https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/7680

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI** **CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS DIVISION** **PETITION NO. E457 OF 2024** **IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLES 2(1) & (4), 3(1), 10(1)(b), (2)(a) & (b), 19(2), 20(1), (3)(b) & (4), 21(1), 22(1), (2)(b), (c) & (d), 23(1) & (3), 27, 43, 159(2)(e), 165(3)(b), 258 AND 259(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA** **AND** **IN THE MATTER OF ALLEGED THREATENED CONTRAVENTION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS UNDER ARTICLES 27 & 43 OF THE CONSTITUTION OFF KENYA** **AND** **IN THE MATTER OF ALLEGED CONTRAVENTION OF ARTICLES 10, 27 AND 43 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA** **AND** **IN THE MATTER OF THE NATIONAL BUILDING CODE, LEGAL NOTICE NO. 47 OF 2024** **BETWEEN** **INSTITUTION OF ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGISTS AND TECHNICIANS** **(KENYA) …………………………………………………………………………………………. PETITIONER** **AND** **THE HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL...................................................1ST RESPONDENT** **THE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION AUTHORITY...............................2ND RESPONDENT** **THE CABINET SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF LANDS,** **PUBLIC WORKS, HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT…………….3RD RESPONDENT** **AND** **ENGINEERS BOARD OF KENYA...............INTENDED INTERESTED PARTY/APPLICANT** **RULING** **INTRODUCTION** 1. Before this Court for determination is a Notice of Motion application dated 12th August 2025 filed by the Engineers Board of Kenya (hereinafter “the Applicant”), seeking to be joined as an Interested Party in these proceedings. The Applicant also prays for the setting aside of the consent order recorded on 20th March 2025, and a stay of any further implementation of the said consent pending the hearing and determination of the application. 2. The application is opposed by the Petitioner, the Institution of Engineering Technologists and Technicians (Kenya), which contends that the Applicant has no direct legal interest in the matter and that the consent order was lawfully entered into between the Petitioner and the Respondents. **BACKGROUND** 1. The Petitioner filed the main Petition dated 20th August 2024 challenging the constitutionality of the National Building Code, 2024 (Legal Notice No. 47 of 2024). The Petitioner alleges that the Code was enacted without adequate public participation and that Sections 6, 63, and 68 of the Code discriminatorily exclude its members, engineering technologists, technicians, craftspersons, and artisans, from undertaking design, supervision, and quality control of construction works, in violation of Articles 27 and 43 of the Constitution. 2. During the pendency of the Petition, the Petitioner and the Respondents negotiated and executed a consent on 13th March 2025, which was recorded in court on 20th March 2025. By that consent, the Respondents undertook to take steps to amend the National Building Code, 2024 to include members of the Petitioner who work in construction-related fields. The matter was to be mentioned after six months to update the court on the status of the amendments, and each party was to bear its own costs. 3. The Applicant, Engineers Board of Kenya, was not a party to those negotiations. On 12th August 2025, it filed the instant application seeking to be enjoined in the Petition and to have the consent order set aside. The Applicant contends that the consent was entered into without its knowledge or input, yet it directly impacts its statutory mandate under the Engineers Act, No. 43 of 2011, to regulate the engineering profession in Kenya. **THE APPLICANT’S CASE** 1. The Applicant’s case is set out in the Notice of Motion dated 12th August 2025, the Supporting Affidavit of Eng. Margaret N. Ogai, the Registrar and Chief Executive Officer of the Applicant, sworn on the same date, and the Further Affidavit sworn on 2nd October 2025. The Applicant also filed Written Submissions dated 3rd October 2025 in support of the Application. 2. The Applicant averred that it is a statutory body established under Section 3 of the Engineers Act, 2011, vested with the exclusive mandate to register engineers and engineering firms, regulate engineering professional services, set standards, and oversee the development and general practice of engineering in Kenya. The Applicant argues that the Petitioner’s case, as presented in the main Petition, seeks to vest statutory authority upon persons who do not qualify as engineers within the meaning of the Engineers Act or the Engineering Technology Act to undertake roles that are expressly reserved for registered engineers. 3. The Applicant contends that the consent recorded on 20th March 2025 was entered into without its participation, input, or consultation, notwithstanding the fact that the issues raised in the Petition go to the very heart of its statutory mandate. The proposed amendments to the National Building Code, which form the basis of the consent, directly implicate the scope, regulation, and practice of professional engineering services and works in Kenya- a domain over which the Applicant exercises exclusive statutory oversight. 4. Relying on the Supreme Court decision in ***Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Matemo & 5 others [2014] KESC 32 (KLR)****,* the Applicant submitted that it has a clear and identifiable stake in the proceedings. It will be affected by the outcome of the Petition, and its interest will not be well articulated unless it appears in the proceedings to champion its cause. The Applicant further relied on the decision ***Muruatetu & another v Republic; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights & 2 others (Interested Parties); Death Penalty Project (Intended Amicus Curiae) [2016] KESC 12 (KLR)*** for the proposition that an interested party must demonstrate a personal interest or stake that is clearly identifiable and proximate enough to stand apart from anything merely peripheral. 5. On the setting aside of the consent, the Applicant placed reliance on ***Merry Beach Limited v Attorney General & 18 Others [2018] eKLR***and ***Republic v National Land Commission & 2 others; Chege t/a Smart Choice Electronic Company (Exparte Applicant); Water and Sewerage Company Ltd (Proposed Interested Party) [2025] KEELC 934 (KLR)*** for the proposition that exceptional circumstances can justify a court enjoining a party even after judgment or consent has been entered, particularly where a party was neither given notice nor heard on the issue in dispute. The Applicant argues that upon its joinder, the consent must be set aside to afford it an opportunity to be heard. 6. The Applicant further averred that the Petitioner, in its Replying Affidavit, acknowledges at paragraphs 44 and 45 that there are overlapping mandates and roles between engineers and engineering technologists. The Applicant argues that this admission demonstrates that the Applicant has an interest in the proceedings and that the need for delineation of professional boundaries cannot happen without its input. The Applicant also contends that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents cannot adequately represent its interests, as the Petitioner itself accuses those Respondents of neglecting its interests, forcing it to file the Petition to secure the consent to amend the Code. 7. The court was therefore urged to allow the Application as prayed. **THE PETITIONER’S CASE** 1. The Petitioner opposes the application through the Replying Affidavit of Yucabed Gwaya, the Vice Chairlady of the Petitioner, sworn on 2nd September 2025, and written submissions dated 22nd October 2025. 2. The Petitioner averred that the Applicant has not demonstrated any direct, identifiable, and proximate legal interest in the Petition. The Petitioner argues that the core of the Petition is constitutional- alleged violations of Articles 27 and 43 arising from the exclusion of its members from the National Building Code. The Petition does not seek to amend, alter, or challenge the validity of the Engineers Act. The Applicant’s interest, the Petitioner contends, is speculative, rooted in professional competition and economic protectionism, and is merely peripheral. 3. On the joinder of interested parties, the Petitioner relied on the Supreme Court decision in ***Communications Commission of Kenya & 4 Others v Royal Media Services Limited & 7 Others [2014] eKLR***, which affirmed that an interested party is one who has a stake in the proceedings and will be affected by the decision of the court either way. The Petitioner also cites the decision in ***Francis Muruatetu & another v Republic & 5 others [2016] eKLR*** for the three elements that must be satisfied for joinder: a clearly identifiable and proximate personal interest or stake, demonstration of prejudice to be suffered in case of non-joinder, and setting out of submissions that are not merely a replication of what other parties will make. 4. The Petitioner argues that the Applicant has failed to satisfy any of these elements. The Applicant’s interest, if any, is in a future hypothetical scenario where the inclusion of engineering technologists might lead to professional overlap. The Applicant has not demonstrated any direct legal prejudice. Moreover, the 1st Respondent, as the principal legal advisor to the government, and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, as the state organs that enacted the Code, are more than capable of representing any broader public interest concerns, including those the Applicant raises. 5. On the consent order, the Petitioner submitted that a consent order is a binding contract between the parties who have freely and voluntarily entered into it. The Petitioner relied on the decision in ***S M N V Z M S & 3 Others [2017] eKLR*** which cited with approval the decision in ***Flora N. Wasike v Destimo Wamboko [1988] eKLR***and placed further reliance on the decision in ***Board of Trustees National Social Security Fund v Michael Mwalo [2015] eKLR***that a consent judgment or order can only be set aside on grounds that would justify setting aside a contract, such as fraud, collusion, undue influence, or mistake. The Petitioner argues that the Applicant has not alleged, let alone provided evidence of, any of these vitiating factors. The Applicant was not a party to the consent and is a stranger to it, lacking the locus standi to seek its annulment. 6. The Petitioner further contends that the Applicant is acting outside its statutory mandate. The Applicant’s role is to regulate engineers under the Engineers Act. It has no legal mandate to speak on the qualifications, standards, or scope of work of engineering technologists, who are exclusively regulated by the Kenya Engineering Technology Registration Board (KETRB) under the Engineering Technology Act, Cap 530A. The Petitioner argues that allowing the Applicant, a regulatory body for a different profession, to join these proceedings to oppose the recognition of a sister profession would be highly irregular, create a conflict of interest, and set a dangerous precedent. 7. The Court was therefore urged to dismiss the instant application with costs. **ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION** 1. Having carefully considered the Notice of Motion, the affidavits on record, the written submissions by both the Applicant and the Petitioner, and the applicable law, this Court finds that the following issues arise for determination: 2. *Whether the Applicant has met the legal threshold to be joined as an interested party in these proceedings.* 3. *Whether the consent order recorded on 20th March 2025 should be set aside.* ***Whether the Applicant has met the legal threshold to be joined as an interested party in these proceedings*** 1. The law governing joinder of interested parties in constitutional petitions is well settled. The Supreme Court in ***Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Mumo Matemu & 5 others (supra)*** defined an interested party as one who has a stake in the proceedings, though he or she was not a party to the cause ab initio, and who will be affected by the decision of the Court when it is made, either way. Such a person feels that his or her interest will not be well articulated unless he or she appears in the proceedings and champions his or her cause. 2. In the subsequent decision in ***Francis Karioki Muruatetu & another v Republic & 5 others (supra)***, the Supreme Court articulated three elements that an applicant must demonstrate to be enjoined as an interested party. These principles were reiterated and reaffirmed in Muruatetu case as follows: *“[37] From the foregoing legal provisions, and from the case law, the following elements emerge as applicable where a party seeks to be enjoined in proceedings as an interested party: One must move the Court by way of a formal application. Enjoinment is not as of right, but is at the discretion of the Court; hence, sufficient grounds must be laid before the Court, on the basis of the following elements: The personal interest or stake that the party has in the matter must be set out in the application. The interest must be clearly identifiable and must be proximate enough, to stand apart from anything that is merely peripheral. The prejudice to be suffered by the intended interested party in case of non-joinder, must also be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Court. It must also be clearly outlined and not something remote. Lastly, a party must, in its application, set out the case and/or submissions it intends to make before the Court, and demonstrate the relevance of those submissions. It should also demonstrate that these submissions are not merely a replication of what the other parties will be making before the Court.”* 1. This Court must apply these principles to the facts of the present case. The Applicant asserts that it has a direct interest in these proceedings because the Petition, if determined in favour of the Petitioner, would result in the inclusion of engineering technologists in the National Building Code to undertake roles that the Applicant contends are reserved for registered engineers under the Engineers Act. The Applicant argues that this would encroach upon its statutory mandate to regulate the engineering profession. 2. The Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that the Applicant’s interest is speculative, peripheral, and rooted in professional competition rather than any direct legal interest. The Petitioner argues that the core of the Petition is constitutional, not professional, and that the Applicant has no mandate over engineering technologists, who are regulated by a separate statute, the Engineering Technology Act, Cap 530A. 3. To resolve this issue, it is necessary to examine the nature and scope of the main Petition. The Petitioner’s grievance is that the National Building Code, 2024, excludes its members from the list of professionals authorized to undertake design, supervision, and quality control of construction works. The Petitioner claims that this exclusion violates its members’ rights under Articles 27 (equality and freedom from discrimination) and 43 (economic rights) of the Constitution. The Petitioner does not seek to have the Engineers Act declared invalid or to have the Applicant’s mandate under that Act curtailed. The Petitioner seeks recognition within the Building Code based on the statutory authority already conferred upon its members by the Engineering Technology Act, Cap 530A. Section 2 of Cap 530A defines professional engineering technology works to include planning, designing, or responsibility for supervision of construction in connection with any building, works, or projects. 4. This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the Engineering Technology Act, 2016, is an Act of Parliament that establishes the Kenya Engineering Technology Registration Board (KETRB) and provides for the registration, regulation, and practice of engineering technologists. The Act has the same legislative status as the Engineers Act, 2011. Both statutes emanate from the same sovereign authority, the Parliament of Kenya. Neither statute purports to repeal or subordinate the other. The Constitution, under Article 94, vests legislative authority in Parliament, and courts must give effect to the will of Parliament as expressed in duly enacted legislation unless such legislation is inconsistent with the Constitution. 5. Against this legislative background, the Applicant’s claim that the Petition seeks to vest statutory authority upon persons who do not qualify as engineers to undertake roles expressly reserved for registered engineers must be examined with caution. The authority of engineering technologists to engage in planning, designing, and supervision of construction flows not from the Petition or from any order this Court may issue, but directly from Cap 530A. The Petition merely seeks to have the Building Code, a subsidiary legislation, align with the primary legislation that already governs engineering technologists. If there is any inconsistency or overlap between the Engineers Act and the Engineering Technology Act, that is a matter for Parliament to resolve through legislative amendment, or for courts to interpret harmoniously in an appropriate case. It is not a matter that the Applicant can use to veto a settlement between other parties in a constitutional petition that is primarily about the procedural validity of a subsidiary legislation and alleged discrimination. 6. The Supreme Court in ***Muruatetu case (supra)*** emphasized that any party seeking to join proceedings in any capacity must come to terms with the fact that the overriding interest or stake in any matter is that of the primary or principal parties before the Court. Third parties admitted as interested parties may only be remotely or indirectly affected, but the primary impact is on the parties that first moved the Court. An interested party may not frame its own fresh issues or introduce new issues for determination by the Court. The stake that the interested party is required to have in the matter cannot take the form of an altogether new issue introduced before the Court. 7. Applying that principle here, the primary parties to this Petition are the Petitioner and the Respondents. The Respondents are state organs responsible for the enactment of the Building Code and for the regulation of the construction industry. They are constitutionally and statutorily mandated to defend public interest, including public safety in construction. The Attorney General, under Article 156 of the Constitution, is the principal legal advisor to the government and represents the national government in court proceedings. The National Construction Authority, under the National Construction Authority Act, Cap 118, is mandated to oversee the construction industry, promote quality assurance, and enforce the Building Code. These Respondents are fully capable of presenting arguments on the interpretation of the Engineers Act, the Engineering Technology Act, and any other relevant legislation. They are also capable of addressing concerns about public safety and regulatory standards. 8. The Applicant has not demonstrated that its interest is distinct from the broader public interest that the Respondents are already mandated to protect. The Applicant’s concern that the inclusion of engineering technologists in the Building Code might lead to building collapses or hazardous conditions is a policy argument about the appropriate scope of practice for different professionals. That argument can be, and indeed ought to be, made by the Respondents, who are the state actors responsible for the Code. The Applicant has not pointed to any specific provision of the Engineers Act that gives it exclusive authority to determine who may be recognized in the Building Code. The Building Code is a subsidiary legislation under the National Construction Authority Act, not under the Engineers Act. The National Construction Authority, not the Applicant, is the primary regulator of the construction industry. 9. The Applicant’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in ***Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Matemo & 5 others (supra)*** is instructive but ultimately does not favour its joinder. In that case, the Supreme Court declined to enjoin the Law Society of Kenya as an interested party because the Society had manifested partisan support for one of the respondents and was seeking to champion individual interests clothed as public interest. The Court held that the Law Society’s mandate to assist the government and the courts and to protect the public could not be invoked to champion the interests of an individual. Similarly, in the present case, the Applicant’s application is driven by a desire to protect the economic and professional interests of its members, registered engineers, against competition from engineering technologists. While that may be a legitimate objective for the Applicant to pursue in other forums, such as stakeholder consultations or parliamentary advocacy, it does not constitute the kind of direct, identifiable, and proximate legal interest required for joinder in a constitutional petition where the primary parties are already capable of representing the public interest. 10. In ***Kenya Medical Laboratory Technicians and Technologists Board & 6 others v Attorney General & 4 others [2017] eKLR,*** the court provided useful guidance on what constitutes a legal interest for purposes of joinder. The court held that a person is legally interested in proceedings only if they can say that the proceedings may lead to a result that will affect them directly by curtailing their legal rights. The true test lies not so much in an analysis of what are the constituents of the applicant’s rights, but rather in what would be the result on the subject matter of the action if those rights could be established. The applicant must have an interest in the pending litigation, but the interest must be legal, identifiable, or demonstrate a duty in the proceedings directly identifiable by examining the questions involved in the suit. 11. Applying this test, the Court must examine what the result of the main Petition might be if the Petitioner succeeds. If the Petitioner succeeds, the National Building Code may be declared unconstitutional for want of public participation, or Sections 6, 63, and 68 may be declared discriminatory and invalid. Alternatively, the Respondents may, pursuant to the consent, amend the Code to include engineering technologists. In either scenario, the Engineers Act remains intact. The Applicant’s mandate to register engineers, regulate engineering professional services, and set standards for engineers is not curtailed in any way. The Applicant has no statutory mandate over the Building Code itself. The Building Code is a regulatory instrument under the National Construction Authority Act, and its amendment does not, on its own, amend or repeal any provision of the Engineers Act. The Applicant’s claim that its legal rights are threatened is therefore speculative and not direct. 12. Moreover, the Applicant has not demonstrated any prejudice that it would suffer if joinder is denied that cannot be addressed through alternative means. The Applicant has stated that it participated in the formulation of the Building Code. If it wishes to participate in the amendment process that will follow pursuant to the consent, it is free to do so as a stakeholder. The consent order itself does not preclude any person or entity from participating in the public participation process that will accompany the amendment of the Code. The Applicant’s proper forum to air its views on the substance of the Code’s amendment is that stakeholder process, not this Court. To allow the Applicant to join these proceedings would be to permit it to use the court process to veto a settlement between other parties and to bypass the normal regulatory and legislative channels for policy advocacy. 13. The Court also notes that the Applicant has not demonstrated that its intended submissions are different from those that the Respondents are already capable of making. The Respondents, through the Attorney General, have already filed submissions dated 2nd December 2024 in response to the main Petition. In those submissions, the Respondents argue that the preparation of design and supervision of works is reserved for engineers under Section 50 of the Engineers Act and the Third Schedule to the Physical and Land Use Planning Act, 2019. The Applicant’s proposed submissions, as set out in its application and supporting affidavits, mirror these arguments. The Applicant has not identified any unique legal or factual issue that only it can bring to the Court’s attention and that the Respondents cannot or will not address. 14. The Supreme Court in ***Muruatetu case (supra)***was clear that an interested party must demonstrate that its submissions are not merely a replication of what the other parties will be making before the court. The Applicant has failed to satisfy this requirement. The Respondents, as the state organs that enacted the Code, are fully capable of defending it. The Attorney General, as the principal legal advisor, is fully capable of interpreting both the Engineers Act and the Engineering Technology Act. The Applicant’s joinder would therefore be redundant and would add nothing to the proceedings except an additional layer of complexity and delay. 15. Consequently, this Court finds that the Applicant has not met the threshold for joinder as an interested party. The Applicant’s interest, while understandable from the perspective of professional regulation, is not the direct, identifiable, and proximate legal interest required by the Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Applicant has not demonstrated that its legal rights will be curtailed by the outcome of the Petition. ***Whether the consent order recorded on 20th March 2025 should be set aside*** 1. Having found that the Applicant is not entitled to be joined as an interested party, the question of setting aside the consent order might appear moot. However, for completeness, and because the Applicant separately prayed for the setting aside of the consent, this Court will address the issue on its merits. 2. The law on setting aside consent judgments and orders is long settled. A consent order has a contractual effect and can only be set aside on grounds that would justify setting aside a contract. In ***Hirani v Kassam (1952) 19 EACA 131***, it was stated that a consent order made in the presence and with the consent of counsel is binding on all parties and cannot be varied or discharged unless obtained by fraud or collusion, or by an agreement contrary to the policy of the court, or if the consent was given without sufficient material facts, or in general for a reason which would enable the court to set aside an agreement. In particular, the Court had the following to state: - *“Prima facie, any order made in the presence and with the consent of counsel is binding on all parties to the proceedings or action, and or those doing under them … and cannot be varied or discharged unless obtained by fraud or collusion, or by an agreement contrary to the policy of the court … or if the consent was given without sufficient material facts, or in misapprehension or ignorance of material facts, or in general for a reason which would enable the court to set aside an agreement.”* 1. In ***Kenya Commercial Bank Limited v Specialised Engineering Co. Limited [1982] KLR 485***the courtheld that a consent order entered into by counsel is binding on all parties to the proceedings and cannot be set aside or varied unless it is proved that it was obtained by fraud or collusion or by an agreement contrary to the policy of the court, or where the consent was given without sufficient material facts or in misapprehension or ignorance of such facts. In ***Flora N. Wasike v Destimo Wamboko (supra)****,* the Court reiterated that a consent judgment has contractual effect and can only be set aside on grounds which would justify setting a contract aside. 2. The Applicant has not alleged any fraud, collusion, undue influence, or mistake in the procurement of the consent order. The Applicant does not claim that the Petitioner or the Respondents acted improperly or that the consent was entered into without authority. The Applicant’s sole ground for seeking to set aside the consent is that it was entered into without its participation, knowledge, or input, and that the consent affects its statutory mandate. 3. The fundamental flaw in the Applicant’s position is that it was not a party to the suit when the consent was entered into, and it has not been joined as a party even now, as this Court has denied its application for joinder. A person who is not a party to proceedings cannot ordinarily apply to set aside a consent order or judgment entered into in those proceedings. The principle of privity of contract, which applies to consent orders as they have contractual effect, dictates that only parties to the contract (or their privies) can seek to enforce or challenge it. The Applicant is a stranger to the consent and has no standing to seek its annulment. 4. The Applicant does not have a direct proprietary or legal interest in the subject matter of the Petition. The Petition challenges the constitutionality of the National Building Code. The Applicant does not own the Code, nor does it have any statutory right to dictate the content of the Code. The Code is a subsidiary legislation under the National Construction Authority Act. The Applicant’s interest, as already discussed, is indirect and speculative. The Applicant was not a necessary party to the proceedings when the consent was entered, and its absence from the negotiations did not vitiate the consent. The consent was between the Petitioner and the Respondents, the very parties who are directly affected by the Petition. The Respondents, being state organs, were fully aware of the Applicant’s existence and its mandate under the Engineers Act. Their decision to consent to the amendment of the Code was a considered decision made in the exercise of their statutory functions. The Applicant cannot now come to court and ask that this lawful settlement be set aside simply because it disagrees with the policy direction that the Respondents have taken. 5. Even if this Court were to consider the merits of the Applicant’s challenge to the consent, the Applicant has not demonstrated any ground that would justify setting aside a contract. The consent is not contrary to public policy. On the contrary, the consent seeks to align a subsidiary legislation (the Building Code) with a primary legislation (the Engineering Technology Act). It seeks to remedy a potential constitutional violation by including a statutorily recognized profession in the regulatory framework for construction. That is a lawful and rational objective. The Applicant’s argument that the consent threatens public safety is a policy argument that is more appropriately addressed to the Respondents during the amendment process, not a ground for setting aside a consent order between other parties. 6. This Court therefore finds that the Applicant has no locus standi to challenge the consent order, and even if it did, it has not established any of the recognized grounds for setting aside a consent order. The prayer to set aside the consent order is denied. **CONCLUSION** 1. For the reasons set out above, this Court finds that the Notice of Motion application dated 12th August 2025 lacks merit. The Applicant has not demonstrated a direct, identifiable, and proximate legal interest in the main Petition that would justify its joinder as an interested party. The Applicant has not demonstrated any prejudice that would be suffered if joinder is denied that cannot be addressed through alternative forums, such as stakeholder participation in the amendment of the Building Code. The Applicant has no locus standi to challenge the consent order recorded on 20th March 2025, having not been a party to the proceedings when the consent was entered, and having failed to establish any of the recognized grounds for setting aside a consent order. 2. Accordingly, the Court makes the following orders: 1. The Notice of Motion Application dated 12th August 2025 is hereby dismissed in its entirety. 2. The Applicant’s prayer to be joined as an interested party in Petition Number E457 of 2024 is denied. 3. The consent order recorded on 20th March 2025 remains valid and binding on the parties to that consent. 4. Each party shall bear their own costs. Orders accordingly. **DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY THIS 20TH DAY OF MAY 2026.** **\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_** **BAHATI MWAMUYE MBS** **JUDGE**