to depart from that ordinary rule. As the Supreme Court held in Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 others, SC Petition No. 4 of 2012; [2014] eKLR,“the award of costs would normally be guided by the principle that ‘costs follow the event’: the effect being that the party who calls forth the event by instituting suit, will bear the costs if the suit fails; but if this party shows legitimate occasion, by successful suit, then the defendant or respondent will bear the costs”.The Respondent, having successfully resisted an appeal confined to two narrow and unproved allegations of set-off, is entitled to the costs of this appeal. Disposition 60.For the foregoing reasons, I make the following orders:i.The appeal is dismissed.ii.The judgment of the Small Claims Court at Milimani delivered on 11th August 2025 in SCCCOMM No. E39746 of 2025, including the finding that the Appellant is indebted to the Respondent in the sum of Kshs. 120,500/=, the award of costs of Kshs. 12,000/=, and interest at court rates from the date of filing the claim until payment in full, is hereby upheld and affirmed in its entirety.iii.The Appellant shall bear the Respondent's costs of this appeal. 61.It is so ordered. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT TNAIROBI THIS 16th DAY OF July 2026.……………………………………………………BENARD WAFULA MURUNGAJUDGEDelivered on a virtual platform in the presence of:Oloo instructed by SK Oloo & Co. Advocates for AppellantsPurity Jeptepkeny & Associates instructed for Respondents (N/A)Kevin Babu - Court Assistant