https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/4314

Gitari [Suing as the representative in the Estate of the Late Gitari Elias Marete) v Marete (Environment and Land Appeal E064 of 2026) [2026] KEELC 4314 (KLR) (9 July 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELC 4314 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Environment and Land Court at Meru Environment and Land Appeal E064 of 2026 JO Mboya, J July 9, 2026 Between Jenny Kaigemia Gitari [Suing As The Representative In The Estate Of The Late Gitari Elias Marete) Appellant and Joyce Kathambi Marete Respondent Ruling 1.The subject application brings to mind the concept of abuse of the due process of the court. Furthermore, there is also the aspect as pertains to whether parties, the Applicant not excepted, are at liberty to oscillate between the High Court and the Environment and Land Court over and in respect of dispute[s], arising from ownership of land, that bear[s] succession connotations, or otherwise. 2.Furthermore, the subject application also reminds me of the observation made by the Court of Appeal in the case of Kahoro & 2 others (Suing on their Behalf and on Behalf of Members of Twendane Company Limited) v Kanyamwi Trading Company Limited [2025] KECA 941 (KLR), where the court considered the conduct of a party or parties who seek to revert to court to re-agitate similar or near similar matters, which have previously been dealt with. 3.The court stated thus:1.In the contemporary world, one animal known for changing its colour to camouflage with its surrounding environment is the chameleon. It will be green in the morning, brown in the afternoon and yellow in the evening, depending on where its majestic walk has taken it. In the legal world, it is known that parties may attempt to approach the court in different shades, while remaining the same parties. To prevent this mischievous way of litigation, the doctrine of res judicata was developed to bar parties from bringing a litigious action once a final determination has been made on the merits of a similar previous suit 4.Before venturing to interrogate the gravamen/nub of the application, it suffices to provide some background. The application before the court is the one dated the 26.06.2026 and wherein the appellant/Applicant [hereinafter referred to as the Applicant] has sought the following reliefs:i.……………………………………………………….spent.ii.Pending the hearing and determination of this application, the hon. Court be pleased to issue an order of inhibition against any dealings, transfer, sale, charge, lease or any other disposition in respect of LR No. Ngusishi Settlement Scheme /192.iii.Pending the hearing and determination of this appeal, the hon. Court be pleased to issue an order of inhibition against any dealings, transfer, sale, charge, lease or any other disposition in respect of LR No. Ngusishi Settlement Scheme /192.iv.That the costs of this Application be provided for.] 5.The application is premised on various grounds which have been enumerated in the body thereof. The grounds are: The Applicant herein is the legal representative of Gitari Elias Marete [deceased]; the deceased claims title to and ownership of L R No. Ngushishi Settlement Scheme /192 [hereinafter referred to as the suit property]; the Applicant filed a suit in the lower court, vide Meru CMCELC No. E130 of 2025; the Applicant also filed an application for temporary injunction and inhibition; the application was heard and dismissed; the Applicant is aggrieved by the ruling and the consequential order; the Applicant has since filed an appeal before this court; the appeal raises arguable issues; and the Applicant shall be disposed to suffer irreparable loss and harm if the suit property is alienated during the pendency of the appeal. 6.Additionally, the Applicant has averred thus: The Respondent intends to alienate /dispose of suit property; the Respondent has since entered into a sale agreement; the orders of inhibition are necessary to preserve the suit property; the court is seized of the jurisdiction to issue the orders of inhibition; and the Applicant has established a basis to warrant the issuance of the orders sought. 7.The instant application is supported by the affidavit sworn on the 26.06.2026. The affidavit is sworn by Jenny Kaigemia Gitari [the deponent]. The deponent has reiterated the grounds contained in the body of the application. In addition, the deponent has annexed various documents including: copy of the memorandum of appeal; copy of the green cards in respect of the suit property; and a copy of the sale agreement relating to a portion of the suit property. 8.The Respondent has opposed the application vide the replying affidavit sworn on the 03.07.2026. The deponent of the replying affidavit has raised various issues. The issues are: The suit property was the subject of succession proceedings vide Nairobi HCC Succession No. 50 of 1999; the succession cause was heard and determined vide Judgment delivered on the 20.01.2009; the court found and held that the suit property was not wholly the property of Elias Gitari [now deceased]; the suit property was found to be part of the estate of Jenifer Kiacia Anampiu [deceased]; the registration of the suit property in the name of Elias Gitari [now deceased] was revoked; a grant of letters of administration was issued in favour of The Respondent herein and Elias Gitari; the certificate of confirmation of grant was thereafter confirmed; the certificate of confirmation of grant distributed the estate, namely; the suit property; and the issues being raised by the Applicant herein have been determined before the High Court. 9.In addition, the Respondent has averred thus: The Applicant herein filed an application for orders of inhibition before the lower court; the application was heard and dismissed; the Applicant proceeded to and filed a similar application for orders of inhibition before the High Court vide Succession Caused E050 of 1999; the application before the High Court was heard and dismissed; and that the current application is the third application by the Applicant. 10.Moreover, it has also been averred that the Applicant herein is guilty of abusing the due process of the court. In particular, it has been posited that the question of ownership of the suit property was equally addressed vide ruling rendered on the 07.02.2018; the High Court [Justice F Gikonyo – Judge] found that the Applicant was guilty of abusing the court process. 11.Other than the foregoing, the deponent of the replying affidavit has also contended that the Applicant herein is devoid of the requisite legal capacity to commence and maintain the subject appeal and by extension the application. The deponent concludes by positing that the application before the court is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the due process of the court. 12.The application came up for hearing today [09.07.2026] whereupon learned counsel for the Applicant intimated that same was ready to proceed with the hearing. In addition, learned counsel sought directions as pertains to the hearing and disposal of the application. 13.With the concurrence of learned counsel for the respondent, the court proceed to and issued directions. In particular, the court directed that the application be canvassed vide oral submissions. 14.Learned counsel for the Applicant adopted the grounds contained in the body of the application; reiterated the contents of the supporting affidavit; highlighted the annextures attached thereto; and thereafter canvassed two key issues. The issues are: The court is seized of the requisite jurisdiction to grant the orders sought; and the Applicant has established sufficient grounds/basis to warrant the issuance of the orders of inhibition. 15.Moreover, learned counsel for the Applicant has submitted that the suit property is now on the verge of being alienated and or disposed of by the respondent. It was contended that the disposal of the suit property vide sale, shall eliminate the substratum of the appeal and by extension, the suit before the Chief Magistrate’s court, namely; Meru CMELC E130 of 2025. To this end, counsel implored the court to issue the orders of inhibition, so as to preserve the suit property. 16.Additionally, learned counsel for the Applicant submitted that the issue of ownership of the suit property has not been heard and determined. In any event, counsel posited that what was dealt with was the succession cause by the High Court. Besides, counsel posited that the High Court was not seized of the requisite jurisdiction to determine ownership of the suit property. 17.As a result of the foregoing, learned counsel for the Applicant submitted that it is the Environment and Land Court, which is seized of the requisite jurisdiction. To this end, counsel submitted that the doctrine of res judicata cannot apply insofar as the question of ownership of the suit property has not been properly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. 18.Learned counsel for the Respondent adopted the replying affidavit sworn on the 03.07.2026 and thereafter canvassed various issues. The issues include: the Applicant herein is divested of the requisite legal capacity to commence/maintain the subject application; the issue of ownership of the suit property was heard and determined judgment delivered on the 20.01.2009; the said Judgment established that the suit property formed part of the estate of Jennifer Kiacia Anampiu [deceased]; the estate of the deceased was distributed vide the certificate of confirmation of grant issued on the 25.02.2014; the issues being raised by the Applicant are res judicata; the Applicant is guilty of abusing the court process; and the subject application amounts to forum shopping. 19.Furthermore, learned for the Respondent has submitted that the Applicant herein had filed a similar application seeking the orders of inhibition before the High Court vide the application dated 16.12.2025; and which application, it is contended was heard and dismissed. In this regard, counsel referenced the ruling of Justice Githinji – Judge, delivered on the 08.07.2026 vide Meru HCC Succession Number 50 of 1999. 20.In addition, it was contended that the subject application is a deliberate and calculated attempt by the Applicant, to invite this court to superintend and countermand the decisions; ruling; and judgment of the High Court. It has been submitted that this court is devoid of jurisdiction to grant the orders sought. Moreover, it has been submitted that the grant of the orders sought, if at all, shall be tantamount to sitting on appeal on decisions of the High Court. 21.Finally, learned counsel for the Respondent has submitted that the High Court issued orders on the 29.05.2025, wherein the cautions and restrictions, which were previously registered against the title of the suit property were removed. Furthermore, it was submitted that the High Court directed that the distribution of the estate of the deceased be completed within six [6] months, wef 29.05.2026. To this end, it has been submitted that the current application is yet another subtle attempt by the Applicant to frustrate the administration of the estate of the Jenifer Kiacia [deceased] and the conclusion of the distribution. 22.Having reviewed the application; the supporting affidavit thereto; the replying affidavit in opposition thereto; and upon consideration of the submissions by/ on behalf of the respective parties, five[5] key issues crystalize for determination. The issues are: Whether the question of ownership of the suit property has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or otherwise; whether the issues at the foot of the current application are barred by the doctrine of res judicata; whether the subject application constitutes/amounts to an abuse of the due process of the court; whether the Applicant has established the requisite conditions to warrant the issuance of the orders sought or otherwise; and What reliefs ought to be granted taking into account the circumstances of the subject appeal. 23.Regarding the first issues, it is common ground that one Elias Gitari [now deceased] and whose estate is represented by the current Applicant, filed a succession cause vide Nairobi HCC Succession Cause No. 50 of 1999. The said succession cause touched on and concerned the administration of the estate of Jennifer Kiacia Anampiu [deceased]. In addition, one of the assets of the estate that formed the basis of the succession cause was the suit property. 24.It is important to underscore that when Elias Gitari [now deceased] took out or commenced the succession cause and included the suit property as part of the estate, same [Elias Gitari] was effectively conceding or confirming that the suit property belonged to the estate of the deceased. Suffice it to state that the petitioner, namely; Elias Gitari, could not have sought administration in respect of the suit property, if same, did not form part of the estate. 25.I hasten to state that succession proceedings/causes, are ordinarily commenced over and in respect of free properties of the deceased. What constitutes the “Free property” of a deceased person, is the defined vide Section 2 of the Law of Succession Act, Chapter 160 Laws of Kenya. 26.Notwithstanding the foregoing, I wish to point out that the succession cause, which was filed/commenced by Elias Gitari [now deceased] was heard and concluded vide Judgment delivered on the 20.01.2009. The learned Judge, namely; Justice W Ouko – Judge [as he then was] identified one key issue for determination. 27.The Judge stated thus:“The only issue in dispute is whether the petitioner is wholly entitled to the suit land. Put differently, whether the deceased’s other children are entitled to a share of her estate, the suit land.” 28.Having identified the singular issue in terms of the preceding paragraph, the learned Judge addressed the issue and ultimately held that the suit property belonged to the estate of Jennifer Kiacia Anampiu [deceased]. The determination by the learned Judge resolved the question of ownership of the suit property, in accordance with the law of succession. It is instructive to point out that on matter[s] of succession, the High Court is the court bestowed with the jurisdiction to determine whether the disputed property, be it land or otherwise, forms part of the free estate. 29.Additionally, it is important to highlight that subsequent to the delivery of the Judgment of Justice Ouko – Judge [as he then was], an application for confirmation of grant was mounted. Notably, the said application was heard and allowed, culminating into the issuance of a certificate of confirmation of grant. The certificate of confirmation of grant was issued on the 25.02.2014. 30.It is instructive to state that the certificate of confirmation of grant contains a schedule at the foot thereof. The schedule defines the property and also adverts to the shares of the respective beneficiaries. One of the beneficiaries shown at the foot of the schedule is Elias Gitari Marete [now deceased]. 31.My understanding of the judgement that was delivered on the 20.01.2009 and the consequential certificate of confirmation of grant, drives me to the conclusion that the question of ownership of the suit property, that is, whether it forms part of the estate or otherwise, was determined. The determination under reference was not appealed against. Furthermore, it is common ground that the determination in question was one in rem. 32.I wish to state that the Judgment of Justice Ouko – Judge [as he then was] disposed of the question of ownership of the suit property. To this end, the current Applicant and her counsel cannot be heard to return to court and pretend [feign ignorance] that the issue of ownership of the suit property remains [sic] outstanding. I am afraid such contention is not only misconceived but laced with dishonesty. 33.In view of the discussion above, I state that I encounter no difficulty in finding and holding that the question of ownership was determined. In addition, the Judgment that determined the question of ownership of the suit property, was a Judgment in rem. The import of a judgment in rem cannot be overstated. [See Section 44 of the Evidence Act, Chapter 80 Laws of Kenya]. 34.Regarding the second issue, namely; whether the issues being canvassed at the foot of the current application are res judicata. I beg to begin the discussion as pertains to the subject issue by pointing out that the Applicant herein has previously filed two [2] applications seeking the issuance of an inhibition. For good measure, the 1st application was mounted before the Chief Magistrate Court; and which application was heard and dismissed. It is the dismissal of the said application that provoked the subject appeal. 35.Importantly, the second application was mounted before the High Court vide Meru HCC Succession No. 50 of 1999. The Applicant sought an order of inhibition, to restrain further dealings or transactions, over and in respect of the suit property. The said application was heard and disposed of vide a ruling delivered on the 08.07.2026. The application was dismissed. 36.I wish to highlight that by the time the current application was being canvassed on the 09.07.2026, the Honourable High Court [Justice Githinji- Judge] had already spoken to the question of inhibition. In addition, there is no gainsaying that the Applicant was privy to and aware of the outcome. 37.To my mind, the question of inhibition had been canvassed and disposed of before a court of competent jurisdiction. It is not lost on me that the High Court is the one that had addressed the issue of ownership and thereafter issued the certificate of confirmation of grant. Furthermore, it is the High Court that had even decreed cancellation of the title that had previously been issued in the name of Elias Gitari Marete. Similarly, it is the High Court that had also issued the orders of 29.05.2025 directing that removal of [sic] all the restrictions and cautions registered against the suit property. 38.Considering the back-ground facts and the issues surrounding the ownership of the suit property, the High Court was competent to engage with and indeed, correctly, engaged with the question of inhibition. Having dealt with the issue/question of inhibition, the Applicant herein could not return to the Environment and Land Court and now purport to seek the same order, namely; an order of inhibition. 39.To my mind, the current application and the orders sought, became res judicata, the moment the High Court delivered the ruling on the 08.07.2026. In this respect, it behooved a conscientious Applicant and by extension a prudent counsel, to bite the bullet and concede that the issue had been effectively determined. I underscore that the question of inhibition became res judicata and thus the current application is prohibited by the provisions of Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act, Chapter 21 Laws of Kenya. 40.The scope and remit of the doctrine of res judicata has been the subject of various, albeit numerous decisions. In the case of Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission v Kiai & 5 others [2017] KECA 477 (KLR), the court reaffirmed the key ingredients/elements of res judicata. The court stated thus:73…………Res judicata is a matter properly to be addressed in limine as it does possess jurisdictional consequence because it constitutes a statutory peremptory preclusion of a certain category of suits. That much is clear from Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act, 2010;"No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of the claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court.”74Thus, for the bar of res judicata to be effectively raised and upheld on account of a former suit, the following elements must all be satisfied, as they are rendered not in disjunctive, but conjunctive terms;(a)The suit or issue was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit.(b)That former suit was between the same parties or parties under whom they or any of them claim.(c)Those parties were litigating under the same title.(d)The issue was heard and finally determined in the former suit.(e)The court that formerly heard and determined the issue was competent to try the subsequent suit or the suit in which the issue is raised. 75.The learned Judges were fully aware and applied their minds to these elements when, applying this Court’s decision in Uhuru Highway Development Ltd v Central Bank of Kenya [1999] eKLR they rendered the elements as;(a)the former judgment or order must be final;(b)the judgment or order must be on merits;(c)it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and(d)there must be between the first and the second action identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action.” 76..The rule or doctrine of res judicata serves the salutary aim of bringing finality to litigation and affords parties closure and respite from the spectre of being vexed, haunted and hounded by issues and suits that have already been determined by a competent court. It is designed as a pragmatic and common-sensical protection against wastage of time and resources in an endless round of litigation at the behest of intrepid pleaders hoping, by a multiplicity of suits and fora, to obtain at last, outcomes favourable to themselves. Without it, there would be no end to litigation, and the judicial process would be rendered a noisome nuisance and brought to disrepute and calumny. The foundations of res judicata thus rest in the public interest for swift, sure and certain justice. 41.I wish to turn to the issue of whether the current application constitutes an abuse of the due process of the court. To begin with, I wish to underscore that the Applicant herein had approached the High Court vide application dated 16.12.2025, wherein the Applicant sought an order of inhibition. The said order of inhibition was intended to negate or suspend the implementation of the orders made on the 29.05.2025. For coherence, the orders of 29.05.2025, had directed that the distribution of the estate of the deceased be concluded within 6 months. 42.Barring repetition, it is worthy to reiterate that the application for inhibition was dismissed by the High Court. Undeterred, the Applicant is before this court and is desirous to partake of and procure an order of inhibition. The import/tenor of the current application is to invite the court [ELC] to issue an order, which will effectively countermand the orders of the High Court. 43.The Applicant may or may not be aware of the legal implications of the invitation. However, I beg to disabuse the Applicant of the notion that same can walk to the ELC and procure an order, which had been declined by the High Court. 44.Further, and in addition, I wish to point out that the current application, is one that is likely to set the ELC and the High Court on a collision path. To my mind, the net effect of the application and the orders sought is to invite this court to superintend the decisions of the High Court. Such kind of an endeavor must be eschewed at all costs. 45.In the case of Kenya Hotel Properties Limited v Attorney General & 5 others [2022] KESC 62 (KLR), the Supreme Cuortof Kenya [the apex court] highlighted the legal position that one Judge cannot countermand/set aside the decision of another Judge of concurrent jurisdiction. The apex court underscored and reiterated the ‘Rule of the thumb’. 46.The court stated thus:As was thus rightly noted by the High Court and the Court of Appeal, the rule of thumb is that superior courts cannot grant orders to reopen or review decisions of their peers of equal and competent jurisdiction much less those court higher than themselves. Again, we take cognizance of our finding in the Samuel Kamau Macharia case where we held that:“A court jurisdiction flows from either the Constitution or legislation or both. Thus, a court of law can only exercise jurisdiction as conferred by the Constitution or other written law. It cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that which is conferred upon it by law. We agree with counsel for the first and second respondents in his submission that the issue as to whether a court of law has jurisdiction to entertain a matter before it, is not one mere procedural technicality; it goes to the very heart of the matter, for without jurisdiction, the court cannot entertain any proceedings. This court dealt with the question of jurisdiction extensively in, In the Matter of the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (Applicant), Constitutional Application Number 2 of 2011. Where the Constitution exhaustively provides for the jurisdiction of a court of law, the court must operate within the constitutional limits. It cannot expand its jurisdiction through judicial craft or innovation.” (emphasis supplied) 47.The legal implication of the orders sought; the obvious likelihood of conflict between the ELC and the High Court; and the number of applications that have been mounted by/on behalf of the Applicant herein, drives me to the conclusion that the subject application and by extension the appeal, constitute an abuse of the due process of the court. 48.What amounts to the abuse of the due process of the court was highlighted by the Supreme Court in the case of Rutongot Farm Ltd v Kenya Forest Service & 3 others [2018] KESC 27 (KLR). The apex court stated as hereunder:“The concept of “abuse of the process of the Court” bears no fixed meaning, but has to do with the motives behind the guilty party’s actions; and with a perceived attempt to manoeuvre the Court’s jurisdiction in a manner incompatible with the goals of justice. The bottom line in a case of abuse of Court process is that, it “appears so hopeless that it plainly and obviously discloses no reasonable cause of action and is so weak to be beyond redemption…”….Beyond that threshold, lies an unlimited range of conduct by a party that may more clearly point to an instance of abuse of Court process.” 49.I now wish to turn to the question as to whether the Applicant has established a basis to warrant the issuance of an order of inhibition. It is important to highlight that an order of inhibition, can and does issue to protect legal or equitable right[s] of claimant. The claimant must demonstrate/prove the colour of right [whether legal or equitable], which is sought to be protected. The order of inhibition does not issue for the mere asking by a party. Moreover, such an order does not issue as of right. 50.Additionally, I wish to point out that an order of inhibition, is akin to an order of temporary injunction. It then means that for one, the Applicant not excepted, to procure such an order, same must establish inter alia: the existence of a prima facie case; a likelihood of irreparable loss; or demonstrate that the balance of convenience tilts in her favour. 51.It is equally important to underscore that an order of inhibition is equitable and discretionary in nature. In this respect, a court of law must consider and interrogate the conduct of the party; and the bona fides of the application. The court must also consider the equitable implications attendant to the issuance of such an order. 52.Has the Applicant established a basis for the issuance of the orders of inhibition? I wish to state that the question of ownership of the suit property was conclusively and effectively determined vide the Judgment delivered on the 20.01.2009. I repeat that the said Judgment, was a judgment in rem. It touched on and determined ownership rights over the suit property. 53.At this juncture, the Applicant herein cannot be heard to posit that the estate of Elias Gitari Marete [now deceased] wants to preserve the suit property, pending the determination of [sic] the question of ownership. To my mind, the question of ownership is water under the bridge. It was determined. It was settled. The Judgment was not appealed against. The issue cannot be revisited by any court. Any disguised attempt towards re-visiting the issue, will be an abuse of the Court process. The Court cannot standby and cheer such a Party. 54.In the premises, I am afraid that there is no colour of right, whether equitable or otherwise, that has been established by the Applicant to warrant the issuance of the order of inhibition. Nevertheless, I must clarify that the estate of Elias Gitari Marete, is entitled to the share of the suit property in terms of the schedule dated 25.02.2014. 55.Moreover, it is not lost on me that the distribution of the share of the estate of Elias Gitari Marete is part of the reason why the High Court directed that the distribution be concluded within six months. Save for the share of the estate of Elias Gitari Marete in terms of the certificate of confirmation of grant, the Applicant herein and the said estate, do not have any colour of rights to underpin the issuance of an inhibition over and in respect of the Suit Property. 56.The circumstances that underpin the issuance of an order of inhibition are articulated vide Sections 68 and 69 of the Land Registration Act, 2012. The section stipulates thus:68. Power of the court to inhibit registered dealings(1)The court may make an order (hereinafter referred to as an inhibition) inhibiting for a particular time, or until the occurrence of a particular event, or generally until a further order, the registration of any dealing with any land, lease or charge.(2)A copy of the inhibition under the seal of the court, with particulars of the land, lease or charge affected, shall be sent to the Registrar, who shall register it in the appropriate register.(3)An inhibition shall not bind or affect the land, lease or charge until it has been registered. 69.Effect of inhibition So long as an inhibition remains registered, any instrument that is inconsistent with the inhibition shall not be registered. 57.Without belabouring the point, I find and hold that the Applicant has neither met nor established the threshold for the grant of the orders of inhibition. In any event, the conduct of the Applicant, which I found to constitute an abuse of the due process of the court, militates against the grant of such an order. Furthermore, it suffices to state that equity frowns against dishonesty. 58.I now wish to address the last issue. The issue relates to the reliefs, if any, that ought to be granted. The application seeking orders of inhibition is indeed barred by the doctrine of res judicata. In addition, I have found that the application constitutes an abuse of the due process of the court. 59.Other than the foregoing, it is not lost on me that the appeal before me challenges the exercise of discretion by the learned Chief Magistrate. Pertinently, the learned Chief Magistrate found and held that the High Court had dealt with the question, which was now being raised before him. The Chief Magistrate held and correctly, in my view, that the grant of such an order would amount to in subordinating the High Court. The position taken by the learned Chief Magistrate reaffirmed the doctrine of Stare decisis. 60.On my part, I have found and held that the subject appeal and by extension, the suit in the lower court, constitute[s] and amount[s] to an endeavor to perpetuate the dispute pertaining to ownership of the suit property. That issue was long determined and settled. The determination of the question of ownership of the suit property and the issuance of the certificate of confirmation of grant, were never appealed against. 61.The principle of finality dictates that matters/issues, which have been finally settled ought to be left to lie. The principle of finality is one key aspect of public policy and the rule of law. It serves a salutary purpose. Absent the principle of finality, courts of law would be over run with frivolous; vexatious; and repetitive claims. 62.Before proclaiming the final orders, it is apposite to cite and reference the holding in the case of William Koross v. Hezekiah Kiptoo Komen & 4 Others [2015] eKLR. The Court of Appeal reaffirmed the principle of finality. The court stated as hereunder:“The philosophy behind the principle of res judicata is that there has to be finality; litigation must come to an end. It is a rule to counter the all-too human propensity to keep trying until something gives. It is meant to provide rest and closure, for endless litigation and agitation does little more than vex and add to costs. A successful litigant must reap the fruits of his success and the unsuccessful one must learn to let go. Speaking for the bench on the principles that underlie res judicata, Y.V. Chandrachud J in the Indian Supreme Cuortcase of Lal Chand v Radha Kishan, AIR 1977 SC 789 stated, and we agree;“The principle of res judicata is conceived in the larger public interest which requires that all litigation must, sooner than later, come to an end. The principle is also founded in equity, justice and good conscience which require that a party which has once succeeded on an issue should not be permitted to be harassed by a multiplicity of proceedings involving determination of the same issue.” 63.In a nutshell, I come to the conclusion that both the application and the appeal constitute abuse of the due process of the court. The application and the appeal are sure candidate for striking out. Final orders: 64.Pulling the threads together, and bearing in mind the circumstance[s] surrounding the dispute herein, the final orders that commend themselves to the court are:i.The Application dated 26.06.2026 be and is hereby struck out.ii.The Appeal vide memorandum of appeal dated 16.06.2026 be and is hereby struck out.iii.Costs of the Application; and the appeal, be and are hereby awarded to the Respondent.iv.The Costs in terms of clause [iii] shall be agreed upon and in default be taxed in the conventional manner. 65.It is so ordered. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT MERU THIS 09TH DAY OF JULY, 2026OGUTTU MBOYA, FCIArb; CPM [MTI].JUDGE.In the presence of:Court Assistant: ZakayoMs. Vivivan Aketch for the Appellant/ApplicantMr. Kariuki for the Respondent