[2012] KEHC 5477 (KLR)

[2012] KEHC 5477 (KLR)

The court found that the specific statutory provisions cited by the applicant (Sections 4 and 34(5) of the Limitation of Actions Act and Section 39(5) of the Arbitration Act) did not directly apply to the circumstances of the case, as they relate to situations not present here. However, the court held that the inherent powers under Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act could be invoked to fill the procedural gap, as there was no specific provision addressing the unique situation where enforcement of an arbitral award was delayed due to protracted litigation and appeal processes. The court determined that the applicant was not responsible for the delay, having acted promptly whenever...

Citation
[2012] KEHC 5477 (KLR)
Parties
Applicant: Glencore Grain Ltd; Respondent: TSS Grain Millers Ltd
Court
High Court
Court Station
High Court at Mombasa
Jurisdiction
Kenya
Judgment Date
31 August 2012
Case Number
Civil Case 388 of 2000
Procedural Posture
Miscellaneous Application / Ruling on Application to Exclude Time From Limitation Period for Enforcement of Arbitral Award
Outcome
application allowed
Legal Topics
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, Limitation Periods, International Arbitration, Court Discretion on Time Exclusion
Source Language
English
Civil Procedure Commercial and Corporate Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Limitation Periods International Arbitration Court Discretion on Time Exclusion

Case Brief

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Parties

Glencore Grain Ltd

Applicant

TSS Grain Millers Ltd

Respondent

Procedural Posture

Miscellaneous Application / Ruling on Application to Exclude Time From Limitation Period for Enforcement of Arbitral Award

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether the court can exclude time spent in litigation from the limitation period for enforcement of an international arbitral award.
  2. 2 Whether the application for exclusion of time is competent under the relevant statutes and rules.
  3. 3 Whether the application was brought without unreasonable delay.

Ratio Decidendi

The court found that the specific statutory provisions cited by the applicant (Sections 4 and 34(5) of the Limitation of Actions Act and Section 39(5) of the Arbitration Act) did not directly apply to the circumstances of the case, as they relate to situations not present here. However, the court held that the inherent powers under Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act could be invoked to fill the procedural gap, as there was no specific provision addressing the unique situation where enforcement of an arbitral award was delayed due to protracted litigation and appeal processes. The court determined that the applicant was not responsible for the delay, having acted promptly whenever...

Court Disposition

application allowed

Orders

  • The period between the filing of the Notice of Appeal on 18th June, 2002 and the delivery of the judgment of the Court of Appeal on 30th November, 2007 is excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed for bringing an action for enforcement of the arbitral award dated 22nd March, 2000.
  • The period from the filing of this application until it is heard and determined shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed as above.