https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/6928

Mungatana v Standard Limited (Civil Case 1320 of 2005) [2026] KEHC 6928 (KLR) (Civ) (21 May 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 6928 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts) Civil Civil Case 1320 of 2005 JN Mulwa, J May 21, 2026 Between Hon Danson Mungatana Plaintiff and The Standard Limited Defendant Judgment 1.By a Plaint dated 02/11/2005, Hon. Danson Mungatana (hereafter the Plaintiff) sued The Standard (hereafter the Defendant) for alleged defamation and sought judgment against Defendant for-;a.General damages for libel;b.Exemplary damages;c.Punitive damages and Aggravated damages;d.Interest on (a), (b) and (c) above at Court’s rates;e.Costs of the suit;f.Any further and or other relief as the honorable Court may deem fit and appropriate to grant; 2.The Plaintiff averred that at all material time relevant to the suit, he is an Advocate of the High Court of Kenya, Member of Parliament (MP) for Garsen Constituency, the Assistant Minister Land and Housing and the founding member of an independent political pressure group known as the “Third Progressive Force (TPF)”. 3.That on 16/07/2005 the Defendant published statements and words in the “The Standard” newspaper, at page 11 following words and cartoon in the popular “Madd world” pull-out-;“Why is it that, after insulting Raila then being dumped by the Mafia “after use” Mungatana-types turn against the government they serve? Are Kenyans so thick” 4.It was further averred that beneath the said words was the caricature of a dog in a dust-bin barking at “two people” who had apparently dumped it there. The dog is depicted as uttering the words “Mkiona Hao Wanyama, Piga! Piga Kabisa” which amounts to a call to hurt or kill wild animals. 5.The Plaintiff continued to state that the scandalous, scurrilous and malicious allegations contained in the said publication made by the Defendant against himself were factually wrong and a gross misrepresentation of the truth, with the cartoon depiction of the Plaintiff as a dog, demeaning him, being derogatory, disparaging and libelous of his character and reputation, thus actionable per se. 6.By reasons of publication of the said words, cartoon and statement which were false, malicious, unwarranted meanwhile published out of malevolence, spite, malice and ill-will without regard to consequence, the Plaintiff was severely injured in his character, personal credit and reputation. As a consequence, he was gravely lowered in the estimation of right-thinking members of the society, his fellow MP’s, rank and file in government, constituents, friends and colleges in the legal fraternity therefore has been subjected to public ridicule, scandal, odium and contempt, to wit, damages are sought. 7.The Defendant filed a statement of defence dated 13/12/2005. Save for admitting to publication of the impugned article, denies the key averments in the plaint and or that the publication was defamatory. In the alternative, the Defendant averred that in so far as the words in the publications consist of opinions, they were fair comment on a matter of public interest, namely that the public has a right to know of any transactions involving parliamentarians and political leaders. 8.The suit proceeded to full hearing during which both parties called evidence in support of their statements and averments in their respective pleadings. Plaintiff’s Case and Evidence 9.Hon. Danson B. Mungatana, testified as PW1. He identified himself as the serving Senator of Tana River County and an Advocate of the High Court of Kenya thereafter adopting his witness statement dated 20/02/2025 as his evidence in chief meanwhile adduced into evidence the document appearing in his list of documents of even date as Pexh.1. The gist of his evidence was that the Defendant’s publication dated 16/07/2005 at Pg. 11 had a caricature, which depicted him in bad manner. 10.On cross-examination, he stated that at time of publication he was a Member of Parliament and regularly addressed political rallies as a passionate and astute politician, stating that at the time he belonged to a group called “Third Progressive Force (TPF)” alongside Koigi Wamwere and Kivutha Kibwana. He went on to state that he called for media scrutiny. He added that at the time, he had made a comment on stray elephants that were killing livestock and destroying homes, so the Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS) needed to intervene. He maintained that the issue of elephants was a common occurrence in the area and therefore a matter of public interest in the County of Tana River. 11.It was his evidence that the publication had a big following and that readers would laugh at people depicted therein as fools and stupid whereas being an Assistant Minister and Member of Parliament, he ought not to have appeared therein. That his appearance in the publication was an insult while at the time he was representing an entire Court and serving in the executive. 12.The Plaintiff further asserted that the publication was hurtful and despite asking the Defendant to apologize it failed to apologise. He confirmed that the publication did not include his photograph however it captured his name and depicted him as a dog and people knew him as the one depicted in the group. It was his evidence that Mungatana Types referred to more people however, he remained the reference point. 13.It was his testimony that if the publication was not ill intended or malicious, the Defendant ought to have apologized. He confirmed having sent a demand letter to the Defendant but did not include it in his bundle of documents. He equally acquiesced that politicians have reasonable exposure and scrutiny by the public and media, however stated that the article by the Defendant was abusive. 14.The plaintiff in further testimony stated that despite the publication he continued to hold his position and was later re-elected in 2007. He went on to state that after the publication, his reputation was damaged and as a consequence lost his influence. In summation, he pointed out that the media have a role to publicize but not to insult or be abusive. 15.In re-examination, the Plaintiff stated that the Defendant never sought any comments from him prior to publication. He repeated that his name was used in the publication, which in turn injured his reputation saying that the publication was equally brought to his attention in parliament whereas the Defendant was a big media house at the time. 16.Rosina Haoda Chadhoro, identifying herself as a resident of Tana Delta and businesswoman, She testified as PW2 meanwhile adopted her witness stated dated 20/02/2025 as her evidence in chief. The gist of her evidence was that she had known the Plaintiff for a long time and having read the impugned publication she was not happy about it, in that it did not portray the Plaintiff in a good picture as it put him in a dustbin. 17.On cross-examination, PW2 maintained that having seen the Plaintiff’s name in the publication the same was not good whereas despite the article containing cartoons of people it was insulting and not a joke. That the article was equally shocking and insulting as it depicted the Plaintiff as a dog put in a dustbin. She stated that after the publication he did not view the Plaintiff in a respectable manner and as a result did not vote for him during the 2007 elections. 18.In re-examination, she maintained that after reading and viewing the cartoon, she thought of the Plaintiff as not a serious person in life. Defendant’s Case and Evidence 19.Paul Kalembe testified as DW1. He began identifying himself as a professional cartoonist and social commentator working with the Defendant on contract to produce a weekly composite cartoon featuring the title “It’s a Madd Madd World” He proceeded to adopt his witness statement dated 08/10/2025 as his evidence in chief meanwhile adduced the documents appearing in the Defendant list of documents dated 14/10/2025 as Dexh.1. 20.The gist of his evidence per his adopted witness statement was that the feature publication formed part of his satirical commentary of Kenyan political conduct and public discourse at the time, that the words “Mungatana-types” was used figuratively and in a collective sense to refer to a general class of politicians and was not a direct personal attack on the Plaintiff, that the Kiswahili phrase used in the cartoon was drawn from words that the Plaintiff was reported in the electronic and print media to have uttered at a public meeting concerning stray elephants in his constituency. 21.Therefore, the Defendant’s reference to them was made as a commentary on an issue already in the public domain whereas the drawing of the dog was purely symbolic. He went on to state that in editorial art, animals are commonly used to depict human situations not physical resemblance, to wit, the cartoon was not intended to portray the Plaintiff’s likeness but to illustrate the concept of political rejection and shifting alliances. 22.DWI stated that the publication therefore constituted fair and honest comment made in good faith, without malice and on a matter of general public importance namely the conduct, utterances and loyalties of elected leaders. In conclusion, he stated that the use of the Plaintiff’s name in a figurative sense was consistent with accepted practice in editorial satire, which frequently uses public figures to illustrate broader themes. 23.On cross-examination, DW1 stated that he is a professional cartoonist with 33 years’ experience, and that the use of the Plaintiff’s name would attract an audience. He testified that the use of the words "it's a “MaddMadd World” was an illustration and not in reference to the Plaintiff. He maintained having used animals to illustrate stories or attach to statements, a normal practice in his trade. It was his evidence that at the time there was no social media and that he had not placed any evidence before Court to show that the Plaintiff had uttered words concerning stray elephants. 24.In re-examination, he iterated not having any evidence of the uttered words however noted that the Plaintiff confirmed uttering the words in question.At the close of the trial, directions were taken on filing of submissions. The parties duly complied with the said directions. Plaintiff’s Submissions 25.Counsel for the Plaintiff began his submissions by setting out a brief the history of the matter, meanwhile condensed his submissions into two (2) cogent issues., thus– On whether the publication made on 16/07/2005 was capable of being construed as defamatory, counsel cited Article 33 of the Constitution and the decisions in James v Ndirangu & 3 Others [2022] KECA 82 (KLR), Patani & another v Patani [2019] KECA 480 (KLR), Miguna Miguna v Standard Group Ltd & 4 Others [2017] eKLR and Swanya v Toyota East Africa Ltd & another [2009] KECA 379 (KLR) to submit that the impugned publication referred to the Plaintiff in name by portraying him negatively and contemptuously before members of the public. 26.It was further submitted that the publication was scandalous whereas the caricature portraying the Plaintiff as a dog was degrading with the intent to injure his reputation before right thinking members of society.While calling to aid the decision in Mathenge v Nation Media Group Ltd [2024] KEHC 12201 (KLR) counsel argued that applying the ‘objective test’, what is in issue is not the Defendant’s intention but what a reasonable reader would understand from the publication, arguing that the caricature and the words published alongside it depicted the Plaintiff negatively with the effect of damaging the latter’s reputation. Counsel went on to argue that publication was admitted by the Plaintiff whereas failure to seek any comment from the Plaintiff prior to publication amounted to evidence of malice and undermined journalistic fairness. That the Plaintiff being a politician and public servant at the time, had a reputation deserving of protection stating that the publication unlawfully injured his reputation. The decisions in City Hopper Limited v The Standard Limited [2018] KEHC 6310 (KLR), Onchieku v Kwayera & Another [2025] KECA 520 (KLR), Musikari Kombo v Royal Media Services Limited [2018] KECA 801 (KLR) and Chirau Ali Mwakwere v Nation Media Group Ltd & Another [2009] eKLR were cited in the above regard. 27.On the question of damage, counsel anchored his submissions on the decisions in Phinehas Nyagah v Gitobu Imanyara [2013] KEHC 6662 (KLR) and Johnson Evan Gicheru v Andrew Morton & Michael O’Mara Books Ltd [2005] 2 KLR 332 to posit that libel is actionable per se, to wit, damages are awardable at large without proof of actual loss. Further citing the decisions in Daniel Musinga t/a Musinga & Co. Advocates v National Nation Newspapers Ltd [2005] KEHC 3185 (KLR) and John v MGN Ltd [1997] QB 586 it was argued that in assessing damages the Court ought to consider the Plaintiff’s standing in society, the extent and mode of publication, whether an apology was offered, the conduct of the Defendant, the need for responsible exercise of media freedom and the gravity of the publication. Penultimately, the Court was urged to award Kshs. 20,000,000/- in general damages and Kshs. 10,000,000/- in exemplary damages with the decisions in Dr. Christopher Murungaru vs John Githongo in Nairobi HCCS no. 446 of 2006 and Henry Obwocha vs Headlink Publishers Limited [2014] being respectively called to aid. In conclusion the Court was urged to allow the suit and reliefs as lodged. Defendant’s Submissions 28.On the part of the Defendant, counsel equally condensed his submissions in two (2) salient issues. Submitting on whether the words and caricature thereto were defamatory in nature, counsel relied on the decisions in Joseph Njogu Kamunge v Charles Muriuki Gachari [2016] KEHC 5119 (KLR), SMW v ZWM [2015] eKLR, John Ward v Standard Limited [2006] eKLR, Attorney General & Samson Kwach vs Quassim Mukoya Kupuoni [2021] KEHC 6044 (KLR), Ngelechei v Sulunye [2023] KEHC 668 (KLR) Chirau Ali Mwakwere (supra) and Khaemba v Omondi & 2 others (Civil Suit E014 of 2021) [2025] KEHC 11913 (KLR) to posit that it was the Plaintiff’s burden to prove that the words complained of were defamatory in character, that they referred to the Plaintiff, and were maliciously published to third parties. 29.The defendant argued that malice is central to the ingredients of defamation whereas in the instant matter the Plaintiff failed to tender any evidence demonstrating that the Defendant knowingly published falsehoods or deliberately ignored the truth. Counsel went on to argue that the publication was grounded on a matter of public interest and contemporaneous political events thus was protected under qualified privilege and justification. That the publication further consisted of political commentary, to wit, the use of the word “Mungatana-types” is a generalized and descriptive expression incapable of precise attribution to the Plaintiff as an individual. 30.It was submitted that the publication employs exaggeration and satire, which are well-recognized tools of political expression, to wit, a reasonable reader would not construe the caricature as a literal call to violence, but as a visual metaphor commenting on a public statement previously attributed to the Plaintiff in the context of human–wildlife conflict. Therefore, the Plaintiff has not satisfied the ingredients to sufficiently prove that the words complained of were defamatory. 31.On whether the Plaintiff is entitled to compensation, counsel relied on the decision in J P Machira t/a Machira & Co. Advocates v East African Standard Ltd [2001] eKLR to posit that the Plaintiff tendered no evidence of loss of office, loss of political standing, social exclusion, or financial loss attributable to the impugned publication and in the absence of such evidence, the damages sought are unsupported, speculative, and contrary to the principles of justice and fairness. As concerns the award of exemplary and aggravated damages, it was submitted that the same is only awarded in exceptional circumstances such as oppression and arbitrary conduct whereas the Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate either. In summation the Court was urged to dismiss the Plaintiff suit with costs. Analysis and Determination 32.The Court has carefully considered the respective parties’ pleadings, the evidence adduced by respective witness, and the parties' written submissions as well as authorities relied in support thereof and deductively crystallizes the following issues for determination-:a.Whether the Plaintiff has made out a case for defamation against the Defendant;b.Whether the defence of fair comment on a matter of public interest is available to the Defendant; andc.Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to an award of damages, and if so, the quantum. Whether the Plaintiff has made out a case for defamation against the Defendant and whether the defence of fair comment on a matter of public interest is available to the Defendant? 33.Pertinent to the determination of the said issues at fore, are the pleadings, which form the basis of the respective parties’ case before this Court. See-; Wareham t/a A.F. Wareham & 2 Others v Kenya Post Office Savings Bank [2004] 2 KLR 91. Akin to pleadings is evidence in support of the pleadings. 34.Further, the applicable law as to the burden of proof is found in Section 107, 108 and 109 of the Evidence Act. In Karugi & Another v Kabiya & 3 Others (1987) KLR 347 the Court of Appeal stated that-:“[T]he burden on a plaintiff to prove his case remains the same throughout the case even though that burden may become easier to discharge where the matter is not validly defended and that the burden of proof is in no way lessened because the case is heard by way of formal proof….The plaintiff must adduce evidence which, in the absence of rebuttal evidence by the defendant convinces the court that on a balance of probabilities it proves the claim.” 35.That said, in so far as the tort of defamation is concerned, the rationale behind the law of defamation was spelt out by the Court of Appeal in Musikari Kombo v Royal Media Services Limited [2018] KECA 801 (KLR), wherein it was stated that;“The law of defamation is concerned with the protection of a person’s reputation. Patrick O'Callaghan in the Common Law Series: The Law of Tort at paragraph 25.1 expressed himself in the following manner:“The law of defamation, or, more accurately, the law of libel and slander, is concerned with the protection of reputation: 'As a general rule, English law gives effect to the ninth commandment that a man shall not speak evil falsely of his neighbour. It supplies a temporary sanction …’Defamation protects a person's reputation that is the estimation in which he is held by others; it does not protect a person's opinion of himself nor his character. The law recognizes in every man a right to have the estimation in which he stands in the opinion of others unaffected by false statements to his discredit' and it affords redress against those who speak such defamatory falsehoods…” (emphasis added) 36.Meanwhile, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition at Pg. 479 defamation is defined as:“The act of harming the reputation of another by making a false statement to a third person.”When it concerns the tort of defamation, there exists competition between the private and public interest. However, it warrants noting that the Plaintiff’s cause of action arose during the auspices of the repealed constitution. That said, the current constitutional dispensation at Article 33(1) guarantees the freedom of expression by way of seeking, receiving or imparting information. Corollary of the forestated, is sub-Article (3) which provides that in exercise of the right of freedom of expression, every person shall respect the rights and reputation of others. 37.Considering the above competing rights Lord Denning MR stated in English Case of Fraser v Evans & Others [1969] 1 ALL ER 8; -“The right of speech is one which it is for the public interest that individuals should possess, and indeed, that they should exercise it without impediment, so long as no wrongful act is done; and unless an alleged libel is untrue, there is no wrong committed.” 38.The Court of Appeal in the case of Swanya v Toyota East Africa Ltd & another [2009] KECA 379 (KLR) rendered that in a suit founded on defamation the plaintiff must prove the following elements -:i.That the matter of which the plaintiff complains is defamatory in character.ii.That defamatory statement or utterance was published by the defendants. Publication in the sense of defamation means that the defamatory statement was communicated to someone other than the person defamed.iii.That it was published maliciously.iv.In slander, subject to certain exceptions, the plaintiff has suffered special damage. 39.Later, the Court of Appeal in Patani & another v Patani [2019] KECA 480 (KLR) while addressing itself to the purport of the law of defamation stated that: -“In rehashing, we note the ingredients of defamation were summarized in the case of John Ward v Standard Ltd. HCC 1062 of 2005 as follows:i.The statement must be defamatory.ii.The statement must refer to the plaintiff.iii.The statement must be published by the defendant.iv.The statement must be false.” 40.It is trite that the ingredients set out in Selina Patani (supra) are sequential hurdles, to wit, all must successively be met in order for one to succeed on a claim premised on defamation. In this case, ingredient (ii) & (iii) above have not been contested, as the Defendant readily admits to publishing the words in question in its’ statement of defence. The two (2) questions in dispute and to be considered contemporaneously are whether the publications were defamatory and or false. Alongside the above, the Court will equally consider the defence of fair comment advanced by the Defendant. 41.At the risk of repetition, it is not in dispute that the Defendant published in its newspaper “The Saturday Standard” a publication which constituted a caricature that mentioned the Plaintiff’s name. Further, by PW1’s evidence, it is not in contention that at the time he was serving as a member of parliament and as an Assistant Minister meanwhile was and is an Advocate of the High Court of Kenya. 42.The gist of the impugned publication was captured earlier in this judgment. It does not require restatement at this juncture. However, what this Court garners to be the Plaintiff’s case is that the impugned publication tacitly by innuendo referred -; that the Plaintiff has been insulting the late Raila Odinga at the behest of political group identified as the “mafia”; the Plaintiff associates with criminals and or crime politicians; the Plaintiff is not loyal to the government in which he serves; the Plaintiff turned and or revolted as against the government after being used and dumped by a political group described as “the mafia”; the Plaintiff is bad and unprincipled leader who practices politics in a despicable manner of a dog; and that the Plaintiff has committed or is guilty of the offence of incitement to violence and disobedience to the law, among others. 43.The publication employed varied choices of words and phrases starting with the title that captioned “Displaced Anger”. The publication further went on to state in part that “why is it that after insulting Raila”,....“then being dumped by the mafia ‘after use Mungatana types turn against the government they serve?’”,. The publication in the form of a caricature, depicts a dog in a trash bin labeled “Elephants” uttering the words “mkiona hao wanyama piga piga kabisa” while also capturing the said dog barking using the words “Woof!… Woof!!” 44.The Defendant through DW1 was of the position that the use of the words “Mungatana-types” was used figuratively and in a collective sense to refer to a general class of politicians. Further that the words depicted in the cartoon, as attributed to the dog, was in reference to public utterance by the Plaintiff concerning stray elephants in his constituency. Therefore other than being satirical commentary, the publication concerned an issue that was already in the public domain with the dog being symbolic. 45.My understanding of the publication as particularly relates to the Plaintiff’s name is that the Defendant in an attempt to publish satirical commentary on happenings within the Plaintif+’fs country and with particular reference to the Plaintiff, appears to portray the fact that the Plaintiff had a reputation of undertaking the bidding of faceless groups of person(s) considered to be of mafia inclination within government. I equally garner from the publication that the faceless mafia-like organization within government used the Plaintiff and like persons to insult the late Raila, and upon being disregarded by the said mafia, the Plaintiff and like persons would turn against the government they had previously been serving. 46.PW1 though confirming that he had made public utterance concerning stray elephants within his constituency, he qualified that his statement was directed to Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS), to intervene in the situation. 47.Concerning defamation, this Court draws guidance from the applicable test on defamation as spelt out in Onama v Uganda Argus Ltd (1969) EA by the East African Court of Appeal, that-:“In deciding whether the words are defamatory, the test is what the words could reasonably be regarded as meaning, not only to the general public, but also to all those “who have a greater or special knowledge of the subject matter” (Emphasis added). 48.By its pleadings, the Defendant’s stance is that the words and in the natural or ordinary meaning or otherwise consisted of a fair comment upon facts which were matters of public interest. While, DW1 attempted to make a case that the utterance depicted in the publication were in reference to a public statement by the Plaintiff, the said statement was not evinced before the Court. 49.PW2 on her part, as I gather, was of the position, upon reading the said publication she was not happy about the same and in her estimation, it did not portray the Plaintiff in good light having depicted the Plaintiff as a dog in a dustbin. The gist of her evidence as I understand it, was that the publication was insulting and or demeaning of the Plaintiff and not a joke, as intended of satirical commentary. After the publication she did not view the Plaintiff in a respectable manner and as a result did not vote for the Plaintiff. 50.As concerns the defence of fair comment on a matter of public interest, the Court of Appeal in Mshindi & another v Ngenye [2024] KECA 1332 (KLR), referenced the decision emanating from the Supreme Court of Canada in Wilradeolia v Simpson (2008) SCC 40 wherein the Court succinctly set out the requirements for a statement to be regarded as fair comment, as follows, that-;“39.……..:“a.The comment must be on a matter of public interest.a.The comment must be based on fact.b.The comment though it can include inferences of fact must be recognizable as a comment.c.The comment must satisfy the following objective test: could any person honestly express that the opinion on the proved facts?d.Even though the comment satisfies the objective test, the defence can be deflated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant was actuated by express malice…….”The defence of fair comment will therefore, avail where comments are made and not statements of fact. The comments so made must be on matters that are of public interest and the facts upon which the comments are based must be true, or substantially true. 51.Subsequently, Gatembu JA in Munene v Gisesa & another [2025] KECA 2115 (KLR) while addressing himself to the defence of fair comment, cited the Supreme Court of England decision of Spiller vs. Joseph [2010] UKSC 53; [2011] 1 A.C.852 where it was observed that-;“6 …the elements that a person relying on the defence of fair comment needs to establish thus:-- the comment must be on a matter of public interest; the comment must be recognizable as comment, as distinct from an imputation of fact; the comment must be based on facts which are true or protected by privilege; the comment must explicitly or implicitly indicate, at least in general terms, the facts on which it is based; and the comment must be one which could have been made by an honest person, however prejudiced he might be, and however exaggerated or obstinate his views. 52.Applying my mind to the above dicta, I do hold the position that satirical commentary in newspaper publication is protected by dint of Article 33(1) of the Constitution and has a place generally in society to convey, humorously the happenings within society. Nevertheless, despite the same being protected, it must be remembered the intent of satirical commentary would be that a “reasonable reader” would understand it as humor rather than a statement of actual fact. It is also pertinent to state that satirical commentary often relies on irony and some form of exaggeration to convey a point whereas the same would be considered defamatory if it is mistaken for a factual assertion that would in the end harm the reputation and object of the commentary . 53.Here, while there appears to have been some irony and or exaggeration in the publication therein, the holistic context of the publication was that the Plaintiff and like persons while in government, undertake the bidding of faceless mafia like groups and latter turn on the same in the event they are released and relieved of their service by the government they serve. The publication though intertwined with public utterance by the Plaintiff appears to advance, as fact, and cast aspersions as to the Plaintiff’s character which in my view would be defamatory. 54.It necessitates emphasis that the test to be applied in defamation is that of the reasonable ordinary man and that it does not concern itself with the Plaintiff’s view of himself nor his character, as stated in Musikari Kombo (supra). While the Defendant attempted to advance the defence of fair comment, the Court is not convinced of the reasons, earlier advanced. Applying itself to the rendition in Wilradeolia (supra) and Spiller (supra), I am inclined to agree that the imputation created by the publication was that the Plaintiff associates with a syndicate of despicable politicians and or that he is a bad and unprincipled leader who practices politics in a despicable manner, which position was fortified by evidence from PW2. 55.Thus, reviewing the material on record, this Court is of the view that the language used in the publication, especially regarding the use of the words and phrases earlier set out herein in reference to the Plaintiff appears to exceed the realms of satirical commentary. And compounded by the falsity of the publication, it can be stated that the Defendant’s actions were clearly reckless and malicious in so far as the publication falsely imputed against the Plaintiff serious and or criminal conduct that ordinarily would in some instances invite penal sanctions. 56.In the end, and in view of the foregoing, the Court justifiably believes that the Plaintiff’s grievance is merited and that the impugned publication was indeed defamatory of and concerning the Plaintiff. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to an award of damages and if so, the quantum? 57.It is well settled that an award of damages is a matter of judicial discretion. In C A M v Royal Media Services Limited [2013] KECA 178 (KLR), the Court of Appeal stated that:-“No case is like the other. In the exercise of discretion to award damages for defamation, the court has wide latitude. The factors for consideration in the exercise of that discretion as enumerated in many decisions including the guidelines in Jones v Pollard (1997) EMLR 233-243 include objective features of the libel itself, such as its gravity, its province, the circulation of the medium in which it is published and any repetition; subjective effect on the Plaintiff’s feelings not only from the prominence itself but from the Defendant’s conduct thereafter both up to and including the trial itself; matters tending to mitigate damages for example, publication of an apology; matters tending to reduce damages; vindication of the Plaintiff’s reputation past and future.” 58.In the case of Joseph Njogu Kamunge v Charles Muriuki Gachari [2016] eKLR, Mativo J. (as he then was) cited the case of John v MG Ltd (1996) 1 ALL E.R. the English Court of Appeal held: -“The successful plaintiff in a defamation action is entitled to recover, the general compensatory damages such sum as will compensate him for the wrong he has suffered. That must compensate him for damages to his reputation, vindicate his name, and taken account of the distress, hurt and humiliation which the defamatory publication caused...Exemplary damages on the other hand had gone beyond compensation and are meant to “punish” the defendant. Aggravated damages will be ordered against a defendant who acts out of improper motive e.g. where it is attracted by malice; insistence on a flurry defence of justification or failure to apologize.” 59.Here, it is not in doubt that the publication touched on the Plaintiff’s integrity, honour and reputation by demeaning him before right thinking members of the society, going by PW2’s evidence. Further, the impugned publication potentially had the effect of wide reach among readers of the “Standard”. It would equally seem that the Defendant has to date not retracted the publication or tendered an apology to the Plaintiff yet the imputation created by the article must have affected the Plaintiff’s reputation nevertheless. 60.As earlier noted in this judgment, the Plaintiff urged the Court to award Kshs. 20,000,000/- in general damages and Kshs. 10,000,000/- in exemplary damages. The Defendant failed to address the Court on the above.That said, in Nation Media Group v Chiguzo [2022] KECA 765 (KLR), the Court of Appeal cited with approval the decision in Nation Newspapers Limited vs. Daniel Musinga T/A Musinga & Co Advocates Civil Appeal No. 120 of 2008, wherein the Court appreciated that while all people are equal before the law, injury suffered in the case of defamation is not the same for all persons and “the status of a particular person affects the extent of the injury suffered.” 61.It went on to quote the English case of John vs. MGM LTD (1997) QB 586 wherein it was stated that-“In assessing damages for injury to reputation, the most important factor is the gravity of the libel; the more closely it touches the Plaintiff’s personal integrity, professional reputation, honour, courage, loyalty and the core attributes of his personality the more serious it is likely to be. The extent of publication is also very relevant: a libel published to millions has a greater potential to cause damage than a libel published to a handful of people.” 62.Here, it is not in dispute that at the time the Plaintiff was an Advocate of the High Court of Kenya, Member of Parliament (MP) for Garsen Constituency, and the Assistant Minister, Land and Housing. Therefore, taking guidance from decisions in Musikari Kombo v Royal Media Services Limited [2018] KECA 801 (KLR) – wherein the claimant (a member of the National Assembly) was awarded Kshs. 5,000,000/-, Agnes Zani v Standard Group Limited [2019] KECA 66 (KLR) - wherein the claimant (a Senator) was awarded Kshs. 5,000,000/- and Ongwen & 5 others v Omollo & 6 others [2023] KECA 1444 (KLR) - wherein the claimant (a Judge) was awarded Kshs. 6,000,000/-, the Court believes that an award of Kshs. 3,000,000/- is justified in the circumstance. 63.On exemplary damages, in the case of Mansion V Associated Newspapers LTD (1965) 2 ALL ER 954 at 957 the English court stated that exemplary damages may be awarded: -“In a case in which a newspaper quite deliberately published a statement which it either knows to be false or which it publishes recklessly, carelessly, whether it be true or false.” 64.Here given the gravitas of the contents of the publication and its implication thereof and the resultant injury to the Plaintiff’s reputation, the latter is entitled to exemplary damages assessed at Kshs. 200,000/- (Two Hundred thousand/-). Having awarded exemplary damages, the Court will decline to award aggravated and punitive damages, there being no basis laid to warrant such an award, as humiliation, distress, injury to reputation, insult, outrage or malice of the publication, that would be the purport of an award of aggravated damages, in my view, has been sufficiently compensated in the earlier award of general damages. Final Disposition 65.The Court finds and holds the Defendant liable for the tort of defamation and enters judgment in favour of the Plaintiff as hereunder -:a.General damages Kshs. 3,000,000/-b.Exemplary damages Kshs. 200,000/-Total Kshs. 3,200,000/-The above amount shall attract interest at Court rates from the date of this judgment until full settlement. 66.Finally, on costs, applying my mind to the provision of Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, I award costs of the suit in favour of the Plaintiff to be borne by the Defendant.Orders accordingly. DELIVERED DATED AND SIGNED AT NAIROBI THIS 21ST DAY OF MAY 2026.JANET MULWA.JUDGE