PKT v JMK (Appeal E160 of 2024) [2026] KEHC 4939 (KLR) (Family) (17 April 2026) (Judgment)

PKT v JMK (Appeal E160 of 2024) [2026] KEHC 4939 (KLR) (Family) (17 April 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 4939 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts) Family Appeal E160 of 2024 H Namisi, J April 17, 2026 Between Hon PKT Appellant and JKM Respondent (Being an Appeal from the entire Ruling and Order made by Hon. Elizabeth Muiru, Principal Magistrate on 15 November 2024 at Nairobi Children’s Court Case No. 1220 of 2017) Judgment 1.The appellate jurisdiction of this Court is invoked to determine a multifaceted dispute emanating from the subordinate Children's Court. The appeal challenges the Ruling and Order delivered on 15 November 2024 by Hon. Elizabeth Muiru (PM) in Milimani Magistrates Court Children's Case No. 1220 of 2017. The core of the controversy lies at the intersection of family law, the strictures of civil procedure, and the jurisdictional boundaries of the Children's Court, specifically addressing the enforcement of child maintenance arrears after the subject of the maintenance order has attained the statutory age of majority. 2.The factual antecedents of this matter trace back to 2017 when the Respondent instituted proceedings on behalf of the minor, G.P., against the Appellant. The primary suit sought declarations of parental responsibility, legal custody, and child maintenance. The minor was born on 12 May 2003. 3.During the pendency of the suit, the trial court issued interim maintenance orders on 26 April 2018. These interlocutory orders directed the Appellant to provide school fees, transport, and related expenses for the minor. Following a full hearing on the merits, the trial court delivered a final judgment on 15 March 2019. The judgment granted joint legal custody to both parents, awarded actual custody to the Respondent, and directed the Appellant to pay school fees quantified at Kshs. 50,000/= per term, alongside other specific medical and upkeep contributions. 4.The immediate catalyst for the present appellate proceedings is an Application and a Notice to Show Cause (NTSC) filed by the Respondent on 5 September 2024 and 13 September 2024, respectively. Through these execution proceedings, the Respondent sought to recover alleged maintenance arrears amounting to Kshs. 2,575,206/=, which she averred had accumulated due to the Appellant's non-compliance with the court's directives. Notably, by the time these execution proceedings were initiated, the minor was 21 years old, having reached the statutory age of majority on 12 May 2021. 5.The Appellant opposed the execution proceedings by filing a Notice of Preliminary Objection on 1 October 2024. The Preliminary Objection challenged the jurisdiction of the Children's Court over an adult subject, contested the legal standing of the Respondent's Advocates, Lestins & Smith Advocates, for failing to comply with Order 9 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules, and argued that the interim orders sought to be enforced had lapsed upon the delivery of the final judgment and were, therefore, res judicata. 6.On 15 November 2024, the trial court dismissed the Preliminary Objection in its entirety. In assuming jurisdiction, the trial magistrate invoked section 35(1) of the Children Act suo motu, a provision governing the extension of parental responsibility beyond the age of 18. Furthermore, the trial court excused the procedural breach of Order 9 Rule 9 by citing the best interests of the child principle. 7.Aggrieved by this determination, the Appellant lodged the instant appeal. The Appellant's Memorandum of Appeal, dated 21 November 2024, delineates 8 specific grounds of appeal. The Appellant contends that the trial magistrate erred in law and fact by:i.Assuming jurisdiction as a Children's Court in a matter where the subject had attained the age of majority.ii.Misdirecting herself in misapplying the provisions of section 35(1) of the Children Act and incorrectly concluding that the dispute pertained to the extension of parental responsibility, despite no application for such an extension having been brought before her.iii.Allowing the firm of Lestins & Smith Advocates to represent the Respondent despite failing to comply with Order 9 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010.iv.Excusing the non-compliance with mandatory procedural rules on account of the best interest of the child principle, despite finding that there was no child before the court.v.Allowing execution to proceed despite the Respondent's failure to extract and serve a decree as mandated by Order 22 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010.vi.Permitting the execution of interim orders despite those orders having lapsed following the delivery of the final judgment.vii.Failing to regard the Appellant's submissions and authorities, thereby arriving at an erroneous determination.viii.Finding that the Appellant's Preliminary Objection was not merited. 8.This Court has carefully reviewed the Memorandum of Appeal, the trial court's record, and the extensive submissions filed by the respective parties. For clarity and coherence, the Court synthesizes the eight grounds of appeal into four overarching issues for judicial determination:i.The Anatomy and Validity of the Preliminary Objection;ii.Procedural Propriety and Locus Standi (Order 9 Rule 9);iii.The Jurisdictional Scope of the Children's Court Post-Majority;iv.The Application of section 35 of the Children Act; The Preliminary Objection 9.Before delving into the substantive merits of the jurisdictional and procedural challenges, it is an absolute necessity to address the jurisprudential foundation of the Preliminary Objection itself. In the trial court proceedings, the Respondent filed Grounds of Opposition asserting that the issues raised by the Appellant were points of fact requiring evidentiary probing, and were therefore incapable of being handled as a Preliminary Objection. The trial court, in its impugned ruling, appears to have treated the Preliminary Objection as lacking the requisite purity of law. 10.The parameters of a valid Preliminary Objection are deeply entrenched and unequivocally settled. The locus classicus remains the celebrated East African Court of Appeal decision in Mukisa Biscuits Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd E.A 696. In that case, Law, J.A. enunciated the foundational rule that a preliminary objection consists of a pure point of law which has been pleaded, or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings, and which, if argued as a preliminary objection, may dispose of the suit. Sir Charles Newbold, in his concurring opinion in the same matter, further clarified that a preliminary objection cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion. 11.This unyielding position was recently reaffirmed and expanded upon by the Supreme Court in Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission v Jane Cheperenger & 2 Others eKLR. The Court explicitly delineated the anatomy of a preliminary objection, stating that it must be founded upon a "settled and crisp point of law, to the intent that its application to undisputed facts, leads to but one conclusion: that the facts were incompatible with that point of law". The Court further warned against the improper use of preliminary objections as a sword rather than a shield against the profligate deployment of judicial time. 12.Applying these stringent principles to the instant appeal, this Court must examine the architecture of the Appellant's Preliminary Objection in the trial court. The objection rested on three main pillars: lack of jurisdiction due to the subject's age under section 91(5) of the Children Act, a statutory bar under the doctrine of res judicata (Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act), and a lack of locus standi due to non-compliance with Order 9 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules. 13.The question of whether a court possesses jurisdiction is quintessentially a pure point of law. As articulated by the Supreme Court in Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 others KESC 8 (KLR), jurisdiction flows from either the Constitution or legislation. The Court emphasized that the issue of whether a court has jurisdiction is not a mere procedural technicality; it goes to the very heart of the matter, for without jurisdiction, the court cannot entertain any proceedings. This principle traces its lineage to the celebrated pronouncement by Nyarangi, J.A. in Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lillian S" vs. Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd eKLR, where it was held that "Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to make one more step". In Virginia Wamuhu Kamiti & another v Lydiah Nyambura Mahinda & 5 others (2022) eKLR, the Court unequivocally held that the question of jurisdiction is dispositive in nature, does not require probing evidence, and is, therefore, properly raised as a Preliminary Objection. 14.Similarly, the doctrine of res judicata and the statutory rules governing the change of Advocates post-judgment require the application of statutory interpretation to the undisputed record of the Court. The fact that the minor was born in 2003, the fact that final judgment was delivered in 2019, and the fact that Lestins & Smith Advocates did not file a consent or obtain leave, are all matters of the official court record. They remain entirely undisputed by the parties. 15.In Super Drill International Limited v Sidian Bank Limited [2021] eKLR, the Court held that an argument premised on section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act is a point of law advanced on the assumption that facts as pleaded are correct. The Court noted that issues touching on law need not be ascertained by evidence as the law speaks for itself. Furthermore, Re Estate of Nchogu Sagana (Deceased) eKLR solidifies that res judicata applies not only to substantive suits but equally to interlocutory applications within a suit, making it a valid ground for a preliminary objection. 16.Therefore, the trial Magistrate was entirely misdirected in failing to recognize the profound legal weight of the Appellant's Preliminary Objection. The issues raised were crisp points of law applied to undisputed facts, possessing the absolute potential to dispose of the execution proceedings with finality without the need for any additional evidentiary ascertainment. The trial court's failure to uphold the Preliminary Objection on these grounds constitutes a reversible error of law. Procedural Propriety and Locus Standi 17.The second issue crystallizes around the strictures of Order 9 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules, and the persistent tension between mandatory procedural compliance and the constitutional imperative of substantive justice envisioned under Article 159(2)(d) of The Constitution. 18.The official record unequivocally indicates that the Respondent was represented by the firm of Omenta & Company Advocates from the inception of the suit in 2017, through the delivery of the final judgment in March 2019, and during subsequent execution attempts in June 2019. However, the Application and Notice to Show Cause filed in September 2024 were drawn, filed, and prosecuted by an entirely new firm, Lestins & Smith Advocates. It is a matter of undisputed fact that this new firm neither filed a consent from the outgoing Advocates nor obtained leave of the court to come on record post-judgment. 19.The regulatory framework is unambiguous. Order 9 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules explicitly mandates:When there is a change of advocate, or when a party decides to act in person having previously engaged an advocate, after judgment has been passed, such change or intention to act in person shall not be effected without an order of the court—(a)upon an application with notice to all the parties; or(b)upon a consent filed between the outgoing advocate and the proposed incoming advocate or party intending to act in person as the case may be. 20.The rationale underpinning this rule is not merely to create an arbitrary bureaucratic hurdle, but rather to safeguard the integrity, orderliness, and predictability of the post-judgment process. The essence of Order 9 Rule 9 is to protect Advocates from mischievous clients who might wait until judgment is delivered to sack the Advocate and replace them, thereby evading fee obligations or creating chaos in the execution phase. Furthermore, the rule ensures that the opposing party and the court have absolute certainty regarding who possesses the lawful mandate to receive service, negotiate post-judgment settlements, or execute decrees. 21.The Respondent, in the trial court, attempted to cure this glaring procedural defect by relying on Article 159(2)(d) of The Constitution, which obliges courts to administer justice without undue regard to procedural technicalities. The Respondent further invoked the best interests of the child principle to urge the court to overlook the procedural misstep. The trial Magistrate accepted this argument hook, line, and sinker, effectively excusing the non-compliance and validating the proceedings. 22.This Court finds that the trial Magistrate erred fundamentally in law in this regard. While Article 159(2)(d) is a transformative constitutional provision designed to prevent justice from being suffocated by archaic procedural rigidity, it is not a panacea for all procedural infractions, nor is it a license to ignore the law. The jurisprudence of the superior courts reveals a consistent and unyielding reluctance to elevate Article 159(2)(d) to a status that annihilates mandatory procedural rules designed to confer locus standi. 23.In James Ndonyu Njogu v Muriuki Macharia eKLR, the Court decisively held that the procedure set out under Order 9 Rule 9 is mandatory and cannot be termed a mere technicality. The Court emphasized that a firm that fails to follow this procedure is not properly on record, lacks legal standing to move the court, and all pleadings filed by it are incurably defective and ought to be struck out. Similarly, in Peter Kamau Ngugi & Another V Grace Akinyi Oloo & Another [2021] eKLR, the Court struck out an application and a Replying Affidavit precisely because the Advocates had failed to seek leave to come on record post-judgment. 24.Recent jurisprudence reinforces this strict compliance. In Oguku v Gumo [2025] KEELC 8270 (KLR), the Court ruled that ignorance of the law regarding post-judgment representation is no defence, and a law firm filing without locus standi renders the application invalid. The Court firmly held that granting leave to come on record cannot apply retrospectively to cure the non-compliance. 25.The Respondent's reliance on the case of CKK v CMM eKLR is highly distinguishable and factually inapplicable to the present case. In that matter, the Court overlooked the Order 9 Rule 9 breach specifically because it was dealing with the immediate physical custody, access, and daily upkeep of a child of extremely tender years, a 5-year-old. In such unique circumstances, the overriding public policy necessity to protect a vulnerable minor under Article 53(2) of The Constitution justified a flexible approach to procedure. 26.In stark contrast, the present case does not involve a child in immediate peril, nor does it involve a minor requiring urgent custody interventions. The subject of these proceedings is an adult aged twenty-one. The proceedings are strictly for the recovery of a liquidated monetary sum—a civil debt. The invocation of the best interests of the child to bypass mandatory civil procedure rules when the subject is no longer a child, and when the issue is purely financial execution, is a gross misdirection of law. As noted by the Appellant, the trial court excused the non-compliance on account of the best interest of the child principle, despite the court having objectively found that there was no child before it to warrant such leniency. 27.The failure of Lestins & Smith Advocates to obtain leave or file a consent before initiating execution proceedings in September 2024 was fatal to their application. The firm lacked the requisite locus standi to move the Children's Court. The trial Magistrate's reliance on the best interests of the child to excuse a fundamental breach of civil procedure in a debt recovery matter involving an adult was legally untenable and contrary to established precedent. On this ground alone, the execution proceedings were incompetent, null, and void ab initio, and ought to have been struck out. The Jurisdictional Scope of the Children's Court Post-Majority 28.The most consequential and jurisprudentially complex issue in this appeal concerns the temporal jurisdiction of the Children's Court, and the legal mechanics of enforcing child maintenance arrears once the subject of the order attains the age of majority. 29.The Appellant vehemently argues that because the minor turned 18 on 12 May 2021, the Children's Court completely and automatically lost jurisdiction over any matters relating to her by operation of section 91(5) of the Children Act. Conversely, the Respondent contends that the Children's Court retains jurisdiction to enforce its own validly issued decrees regarding arrears that accrued during the period of minority. 30.To untangle this jurisdictional knot, the Court must distinguish between two entirely separate legal concepts: (a) a fresh application seeking new maintenance orders for an adult, and (b) the execution of a decree for arrears that crystallized into a civil debt while the subject was still a minor. 31.Section 91(5) of the Children Act states:Where, in the course of any proceedings in a children’s Court, it appears to the Court that the person charged, or to whom the proceedings relate, is above the age of eighteen years, the Court shall transfer the proceedings to a Court other than a children’s Court to conduct the proceedings under any other relevant law 32.If interpreted literally and in total isolation, this section implies an absolute guillotine on the Children's Court's jurisdiction the moment the clock strikes midnight on a child's eighteenth birthday. However, statutory interpretation in family law demands a purposive and holistic approach that harmonizes the entire statute, ensuring that the legislative intent of securing child welfare is not defeated by rigid technicalities. 33.Section 121 of the Children Act specifically and comprehensively addresses the enforcement of maintenance orders. It provides that any person, including a child in whose favour a maintenance order has been made, may apply to the Court for the enforcement of the order and the recovery of any sums due and payable thereunder if the person against whom the order was made defaults. The law empowers the court with wide-ranging execution tools, permitting it to order that arrears be paid in lumpsum or instalments, issue warrants for distress on property, attach earnings, or even commit the persistent defaulter to civil jail. 34.The critical legal principle to establish here is that child maintenance arrears do not evaporate into the legal ether simply because the child attains the age of majority. Arrears represent a crystallized civil debt owed either to the custodial parent who bore the financial burden unilaterally during the period of default, or to the adult child themselves. A debtor's liability to pay an outstanding maintenance debt remains enforceable, subject only to specific prescription or limitation laws. 35.The Court has directly grappled with the question of which Court possesses the proper jurisdiction to enforce these arrears post-majority. In the highly persuasive case of MW v EBM [2022] KEHC 9983 (KLR) the Court dealt with a scenario where an applicant sought to commit a respondent to civil jail for non-payment of maintenance arrears. The Court explicitly ruled that it lacked primary jurisdiction to enforce maintenance orders originally issued by the Children's Court or to investigate arrears under the Children Act. The Court directed the parties to return to the Children's Court for the resolution of arrears and compliance issues, firmly establishing that the Children's Court retains residual, executionary jurisdiction to enforce its own decrees, regardless of the subsequent aging of the child. 36.Similarly, in the consolidated appeal of PNK & another v AWW (Civil Appeal E227 & E229 of 2021) KEHC 8928 (KLR), the Court reviewed a Children's Court order that directed the payment of Kshs 560,000/= in arrears. The appellate court emphasized the necessity of proper financial assessment to establish the apportionment of responsibility for arrears, affirming that the machinery for such execution and assessment remains squarely within the originating Children's Court. Furthermore, in CSM v SKG (Family Appeal E014 of 2024) [2025] KEHC 16081 (KLR), the appellate court upheld a trial court's determination dismissing an application for Kshs 210,000/= in maintenance arrears, demonstrating that the trial courts routinely and properly handle post-judgment arrears disputes. 37.Therefore, the Appellant's argument that the Children's Court automatically loses all jurisdiction to execute an existing decree for accrued arrears upon the subject's eighteenth birthday is legally flawed. The Children's Court remains the appropriate and legally competent forum to execute decrees it issued regarding financial obligations that fell due during the period of minority. The trial Magistrate was correct in assuming that her court could, in theory, hear an execution application for arrears. The Misapplication of Section 35 of the Children Act 38.While the Children's Court possessed the theoretical residual jurisdiction to entertain an execution application for past arrears, the trial Magistrate committed a grave and reversible error of law in the manner she assumed and justified this jurisdiction. 39.Faced with the Appellant's Preliminary Objection regarding the age of majority, the trial Magistrate did not rely on the court's inherent power to execute its own decrees under section 121 of the Children Act or Order 22 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Instead, in a highly irregular move, the Magistrate invoked section 35(1) of the Children Act suo motu to justify the assumption of jurisdiction, operating on the erroneous premise that the dispute pertained to the extension of parental responsibility. 40.Section 35(1) of the Act provides:Parental responsibility in respect of a child may be extended by an order of the Court after the date on which the child attains the age of eighteen years if the Court is satisfied, either of its own motion or on application by any person, that special circumstances exist with regard to the welfare of the child that would necessitate the making of such extension. 41.Subsection (2) details that these special circumstances include cases where the child requires extended responsibility due to special needs arising from severe disability or developmental disorder. The Court has progressively, and rightly, expanded this definition to include ongoing higher education. In EMK alias A v SSS KEHC 154 (KLR), the Court recognized that an adult child pursuing a university education constitutes a special circumstance warranting the extension of parental responsibility under the Act. Similarly, in CM vs SWA (Civil Appeal No. 21 of 2018), the court affirmed that the provision of tertiary education can justify continuing maintenance beyond age eighteen. The Supreme Court, in Mutheu Agatha Khimulu v Raheem Mehdi Aziz Azad & 4 others (Petition No. E003 of 2022), further affirmed that parental duties are ongoing commitments, and the child's welfare remains the top priority even when interpreting parental responsibility agreements. 42.However, the statutory threshold and procedural mechanics for invoking Section 35 are stringent. As unequivocally stated by Mrima J. in Sagala v Sagala (Civil Appeal 9 of 2023) [2024] KEHC 5573 (KLR), the amorphous nature of special circumstances requires that a court consider all relevant factors to determine if an exceptional nature exists justifying the extension. The court held: "In this case, those 'special or exceptional circumstances' must be demonstrated by the Appellant". Similarly, in JKT v AK & another KEHC 18120 (KLR), the Court emphasized that while section 35 gives the Court wide discretion, it is predicated on the Court being satisfied by evidence that special circumstances exist. 43.Crucially, section 35 is inherently prospective and forward-looking. It is designed to create new or continuing legal obligations beyond the age of eighteen for the ongoing welfare and support of the adult dependent. It is completely distinct and legally divorced from the retrospective enforcement of past arrears that accrued prior to the age of eighteen. 44.In the matter before the trial court, the Respondent's Application and Notice to Show Cause did not contain any prayer, whatsoever, for the extension of parental responsibility. There were no pleadings alleging that the minor suffered from a disability, nor was there any evidentiary documentation proving ongoing university enrolment that required prospective fee payments. The Respondent’s Supporting Affidavit exclusively sought the recovery of Kshs. 2,575,206/= in accumulated historical arrears for school fees and maintenance stemming from alleged defaults on the 2018 and 2019 orders. The Respondent's own submissions in the lower court confirm that the application was purely directed at recovering alleged maintenance arrears rather than seeking an extension of parental responsibility. 45.By invoking section 35(1) suo motu in a complete evidentiary vacuum, without any pleadings, without affidavit evidence of special circumstances, and without a formal application for extension before her, the trial Magistrate acted ultra vires. A court cannot magically transmute a straightforward debt recovery execution application into a substantive, forward-looking inquiry for the extension of parental responsibility merely to conveniently bypass a jurisdictional objection. 46.As the Supreme Court noted in Macharia v KCB (supra), a court cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction through judicial craft or innovation where the legislation is clear, and the parameters of its power are defined. The trial court conflated two distinct legal mechanisms: the execution of a crystallized decree for past arrears, governed by execution rules and section 121 of the Children Act and the substantive extension of ongoing parental duties governed by section 35. This conflation constitutes a fatal and reversible error of law. Enforceability of Lapsed Interim Orders and the Necessity of a Decree 47.An ancillary, yet vital, issue raised by the Appellant in the Preliminary Objection was that the Respondent sought to enforce interim orders dated 26 April 2018, which allegedly lapsed upon the delivery of the final judgment on 15 March 2019. The Appellant relied on the Court of Appeal decision in Olive Mwihaki Mugenda & Another v Okiya Omtata Okoiti & 4 Others eKLR, which established that any and all interlocutory orders lapse upon the delivery of judgment after the full and final determination of a suit. 48.The legal principle is sound: interim maintenance orders are designed to provide temporary relief pendente lite. Once a final judgment is rendered, it comprehensively defines the rights and obligations of the parties, superseding the interim regime. If a party wishes to recover arrears that accrued under an interim order, those arrears must generally be quantified, proved, and merged into the final decree, or executed prior to the final judgment. 49.The Respondent's Notice of Motion dated 5 September 2024 sought to enforce compliance with both the interim orders of 26 April 2018 and the final judgment of 15 March 2019. To the extent that the execution proceedings sought to enforce lapsed interim orders without a properly extracted final decree quantifying those specific historical arrears, the application was procedurally defective. 50.As noted in Danson Muriithi Ayub v Evanson Mithamo Muroko [2015] eKLR, the requirement to extract a decree and serve it on the respondent is a fundamental prerequisite for any form of execution to be sustained. The Court affirmed that a successful litigant becomes a decree holder only when a decree is passed and extracted; a litigant is unable in law to enjoy the fruits of any judgment if they do not extract or draw a decree. In this case, the Appellant rightly pointed out the Respondent's failure to extract and serve a decree as mandated by Order 22 of the Civil Procedure Rules, rendering the execution proceedings premature and legally untenable. 51.Furthermore, the Appellant argued that the enforcement of the interim orders was res judicata under section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act, citing a previous ruling by Hon. H.M. Mbati on 13 September 2019 that allegedly dismissed a similar Notice to Show Cause seeking to enforce the same 2018 interim orders. If the exact issue of the enforceability of the 2018 interim arrears was conclusively determined in the negative in September 2019, the Respondent is statutorily barred from resurrecting the identical claim in 2024. The trial Magistrate erred by summarily dismissing the Preliminary Objection without interrogating the court record to verify the res judicata claim, which, as established earlier, is a pure point of law capable of disposing of the application. 52.Based on the foregoing, this Court makes the following orders:i.The Appeal is hereby allowed in its entirety.ii.The Ruling and Order of the learned trial Magistrate, Hon. Elizabeth Muiru (PM), delivered on 15 November 2024 in Milimani Magistrates Court Children's Case No. 1220 of 2017, is hereby set aside.iii.The Appellant's Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 1 October 2024 is upheld.iv.THAT consequently, the Respondent's Notice of Motion dated 5 September 2024 and the Notice to Show Cause dated 13 September 2024 are struck out for being incompetent, procedurally defective under Order 9 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Rules, and jurisdictionally flawed in their reliance on section 35 of the Children Act.v.Each party shall bear their own costs for this Appeal and the proceedings in the trial court. DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 17 DAY OF APRIL 2026HELENE R. NAMISIJUDGE OF THE HIGH COURTDelivered on virtual platform in the presence of:For Appellant: N/AFor Respondent: N/ACourt Assistant Lucy Mwangi