Migoya v Republic (Criminal Appeal E068 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 8310 (KLR) (4 June 2026) (Judgment)

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT KISUMU** **CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. E068 OF 2025** **HENRY ODERO MIGOYA….………………………………APPELLANT** **VERSUS** **REPUBLIC………………………….………………….…….RESPONDENT** *(Being an appeal from the conviction and sentence* *of* ***Hon. A.K. Mokoross, Senior Principal Magistrate*** *delivered and imposed on 9th June, 2025 and 30th June, 2025 respectively in Tamu Criminal Case No. E199 of 2022).* **JUDGEMENT** 1. **THE CHARGES.** 2. **Henry Odero Migoya** (hereinafter referred to as “the Appellant”) was arraigned before the trial court and faced a total of eight (8) counts. The charges concerned a wide range of alleged criminal conduct arising from his management of Christian Dream School, located at Rakwaro Village, Nyangoma Location, Muhoroni Sub-County within Kisumu County, and related to funds received from an American non-profit organization known as Helping Hands International (hereinafter “HHI”). 3. The eight (8) counts, as set out in the amended charge sheet, were as follows: * Count I: Fraudulent disposal of trust property contrary to *Section 327(2)(a)* as read with *Section 327(1)* of the *Penal Code, Cap 63 Laws of Kenya*. * Particulars of the offence: Between 1st January, 2016 and 1st August, 2021, the Appellant, being a trustee of property on behalf of Helping Hands International (HHI), dishonestly converted such property, valued at approximately Ksh.600,000/-, to his own use, which was not authorized by the Trust, with intent to defraud. * Counts II: Demanding property with menaces contrary to *Section 302* of the *Penal Code, Cap 63 Laws of Kenya*. * Particulars: On diverse dates between 1st January, 2019 and 31st December, 2021 at Rakwaro village, Nyangoma Location in Muhoroni Subcounty, the Appellant, with menaces/force, demanded Ksh.45,000/- from **Beatrice Akinyi Agando,** with intent to steal. * Counts III: Demanding property with menaces contrary to *Section 302* of the *Penal Code, Cap 63 Laws of Kenya*. * Particulars: On diverse dates between 1st January, 2019 and 31st December, 2021 at Rakwaro village, Nyangoma Location in Muhoroni Subcounty, the Appellant, with menaces/force, demanded Ksh.72,000/- from **Angeline Atieno Okungu,** with intent to steal. * Counts IV: Demanding property with menaces contrary to *Section 302* of the *Penal Code, Cap 63 Laws of Kenya*. * Particulars: On diverse dates between 1st February, 2021 and 30th June, 2021 at Rakwaro village, Nyangoma Location in Muhoroni Subcounty, the Appellant, with menaces/force, demanded Ksh.31,200/- from **Millicent Adhiambo Magero,** with intent to steal. * Counts V: Demanding property with menaces contrary to *Section 302* of the *Penal Code, Cap 63 Laws of Kenya*. * Particulars: On diverse dates between 1st January, 2021 and 31st December, 2021 at Rakwaro village, Nyangoma Location in Muhoroni Subcounty, the Appellant, with menaces/force, demanded Ksh.20,400/- from **Akinyi Daisy Brenda,** with intent to steal. * Counts VI: Demanding property with menaces contrary to *Section 302* of the *Penal Code, Cap 63 Laws of Kenya*. * Particulars: On diverse dates between 1st January, 2021 and 31st December, 2021 at Rakwaro village, Nyangoma Location in Muhoroni Subcounty, the Appellant, with menaces/force, demanded Ksh.27,200/- from **Mercy Achieng Jakoyo,** with intent to steal. * Counts VII: Demanding property with menaces contrary to *Section 302* of the *Penal Code, Cap 63 Laws of Kenya*. * Particulars: On diverse dates between 1st January, 2021 and 31st December, 2021 at Rakwaro village, Nyangoma Location in Muhoroni Subcounty, the Appellant, with menaces/force, demanded Ksh.37,400/- from **Winnie Ochieng,** with intent to steal. * Count VIII: Obtaining money by false pretences contrary to *Section* *313* of the *Penal Code, Cap 63 Laws of Kenya.* * Particulars: On 26th November, 2020, the Appellant, jointly with another not before court, with intent to defraud, obtained Ksh.50,000/- from **Paul Stanley Amakobe** of Helping Hands International by falsely pretending that the money was required to support burial expenses for the late **Silas Odhiambo,** a fact which the Appellant knew to be false. 1. The Appellant denied the charges, which then called for a full trial. 2. **THE DUTY OF THIS COURT.** 3. This being a first appeal, this court is enjoined to re-analyze, re-evaluate and re-assess the evidence before the trial court and reach its own conclusions bearing in mind that it did not see or hear the witnesses when they testified first hand (see ***Okeno v Republic [1972] E.A, 32 at 36; Pandya v Republic [1957] EA 336; Shantilal. M. Ruwala v Republic [1957] EA 570;*** and***Peter v Sunday Post [1958] EA 424*.**) 4. In executing its duties, this court must consider whether the trial court considered all the evidence, weighed it correctly and whether it correctly applied the law or legal principles to it in arriving at its decisions in respect of both the conviction and sentence. 5. **THE PROSECUTION CASE.** 6. The prosecution’s case was based on the testimony of 16 witnesses. 7. The first prosecution witness was **Stanley** **Paul Amakobe,** (PW1) who told the trial court that he was a businessman who also worked with a Non Governmental Organization known as Helping Hands International (HHI) and resided in Nairobi. He recalled that in the year 2019, he accompanied a team of approximately nine foreigners from the United States of America to Rakwaro village near Awasi for purposes of conducting a dental medical camp for the local community. He stated that the team leader was one **Chrissie Christian** from the NGO and that the host during the visit was the Appellant, **Henry Migoya.** 8. The witness testified that after the foreigners returned to the United States, communication ensued between them and his employer, following which he was incorporated into the management and disbursement of funds intended to support Christian Dream School. He stated that the funds were meant for payment of salaries to teachers, guards, cooks and the Appellant, as well as for tuition and food for sponsored children. According to him, the Appellant was the contact person through whom the transactions were conducted. 9. PW1 further testified that he would receive instructions regarding disbursement of funds and would thereafter send the money through the M-Pesa platform to the persons designated by the Appellant. He stated that the Appellant received salary payments and tuition funds, while food and salary payments for certain staff members were sent to one **Evalyn Atieno Ongoro.** He produced M-Pesa statements covering the period between 1st January, 2019 and 31st December, 2021 to demonstrate the various remittances made. 10. The witness gave evidence that in the year 2020, **Christian** again visited the school and disputes arose concerning alleged corruption within the institution. He stated that the Appellant was questioned in his presence and that of his employer regarding financial impropriety but allegedly failed to cooperate. PW1 testified that complaints had been raised by teachers alleging that after they received salaries, they were compelled to refund part of the money to the Appellant as kickbacks. He further stated that some teachers were allegedly dismissed for failing to remit such kickbacks. 11. PW1 testified that complaints were also raised concerning non-payment of tuition fees for sponsored children despite funds having been remitted for that purpose. He further stated that donations and assets had been purchased for the benefit of the school, including a playground, shade net, laptops, water tanks and construction materials. According to him, he personally purchased some of the items in Nairobi and caused them to be delivered to the school. 12. It was the evidence of PW1 that with the assistance of the donor organization, the school later moved from the church compound to a separate location and that funds were sent to the Appellant for construction of the new school premises. He further testified that they later discovered that the Appellant had registered the school under his own name as sole proprietor, contrary to the intentions of the donors who allegedly intended the school to operate as a community institution. He produced a certificate of registration for the institution and a business registration certificate in support thereof. 13. The witness also testified regarding the death of a sponsored child known as **Silas Odhiambo.** He stated that donor funds had been sent for food and later for funeral expenses after the child allegedly died due to malnutrition. According to PW1, the Appellant supplied a telephone number purportedly belonging to the deceased child’s mother to which funeral funds amounting to Ksh.80,000/- were allegedly sent, but they later learned that the money did not reach the intended family. 14. PW1 further produced documentary exhibits comprising proforma invoices from Polyplay Limited relating to purchase of a playground, quotations, invoices and delivery notes from Vectus Kenya Limited concerning water tanks, and a master list of sponsored children which included the deceased child, **Silas Odhiambo.** 15. Upon cross-examination by the Appellant, PW1 conceded that he did not know when Christian Dream School was established and who owned it in 2019, or the categories and management structures of schools in Kenya. He admitted that he was not an expert on schools and that his role was limited to facilitating disbursement of donor funds. 16. PW1 further admitted that the complaints regarding kickbacks were not made directly to him by the teachers but were allegedly communicated to **Christian** who in turn informed his employer. He acknowledged that the court was to determine the legality of the alleged transactions and conceded that certain matters, including the role of the Appellant and details regarding sponsored children, would best be answered by **Christian** and other witnesses. 17. The witness maintained, however, that he sent money for food, salaries, tuition, funeral expenses and construction through M-Pesa as instructed, and that the Appellant supplied the contact details of the recipients. He further reiterated that the Appellant was the administrator of the school together with **Christian** and stated that he was testifying on behalf of **Christian** regarding the financial transactions undertaken for the benefit of the school and sponsored children. 18. PW1 further stated that he had known HHI since around 2019 and came to know the Appellant through that organisation. He stated that his role involved sending money to the Appellant for employees and that he understood the Appellant to be an employee of HHI. 19. He further stated that he had records showing payments made to the Appellant as salary, and gave specific dates and amounts allegedly paid, including Ksh.17,500/- on several occasions between 2020 and 2021, and other smaller transfers. He maintained that the payments he made to the Appellant were salaries for work done under HHI and that he acted on instructions and lists provided by that organisation. He stated that he did not know whether HHI was registered in Kenya and that it was not his responsibility to verify the registration status of Christian Dream School or related entities. 20. The witness further testified that he began engaging the Appellant in 2019 and denied sending him money before that time. He stated that he did not handle matters relating to Community Care Development beyond what was linked to accountability checks involving the Appellant, and claimed that the Appellant was an account holder associated with that organisation, although he admitted he had no documentary proof personally in court to confirm ownership. 21. PW1 stated that he had a power of attorney authorising him to speak on behalf of **Chrissie Christian** but clarified that he did not have authority to speak for other individuals such as one **Archbold,** although he referred to **Archbold** as having sent money in his statement. He also alleged that funds of about US$20,000 were involved in church or project support, but acknowledged this could not construct a school. 22. The witness further testified that he had previously done business with the Appellant, including the sale of a motor and stated that this transaction was independent of HHI’s engagements. 23. He stated that he sometimes sent money to the Appellant for school fees and sponsorship purposes as directed by HHI and that he relied on records maintained by the organisation. He maintained that the names and transactions were reflected in M-Pesa statements produced in court. 24. PW1 denied recalling whether he personally received money from the Appellant and insisted he had no other business dealings with him beyond the alleged vehicle sale and organisational transactions. He stated that he always confirmed recipient numbers before sending money and that the numbers used were provided through **Christian** via one **Dr. Mike.** 25. He further stated that he had receipts and documentation relating to goods and sponsorships, including quotations and delivery notes and claimed that items purchased were delivered to the Appellant. He insisted that he had not lied to the court and maintained that all payments he made were for salaries, child sponsorship and school-related support as instructed by HHI. 26. The prosecution called **Beatrice Akinyi Ogando,** who testified before the trial court as PW2. In her testimony before the trial court, the witness stated that she was a director with HHI. She testified that she knew the Appellant, as he was the director and manager of **Christian Dream School** where she worked as a teacher beginning January, 2020. She stated that although she did not receive an appointment letter, she had initially joined the institution as a student and later worked as a teacher in order to raise school fees. 27. PW2 testified that she initially earned a monthly salary of Ksh.4,000/- paid in cash, although she expected to earn at least Ksh.6,000/-. According to her, the sponsor supporting the school was one **Chrissie Christian** and the person responsible for transmitting donor funds was **Stanley Paul Amakobe** (PW1). She stated that for the first three months, her salary was paid in cash but thereafter payments were remitted through M-Pesa or bank accounts. 28. The witness testified that at some point PW1 visited the school and that is when PW2 discovered that the amount intended for her salary exceeded what she had been receiving. She stated that the salary money was placed in envelopes but the appellant demanded the envelopes from the teachers immediately after they received them. She further testified that beginning around April 2020, donor funds were sent directly to the teachers’ M-Pesa accounts and the Appellant instructed her to retain only a portion of the salary and refund the balance to him. 29. PW2 stated that upon receiving payments through M-Pesa, she would remit part of the money back to the Appellant as a kickback. She testified that from April, 2020 to August, 2021 she consistently sent money back to the Appellant after receiving salary payments. She gave several examples of transactions in which she received funds from PW1 and thereafter transferred part of the money to the Appellant through M-Pesa. 30. PW2 testified, for instance, that on 9th July, 2021 she received Ksh.5,000/- from PW1 and sent Ksh.3,000/- to the Appellant. She further stated that on 8th April, 2021 she received Ksh.10,000/- and remitted Ksh.7,000/- to the Appellant, while on 10th March, 2021 she received Ksh.10,000/- and remitted Ksh.2,000/-. She also referred to other transactions where she received Ksh.15,000/- and remitted Ksh.7,000/-, Ksh.8,000/- and remitted Ksh.2,000/- and Ksh.3,000/- to the Appellant. 31. PW2 further testified that the Appellant would summon the teachers to his office and remind them to remit the kickbacks. According to her, teachers who failed to refund the money risked dismissal from the school. She stated that she personally experienced this after failing to remit part of the money she had received on 9th July, 2021, following which she was allegedly chased away from the school. 32. The witness testified that she informed **Christian** of the matter and was promised assistance in obtaining another job. She stated that in total she remitted Ksh.11,500/- through M-Pesa and a further Ksh.9,000/- in cash to the Appellant. She produced her M-Pesa statement covering the relevant period as documentary evidence. 33. Upon cross-examination, PW2 confirmed that she was a qualified teacher though she did not produce her teaching certificates before the trial court. She stated that she knew the Appellant through the school, that they came from the same village, and that she knew his family. She testified that she had personally applied for the teaching position by taking her documents to the Appellant, who then allowed her to teach at the school. 34. PW2 admitted that she had no written contract of employment and was not part of the school’s board of directors. She nevertheless maintained that the Appellant operated and managed the school and that some pupils at the institution were sponsored by donors. She testified that the donors knew the teachers and that she had direct contact with them. 35. The witness reiterated during cross-examination that the “kickback” referred to the money she was instructed to send back to the Appellant after receiving salary payments. She stated that the Appellant warned the teachers that failure to refund the money would lead to termination of employment and that the teachers feared him. She testified that she raised complaints about the arrangement in April, 2020, after which salaries began being sent directly through M-Pesa. 36. PW2 further testified that she later became a director of HHI and was involved in disbursement of donor funds for workers’ salaries and school fees. She maintained that she would send the exact amounts directed by the donors and that there existed evidence showing that some school fees remitted for sponsored children were not paid to the schools, resulting in some children being sent away for fees arrears. 37. In re-examination, PW2 reiterated that she was employed by the Appellant as a teacher and that between January and March, 2020 she received Ksh.4,000/- monthly. She further clarified that when salary envelopes were issued, the Appellant would take all the envelopes from the teachers. She also stated that she only kept account of money personally sent to her and the amounts she remitted to the Appellant. 38. The third prosecution witness was **George Omondi Ondiek,** a farmer residing in Kamswa. He testified that he knew the Appellant, whom he described as the director of **Christian Dream School.** He further stated that his child was a pupil at the said school. 39. PW3 testified that in the year 2017, he approached the Appellant seeking admission for his child into the school at the PP2 level. According to him, after the child joined the institution, an administrator from the school visited his home and informed him that his child had obtained sponsorship and would therefore receive assistance from donors. 40. The witness stated that despite being informed that his child had obtained sponsorship, the Appellant later told him that he was still required to continue paying school fees. He testified that he paid school fees at the rate of Ksh.100/- per week, amounting to approximately Ksh.500/- per month. According to him, the payments were made in cash and he was never issued with receipts despite requesting for them. 41. PW3 testified that in November, 2020 his child fell sick and subsequently died. Following the child’s death, the Appellant allegedly visited his home and informed him that donors had been contacted and that financial assistance would be sent to assist with funeral expenses. He stated that he was asked to wait for the assistance but none was ever received. 42. The witness further testified that after the funeral, officials from HHI visited him and inquired whether he had received any assistance for the burial. He informed them that he had not received any money and that he had instead relied on contributions from relatives and neighbours to bury the child. 43. PW3 stated that he was later summoned by officers from the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) to record a statement concerning the alleged funeral assistance. He testified that during the investigations he learned that a sum of Ksh.50,000/- had allegedly been sent for funeral expenses. However, he denied ever receiving the money and stated that the telephone number to which the funds were allegedly sent belonged to **Joseph Oluoch,** whom he identified as the Appellant’s brother. 44. The witness further testified that in June of that year, the Appellant visited him at his home and later followed him to his farm, where he allegedly threatened him against testifying in court. According to PW3, the Appellant warned him not to appear as a witness and threatened to burn him and his family. He identified the Appellant before the trial court as the person who made the threats. 45. PW3 produced a burial permit relating to his deceased child, **Silas Odhiambo Omondi,** as an exhibit before the court. He reiterated that although the child had allegedly been sponsored by donors, he continued paying school fees throughout the child’s attendance at the school. 46. Upon cross-examination, PW3 confirmed that he was a farmer who cultivated maize and that he and the Appellant hailed from the same village. He stated that prior to the case against the Appellant, he had no disagreements with him and had learned in 2017 that the Appellant assisted needy members of the community through the school. 47. The witness admitted that Christian Dream School was a private school and that before joining it, his child had attended another private institution known as Junior Academy in Koru. He testified that he sought admission into the Appellant’s school because he experienced difficulties paying fees at the previous school. 48. PW3 further stated during cross-examination that he did not know the amount paid by other parents as school fees and that he had no direct contact with them. He reiterated that despite asking for receipts, he was told to choose between obtaining receipts and allowing his child to continue attending school. He testified that this led him to believe that “something was being hidden.” 49. The witness stated that donor representatives later visited him and informed him that his child had obtained sponsorship and that they would cater for the child’s expenses. However, he stated that no documentary proof of sponsorship was shown to him. He further testified that after the child’s death he was compelled to lease part of his land in order to raise money for the funeral expenses. 50. PW3 maintained that he later learned that Ksh.50,000/- had allegedly been sent for the funeral through a telephone number belonging to **Joseph Oluoch,** the Appellant’s brother. He stated that the Appellant was the person requested to provide the telephone number through which the funeral assistance would be transmitted. 51. In re-examination, PW3 reiterated that it was the Appellant who informed him that his child had obtained sponsorship from donors. He further stated that after the child’s death, the Appellant informed him that he had communicated with the donors and was awaiting a report concerning the funeral assistance. 52. In her testimony before the trial court, **Daisy Brenda Akinyi,** the fourth prosecution witness (PW4), a trained teacher residing at Awasi, testified that she held Teachers Service Commission (TSC) Number 9\*\*\*\*2 and produced her TSC certificate dated 30th June, 2022 as an exhibit before the court. She stated that she came to know the Appellant, when he served as the director of Christian Dream School. 53. PW4 testified that she commenced employment at the school in January, 2021 after completing her college training. According to her, she reported to the school on 7th January, 2021 and officially began teaching duties on 11th January, 2021. She stated that she taught pupils from Grades Two to Four. 54. The witness testified that although there was no written agreement, she expected to earn a monthly salary of Ksh.10,000/-. She stated that the Appellant informed her that whenever salary funds were sent to her M-Pesa account, she was only to retain Ksh.8,000/- and remit the balance to him. 55. PW4 stated that her first salary payment was received on 7th February, 2021 through M-Pesa from PW1. She testified that she received Ksh.18,000/-, withdrew Ksh.14,000/-, and thereafter handed Ksh.6,800/= in cash to the Appellant on the following day. According to her, she repeated the same arrangement during the following month after again receiving Ksh.15,000/-. 56. The witness further testified that beginning in April, 2021 she started remitting the money directly to the Appellant through M-Pesa. She stated that on 9th April, 2021 she received Ksh.15,000/- and sent Ksh.6,800/- to the Appellant. She gave further evidence that on 8th May, 2021 and 8th June, 2021 she similarly received Ksh.15,000/- from PW1 and remitted Ksh.6,800/- to the Appellant on each occasion. 57. PW4 testified that in total she remitted Ksh.20,400/- to the Appellant through M-Pesa. She stated that the Appellant never explained the reason why she was required to remit part of her salary to him. 58. The witness further testified that in July, 2021, she declined to send any money to the Appellant after receiving her salary. According to her, the Appellant informed her that because she had failed to remit the money, she had been dismissed from employment at the school. 59. PW4 produced her M-Pesa statement as evidence before the court and identified the Appellant in court as the person to whom she had remitted the money. 60. Upon cross-examination, PW4 confirmed that she was a trained teacher who had completed her training in the year 2020 at Borabu Teachers Training College. She however admitted that at the time she was not yet registered as a TSC teacher despite possessing a TSC number. 61. The witness testified that she obtained employment at Christian Dream School after receiving a referral and submitting an application letter together with her curriculum vitae. She admitted that she did not sign any written contract of employment and that she was simply instructed to commence work. 62. PW4 maintained that the appellant was responsible for payment of the teachers through PW1. She testified that the Appellant was before the court because he demanded money from the teachers and dismissed those who failed to refund part of the salary payments. 63. The witness admitted that the Appellant did not physically accompany them when withdrawing money from their M-Pesa accounts. She however insisted that she did not voluntarily give the money to him and maintained that the remittances were made because of his demands. 64. PW4 also admitted that she had not produced documentary proof such as schemes of work or assessment books to demonstrate her employment at the school. Nevertheless, she testified that she actively taught Grades Two, Three and Four and gave the approximate number of pupils in each class. She further maintained that she relocated to Awasi after securing employment at the school. 65. The fifth prosecution witness (PW5) was **Millicent Adhiambo,** a teacher residing at Ogweda in Awasi. She testified that she knew the Appellant as the director of Christian Dream School, where she was employed as a teacher from January, 2021. She stated that she was a qualified ECDE teacher and produced her ECDE certificate as an exhibit before the trial court. 66. PW5 testified that she taught ECDE and PP1 classes at the said school. She stated that there was no formal written employment agreement, but that the Appellant informed her that she would receive a salary of Ksh.15,000/- through M-Pesa, out of which she was expected to retain Ksh.7,000/- and remit the balance to him. 67. The witness testified that her salary was paid through PW1, who acted on behalf of the donors associated with HHI. She stated that she received her first payment on 1st February, 2021 and thereafter continued receiving monthly payments of Ksh.15,000/-. 68. PW5 gave evidence that she regularly transferred part of her salary to the Appellant. She stated that on 10th March, 2021 she received Ksh.15,000/- and transferred Ksh.7,800/- to the Appellant. She further testified that on 8th April, 2021, 8th May 2021 and 8th June, 2021 she received similar amounts and transferred Ksh.7,800/- on each occasion to the Appellant. 69. The witness testified that in total she remitted Ksh.32,200/- to the Appellant through M-Pesa. She stated that she continued with this arrangement until June, 2021 when she stopped remitting the money after a visit by donor representatives. 70. PW5 testified that following the donor visit, she learned that the full amount of Ksh.15,000/- constituted her salary and that she was not required to remit any portion of it to the Appellant. She stated that she stopped working for the Appellant after refusing to continue transferring money to him and that she was thereafter dismissed from employment. 71. The witness further testified that she received her salary for July, 2021 but did not remit any money to the Appellant thereafter. She identified the Appellant in court as the person to whom she had been sending part of her salary and produced her M-Pesa statement as evidence. 72. Upon cross-examination, PW5 confirmed that she was a trained ECDE teacher having trained in Siaya. She stated that she did not know the Appellant prior to applying for employment at the school and that she was informed she had been selected after submitting her application. 73. The witness admitted that there was no written contract of employment and that she was not directly paid by the school but through PW1 on behalf of the donors. She stated that she had no proof that the payments came from the school itself. 74. PW5 maintained that the Appellant ran Christian Dream School and that the donors, identified as HHI, were responsible for funding salaries. She testified that although she remitted money to the Appellant, the M-Pesa statements did not indicate the reason for the transfers and that she did not voluntarily agree to the deductions. 75. In her testimony before the trial court, PW6, **Mercy Achieng Jakoyo,** a teacher residing at Thubi, testified that in January, 2021 she commenced working with HHI under the leadership of the Appellant and was deployed to teach at Christian Dream School where she served as a teacher. 76. PW6 testified that upon employment she was informed by the Appellant that her monthly salary would be Ksh.15,000/-, out of which she was required to remit Ksh.8,000/- back to him. She stated that the Appellant warned her that failure to remit the said amount would result in loss of employment. 77. The witness testified that she initially complied with the Appellant’s instructions and began remitting part of her salary through M-Pesa. She stated that she received payments from PW1, and thereafter transferred portions of the money to the Appellant on various occasions. 78. PW6 specifically testified that on 8th February, 2021, 10th March, 2021, 9th April, 2021 and 8th June, 2021, she received Ksh.15,000/- from PW1 and remitted between Ksh.6,800/- and Ksh.8,000/- to the Appellant on each occasion. She produced her M-Pesa statement covering the period 1st January, 2019 to 31st December, 2021 in support of her evidence. 79. The witness testified that on 19th June, 2021, donor representatives visited the school and it was at that point she became aware that the entire Ksh.15,000/- constituted her salary and that she was not required to remit any portion of it to the Appellant. She stated that from that date she ceased sending money to the Appellant. 80. PW6 testified that after she stopped remitting the money, the Appellant informed her that she could no longer continue working at the school and she was subsequently dismissed from employment. 81. She identified the appellant before the trial court as the person who had instructed her to remit part of her salary and stated that he had never refunded any of the money she had sent to him. 82. Upon cross-examination, PW6 confirmed that she was a trained teacher but admitted that she did not produce her professional documents in court. She stated that she came to know the Appellant in January, 2021 when she joined the school after responding to an application process. 83. The witness testified that she had written an application letter and attended an interview before being employed. However, she admitted that she had not produced the application letter, interview records or any documentary evidence showing her employment at the school, including schemes of work or attendance registers. 84. PW6 further stated that she had no written contract of employment and no documentary proof that she was formally employed by the Appellant. She nevertheless maintained that the Appellant was the director of Christian Dream School and that she was paid through PW1 on behalf of HHI. 85. The witness testified that she did not communicate with the Appellant before sending money and that the remittances were made through M-Pesa without prior consultation. She maintained that she sent money at specific times indicated in her statement and identified the Appellant as the recipient of the funds. 86. PW6 concluded her testimony by stating that she had never been refunded any of the money she remitted and maintained that the Appellant had employed her and later terminated her employment after she stopped sending the alleged remittances. 87. In her testimony before the trial court, PW7 **Angeline Atieno Okungu,** an ECDE teacher residing in Awasi and employed at Kolung Primary School testified that she knew the Appellant as the director of Christian Dream School, where she was employed as a teacher in the year 2018 and worked until mid-2019. 88. PW7 testified that she was initially employed on a salary of Ksh.3,000/- per month after negotiating with the Appellant, although she had initially demanded Ksh.8,000/-. She stated that she worked under the Appellant’s management and that he directly controlled the school’s operations and employment terms. 89. The witness testified that in the year 2020, PW1 acting on behalf of donors associated with HHI, was introduced as the person responsible for payment of salaries. She stated that he distributed salaries in envelopes marked with the amount inside, per teacher. 90. PW7 stated that after receipt of the salary envelopes, the Appellant instructed the teachers to surrender the envelopes to him on the basis that he had already paid them. She testified that thereafter she was instructed that any salary received above Ksh.3,000/- was to be remitted back to the Appellant, failing which she risked losing her job. 91. The witness testified that due to fear of dismissal, she complied with the Appellant’s instructions and remitted part of her salary back to him through M-Pesa. She further stated that she was required to remit the money within one day of receiving it. 92. PW7 testified that she eventually stopped reporting to work in 2021 after the Appellant sent her home and told her that he would call her back. She stated that she had complied with the remittance arrangement because other teachers who failed to do so had been dismissed. 93. The witness testified that in total she remitted approximately Ksh.72,500/- to the Appellant over the period of her employment. She identified the Appellant in court as the person who employed her and to whom she sent the money. 94. PW7 produced her M-Pesa statement covering the period 1st January, 2019 to 31st December, 2021 in support of her testimony, and pointed out multiple transactions showing receipt of funds from PW1 and subsequent transfers to the Appellant. 95. Upon cross-examination, PW7 confirmed that she was an ECDE teacher and that she was employed through a referral from her husband, who allegedly knew the Appellant. She admitted that she did not have a written employment contract or documentary proof of employment such as appointment letters or school records. 96. The witness stated that she did not know the Appellant prior to joining Christian Dream School and that she came from the same general village area as the Appellant and her husband. She however admitted that she did not know how her husband knew the Appellant. 97. PW7 maintained that the Appellant determined the salary structure and that she was first paid in cash before payments were later made through M-Pesa by PW1 on behalf of the donors. 98. She further admitted during cross-examination that she sent money to the Appellant while at home and not in his presence, and that she sometimes contacted him afterwards to confirm receipt. She reiterated that she had no employment contract but insisted that the Appellant was her employer and controlled the salary payments. 99. PW7 maintained in re-examination that she was paid through the donor system and that the appellant had not refunded any of the money she remitted to him. 100. In his testimony before the trial court, PW8 **Felix Henry Omollo,** a teacher residing in Awasi and working at Therbie Primary School stated that he knew the Appellant, who was associated with Christian Dream School, and that he initially came into contact with him in 2016 when he sought assistance with school fees. 101. PW8 testified that in 2016 he approached the Appellant seeking financial assistance for his education, during which the Appellant took his photograph and indicated that he would seek support from donors. He stated that he was later informed to await feedback which was never communicated to him. 102. The witness testified that in 2019 he again approached the Appellant due to personal difficulties, including his mother’s illness, and requested for employment. He stated that the Appellant employed him as a teacher at Christian Dream School and promised to pay him a salary of Ksh.5,000/- per month. 103. PW8 testified that he was instead paid Ksh.3,000/- per month in cash and did not raise any complaint at the time. He stated that he continued working under those terms until later developments involving donor payments. 104. The witness testified that later, a coordinator identified as **Stanley Paul Amakobe** (PW1) visited the school and brought salary envelopes for teachers, with indications that the amounts per teacher were Ksh.8,000/-. He stated that upon receipt of the envelopes, the Appellant instructed the head teacher to collect them back, and the teachers complied. 105. PW8 further testified that the Appellant instructed the teachers that once funds were disbursed through M-Pesa by PW1, they were to retain some amounts and remit the balance to him. He stated that phone numbers of teachers were collected and thereafter payments were made through M-Pesa. 106. The witness testified that the Appellant required the teachers to inform him whenever they received money, although in some instances, he obtained the information indirectly through other teachers. He stated that on one occasion the Appellant allegedly sent his daughter to collect money from him, which he declined to release. 107. PW8 testified that after he refused to remit money to the Appellant, the latter told him not to return to the school and his employment effectively came to an end. He further stated that in 2021 he was surprised to learn that his name appeared among beneficiaries of donor funds despite never receiving such benefits. 108. The witness stated that he had never signed any written employment contract with the Appellant or with PW1 and that payments were made either in cash or through M-Pesa channels controlled by the Appellant and the donor representatives. 109. PW8 identified the Appellant in court as the person who employed him and allegedly instructed him to remit part of his salary. He maintained that he ultimately ceased working at the school after refusing to comply with the Appellant’s instructions. 110. Upon cross-examination, PW8 confirmed that he had known the Appellant for a long time and that the Appellant had previously been known for assisting needy persons, including helping some children access education. He admitted that he had personally approached the Appellant seeking assistance for school fees. 111. The witness conceded that he was not a professional teacher but stated that he had been engaged to teach at the school. He admitted that he did not sign any contract with either the Appellant or PW1 and that he had no documentary evidence linking him formally to the Appellant’s employment. 112. PW8 maintained that PW1 was the person who paid teachers through donor funds and that he was still working with HHI in some capacity. He further admitted that he had nothing concrete to demonstrate a formal contractual relationship with the Appellant, though he insisted that the Appellant was involved in the employment and payment arrangements at the school. 113. **Mercy Awuor,** testified as PW9. The witness told the trial court that she was a teacher who had previously worked at Christian Dream School where the Appellant was her employer. She testified that she joined the school in early 2021 after being introduced to the Appellant by a person living near the school, and that the Appellant accepted to employ her as a teacher. 114. PW9 testified that the Appellant informed her that her salary would be paid through the M-Pesa platform. She stated that although she expected to earn Ksh.15,000/- per month, the Appellant initially offered her Ksh6,0.00/- and later increased it to Ksh.7,000/-. She testified that she eventually taught at the school under those terms. 115. The witness testified that payments were processed through PW1, whom she understood to be acting under HHI. She stated that she would receive Ksh.15,000/- and was instructed by the Appellant to remit approximately Ksh.7,000/- to him thereafter. 116. PW9 gave evidence that she complied with the Appellant’s instructions and made several remittances through M-Pesa. She testified that on 6th February, 2021 she received Ksh.15,000/- and sent Ksh.7,800/- to the Appellant; on 10th March, 2021 she received Ksh.15,000/- and sent Ksh.6,800/-; on 9th April, 2021 she remitted Ksh.7,600/-; on 8th May, 2021 she remitted Ksh.7,800/-; and on 8th June, 2021 she again remitted Ksh.7,600/-. 117. The witness testified that in total she remitted approximately Ksh.37,400/- to the Appellant during her employment. She stated that she stopped working at the school around June, 2021 after donor representatives intervened and the payment arrangement ceased. 118. PW9 identified the Appellant in court as the person who employed her and directed her to remit part of her salary back to him. She produced her M-Pesa statement as documentary evidence in support of her testimony. 119. Upon cross-examination, PW9 confirmed that she was a trained teacher who had attended Kanaan International College but admitted that she had not produced her academic certificates before the court. She stated that she approached the Appellant directly for employment at the school. 120. The witness testified that there was no formal interview process and no written employment contract between her and the Appellant. She maintained, however, that the Appellant was the head of the school and set the terms of employment. 121. PW9 admitted that she did not have documentary proof of employment at the school but insisted that she worked there and was paid through PW1. She further stated that she was aware the school operated under a donor sponsorship programme. 122. The witness stated that she sent the money to the Appellant while at home and that the Appellant was not physically present during the transactions. She further admitted that she did not have a clear explanation for discrepancies in the amounts she remitted. 123. PW9 maintained in re-examination that she remitted money under the belief that failure to do so would result in loss of employment, and that PW1 was the person handling salary payments under the sponsorship programme associated with HHI. 124. The tenth prosecution witness was **Michael Hyodo,** a missionary, who told the trial court that he met the Appellant in 2006 at a school in Mathare. He testified that he later engaged with the Appellant in connection with assistance programmes facilitated through HHI, particularly in relation to the funding of Christian Dream School. 125. PW10 testified that he was involved in facilitating financial support to the school by sourcing and transmitting funds, which were channelled to the Appellant. He stated that the Appellant was engaged in managing the school and was responsible for receiving funds intended for teachers and school projects. 126. The witness testified that funds were sent to support the school’s operations, including payment of teachers, construction of facilities such as a borehole, church building, purchase of furniture, tanks and other learning materials. He stated that teachers were expected to be paid Ksh.15,000/- but that the payments were often not directly received by them in full. 127. PW10 testified that he became aware of alleged misappropriation of funds intended for the school, stating that monies sent for teachers and school projects were instead used by the Appellant for personal benefit. He further stated that teachers were later required to remit part of their salaries to the Appellant under threats or intimidation. 128. The witness testified that as a result of these concerns, he and other partners confronted the Appellant and later reported the matter to law enforcement authorities. He stated that students who had been supported under the programme were subsequently withdrawn from the Appellant’s school. 129. PW10 further testified that funding arrangements involved transfers through intermediary organisations linked to HHI and that records existed showing payments made to the Appellant, including payroll documentation and financial statements. 130. The witness identified the Appellant in court as the person who received and controlled the funds intended for the school and its teachers. He stated that he had visited the school on several occasions and personally observed its operations under the Appellant’s management. 131. Upon cross-examination, PW10 confirmed that he was a United States citizen residing in Kenya under a class 2 residency permit and that he was a dentist by profession, although he did not practice dentistry in Kenya. He stated that he was involved in missionary work and held relevant permits for such activities. 132. The witness admitted that he did not produce certain documentation such as work permits or financial records in court, although he maintained that such records existed in his possession electronically. He further stated that he had forwarded some documents to investigative authorities. 133. PW10 testified that he engaged directly with the Appellant through the programmes and believed that the Appellant was an employee or representative of HHI. He maintained that funds were channelled to the Appellant for distribution to teachers and school projects. 134. The witness further stated that he visited Christian Dream School on several occasions and had a general understanding of its operations, including donor-funded programmes such as feeding initiatives and infrastructure development. 135. PW10 concluded by reiterating that he had no doubt that funds intended for the school were received by the Appellant, though he acknowledged that he did not personally manage all financial records presented to court. 136. **Cliff Colin Aiko,** a builder and student residing in Riat area testified as PW11. He told the trial court that he knew the Appellant, initially as a community member and photographer and later as the director of Christian Dream School around 2020. 137. PW11 stated that he was introduced to the school through his father and the Appellant, and that he submitted an application to teach. He testified that he was assigned to teach various subjects including Mathematics, English and Environmental Studies after being directed by the head teacher. 138. The witness testified that he did not have a formal agreement on salary but was initially paid Ksh.3,000/- in cash, and later received Ksh.8,000/- through M-Pesa facilitated by HHI through PW1. 139. PW11 testified that prior instructions had been given that teachers were to retain only Ksh.3,000/- of their payments and remit the balance to the Appellant, as directed by the Appellant himself. He stated that he was expected to remit Ksh.5,000/- to the Appellant. 140. The witness testified that he did not remit the money as required, and that the Appellant later confronted him at his home and asked whether he had received and remitted the funds. Upon confirming non-remittance, PW11 stated that he was dismissed from the school for non-compliance with the directive to return part of his salary. 141. PW11 further testified that he did not voluntarily leave employment but was terminated after failing to comply with the alleged arrangement concerning salary remittance. 142. Upon cross-examination, PW11 stated that he had completed his Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) in 2019 and that he was engaged at the school shortly thereafter, describing himself variously as a teacher and support staff. He testified that his recruitment and dismissal were verbal, without written contract or formal documentation and that he was instructed to start teaching immediately upon arrival at the school. 143. PW11 admitted that he had no documentary proof of employment or sponsorship arrangements, though he maintained that the school had sponsored children and that payments were made by HHI through intermediaries. 144. He further stated that he worked at Christian Dream School for approximately two months before the school was disrupted by COVID-19-related closures, and that he was ultimately dismissed shortly after receiving payment. 145. PW11 maintained in re-examination that his dismissal was linked to his refusal or failure to remit part of his salary to the Appellant, and that he did not voluntarily resign from his employment. 146. The twelfth witness that the prosecution called before the trial court was **Lynette Aluoch Omondi** (PW12) a casual labourer residing in Awasi. She testified that she knew the Appellant as a neighbour and that he was the director of Christian Dream School where her child, **Silas Odhiambo,** was enrolled. 147. PW12 testified that her child joined the school in PP2 in 2017 and progressed to Grade 2 and later met his demise. She stated that the school had foreign sponsors who visited their home, took photographs and allegedly promised to support the child fully, including school fees, clothing, shoes and food. 148. The witness testified that despite the alleged sponsorship, she continued to pay school-related expenses, including fees and food contributions. 149. PW12 further testified that after the child’s death, she was informed by visiting sponsors who were linked to HHI that funds had been sent to assist with the funeral expenses through her phone number, but she denied receiving any such money. 150. She stated that the Appellant was present during interactions with the sponsors but remained apart during discussions concerning the burial arrangements, and no direct agreement on funeral support was reached with her. 151. PW12 testified that she later learnt from the sponsors that money had been sent for funeral expenses via M-Pesa, though she maintained that she did not receive the said funds. She identified the Appellant in court as the person who brought the sponsors to their home and facilitated their interaction with the family. 152. Upon cross-examination, PW12 confirmed that she was a resident of Awasi and that the Appellant was her neighbour. She reiterated that her child had attended Christian Dream School and that she understood it to be a sponsored institution. 153. PW12 stated testified that her child fell ill and later died, and that community members and church members assisted with burial expenses after she leased land to raise funds. She admitted that she did not possess documentary proof of the child’s enrolment or sponsorship and that any receipts she may have had were lost. She also confirmed that she had no formal records of funeral contributions received or made. 154. PW12 maintained in re-examination that the Appellant had taken the sponsors to their home and that after the burial, the sponsors returned and inquired whether she had received the funeral donation allegedly sent to her. 155. In her testimony before the trial court, **Chrissy Christian** (PW13), a United States citizen and volunteer with a non-profit organisation involved in educational and humanitarian support work, testified that she first came to know the Appellant through social media in 2014, when he sought assistance for community development and school-related projects. 156. PW13 testified that she engaged with the Appellant through Helping Hands International, which supported education and welfare programmes in Kenya. She stated that the Appellant proposed establishment and support of Christian Dream School, including construction of school infrastructure, payment of teachers, feeding programmes and medical support for pupils. 157. The witness testified that over time, substantial funds were remitted to support the school, including approximately US$2.4 million for construction works and further recurring operational funding estimated at about Ksh.800,000/- per month for salaries, school fees, feeding, uniforms and other school needs. She stated that funds were transmitted mainly through Western Union Money Transfer platform and later through intermediaries including PW1, who assisted in disbursement to the Appellant and the teachers. 158. PW13 stated that the initial arrangement provided for teachers’ salaries of Ksh.8,000/-, which were later increased to Ksh.15,000/- per teacher. She testified that the Appellant controlled recruitment of teachers and provided lists of beneficiaries for payment purposes. 159. She further testified that after some time, concerns arose that the Appellant was misusing funds. These included allegations that teachers were being required to remit part of their salaries to him, that some pupils’ school fees were not properly paid despite funds being sent and that parents were still being asked to contribute towards schooling despite donor support. 160. PW13 testified that upon receiving whistleblower information and complaints from the community, investigations were conducted which confirmed suspected financial irregularities. As a result, donor funds were redirected to be paid directly to teachers through HHI via PW1, bypassing the Appellant. 161. The witness stated that she personally received information from teachers who confirmed that they were compelled to remit part of their salaries to the Appellant, and that some who refused were allegedly dismissed from employment. 162. PW13 also testified regarding the death of a sponsored child, **Silas Odhiambo,** confirming that the Appellant informed her of the death and requested burial assistance. She stated that funds were sent for burial expenses through a mobile number provided by the Appellant, allegedly belonging to the deceased’s family, but it was later discovered that the money did not reach the intended beneficiaries. She further testified that when donor representatives later visited the family, the family denied receipt of burial funds, raising further concern about diversion of the funds. 163. PW13 testified that the Appellant later claimed ownership of the school, which was contrary to the understanding of donors that it was a community-supported institution. She stated that this revelation emerged after investigations into the financial management of the school. 164. Upon cross-examination, PW13 stated that she was a volunteer with HHI and that the organisation was not formally registered in Kenya but operated as a non-profit humanitarian entity. She stated that she had authority from the organisation’s leadership to testify and produce records. 165. She confirmed that funds were transmitted through Western Union and other documented channels and that email correspondence existed between her organisation and the Appellant concerning funding of the school, construction projects and welfare programmes. 166. PW13 maintained that the Appellant played a central role in controlling school operations, including selection of teachers, allocation of funds and management of donor resources. 167. In re-examination, the witness reiterated that funds for sponsorship, salaries and burial assistance were channelled through the Appellant, who provided recipient details, and that organisational records supported the transactions and payments made to him and through intermediaries. 168. The fourteenth prosecution witness was **Inspector Peter Mbatha,** a digital forensic examiner attached to the DCI Headquarters. He testified that held holds a Bachelor’s degree in IT from KCA University and a Master of Science in Distributed Community Technology from the University of Nairobi. He also stated that he was a certified mobile and computer forensic examiner and had training in online investigations. He stated that he had served in the police force since 2007 and had worked as a forensic examiner since 2016. 169. The witness told the trial court that on 14th June, 2022, he received a Nokia mobile phone and a SIM card as exhibits from DCI Muhoroni for forensic examination. He was instructed to extract WhatsApp images, WhatsApp chats and SMS messages covering the period between 1st January, 2015 and 15th March, 2022. He was also instructed to verify and extract data relating to specified email accounts linked to the device, including *chrissie@yahoo.com,* *henrymigoya2020@gmail.com* and *klands@gmail.com.* 170. PW14 testified that after analysis, he confirmed that the mobile phone was a Nokia device and that he extracted WhatsApp chats and other digital data from it. He prepared a forensic report under case number CCC/649/2022 and produced the exhibit report, SIM card and exhibit memo as evidence. He stated that he complied with the instructions given and generated a report consisting of approximately 602 pages. 171. The witness further testified that from the device, he identified multiple email accounts linked to it. These included *comcaredev@gmail.com* associated with **Henry Migoya,** *henrymigoya2020@gmail.com* also associated with **Henry Migoya** and *comcare@yahoo.com* associated with **Chrissie Christian.** He stated that these accounts showed extensive communication patterns over time. 172. PW14 also told the court that in a separate instruction received in September, 2022, he was requested to analyze email correspondence involving **Chrissie Christian’s** email address in relation to *henrymigoya2020@gmail.com.* He testified that he used forensic tools to examine the accounts and found over 400 email exchanges between the accounts. 173. He stated that the emails dated as far back as 2015 and included various attachments such as PDF files, Word documents, Excel sheets, images and videos. He produced printouts and screenshots forming part of his report and prepared certificates under the *Evidence Act* to support the admissibility of his findings. 174. On cross-examination, PW14 confirmed that he was a qualified forensic examiner and acted under instructions from the investigating officers. He stated that he did not verify ownership or authorship of the email accounts or messages and that his role was limited to extraction and analysis of digital data. 175. PW14 further confirmed that he was not the investigating officer in the case and did not independently determine who controlled or used the email addresses and phone numbers. He stated that his work was limited strictly to forensic examination of the exhibits provided to him and preparation of the technical report. 176. The prosecution called **Police Constable Elisha Kipruto** attached to DCI Muhoroni, as PW15. The witness testified that he was involved in the investigation of allegations against the accused relating to Christian Dream School and HHI, after receiving a complaint forwarded to his office on 10th November, 2021 through **Inspector Fredrick Barasa** and PW1, **Stanley Amakobe.** 177. The officer stated that he printed and reviewed emails forming part of the complaint, which alleged that the accused had obtained money by falsely claiming he was building a community school and had diverted funds meant for teachers’ salaries. He identified the complainant entity as HHI, a charity organization and confirmed that PW1 presented a power of attorney authorizing him to act on behalf of the complainant. He produced the power of attorney and an email extract dated 1st November, 2024 as exhibits. 178. PW15 testified that he interviewed PW1, who produced Western Union remittance slips showing funds sent to the accused for construction and school operations. He stated that the total funds traced to the accused amounted to USD33,500 between 7th August, 2016 and 21st July, 2020, and he produced records of the remittances as exhibits. 179. The witness further stated that he summoned the Appellant, who appeared voluntarily, and recorded a statement from him. He recovered a Nokia mobile phone from the Appellant, prepared an inventory which the Appellant signed and forwarded the phone for forensic examination to extract WhatsApp messages and communications relevant to the case. The extracted WhatsApp and SMS printouts were produced in court exhibits. 180. PW15 stated that forensic communications showed the Appellant had sent messages to the complainant containing lists of teachers and proposed salaries to be paid through HHI. He also indicated that the Appellant used email addresses including *comcaredev@gmail.com*, which was linked to him. 181. The witness produced correspondence with the Ministry of Education, including a letter dated 11th November, 2022, a reply dated 5th November, 2024 and a certificate of registration for Christian Dream School as exhibits. The certificate indicated that the school was registered as a private primary school managed by the Appellant, with the email *comcaredev@gmail.com* listed. 182. PW15 further testified that he wrote to HHI and obtained its charter and master list of sponsored children, which he produced as exhibits. P. He also produced his request letter from as an exhibit. The charter identified **Rom Ashpole** as the president of HHI and outlined programmes such as child sponsorship and disaster relief. 183. PW15 stated that he recorded statements from teachers who alleged that the Appellant extorted part of their salaries under threat of dismissal. He also produced pleadings and court documents in *Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. E013 of 2022 through which he obtained a court order* to investigate the M-pesa statements of the concerned teachers. 184. PW15 produced the M-Pesa statements for several teachers, including **Beatrice Akinyi Ogado,** **Millicent Adhiambo Magero, Akinyi Daisy, Winnie Ochieng, Brenda Akinyi** and **Angeline Atieno,** all of which showed salary payments to their respective M-Pesa numbers and transactions linked to the Appellant and the sponsorship program. 185. PW15 also produced teacher qualification documents obtained during investigation, including a Primary Teacher Education Certificate, a Certificate in Childhood Development and Education and a JSC registration record for a teacher. 186. The witness testified that he investigated allegations that the Appellant received Ksh.50,000/- for the burial of **Silas Odhiambo.** He traced the funds through M-Pesa transactions from PW1 to **Joseph Oluoch** (MPesa account 0710\*\*\*\*63), and then to the Appellant’s account 0724\*\*\*\*95. He produced MPesa statements for **Joseph Oluoch** and a burial permit for **Silas Odhiambo** as exhibits. The witness also produced an email requesting burial funds from HHI. 187. PW15 further produced as exhibits an affidavit and an application for orders to investigate the Appellant’s MPesa account and the Appellant’s MPesa statement as exhibits, showing receipt of funds from teachers and other sources. 188. PW15 testified that he conducted a site visit to Christian Dream School on 16th June, 2022, where he recovered various items including water tanks, desks, seats, office furniture, a playground structure, solar panels, a pump and a shade net. He also recovered items from the Appellant’s residence, including solar panels and a water pump. These were documented in inventories and a voluntary surrender inventory which the witness produced as exhibits. 189. The witness produced photographs of the school and recovered items, including images of the playground, solar system, water tanks, shade net, metallic seats, school signage, duty roster and certificate of registration displayed at the school as exhibits in support of the prosecution case. He also produced a photographic certificate and exhibit memo form before the trial court. 190. PW15 concluded that the investigation established that funds from HHI were used to finance Christian Dream School, but also that the Appellant diverted or received funds directly from teachers and sponsorship programs. He stated that he relied on witness statements and accounts, financial records and forensic evidence to prefer charges against the Appellant. 191. The last prosecution witness was **Police Sergeant James Makobi,** (PW16), who testified and told the trial court that was attached to the DCI and seconded to Safaricom as a police liaison officer based in Kisumu, serving the greater Western region. His role involved receiving court orders and formal requests from investigating officers and retrieving telecom and MPesa records from Safaricom for use in investigations and court proceedings. 192. The officer stated that in relation to the case, he received and processed MPesa statements for multiple mobile phone numbers covering the period between 1st January, 2019 and 31st December, 2021, pursuant to a court order issued under *Miscellaneous Application No. E013 of 2022* at Tamu Law Courts. The numbers included: 0722\*\*\*\*52, 0719\*\*\*\*88, 0718\*\*\*\*60, 0712\*\*\*\*76, 0712\*\*\*\*14, 0710\*\*\*\*74, 0710\*\*\*\*63, 0710\*\*\*\*97, 0703\*\*\*\*81, 0799\*\*\*\*42, 0797\*\*\*\*34, 0769\*\*\*\*41, 0748\*\*\*\*61, 0743\*\*\*\*82, 0741\*\*\*\*88, 0740\*\*\*\*20, 0740\*\*\*\*47, 0729\*\*\*\*05 and 0704\*\*\*\*26. 193. The witness further testified that he also produced an additional MPesa statement for mobile number 0724\*\*\*\*95 covering the period 1st January, 2017 to 31st December, 2021, which was obtained pursuant to a separate court order issued in *Miscellaneous Application No. E022 of 2022.* 194. PW16 stated that he prepared and signed an electronic evidence certificate dated 24th May, 2024 under *Section 65B* as read with *Section 106B* of the *Evidence Act.* He confirmed that the M-Pesa records were printed from Safaricom’s computer systems, were true copies of electronic records stored in Safaricom databases and that he used a designated computer and printer under his control when generating the printouts. He produced the M-Pesa bundle as containing all the extracted information as together with the certificate of electronic evidence as exhibits. 195. In cross-examination, PW16 confirmed he had 23 years of service and 8 years of experience working with Safaricom in data-related liaison work. He stated that he had undergone internal training in data extraction and analysis with both DCI and Safaricom, although he did not produce certificates in court. 196. The witness maintained that the M-Pesa records that he produced were generated from Safaricom systems and that subscriber details correspond to registered owners identified through national identity cards, alien identity cards or passports. He specifically stated that the number 0722\*\*\*\*52 was registered in the name of **Stanley Paul Amakobe,** (PW1) as reflected in the records and exhibits produced. 197. The prosecution case was closed at that stage. 198. **RULING ON CASE TO ANSWER.** 199. In a considered ruling delivered on 16th September, 2024, the trial court evaluated the prosecution evidence placed before it and found that the same had established a *prima facie* case against the Appellant sufficient to warrant him being placed on his defence on all the counts. 200. The court held that the evidential threshold required at that stage had been met and consequently, the Appellant was put on his defence and, upon being called upon to elect his mode of defence, he chose to give sworn testimony. 201. **THE DEFENCE CASE.** 202. The Appellant DW1 testified that he was a resident of Rakwaro village, an entrepreneur involved in farming and education and a married father of six children, two of whom have disabilities. He described his long-standing involvement in community development and education initiatives. 203. The Appellant stated that he previously lived in Mathare, Nairobi, where he engaged in social work through church activities and youth organisations. He said he co-founded a community-based organisation called Community Care Development Organisation, for which he produced a Certificate of Registration. He also produced a walk permit dated 15th October, 2003, a recommendation letter from Mathare Youth Sports Association dated 18th October, 2002, a certificate of donation from Médecins Sans Frontières dated 11th February, 2003, a certificate of reporting compliance dated 30th June, 2009 and a letter from the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development dated 11th November, 2009 as exhibits. 204. The Appellant further produced a donation letter from Blow Plast Limited dated 30th October, 2003, a recommendation letter from Hindu Council of Kenya dated 19th May, 2009 and a certificate of membership to Rotary Club Kisumu as exhibits. He also referred to a Rotary District Governor magazine, which he produced as an exhibit, to show support for his initiatives. 205. The Appellant testified that he became the secretary of Community Care Development Foundation and used the entity to advance development projects in Rakwaro area. 206. He stated that with support from Rotary Clubs and other partners, he implemented a borehole project. He produced a grant of letters of administration intestate dated 3rd November, 2015 relating to his family land where the borehole was drilled, a contract for drilling the borehole and nine receipts from Titan Building Concept Ltd. He also produced authorization from the Water Resource Management Authority dated 5th January, 2017. 207. The Appellant testified that he started an informal school at an Anglican Church in 2016, which was later named Christian Dream School, beginning with a small number of pupils and expanding over time. He said he charged minimal fees and relied on community and donor support. He produced a Certificate of Registration for Basic Education Institutions dated 6th May, 2019 and a title deed for land parcel Kisumu/Wangaya I/7635. He further produced documents showing educational support activities, including receipts for secondary school fees, a bankers cheque for registration and a Barclays bank payment receipt for college fees. 208. The Appellant also produced evidence of donations from international supporters, including Western Union receipts and a second certificate of registration for Christian Dream School dated 23rd August, 2019. 209. The Appellant stated that the school expanded with facilities including water tanks, shade nets, chairs and other infrastructure. He produced a delivery note from Vectus Kenya Ltd dated 27th May, 2021, an invoice and delivery note from Polyplay Ltd dated 23rd February, 2021, a delivery note from Hortipro Ltd dated 23rd October, 2019, a receipt from Hortipro Ltd dated 14th August, 2020 and a receipt from Equator Shades and Tents dated 9th December, 2019. He further produced 52 assorted receipts for school supplies, stating these reflected operational funding from well-wishers and parents. 210. In relation to the allegations before the trial court, the Appellant testified that he communicated with PW13 via email and LinkedIn but denied receiving money from her. He denied authorship of the email *henrymigoya2020@gmail.com,* stating it was created by PW1 who also allegedly informed him of its creation. 211. The Appellant explained that following the death of a pupil, **Silas Odhiambo,** he contributed to burial arrangements and received funds through intermediary **Joseph Oluoch.** He said he received Ksh.48,000/- from **Oluoch,** who had received Ksh.50,000/- from PW1, and denied direct receipt or solicitation of burial funds from PW13. 212. The Appellant testified that teachers at the school were employed locally, some untrained, and that due to resource constraints they contributed toward meals voluntarily. He stated that payments to teachers were sometimes routed through PW1, whom he described as a well-wisher introduced to him for mentorship. 213. During cross-examination, he maintained that the school was a private/family initiative supported by donors and denied fraud. He stated that he had no written resolutions regarding teacher contributions, no formal employment records for teachers and that many financial transactions were handled informally through friends and donors. 214. The Appellant also reiterated that the land and school facilities were lawfully acquired or developed through family and donor support and that he was the registered manager of the school under the Ministry of Education documentation though he acknowledged discrepancies raised by the prosecution regarding ownership, management structure and email communications. 215. On re-examination, the Appellant insisted that PW1 created the disputed email account, that PW13 had no role in school management and that all resources obtained were used for community benefit including education, water and agriculture projects. 216. The Appellant called **Jael Atieno Otieno** (DW2) as his witness. In her testimony, DW2 told the trial court that she was an Early Childhood Development (ECD) trained teacher and a resident of Milenye village in Muhoroni sub-county. She produced her ECDE results slip and stated she had previously worked at Simbi Lwara School and Kolang Primary School, producing employment letters from both institutions. 217. DW2 stated that she joined Christian Dream School in March, 2016 after applying for employment. She produced a letter dated 26th December, 2015 confirming her engagement. She said she initially found one teacher at the school and later more teachers were recruited as enrolment increased. 218. DW2 testified that the school operated initially within a church in Rakwaro village, with support from parents and visiting donors who provided porridge flour and other supplies. Parents contributed water, firewood and later cash for feeding programs as the school expanded. 219. She stated that in 2018, external friends of the Appellant supported the school’s feeding programme. By 2019, the school had approximately 150 children and about five teachers. She said she was eventually appointed head teacher after the previous head teacher stepped down. 220. DW2 testified that following guidance from a Curriculum Support Officer, afternoon lessons were introduced. She stated that because teachers were not provided meals, it was agreed that teachers would contribute money toward their feeding, and the Appellant was tasked with collecting and managing those contributions. 221. The witness stated that teacher contributions were initially made in cash and later via mobile money (M-Pesa) due to security concerns. She produced her M-Pesa statement and referred to specific transactions to demonstrate such contributions. 222. DW2 further stated that teachers also contributed towards training costs, and produced a TSC letter dated 18th May, 2021 and a training report from Christian Dream School. She explained that training sessions were sometimes reimbursed after salary payments. 223. DW2 testified that the Appellant was the director and proprietor of the school, responsible for overseeing operations and donor engagement. She said she served as head teacher, responsible for admissions and day-to-day administration and that the school continued operating with structured classes and feeding programmes. 224. She stated that in 2021, pupils and teachers left the school following a meeting held outside the school, though she did not know the reason. She also confirmed awareness of the criminal case against the Appellant. 225. Regarding the death of pupil **Silas Odhiambo,** DW2 testified that the school collectively agreed to contribute towards burial expenses. She stated that PW2 **Beatrice Akinyi,** a teacher, was assigned to collect the funds and hand them over to the child’s mother. 226. DW2 further testified that police officers later visited the school with PW2, took photographs and removed items including water tanks, a slide, office tables and chairs, steel chairs, gas cylinders, solar panels and shade nets. She stated she was later informed at the DCI office that the items were alleged to belong to HHI. 227. During cross-examination, the witness confirmed that teacher contributions were approximately Ksh.8,000/- per month for food and training, and that training sessions cost about Ksh.800/- per head and were held monthly over five days. She admitted that she did not have complete documentation such as receipts for all trainings, full lists of contributing teachers, or full attendance records. She also stated that reports and stamps produced in evidence were prepared by teachers, including a handwritten report she attributed to a teacher named **Mercy.** 228. DW2 maintained that she testified as the head teacher of Christian Dream School and affirmed that she had no personal motive in supporting the Appellant’s case, stating she was merely presenting her experience of the school’s operations. 229. The defence case was closed at that stage. 230. **THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS.** 231. In determining the case before him, the learned trial Magistrate considered counts II to VII together on the basis that all the said counts were founded on *Section 302* of the *Penal Code* and were substantially similar in nature. 232. The trial court identified the essential ingredients of the offence of demanding property with menaces as being threefold, namely: proof that the accused demanded a valuable thing from another person; proof that the demand was accompanied by force or menaces; and proof that the demand was made with intent to steal. 233. The learned trial Magistrate further adopted the holding in the case of ***Samuel Alwenda Oyani v Republic [1993] eKLR*** on the meaning of the term “menaces” within the context of *Section 302* of the *Penal Code.* The court construed menaces to mean a threat issued by an accused person with the intention of alarming the victim in a manner capable of affecting the mind of a person of ordinary firmness and courage. 234. Applying the foregoing principles to the evidence before the court, the learned trial Magistrate observed that the Appellant did not deny receiving money from the complainants in counts II to VII. The Appellant’s defence, however, was that the monies sent to him were voluntary contributions made pursuant to a mutual agreement among teachers to contribute towards lunch expenses. 235. The Appellant further contended that the prosecution had failed to establish the element of menace because the alleged threats to dismiss the complainants from employment could not reasonably have intimidated them, given that they were employees of HHI and remained in employment even after institution of the criminal proceedings. 236. The trial court rejected the Appellant’s explanation and found it implausible when weighed against the documentary and oral evidence adduced by the prosecution. The court reasoned that if the remittances were indeed voluntary lunch contributions pursuant to a common arrangement, one would reasonably expect the contributions to be uniform and consistent in amount among all the teachers. However, the trial court noted that the M-Pesa statements produced before the court demonstrated a markedly different pattern. 237. In particular, the learned trial Magistrate found that the 2nd complainant, while earning a monthly salary of Ksh.8,000/-, consistently remitted between Ksh.4,000/- and Ksh.4,500/- to the Appellant, and upon her salary increasing to Ksh.15,000/-, her remittances similarly increased to approximately Ksh.8,900/-. 238. The trial court noted a similar pattern in respect of the 3rd complainant, whose remittances rose proportionately with increments in salary. 239. As regards the 4th complainant, the evidence showed that upon receipt of a salary of Ksh.15,000/-, she would remit Ksh.7,800/- to the Appellant. 240. The same pattern was observed in relation to the 5th and 6th complainants, who each remitted Ksh.6,800/- from salaries of Ksh.15,000/-. 241. From the foregoing evidence, the learned trial Magistrate concluded that there existed a consistent pattern demonstrating that the amounts remitted to the Appellant were pegged on the complainants’ salaries rather than on any common or voluntary lunch arrangement. The court therefore found that the remittances lacked the consistency and uniformity expected of mutually agreed contributions and instead pointed towards coercive extraction of money from the complainants. 242. The trial court further found it significant that the remittances to the Appellant ceased simultaneously, a circumstance which, in the court’s view, undermined the Appellant’s narrative that the payments were voluntary and pursuant to a standing mutual arrangement among the teachers. 243. On the question whether the threats attributed to the Appellant amounted to menaces capable of affecting persons of ordinary courage, the learned trial Magistrate found that the threats were indeed sufficiently intimidating to influence the complainants and compel compliance with the Appellant’s demands. 244. The court reasoned that although PW1 was the person responsible for payment of salaries, the evidence established that it was the Appellant who had hired the complainants and therefore wielded the authority to terminate their employment. 245. The trial court particularly relied on the testimony of PW2 and PW4, who stated that they were dismissed and evicted from Christian Dream School after refusing to remit the demanded sums to the Appellant. The court also relied on the evidence of PW7, who testified that she complied with the Appellant’s demands out of fear after witnessing colleagues lose their jobs for failing to comply. 246. The learned trial Magistrate consequently found that the complainants’ fear was genuine and objectively reasonable in the circumstances. 247. As regards the final ingredient of intent to steal, the learned trial Magistrate held that the same was demonstrated by the fact that the Appellant received money from the complainants and never refunded any portion thereof. The court therefore inferred that the demands were made with the intention of permanently depriving the complainants of their money. 248. Ultimately, upon evaluating the totality of the evidence, the learned trial Magistrate was satisfied that the prosecution had proved all the essential ingredients of the offence of demanding property with menaces contrary to *Section 302* of the *Penal Code* in respect of counts II to 7, and consequently found the Appellant guilty on the said counts. He was thereafter sentenced to three 3 years’ imprisonment on each count, the court ordering that the sentences run concurrently. 249. **GROUNDS OF APPEAL.** 250. Aggrieved by the convictions and sentences, the Appellant lodged the present appeal vide the petition of appeal dated 14th July, 2025. The grounds of appeal are as follows: 1. **THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in fact and in law in finding that all the six counts on demanding property with menaces contrary to *Section 302* of the *Penal Code* had been proved against the Appellant to the required standards.** * 1. **THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in fact and in law in failing to put into consideration the evidence by DW2 as to the purposes of the payments made to the accused person.** 2. **THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in fact and in law by finding that it is overly optimistic that the accused would make reparations at that time yet there was evidence on record that the accused had tried an out of court settlement with the complainants.** 3. **THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in fact and in law by overlooking the probation report which was on record and therefore denying the accused person and the complainants an opportunity for reconciliation as envisaged in the *Constitution.*** 4. **THAT the learned trial Magistrate erred in fact and law in arriving at a decision that was not supported by evidence.** 1. On the strength of these grounds, the Appellant urges this court to allow the appeal, quash his conviction and acquit him and set aside the death sentence. 2. The appeal, as sanctioned by the court, proceeded by way of written submissions and both sides complied by filing their respective submissions. 3. **THE APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS.** 4. In his written submissions, the Appellant states that the appeal raises five issues for determination, namely: whether the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution proved the offences under *Section 302* of the *Penal Code* in Counts II to VII; whether the learned trial Magistrate failed to consider the Appellant’s defence and the evidence of DW2; whether the court failed to consider the probation report and reconciliation efforts; whether the conviction was unsupported by evidence and therefore unsafe; whether the sentence imposed was harsh and excessive. 5. On the first issue, the Appellant submits that *Section 302* of the *Penal Code* requires proof that the accused demanded a valuable thing, that the demand was accompanied by menaces or force and that there was intent to steal. Reliance is placed on ***Samuel Alwenda Oyani v Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 145 of 1998),*** where “menaces” were defined as threats of such nature as to overbear the mind of a reasonable person. 6. It is argued that the prosecution failed to prove that the M-pesa remittances were obtained through menaces, as DW2’s evidence showed that teachers voluntarily agreed to contribute for lunch and training expenses. 7. The Appellant further contends that the alleged threat of dismissal could not constitute menaces since the complainants were not employed by the Appellant but by HHI and continued in employment thereafter. It is further argued that variation in contribution amounts was wrongly interpreted by the trial court as coercion, whereas it was consistent with voluntary contributions. The Appellant submits that no legal power of dismissal was proved against him, and therefore the alleged threats could not meet the threshold under *Section 302.* 8. On the second issue, the Appellant submits that the trial court failed to properly evaluate his defence and the corroborative testimony of DW2, contrary to the duty of a trial court as set out in ***Okeno v Republic [1972] EA 32.*** DW2’s evidence, it is argued, established that teachers had agreed to contribute for lunch and training and that monies were remitted voluntarily and in some cases borrowed and later reimbursed. 9. The Appellant relies further on ***Kiilu & Another v Republic [2005] 1* *KLR 174*** and ***Nzivo v Republic [2005] 1 KLR 699*** for the principle that failure to consider an accused person’s defence amounts to a miscarriage of justice. It is contended that the trial court dismissed DW2’s evidence without analysis, thereby violating *Article 50(2)(k)* of the *Constitution* and failing to properly weigh the totality of the evidence. 10. On the third issue, the Appellant argues that although a probation report was called for under *Section 4* of the *Probation of Offenders Act*, the trial court failed to give it due consideration. The report allegedly described the Appellant as a first offender of good character and recommended reconciliation and a non-custodial sentence. 11. The Appellant relies on ***Bernard Kimani Gacheru v Republic [2002] eKLR and Ambani v Republic [1990] KLR 161*** to submit that an appellate court may interfere with sentence where the trial court overlooks material factors or acts on wrong principles. 12. It is further argued that *Article 159(2)(c)* of the *Constitution* and the *Sentencing Policy Guidelines* at paragraph 4.1 require courts to promote restorative justice and consider non-custodial sentences where appropriate, especially for first offenders. 13. On the fourth issue, the Appellant submits that the conviction was based on conjecture and not evidence, contrary to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Reliance is placed on the authority of ***Okethi Okale & Others v Republic [1965] EA 555*** for the proposition that convictions must be based on actual evidence and not speculation, and on ***Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372*** regarding the standard of proof. 14. The Appellant further cites ***Sawe v Republic [2003] KLR 364*** to argue that suspicion, however strong, cannot found a conviction. It is contended that the trial court’s inference that non-uniform M-pesa contributions indicated coercion was speculative and unsupported by evidence, and that the alleged threats did not meet the legal threshold under *Section 302* of the *Penal Code.* 15. On the fifth issue, the Appellant submits that the sentence of three years’ imprisonment was manifestly harsh and excessive in light of the circumstances. Reliance is placed on ***Bernard Kimani Gacheru v Republic [2002] eKLR and Ambani v Republic [1990] KLR 161*** for the principles governing appellate interference with sentence. 16. It is argued that the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors including first offender status, reconciliation efforts and the probation report. The Appellant further invokes *Article 50(2)(p)* of the *Constitution* and the *Sentencing Policy Guidelines,* arguing that a non-custodial sentence would have been appropriate. 17. In conclusion, the Appellant prays that the appeal be allowed, the conviction on Counts II to VII quashed, and the sentences set aside. In the alternative, he urges the Court to substitute the custodial sentence with a non-custodial sentence in line with the probation report and make such further orders as the Court may deem just. 18. **THE RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS.** 19. On its part, the Respondent submits that the following issues arise for determination in this appeal: first, the proper role and scope of this Honourable Court as a first appellate court in a criminal appeal; secondly, whether the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in finding that the prosecution proved the offences of demanding property with menaces contrary to *Section 302* of the *Penal Code* on Counts II to VII beyond reasonable doubt; thirdly, whether the trial court failed to properly consider the defence evidence, particularly that of DW2; fourthly, whether the sentence of three (3) years’ imprisonment was harsh, excessive or unjust in light of the probation report, mitigation and alleged reconciliation; and finally, whether the conviction as a whole was unsafe or unsupported by the evidence on record. 1. On the role of this Court as a first appellate court, the Respondent submits that the jurisdiction of this Court is anchored in *Sections 347* and *354(1)* of the *Criminal Procedure Code.* These provisions empower the High Court, on a first appeal from the subordinate court, to re-examine, re-analyse and re-evaluate the entire record of evidence and to arrive at its own independent conclusions. 2. However, in doing so, the Court is required to bear in mind that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses testify and must therefore make due allowance for that limitation, particularly on issues of credibility. 3. The Respondent relies on the celebrated decision in ***Okeno v Republic*** (supra) where the Court of Appeal emphatically stated that a first appellate court has a duty not merely to look for evidence to support the findings of the trial court, but to re-consider the evidence as a whole, evaluate it independently and draw its own conclusions while bearing in mind that it did not observe the witnesses. 4. The Respondent further relies on ***Kiilu & Another v Republic [2005] eKLR*** where the Court of Appeal reiterated that although a first appellate court is bound to re-evaluate the evidence, it should not lightly interfere with findings of fact by the trial court unless such findings are shown to be based on no evidence, on a misapprehension of the evidence or are plainly unreasonable. 5. The Respondent submits that this limitation is particularly relevant in this appeal where the trial court made detailed and reasoned findings based on both oral and documentary evidence. 6. On the question of sentence, the Respondent relies on ***Bernard Kimani Gacheru v Republic [2002] eKLR*** where the Court of Appeal held that sentencing is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and an appellate court will only interfere where it is demonstrated that the court acted on wrong principles, overlooked material factors, took into account irrelevant considerations or imposed a sentence that is manifestly excessive in the circumstances of the case. The Respondent submits that this threshold has not been met in the present appeal. 7. Guided by the foregoing authorities, the Respondent submits that this Court should approach the findings of the trial court with appropriate judicial restraint, particularly where the findings were based on direct witness testimony, corroborated documentary evidence and reasoned judicial analysis. 8. The Respondent further submits that the trial court in this matter conducted a careful, balanced and methodical evaluation of both the prosecution and defence evidence and reached conclusions that are fully supported by the record. 9. On a proper re-evaluation of the evidence, the Respondent submits that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt on counts II to VII, and that the conviction was safe, sound and unassailable. The Respondent further submits that the learned trial Magistrate correctly directed himself on the law and properly applied the evidence to the legal ingredients of the offence under *Section 302* of the *Penal Code.* 10. The Respondent points out that *Section 302* of the *Penal Code* provides that any person who, with intent to steal, demands any property from any person with menaces or force commits a felony. The Respondent submits that the offence is comprised of three essential elements: (i) proof of a demand for property; (ii) proof that such demand was accompanied by menaces or force; and (iii) proof of an intention to steal. 11. It is urged that all three elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt, and the Respondent submits that the prosecution discharged this burden to the required legal standard. 12. On the first element, the Respondent submits that the evidence of the six complainants, namely PW2, PW4, PW5, PW6, PW7 and PW9, was consistent, coherent and mutually corroborative. Each of them testified that the Respondent demanded that they remit a portion of their salaries, in some instances specifying the exact amount they were to retain and the balance to be sent to him. The evidence, the Respondent asserts, demonstrated a systematic and recurring pattern of deductions from salaries, which was not sporadic or accidental, but deliberate and structured. 13. On the second element of menaces, the Respondent relies on the definition in ***Samuel Alwenda Oyani v Republic [1993] eKLR*** where the Court of Appeal held that “menaces” are threats which would be likely to operate on the mind of a person of ordinary firmness and courage, and it is not necessary that the victim must actually be alarmed, but rather that the accused intended to alarm the victim by such threats. 14. The Respondent submits that the learned trial Magistrate properly adopted this legal test and correctly found that the threats of dismissal from employment constituted menaces within the meaning of *Section 302.* The Respondent further submits that threats relating to employment security, particularly in a context where the complainants were economically vulnerable teachers in a rural setting, are inherently coercive and capable of influencing the conduct of a reasonable person. 15. The Respondent submits that the prosecution evidence showed that the Respondent not only issued threats but also acted upon them in certain instances by dismissing teachers who failed to comply. This fact, in the Respondent’s view, is of critical probative value because it demonstrates that the threats were not hollow or speculative but were real, actionable and capable of enforcement. It therefore follows that the complainants’ compliance was not voluntary but induced by fear of loss of livelihood. 16. The Respondent further submits that the M-Pesa records produced in evidence constituted strong and objective documentary corroboration of the complainants’ testimony. These records demonstrated that the amounts remitted to the Respondent were not fixed communal contributions, but fluctuated in proportion to the complainants’ salaries. The Respondent submits that this pattern is inconsistent with a voluntary arrangement and strongly supports the prosecution’s case that the payments were compelled. 17. The Respondent further submits that the evidence of PW13 and PW15 confirmed that the Respondent exercised substantial control over the operations of the school and had significant influence over employment decisions and that this *de facto* authority made the threats of dismissal credible and reinforced the coercive nature of the demands. 18. On the third element, intention to steal, the Respondent submits that the evidence clearly established that the Respondent received money over a prolonged period, failed to account for it and did not demonstrate any legitimate communal purpose for which the funds were used. The Respondent submits that the absence of records, accountability mechanisms or transparency supports the inference of dishonest intention. 19. The Respondent therefore submits that the learned trial Magistrate correctly found that all three ingredients of the offence were proved beyond reasonable doubt and that the convictions on Counts II to VII were safe and proper. 20. On the defence case, including the testimony of DW2, the Respondent submits that the trial court properly considered the defence evidence but rejected it for sound legal and factual reasons. The Respondent relies on ***Kiilu & Another v Republic*** (supra) for the principle that a trial court is entitled to reject a defence that is inconsistent with credible prosecution evidence, provided it gives reasons. 21. The Respondent submits that DW2’s testimony that the payments were voluntary contributions for lunch and training was directly contradicted by the M-Pesa records, which showed irregular and salary-linked deductions. The Respondent further submits that DW2’s account was not supported by any documentary evidence such as agreements, minutes of meetings or records of communal expenditure. 22. The Respondent further submits that the timing of the cessation of payments, which coincided with external intervention by HHI, further undermined the defence theory. If the payments had been voluntary, there would have been no reason for their abrupt cessation upon external oversight. 23. The Respondent therefore submits that the trial court did not fail to consider the defence evidence; rather, it properly evaluated it against the totality of the evidence and gave cogent reasons for rejecting it. 24. On the safety of the conviction, the Respondent submits that the conviction was supported by overwhelming evidence comprising six consistent complainant testimonies, corroborated by independent M-Pesa records, institutional evidence from HHI, investigative findings by PW15 and digital forensic evidence from PW14. The Respondent submits that this was a robust evidential foundation that left no reasonable doubt as to guilt. 25. On sentence, the Respondent submits that the trial court exercised its discretion properly and judiciously. The sentence of three (3) years’ imprisonment, against a statutory maximum of ten (10) years, was well within the lawful range and reflected a balanced consideration of both aggravating and mitigating factors. 26. The Respondent submits that aggravating factors included the multiplicity of victims, the prolonged duration of the offending spanning several years, the vulnerability of the complainants as low-income teachers, the abuse of a position of authority and the systematic and premeditated nature of the conduct. 27. The Respondent further submits that the mitigating factors, including the Respondent’s status as a first offender, alleged reconciliation and the probation report, were duly considered but could not outweigh the seriousness of the offences or the public interest in deterrence. 28. The Respondent relies on ***Bernard Kimani Gacheru v Republic*** (supra) and submits that there is no demonstrated basis for interference with the sentence, as it is neither manifestly excessive nor based on wrong principles. 29. The Respondent further submits that probation reports are advisory in nature and do not bind the court, and that the trial court was entitled to depart from the recommendation where the interests of justice required a custodial sentence. 30. The Respondent also submits that reconciliation between parties, while a relevant mitigating factor, does not extinguish criminal liability nor override the public interest in punishment and deterrence, particularly in cases involving abuse of authority and exploitation of vulnerable persons. 31. In conclusion, the Respondent accordingly prays that this Court dismisses the appeal in its entirety and upholds both the conviction and the sentence imposed by the learned trial Magistrate. 32. **ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION.** 33. Having considered the grounds of appeal, the record of the trial court, the submissions by the parties and the applicable law, the following issues present themselves for determination: 1. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt all the essential ingredients of the offence of demanding property with menaces contrary to *Section 302* of the *Penal Code* in respect of counts II to VII. 2. Whether the learned trial Magistrate properly evaluated and considered the Appellant’s defence, including the testimony of DW2. 3. Whether the convictions entered against the Appellant were safe and supported by the totality of the evidence on record. 4. Whether the learned trial Magistrate properly exercised his discretion in sentencing the Appellant to three (3) years’ imprisonment on each count. 5. Whether, subject to the findings on the foregoing issues, the Appellant has established sufficient legal or factual basis to warrant interference by this Court, as a first appellate court, with either the conviction, the sentence or both. 34. **ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS.** 35. The first issue for determination is whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the offence of demanding property with menaces contrary to *Section 302* of the *Penal Code* in respect of Counts II to VII. 36. In a criminal trial, the burden throughout remains upon the prosecution to establish each and every ingredient of the offence beyond reasonable doubt and never shifts to an accused person save for any statutory exceptions. 37. *Section 302* of the *Penal Code* provides as follows: **“302. Any person who, with intent to steal anything, demands it from any person with menaces or force is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for ten years.”** 1. From the wording of the provision, the offence comprises three essential ingredients namely; first, there must be proof of a demand for property or a valuable thing; secondly, the demand must be accompanied by menaces or force; and thirdly, the demand must be made with intent to steal. These ingredients were correctly identified by the learned trial Magistrate. 2. In the case of ***Samuel Alwenda Oyani v Republic*** (supra), the Court of Appeal considered the meaning of the term “menaces” under *Section 302* of the *Penal Code* and held that: ***“Menaces means threats of such a nature and extent that the mind of an ordinary person of normal stability and courage might be influenced or made apprehensive.”*** 1. The Court further observed that the test is objective and the question is whether the conduct complained of was capable of operating upon the mind of a person of ordinary firmness and courage. It is therefore not necessary that actual violence be used; threats capable of inducing fear or compliance are sufficient. 2. This Court has carefully re-evaluated the entirety of the evidence on record as required of a first appellate court under the principles set out in ***Okeno*** (supra). 3. On the first ingredient relating to demand for property, the evidence of the complainants was direct, consistent and mutually corroborative. PW2, PW4, PW5, PW6, PW7 and PW9 each testified that after receiving salary payments facilitated through HHI sponsorship arrangements, they were required by the Appellant to remit substantial portions of those salaries back to him through M-Pesa transfers. Their testimonies were, in my view, not isolated or accidental but disclosed a clear and systematic pattern. 4. The complainants in the six counts consistently testified that the Appellant would either communicate the amount to be remitted or dictate the amount they were to retain from their salaries before forwarding the balance to him. The prosecution further produced M-Pesa statements through PW15 and PW16 which objectively corroborated those assertions. 5. The M-Pesa records produced pursuant to lawful court orders under *Miscellaneous Criminal Application Nos. E013 of 2022* and *E022 of 2022* revealed repeated remittances by the complainants to the Appellant’s mobile number over an extended duration. The records constituted electronic evidence properly admitted pursuant to *Sections 65B* and *106B* of the *Evidence Act* through the certificate produced by PW16. 6. Importantly, the Appellant himself did not deny receiving the monies. His defence was not that the transactions never occurred but rather that they constituted voluntary contributions towards meals and teacher welfare arrangements. Accordingly, the fact of demand and receipt of money was substantially undisputed. The only contest was whether the remittances were voluntary or coerced. 7. The evidence on record overwhelmingly demonstrates that the remittances were not voluntary communal contributions as alleged by the defence. First, the amounts remitted lacked any semblance of consistency expected of ordinary welfare contributions. The trial court correctly observed that the remittances rose proportionately with increments in salaries. For example, PW2 testified that while earning Ksh.8,000/- she remitted approximately Ksh.4,000/- to Ksh.4,500/- to the Appellant and when her salary increased to Ksh.15,000/-, her remittances similarly rose to approximately Ksh.8,900/-. Similar patterns were reflected in respect of PW4, PW5, PW6 and PW7. 8. This Court finds no error in the inference drawn by the learned trial Magistrate that such salary-linked deductions were inconsistent with fixed or voluntary welfare contributions. If indeed the monies were contributions for communal lunch or training expenses, one would reasonably expect either uniformity or at least some documentary framework such as agreed contribution schedules, minutes, welfare resolutions or expenditure records. None was produced. 9. Indeed, DW2 admitted during cross-examination that she had no complete records of the alleged contributions, no receipts for most trainings, no comprehensive lists of contributors and no proper attendance records for the alleged programmes. The defence explanation therefore remained unsupported by independent documentary evidence despite the alleged arrangement having existed over a prolonged period. 10. Further, the simultaneous cessation of remittances after donor intervention strongly undermined the defence theory. If the remittances were genuinely voluntary welfare contributions beneficial to all teachers, there would have been no logical reason for them to abruptly cease once HHI and PW1 began direct oversight of salary disbursement. The timing strongly supports the prosecution case that the payments were extracted under coercive conditions linked to the Appellant’s authority over the teachers. 11. On the second ingredient of menaces, the complainants consistently testified that failure to remit money to the Appellant exposed them to dismissal from employment or other adverse consequences. 12. The Appellant argues that the complainants were employees of HHI and therefore he lacked authority to dismiss them. That argument is not supported by the evidence on record. PW13 testified that the Appellant exercised substantial control over the operations of Christian Dream School including recruitment of teachers, supervision of staff and management of school operations. PW13 specifically testified that the Appellant controlled recruitment and supplied lists of teachers for salary payment purposes. PW15 similarly testified that investigations established that the Appellant exercised operational control over the school. 13. In his defence, the Appellant testified that he was the founder of Christian Dream School. He stated that he charged minimal fees and relied on community and donor support. It is therefore evident that the teachers working at the school were subordinate to him, and that he exercised authority and control over them. He produced a Certificate of Registration for Basic Education Institutions issued in his name, which he relied on as evidence of ownership of the school. The complainants therefore worked within an environment under the Appellant’s control and reasonably perceived him as having the power to terminate their engagement. 14. This evidence, his own, demonstrated that the Appellant exercised actual and practical authority over the complainants, notwithstanding the existence of donor funding arrangements. 15. Significantly, the prosecution evidence established that the threats were not idle. PW2 and PW4 testified that they were dismissed and evicted from the school after refusing to continue remitting money to the Appellant. PW7 testified that she complied with the Appellant’s demands because she feared losing her employment after witnessing consequences suffered by her colleagues who resisted. This evidence substantially elevated the threats from mere verbal assertions to real and enforceable sanctions. 16. In the circumstances of this case, threats relating to loss of employment against low-income rural teachers dependent on modest salaries were undoubtedly capable of operating on the minds of persons of ordinary firmness and courage. 17. The Court therefore agrees with the learned trial Magistrate that the threats constituted “menaces” within the meaning of *Section 302* of the *Penal Code* as interpreted in ***Samuel Alwenda Oyani v Republic.*** 18. This Court also rejects the Appellant’s contention that the complainants could not have been intimidated because they remained employed for some period thereafter. The offence under *Section 302* is complete once a demand accompanied by menaces is made with intent to steal. Continued temporary employment does not negate the existence of coercion, especially where evidence shows that some complainants actually lost employment after non-compliance. 19. On the third ingredient of intent to steal, the Court finds that the prosecution equally discharged its burden. Intent, being a state of mind, is ordinarily inferred from conduct and surrounding circumstances. In the present case, the repeated extraction of substantial portions of teachers’ salaries without transparent accounting, lawful authority or proper welfare records irresistibly points towards dishonest intention. 20. The Appellant failed to demonstrate any legitimate accountability mechanism regarding the monies received. No audited records, welfare accounts, expenditure schedules or supporting documentation were produced to show that the remitted funds were collectively utilised for the alleged welfare purposes. Even his witness – DW2 – conceded the absence of proper records. 21. Furthermore, the evidence revealed that the Appellant received the monies personally through his own M-Pesa account and retained control over them. The amounts demanded varied according to the salaries received by individual teachers rather than according to any identifiable communal expenditure. This pattern, as I have before stated, strongly supports the inference that the Appellant intended to dishonestly appropriate part of the complainants’ earnings for his own benefit. 22. The Court has also considered the Appellant’s broader defence that he was a philanthropist and community developer who established the school through donor and community support. While there was evidence that the Appellant indeed participated in educational and community projects, such evidence did not displace or neutralize the specific and direct evidence concerning the unlawful demands made against the complainants. Good works or prior charitable activities cannot operate as a legal defence to criminal conduct otherwise proved by credible evidence. 23. Equally, the Appellant’s contention that PW1 created one of the disputed email accounts does not materially affect the charges under *Section 302.* The convictions were not founded solely upon electronic correspondence but upon a combination of direct complainant testimony, corroborative M-Pesa records, institutional evidence and surrounding conduct. Even without the disputed email evidence, the prosecution case remained cogent and compelling. 24. This Court further finds that the prosecution evidence was materially corroborated by independent documentary and forensic evidence. PW14 extracted communications and electronic data linking the Appellant to donor operations and salary arrangements while PW15 and PW16 produced objective financial records showing the flow of money from complainants to the Appellant. Such evidence substantially reduced the possibility of fabrication or collusion. 25. The Court is alive to the principle stated in ***Sawe*** (supra) that suspicion alone, however strong, cannot found a conviction. However, the present case was not based on suspicion. The prosecution presented direct testimony from multiple complainants corroborated by documentary financial evidence, electronic records and surrounding conduct demonstrating coercion and unlawful extraction of money. The conviction therefore rested upon credible evidence and reasonable inferences properly drawn therefrom. 26. Having independently reconsidered and re-evaluated the entire evidence on record, this Court is satisfied that the learned trial Magistrate properly directed himself on both the law and the facts and correctly concluded that the prosecution had proved all the ingredients of the offence of demanding property with menaces contrary to *Section 302* of the *Penal Code* in respect of Counts II to VII beyond reasonable doubt. 27. The second issue for determination is whether the learned trial Magistrate failed to properly evaluate and consider the Appellant’s defence, including the testimony of DW2, and in particular whether the court erred in rejecting the defence contention that the monies remitted to the Appellant constituted voluntary contributions towards teachers’ meals, welfare and training expenses rather than monies obtained through coercion or intimidation. I have already largely addressed this issue. 28. It is now settled law that a trial court bears a duty to consider the defence advanced by an accused person alongside the prosecution evidence before arriving at its determination. A court is not at liberty to merely recite the defence and dismiss it perfunctorily. The defence must be weighed against the totality of the evidence on record. 29. As we have seen above, a first appellate court is duty-bound to reconsider and evaluate the evidence afresh and draw its own conclusions while bearing in mind that it did not have the opportunity to see and hear witnesses testify. The the duty of evaluation extends to both the prosecution and defence evidence. 30. Where a defence raises a plausible explanation consistent with innocence, the same must be adequately considered and weighed against the prosecution case. However, the law is equally clear that a trial court is entitled to reject a defence where it finds the same inconsistent with credible prosecution evidence, provided reasons are given. 31. This Court has carefully reconsidered the defence evidence tendered by the Appellant and DW2. Having done so, I am unable to agree with the Appellant’s contention that the learned trial Magistrate failed to consider the defence case. To the contrary, the record demonstrates that the trial court expressly identified, summarized and analyzed the substance of the defence before rejecting it for reasons that were both legally and factually sound. 32. The Appellant’s principal defence, which I have already addressed under the first issue, was that the complainants voluntarily remitted monies towards communal feeding arrangements and teacher welfare expenses. DW2 substantially supported this position by testifying that teachers contributed money for meals and training expenses and that the Appellant merely coordinated collection and management of such contributions. 33. The learned trial Magistrate directly addressed that defence and subjected it to scrutiny against the objective evidence on record, particularly the M-Pesa statements. The court specifically considered whether the pattern of remittances was consistent with voluntary welfare contributions and concluded that it was not. In this Court’s view, that approach was entirely proper. 34. The trial court correctly observed that if the remittances were indeed ordinary welfare or lunch contributions agreed upon collectively by teachers, one would reasonably expect consistency, predictability and some form of documentary structure. However, the evidence disclosed the opposite. The amounts remitted varied from teacher to teacher and increased proportionately with increases in salary. The proportional relationship between salary increments and remittance amounts was highly inconsistent with the defence theory of voluntary welfare contributions. 35. The Appellant argued that varying contribution levels could still occur voluntarily depending on individual capacity. While that proposition may theoretically be possible, the evidence before the trial court revealed a remarkably consistent pattern of substantial salary-linked deductions across several complainants over an extended period. The learned trial Magistrate was therefore entitled to conclude that the pattern pointed more persuasively to compelled extraction than voluntary welfare arrangements. 36. Further, the simultaneous cessation of remittances following donor intervention, as reflected in the six complainants’ M-Pesa statements, significantly undermined the defence theory. The learned trial Magistrate correctly observed that had the payments been genuine voluntary welfare contributions for the collective benefit of the teachers, there would have been no logical basis for their immediate discontinuation upon the introduction of external oversight. This was a conclusion reached after due consideration of the defence evidence, and there is no basis upon which this Court can fault it. 37. DW2 herself admitted under cross-examination that she lacked complete records relating to the alleged contributions, training sessions and expenditure. She conceded that there were no comprehensive attendance records, no proper receipts for many trainings and no complete contributor lists. The absence of such records materially weakened the credibility of the defence explanation. 38. This Court also notes that the defence evidence contained substantial internal inconsistencies. On one hand, the Appellant maintained that the remittances were voluntary contributions. On the other hand, DW2 testified that teachers contributed approximately Ksh.8,000/- per month for meals and training. That figure was itself strikingly excessive considering the modest salaries earned by the complainants and further undermined the plausibility of the alleged arrangement. 39. Moreover, the evidence of coercion adduced by the complainants remained largely unshaken during cross-examination. PW2 and PW4 testified that they suffered adverse consequences, including dismissal and eviction, after failing to continue remitting money to the Appellant. PW7 similarly testified that she continued making payments because she feared dismissal after observing what had happened to her colleagues. 40. The defence failed to provide any satisfactory explanation for those allegations. If indeed the remittances were voluntary welfare contributions, there would have been no rational basis for punitive measures against teachers who declined to contribute. The evidence of dismissal and intimidation therefore fundamentally contradicted the Appellant’s narrative of voluntariness. 41. This Court also finds that the Appellant’s own testimony materially undermined the defence case. During cross-examination, the Appellant admitted that many transactions were handled informally through friends and donors and further conceded that there were no formal employment records for teachers and no written resolutions regarding teacher contributions. Those admissions significantly weakened the reliability and accountability of the alleged welfare arrangement. 42. The Court further notes that the Appellant’s defence shifted in material respects. While he denied authorship of certain email accounts and denied direct receipt of some donor funds, he nevertheless acknowledged receiving monies from teachers and from intermediary persons connected to the school operations. Such inconsistencies were properly taken into account by the trial court when assessing credibility. 43. It is important to emphasize that a trial court is not obligated to accept a defence merely because it has been raised. Its duty is to evaluate whether the defence raises a reasonable doubt when weighed against the prosecution evidence. In ***Kiilu & Another v Republic*** (supra) the Court recognized that a defence may properly be rejected where it is inconsistent with credible prosecution evidence. That is precisely what occurred in the present case. 44. The Appellant further contends that the trial court violated his fair trial rights under *Article 50(2)(k)* of the *Constitution* by allegedly failing to consider the defence evidence. I find no merit in that contention. *Article 50(2)(k)* guarantees the right of an accused person to adduce and challenge evidence. 45. The record of the trial court clearly shows that the Appellant elaborately cross-examined the prosecution witnesses, both personally and through his Counsel. The record further clearly demonstrates that he testified extensively, called DW2 as a witness and produced numerous documentary exhibits. The trial court fully recorded and summarized that evidence before rendering its determination. The mere fact that the defence was ultimately rejected does not amount to a violation of the *Constitution.* 46. Indeed, the learned trial Magistrate gave specific reasons for rejecting the defence theory, particularly the inconsistency between the alleged voluntary contributions and the objective M-Pesa patterns. The court further considered the evidence relating to dismissals and threats and found the prosecution version more credible. This was not a case of failure to consider the defence but rather one where the defence was considered and found unpersuasive. 47. This Court must also bear in mind that findings relating to credibility and demeanor are matters upon which the trial court enjoys considerable advantage, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses testify firsthand. As stated in ***Pandya v Republic [1957] EA 336,*** an appellate court should be slow to interfere with findings based on credibility unless no reasonable tribunal could have reached such conclusions. 48. In the present matter, the learned trial Magistrate had the benefit of hearing and seeing both the prosecution witnesses and the defence witnesses testify. The court found the prosecution witnesses credible and their accounts mutually corroborative. Conversely, the defence explanation was found implausible when measured against the objective documentary evidence. Upon my own independent evaluation, I find no basis for interfering with those conclusions. 49. The Court further observes that the defence evidence did not effectively rebut the strong corroborative force of the M-Pesa records produced through PW15 and PW16. Those records objectively demonstrated repeated remittances by the complainants to the Appellant over a sustained period. Documentary evidence of that nature carried substantial probative value and strongly corroborated the complainants’ oral testimony. 50. Additionally, the prosecution evidence established that the Appellant exercised significant operational control over Christian Dream School including recruitment, supervision and retention of teachers. Consequently, the complainants’ apprehension regarding dismissal or adverse consequences was entirely credible and consistent with the surrounding circumstances. The defence did not meaningfully displace that evidence. 51. Having independently reconsidered the entirety of the defence case alongside the prosecution evidence, this Court is satisfied that the learned trial Magistrate properly directed himself on the applicable legal principles, fully considered the Appellant’s defence and the testimony of DW2 and gave cogent reasons for rejecting the same. 52. The third issue for determination is whether the convictions entered against the Appellant were safe and supported by the totality of the evidence on record, including the oral testimonies of the complainants and witnesses, the M-Pesa statements, digital forensic evidence and the documentary material produced before the trial court. 53. The Appellant contends that the conviction was unsafe because the prosecution case allegedly rested upon conjecture, speculation and unsupported inferences. Reliance was placed upon ***Okethi Okale & Others v Republic [1965] EA 555*** and ***Sawe v Republic*** (supra) for the proposition that suspicion, however strong, cannot form the basis of a criminal conviction. 54. That proposition is undoubtedly correct as a matter of law. However, in light of the findings made on the first and second issues in favour of the Respondent, it follows as a necessary consequence that the convictions entered against the Appellant were safe and were firmly supported by the totality of the evidence on record. 55. This Court finds no basis for rejecting the digital evidence merely because PW14 could not independently prove authorship of every communication. Electronic evidence is to be evaluated alongside the totality of the surrounding evidence. In the present case, the extracted communications aligned substantially with the testimonies of PW13, PW15 and the complainants concerning the Appellant’s operational role and control over school affairs. 56. This Court also rejects the Appellant’s submission that the conviction rested upon speculative inference from the M-Pesa records. Courts are entitled to draw reasonable inferences from proved facts. In criminal proceedings, circumstantial and documentary evidence may properly corroborate direct testimony where the chain of circumstances points irresistibly toward guilt. 57. Upon my own exhaustive re-analysis and independent evaluation of the evidence on record, I am satisfied that the convictions entered against the Appellant were safe, sound and fully supported by credible evidence. I find no misdirection, misapprehension of evidence or improper inference capable of warranting interference by this Court. 58. The fourth issue for determination is whether the sentence of three (3) years’ imprisonment imposed upon the Appellant on each of Counts II to VII, to run concurrently, was harsh, excessive, unlawful or imposed in disregard of the mitigation advanced by the Appellant, the probation report and the alleged reconciliation efforts between the parties. 59. The law regarding appellate interference with sentence is firmly settled. Sentencing is primarily a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and an appellate court will not lightly interfere with that discretion unless it is demonstrated that the trial court acted on wrong principles, considered irrelevant matters, failed to consider relevant matters, imposed an illegal sentence or that the sentence is manifestly harsh or excessive in the circumstances. 60. In ***Bernard Kimani Gacheru v Republic [2002] eKLR,*** the Court of Appeal stated: ***“It is now settled law, following several authorities by this Court and by the High Court, that sentence is a matter that rests in the discretion of the trial court. Similarly, sentence must depend on the facts of each case. On appeal, the appellate court will not easily interfere with the discretion exercised by a trial court unless it is evident that the trial court acted upon some wrong principle or overlooked some material factor or the sentence is manifestly excessive in view of the circumstances of the case.”*** 1. Similarly, in ***Wanjema v Republic [1971] EA 493,*** the Court held that an appellate court may interfere where the sentence imposed is manifestly excessive in the circumstances or where the trial court overlooked some material factor or acted on wrong principles. 2. Guided by the foregoing principles, this Court is required to examine whether the learned trial Magistrate exercised his sentencing discretion properly and judicially. 3. The Appellant was convicted of six counts of demanding property with menaces contrary to *Section 302* of the *Penal Code.* The said provision criminalizes the conduct of any person who, with intent to steal, demands property from another with menaces or force. The offence is a serious felony because it involves coercive extraction of property through intimidation and abuse of power. 4. The record of the trial court demonstrates that after conviction, the trial court considered the Appellant’s mitigation, including the fact that he was a first offender, a family man and involved in community initiatives. The Appellant also placed reliance on the probation report and alleged reconciliation efforts with some complainants. 5. However, the learned trial Magistrate was equally obligated to balance those mitigating factors against the aggravating circumstances disclosed by the evidence on record and the broader public interest in punishment, deterrence and protection of vulnerable persons from exploitation. 6. Upon re-evaluation of the record, this Court is satisfied that the offences committed by the Appellant were not isolated or spontaneous acts. The evidence established a systematic and prolonged scheme through which the Appellant repeatedly demanded and received portions of teachers’ salaries over an extended duration. The evidence further showed that the amounts remitted were substantial when viewed against the complainants’ modest earnings as rural teachers. 7. The court also notes, as did the trial court, that the Appellant abused a position of authority and influence. The complainants viewed him as the person capable of determining whether they remained in employment. In ***R v Mohamed Abdow Mohamed [2013] eKLR,*** the Court observed that abuse of a position of trust or authority is a significant aggravating factor in sentencing because it involves exploitation of vulnerable persons who depend on the offender. 8. The complainants in the present matter were economically vulnerable teachers earning relatively modest salaries. The trial court correctly appreciated that threats relating to employment security in such circumstances carried serious coercive force. 9. The evidence disclosed actual adverse consequences arising from the Appellant’s conduct. PW2 and PW4 testified that they were dismissed and evicted after resisting the demands. PW7 similarly testified that she complied out of fear after observing the consequences suffered by colleagues who refused. 10. These were not harmless or technical infractions. The conduct involved deliberate exploitation of vulnerable workers through intimidation and fear of loss of livelihood. Notably, the trial court noted that Appellant exhibited no genuine acceptance of responsibility. 11. The Appellant argues that the trial court failed to properly consider the probation report and reconciliation efforts. This Court, with respect, is unable to agree. A probation report is advisory in nature and does not bind the court. The sentencing court retains discretion to determine whether a custodial or non-custodial sentence best serves the interests of justice in the circumstances of the particular case. 12. Sentencing must take into account the circumstances of the offence, the character of the offender and the interests of the public, and the trial court retains discretion even where probation reports make recommendations. 13. Equally, *Article 159(2)(c)* of the *Constitution* encourages alternative dispute resolution mechanisms including reconciliation and restorative justice. However, the same constitutional provision does not extinguish criminal liability nor compel a court to impose a non-custodial sentence where the gravity of the offence demands otherwise. 14. The *Sentencing Policy Guidelines* likewise recognize restorative justice as an important consideration but emphasize that sentencing must also promote accountability, deterrence, denunciation and community protection. 15. In the present matter, the offences involved repeated exploitation of employees through threats and abuse of authority. Such conduct carries significant public interest considerations which extend beyond the wishes of individual complainants. 16. The Court must also consider that the Appellant was convicted on six separate counts. The multiplicity of victims and repeated nature of the conduct substantially aggravated the seriousness of the offences. 17. The sentence imposed was three (3) years’ imprisonment on each count, with the sentences ordered to run concurrently. It is evident that the sentence imposed fell well below the statutory maximum of 10 years imprisonment and cannot therefore be described as manifestly excessive in the circumstances. 18. This Court has also considered the Appellant’s argument that he was a first offender and engaged in charitable and community activities. Those factors were properly availed in mitigation and considered by the trial court. 19. Upon independent re-evaluation of the entire record, this Court finds no evidence that the learned trial Magistrate acted on wrong principles, overlooked any material factor or imposed a sentence that was unlawful or manifestly excessive. The trial court was therefore entitled to conclude that a custodial sentence was necessary both for punishment and deterrence. 20. The fifth and final issue for determination is whether, in light of the Court’s findings on the preceding four issues, the conviction and sentence can be said to be unsafe, unjust or otherwise incapable of being sustained. 21. This issue is largely consequential. Having independently re-evaluated the entire record and found that the prosecution proved the ingredients of the offence under *Section 302* of the *Penal Code* beyond reasonable doubt, that the trial court properly evaluated and rejected the defence, that the conviction was supported by cogent oral, documentary, financial and digital evidence and that the sentence imposed was lawful and proportionate, there remains no legal or factual foundation upon which the Appellant’s conviction or sentence can be disturbed. 22. **CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION.** 23. In light of the foregoing findings, this Court is satisfied that the appeal on both the convictions on counts II to VII and the corresponding sentences thereon is without merit. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed in its entirety, and both the convictions on all counts and the sentences imposed are hereby upheld. 24. This file is hereby closed. DELIVERED (virtually), SIGNED & DATED this 4th day of June, 2026. **JOE M. OMIDO** **JUDGE** APPELLANT: Present, virtually. FOR THE APPELLANT: **Mr. Onyiego.** FOR THE RESPONDENT: **Ms. Muema.** COURT ASSISTANT: **Mr. Juma.**