https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/11950

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT AT NYERI** **CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. E075 OF 2025** **JACOB GIKUNDI KARWIGI ……………………………….…… APPELLANT** **VERSUS** **REPUBLIC ……………………………….…..……….….…….RESPONDENT** **JUDGMENT** 1. This is an appeal against the conviction and sentence by the Hon. E. M. Gaithuma (RM) given on 11.11.2024 in Nyeri CMCCRC No. E799 of 2023. 2. The appellant was charged with the offence of Burglary contrary to section 304(2) of the Penal Code.The particulars were that on the night of 21.04.2023 and 22.04.2023 at Ngangarithi area, in Nyeri Central sub-county, within Nyeri County, jointly with others not before the court broke and entered a dwelling house of Lilian Mango with intent to commit a felony therein. 3. In the second count the appellant was charged with the offence of stealing contrary to section 279(b) of the Penal Code. The particulars were that on the night of 21.04.2023 and 22.04.2023 at Ngangarithi, area, in Nyeri Central sub-county, within Nyeri County, jointly with others not before the court, stole from a dwelling house of Lilian Mango: two stools, a table, MEKO gas, a laptop ACER, oven and a passport all valued at Ksh. 68,850/=. 4. There was an alternative count, that of handling stolen goods contrary to Section 322(1) and (2) of the Penal Code. The particulars were that on the night of 21.04.2023 and 22.04.2023 at Ngangarithi, area, in Nyeri Central sub-county, within Nyeri County, otherwise than in the cause of stealing, dishonesty retained two stools, knowing or having reason to believe them to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained. 5. The Appellant was arraigned in court on 22.05.2023 and pleaded not guilty before Hon. M. N. Lubia, SRM. After preliminaries were concluded, the appellant indicated that he wished to change plea before Hon. E. M. Gaithuma (RM). The charges were again read to the appellant in Kiswahili, a language he indicated he understood and he replied, ‘ni ukweli.’ Facts were read to him and he said facts as read out by the prosecutor are true. 6. Subsequently, he was convicted on his own plea of guilty in the main counts, Count I and II. He mitigated that he committed the crime and the second accused was not involved. He prayed for probation. He indicated he had two children. The court called for presentence report. The same was filed, indicating that the appellant had other previous convictions and several other cases. 7. When he was asked to mitigate, he stated as follows: *“I committed the crime and the second accused person was not involved. I pray for a probation sentence. I have two children.”* 1. The trial court considered the report relating to the appellant's previous offences. From that report, the court formed the view that the appellant was not remorseful. Having considered the nature and circumstances of the offence, together with the appellant's antecedents, the court proceeded to sentence him to 7 years' imprisonment on each of the two counts. The court further directed that the sentences would run concurrently. 2. Aggrieved, the Appellant lodged the Petition of Appeal dated 18.11.2025. He had been granted leave of the court in Misc. Criminal Application No. E059 of 2025. He set out 16 grounds of appeal. It is not necessary to set out the said grounds as they are ancillary, repetitive, prolix and a waste of judicial time. This court has repeatedly stated that counsel must take time to draw the memoranda of appeal in strict compliance with the rules of the court. In the case of [**Robinson Kiplagat Tuwei v Felix Kipchoge Limo Langat [2020] KECA 224 (KLR**)](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2020/224/eng%402020-11-06), the court of appeal posited as follows: What we have before us are some 18 grounds of appeal that lack focus and are repetitively tedious. It is certainly not edifying for counsel to present two dozen grounds of appeal, and end up arguing only two or three issues, on the myth that he has condensed the grounds of appeal. (See Abdi Ali Dere v. Firoz Hussein Tundal & 2 Others [2013] eKLR) and Nasri Ibrahim v. IEBC & 2 Others [2018] eKLR. In the latter case, this Court lamented: “We must reiterate that counsel must strive to make drafting of grounds of appeal an art, not an exercise in verbosity, repetition, or empty rhetoric…A surfeit of prolixious grounds of appeal do not in anyway enhance the chances of success of an appeal. If they achieve anything, it is only to obfuscate the real issues in dispute, vex and irritate the opposite parties, waste valuable judicial time, and increase costs.” 1. There were also Amended Grounds of Appeal filed together with the appellant's submissions. The same were canvassed in the written submissions. They will best be considered in the submissions and shall address the issues arising therefrom in the determination of this appeal. Submissions 1. The Appellant filed written submissions dated 29.04.2026. He submitted that the trial court failed to consider the doctrine of the same transaction when passing sentence. He further contended that the trial court erred in convicting him on what he termed an equivocal plea of guilty. According to the Appellant, the court's failure to reconfirm the plea at a later stage rendered the plea equivocal and, consequently, unsafe. He therefore argued that the conviction founded on that plea could not be sustained. 1. He blamed the court for failing to explain the charge. Reliance was placed on **Adan V Republic (1973) EA 445**. He blamed the court on the language, English /Kiswahili. He also submitted that his rights under that articles 25(c) and 50(2) of the constitution were breached. He submitted that that there were irregularities, that is failure to explain the charge, to ensure the plea was unequivocal, to inquire into his mental state and comprehension, which are said to have breached the appellant’s right to fair trial. 2. He relied on the case of [**Benard Injendi v Republic [2017] KEHC 8808 (KLR)**](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2017/8808/eng%402017-05-03)**,** where, Ruth N. Sitati J, posited as follows: 13. So, a part from the appellant’s reply which was in Kiswahili, there is no indication on the record, whether the charge was read in Kiswahili or in English or in some other language. Based on the principles already set out above, I am in agreement with counsel that the appellant’s plea was not unequivocal thereby rendering the whole trial null and void. 14. Further, after the facts were read out to the appellant the answer given by him was, “the facts are true.” Where upon the court entered a plea of guilty and convicted the appellant. Whether the plea was taken in Kiswahili or English, whatever the case, the trial court failed to indicate the language for the plea and complicated matters further when it recorded the appellant’s answers both Kiswahili and English. In this regard, grounds 1 and 2 of the appeal succeed. Ground 3 as reframed by appellant’s counsel also falls in this same category and succeeds because the trial court did not observe the principle for taking a plea as set out in Adan’s case (above). 1. He posited that the consequences of pleading guilty were not explained to him. He relied on the case of [**Kennedy Ndiwa Boit v Republic [2002] KECA 206 (KLR**)](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2002/206/eng%402002-10-18), where the court of appeal [Omolo, Lakha & O'Kubasu, J.A], posited as follows: Stopping there for the moment, it is abundantly clear to us that at no stage did the Magistrate warn the appellant of the consequences of his pleading guilty to the charge. Indeed the appellant's plea in mitigation that "I am asking for pardon" clearly shows that the appellant was wholly unaware that he ran the risk of being sentenced to death. Luckily for the appellant, he turned out to be under-age and so could not be sentenced to death but that is not the point in issue. The point is that the Magistrate who could not have known the age of the appellant did not warn him of the consequences of his pleading guilty to the charge facing him. Had the appellant been over eighteen years old, he could have been sentenced to death without one single word of caution. 1. He submitted that he needed making up an informed plea. He stated that the plea was unequivocal and there was an ambiguity in interpretation of pleas. Reliance was placed on the case of [**Alexander Likoye Malika v Republic**](https://kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2015/764) [2015] eKLR, where the court held as follows: “A court may only interfere with a situation where an accused person has pleaded guilty to a charge where the plea is imperfect, ambiguous, or unfinished such that the trial court erred in treating it as a plea of guilty. Another situation is where an accused person pleaded guilty as a result of mistake or misapprehension of the facts. An appellate court may also interfere where the charge laid against an accused person to which he has pleaded guilty disclosed no offence known to law. Also where upon admitted facts the appellant could not in law have been convicted of the offence charged. 1. He submitted that the plea was ambiguous and imperfect. He relied on the case of [Wakia**nda v Republic [2016] KECA 181 (KLR)**](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2016/181/eng%402016-11-17), where the court of appeal [PNWaki, RN Nambuye & PO Kiage, JJA] posited as follows: 12. Given all the safeguards available to an accused person through the process of trial, the entry of a plea of guilty presents a rare absolute capitulation; a throwing in of the towel and a giving of a walkover to the prosecution and often at great cost. A conviction comes with its consequences of varying gravity. Thus it is that the courts, at any rate appellate courts, would not accept a plea of guilty unless satisfied that the same has been entered consciously, freely and in clear and unambiguous terms. The process of ensuring this was well-captured in the oft-cited case of [Adan v Republic](https://droitandleyadvocates.wordpress.com/2015/08/30/adan-v-r-1973-ea-445/comment-page-1/) (supra) and has been followed in many cases after it. See: [Lusiti v Republic](https://kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/1977/15%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) [1976-80] 1 KLR 585;[Kariuki v Republic](https://kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/1984/79%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) [1984] KLR 809. 13. The beginning point of ensuring that the accused person has entered into a free and conscious plea of guilty is being satisfied that he understands the proceedings and that he in particular understands the charge that is facing him. Indeed, the court taking the plea is required to read and explain to the accused the charge and all the ingredients in the accused person's language or a language he understands. In the instant case, the record reads thus; “Court: The substance of the charge(s) and every element thereof has been stated by the court to the accused in a language that he understands who being asked whether he admits or denies the truth of the charge replies in Kiswahili:- “It is true.” 14.With respect, we find this disturbing. It seems to us that this is part of a template used by courts at plea taking. That is why it speaks of “charge(s)” when there was a single charge and the rather odd “in a language he understands”, when it is more normal and logical to simply state the language used. This smacks of a mere going through the motions, a recital of ritual. While that may not much matter when the plea entered is one of not guilty followed by a trial with all its attendant safeguards, it assumes a critical dimension when the plea is one of guilty and leads to conviction. 1. He submitted that it is important to be specific and in the language used, by not being specific, it makes the plea unreliable. He submitted that section 207 of the criminal procedure code was not complied with. There was need to explain the charge clearly and give opportunity to dispute facts. He relied on the case of **Karanja v Repiblic [2004] eKLR**. 2. The Appellant further submitted that it is imperative for a trial court to be precise in the language used during plea taking. He argued that the failure to record the proceedings with sufficient specificity rendered the plea unreliable and unsafe. According to him, the court did not comply with section 207 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which requires that the charge and every essential ingredient thereof be explained to an accused person in a language that he or she understands before a plea is taken. 3. He further contended that, after the plea of guilty was entered, the prosecution facts ought to have been stated clearly and the accused afforded an opportunity to admit, deny, or explain those facts. In his view, the failure to strictly adhere to this procedure rendered the plea equivocal and incapable of sustaining a conviction. He relied on the case of **Karanja v Republic [2004] eKLR**. 4. He prayed that 7 years sentence be set aside and it runs concurrent with sentences in his three other cases. 5. The Appellant also submitted that the Respondent failed to follow strict procedure in relation to inventory of seizure, certificate of sampling, Government Analyst report and testimony of a gazetted analyst. He cited Section 74A of the Act. Reliance was placed on **Moses Banda v Daniel (2016) eKLR** based on which it was submitted that the procedure in Section 74A of the Act was mandatory and failure to follow it would render any sentence imposed not to stand. 6. It was submitted that the plea was equivocal and the sentence was excessive and based on pubic sentiments. He submitted that the language of the plea was not recorded and no caution was administered. 7. The Respondent filed submission on 30.04.2026. It was submitted that the plea was unequivocal. They cited **Adan v Republic (1973) EA**. 8. It was further submitted that the sentence was proper as in law provided as the appellant had a previous record, being CR 797 of 2023. This is what gave rise to the appeal. They submitted that every element of the charge was read to the appellant. They submitted that the evidence against the appellant was cogent and the appellant knew the position. They averred that section 207 of the Criminal Procedure Code was complied with. 9. Reliance was placed on the case of [**Ombena v Republic** [1981] KECA 28 (KLR)](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/1981/28/eng%401981-06-23), where the court of appeal [Law, Miller & Potter JJA] held as follows: The appellant’s third ground is that the magistrate did not hear and record the facts of the case before convicting them. In Adan v Republic [1973] EA 445, the Court of Appeal laid down in the simplest and plainest terms the manner in which pleas of guilty should be recorded and the steps which should be followed. It is appropriate to set out the holding in full — “Held: (i) the charge and all the essential ingredients of the offence should be explained to the accused in his language or in a language he understands; (ii) the accused’s own words should be recorded and if they are an admission, a plea of guilty should be recorded; (iii) the prosecution should then immediately state the facts and the accused should be given an opportunity to dispute or explain the facts or to add any relevant facts; (iv) if the accused does not agree with the facts or raises any question of his guilt his reply must be recorded and change of plea entered; (v) if there is no change of plea a conviction should be recorded and a statement of the facts relevant to sentence together with the accused’s reply should be recorded.” In this case it is not certain that the prosecutor stated the facts, or that the appellants were given an opportunity to dispute or explain the facts or to add any relevant facts. The bald record that the prosecutor said “Facts are as per charge sheets”, and that the charge was read over and explained a second time, is not in our view sufficient to enable us to be satisfied that the pleas were unequivocal. In the Adan case the court said, at p 447: “The statement of facts serves two purposes: it enables the magistrate to satisfy himself that the plea of guilty was really unequivocal and that the accused has no defence and it gives the magistrate the basic material on which to assess sentence. It not infrequently happens that an accused, after hearing the statement of facts, disputes some particular fact or alleges some additional fact, showing that he did not really understand the position when he pleaded guilty: it is for this reason that it is essential for the statement of facts to precede the conviction.” 1. They placed further reliance on the case of *Wanjema v Republic* (1971) EA 493. At page 494, where it was averred, that sentence must depend on its own particular facts. The court stated as follows: **“An appellate court should not interfere with the discretion which a trial court has exercised as to sentence unless it is evident that it overlooked some material factor, took into account some immaterial factor, acted on a wrong principle or the sentence is manifestly excessive in the circumstances of the case.”** 1. They submitted that the sentences should be 10 and 7. Hence the 7-year sentence is lenient. They submitted that Articles 25(c) and 50(2) of the constitution were not breached. It was submitted that section 348 of the Criminal Procedure Code allows appeals only to the extent of legality of sentence. They averred that there is nothing impeaching the plea of guilty. Reliance was placed on **Ndede vs Republic [1991] KLR 567 & Nelson vs Republic [1970] E.A. 599**. Analysis 1. This being a first appeal, this court is under a duty to reevaluate and assess the evidence and make its own conclusions. It must, however, keep at the back of its mind that a trial court, unlike the appellate court, had the advantage of observing the demeanour of the witnesses and hearing their evidence firsthand. The Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa in ***Pandya vs Republic [1957] EA 336*** held as follows: On a first appeal from a conviction by a Judge or magistrate sitting without a jury the appellant is entitled to have the appellate court’s own consideration and views of the evidence as a whole and its own decision thereon. It has the duty to rehear the case and reconsider the witnesses before the Judge or magistrate with such other material as it may have decided to admit. The appellate court must then make up its own mind not disregarding the judgment appealed from but carefully weighing and considering it. When the question arises which witness is to be believed rather than another and that question turns on manner and demeanor, the appellate court must be guided by the impression made on the judge or magistrate who saw the witness but there may be other circumstances, quite apart from manner and demeanor which may show whether a statement is credible or not which may warrant a court different. 1. On a first appeal, the appellant is entitled to a fresh and exhaustive reevaluation of the evidence on record, with the appellate court drawing its own conclusions, while bearing in mind that it did not have the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. In the case of **Okeno v Republic [supra],** the East Africa Court of Appeal stated on the duty of the court on a first appeal: An appellant on a first appeal is entitled to expect the evidence as a whole to be submitted to a fresh and exhaustive examination (Pandya v. R., [1957] E. A. 336) and to the appellate court's own decision on the evidence. The first appellate court must itself weigh conflicting evidence and draw its own conclusions. (Shantilal M. Ruwala v. R., [1957] E.A. 570). It is not the function of a first appellate court merely to scrutinize the evidence to see if there was some evidence to support the lower court's findings and conclusions; it must make its own findings and draw its own conclusions. Only then can it decide whether the magistrate's findings should be supported. In doing so, it should make allowance for the fact that the trial court has had the advantage of hearing and seeing the witnesses, see Peters v. Sunday Post, [1958] E. A. 424. 1. However, the matter herein relates to a plea of guilty. An appeal is not allowed unless to the extent of the unequivocally of the plea and compliance with procedural safeguards. Section section 348 of the Criminal Procedure Code posited as follows: **No appeal shall be allowed in the case of an accused person who has pleaded guilty and has been convicted on that plea by a subordinate court, except as to the extent or legality of the sentence.** 1. Therefore, there should not be an appeal from a plea of guilty. However, precedent has shown that there could be an appeal on the equivocality of plea. 2. As to whether the plea was unequivocal, it is instructive to note that the procedure of taking plea is provided for under section 207 of the Criminal Procedure Code as follows: 3. The substance of the charge shall be stated to the accused person by the court, and he shall be asked whether he pleads not guilty, guilty or guilty subject to a plea agreement. 4. If the accused person admits the truth of the charge otherwise than by a plea agreement his admission shall be recorded as nearly as possible in the words used by him, and the court shall convict him and pass sentence upon or make an order against him, unless there appears to it sufficient cause to the contrary: Provided that after conviction and before passing sentence or making any order the court may permit or require the complainant to outline to the court the facts upon which the charge is founded. 5. The procedure was properly outlined and set out in the case of **Adan v R (1973) 446** as follows: “When a person is charged, the charge and the particulars should be read out to him, so far as possible in his own language, but if that is not possible, then in a language which he can speak and understand. The magistrate should then explain to the accused person all the essential ingredients of the offence charged. If the accused then admits all those essential elements, the magistrate should record what the accused has said, as nearly as possible in his own word, and then formally enter a plea of guilty. The magistrate should next ask the prosecutor to state the alleged offence and, when the statement is complete, should give the accused an opportunity to dispute or explain the facts or to add any relevant facts if the accused does not agree with the statement of facts or asserts additional facts which if true might raise a question as to his guilt, the magistrate should record a change of plea to “not guilty” and proceed to hold a trial. If the accused does not deny the alleged facts in any material respect, the magistrate should record a conviction and proceed to hear any further facts relevant to sentence. The statement of facts and the accused’s reply must, of course, be recorded”. 1. Where a plea is equivocal, the court cannot accept the same. In **P. Foster (Hallege) Ltd -Vs- Roberts** (1978) 2 ALL ER 751, 754 – 755 it was held thus: *“... A court cannot accept an equivocal plea of guilty: It … must either obtain an equivocal plea or enter a plea of not guilty. For a plea to be equivocal the defendant must add to the plea of guilty qualification which, if true, may show that he is not guilty of the offence charged.”* 1. The appellant in this court chose Kiswahili as the language he understands. That was the same position in the court below. He first pleaded not guilty. The first witness testified. He then prayed that he changes plea. The words in the record are ‘I wish to change plea.” There are no contestations that this was not the request. My understanding of change of plea is that the appellant wished to have plea other than the plea he had earlier taken, that is the plea of not guilty to one which was not ‘plea of not guilty’. 2. In the case of [**Ikoka v Republic [2025] KECA 614 (KLR)**](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2025/614/eng%402025-03-28), the court of appeal [HMOkwengu, HA Omondi & JM Ngugi, JJA] addressed the question of unequivocal plea, when there is change of plea. **24. From the above, there is nothing to show that the appellant was confused or did not fully understand the charge. It is clear that the appellant decided to change his plea on his own volition and we are satisfied that his plea of guilty was unequivocal.** 1. In the case of [**Wakianda v Republic [2016] KECA 181 (KLR)**](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2016/181/eng%402016-11-17)**,** the court of appeal [PN Waki, RN Nambuye & PO Kiage, JJA] posited as follows: 12. Given all the safeguards available to an accused person through the process of trial, the entry of a plea of guilty presents a rare absolute capitulation; a throwing in of the towel and a giving of a walkover to the prosecution and often at great cost. A conviction comes with its consequences of varying gravity. Thus it is that the courts, at any rate appellate courts, would not accept a plea of guilty unless satisfied that the same has been entered consciously, freely and in clear and unambiguous terms. The process of ensuring this was well-captured in the oft-cited case of [*Adan v Republic*](https://droitandleyadvocates.wordpress.com/2015/08/30/adan-v-r-1973-ea-445/comment-page-1/) (supra) and has been followed in many cases after it. See: *[Lusiti v Republic](https://kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/1977/15%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank)* [1976-80] 1 KLR 585;*[Kariuki v Republic](https://kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/1984/79%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank)* [1984] KLR 809. 13. The beginning point of ensuring that the accused person has entered into a free and conscious plea of guilty is being satisfied that he understands the proceedings and that he in particular understands the charge that is facing him. Indeed, the court taking the plea is required to read and explain to the accused the charge and all the ingredients in the accused person's language or a language he understands. In the instant case, the record reads thus;“Court: The substance of the charge(s) and every element thereof has been stated by the court to the accused in a language that he understands who being asked whether he admits or denies the truth of the charge replies in Kiswahili:- “It is true.” 14. With respect, we find this disturbing. It seems to us that this is part of a template used by courts at plea taking. That is why it speaks of “charge(s)” when there was a single charge and the rather odd “in a language he understands”, when it is more normal and logical to simply state the language used. This smacks of a mere going through the motions, a recital of ritual. While that may not much matter when the plea entered is one of not guilty followed by a trial with all its attendant safeguards, it assumes a critical dimension when the plea is one of guilty and leads to conviction. 15. We think that it is good practice for the specific language used to state the elements of the charge be specifically stated. That should be established by specifically asking the accused what language he understands, and recording his answer before either using the language he mentions or ensuring a translator is present to convey the proceedings to him in the chosen language. We also think that the elements of the offence are not complete if the sentence, especially if it is a severe and mandatory sentence, is not brought to the attention of the accused person. One surely ought to know the consequences of his virtual waiver of his trial rights that the[*Constitution*](https://kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) guarantees him. That did not occur here and yet the appellant was unrepresented calling upon the trial court to be particularly solicitous of his welfare. The officer presiding is not to be a mere umpire aloofly observing the proceedings. He is the protector, guarantor and educator of the process ensuring that an unrepresented accused person is not lost at sea in the maze of the often- intimidating judicial process. 16. We are not satisfied that the appellant herein, to use the phraseology of *[Lusiti v Republic](https://kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/1977/15%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank)* (supra) “wished to admit without any qualification each and every essential ingredient of the charge”. The fact that he had a history of psychiatric challenges only goes to add to the possibility of equivocation but we shall not explore the issue further in view of what we shall shortly state. 1. In this case the facts were clearly read to the Appellant in Kiswahili language that he chose. When he was called to answer he stated *"the facts are true."* This plea was unequivocal plea. There was no provocation or undue influence demonstrated. In *Kato v Republic [1971] 1 E.A 542 (CAD*) the Court of Appeal set out the way of taking the plea and in that case, where plea was equivocal the court quashed the conviction and set aside the sentence. In that case the court said: *The procedure relating to the calling upon the accused person to plead is governed by s.203 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In our view, if it can be clearly shown that an accused person has admitted all the ingredients which constitute the offence charged, it is then proper to enter a plea of guilty. The words "it is true" when used by an accused person may not amount to a plea of guilty, for example, in a case where there may be a defence of self-defence or provocation. As was said by this court in the case of R v Yonasani Egalu (1942), 9 E.A.C.A. 65, at p. 67"* 1. The Appellant properly took his plea in a language he understood which was Kiswahili language. He admitted the charges and the case proceeded to mitigation before he was sentenced. The issue of equivocal plea therefore does not arise. The Appellant did not dispute the facts as narrated, which meant that his was an unequivocal plea of guilty, and the trial magistrate correctly entered the pea and convicted him after mitigation. 2. The other grounds introduced in the submissions relating to sanity are flimsy and do not go to the root of the trial in light of the plea of guilty. This is also a roundabout way of challenging the unequivocal plea which he took. The question of sanity is not part of the court or prosecution. Everyone is presumed sane. Section 11 of the Penal Code, provides as follows: *Every person is presumed to be of sound mind, and to have been of sound mind at any time which comes in question, until the contrary is proved.* 1. There was no plea of insanity taken in the court below and as such the same cannot be raised at this level. Further, the court met all the parameters for an unequivocal plea. We think that it is good practice for the specific language used to state the elements of the charge be specifically stated. That should be established by specifically asking the accused what language he understands, and recording his answer before either using the language he mentions or ensuring a translator is present to convey the proceedings to him in the chosen language. We also think that the elements of the offence are not complete if the sentence, especially if it is a severe and mandatory sentence, is not brought to the attention of the accused person. One surely ought to know the consequences of his virtual waiver of his trial rights that the[Constitution](https://kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) guarantees him. That did not occur here and yet the appellant was unrepresented calling upon the trial court to be particularly solicitous of his welfare. The officer presiding is not to be a mere umpire aloofly observing the proceedings. He is the protector, guarantor and educator of the process ensuring that an unrepresented accused person is not lost at sea in the maze of the often- intimidating judicial process. 16.We are not satisfied that the appellant herein, to use the phraseology of [Lusiti v Republic](https://kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/1977/15%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) *Lusiti, Charles v Republic* Criminal Appeal 319 of 1971; [1977] KEHC 15 (KLR), “wished to admit without any qualification each and every essential ingredient of the charge”. The fact that he had a history of psychiatric challenges only goes to add to the possibility of equivocation but we shall not explore the issue further in view of what we shall shortly state. 1. There was no history of psychiatric challenges given. Plea was thus proper. The appeal on conviction is unmerited and is consequently dismissed. 2. The court now turns to sentencing, which is one of the most intricate aspects of the criminal trial process and forms an integral part of the administration of justice. It complements the trial by determining the appropriate consequence of criminal conduct. A proper sentence should meet the ends of justice and uphold the fundamental principles of sentencing, including proportionality, deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, restorative justice, denunciation, reconciliation and reintegration and protection including community protection. The objectives of sentencing as set out in the 2023 Sentencing Guidelines are as follows: “1.3.1 Sentences are imposed to meet the following objectives. There will be instances in which the objectives may conflict with each other – insofar as possible, sentences imposed should be geared towards meeting the objectives in totality. * + 1. **Retribution:** To punish the offender for their criminal conduct in a just manner. 2. **Deterrence:** To deter the offender from committing a similar or any other offence in future as well as to discourage the public from committing offences. 3. **Rehabilitation:** To enable the offender to reform from his/her criminal disposition and become a law-abiding person. 4. **Restorative Justice:** To address the needs arising from the criminal conduct such as loss and damages sustained by the victim or the community and to promote a sense of responsibility through the offender’s contribution towards meeting those needs. 5. **Community Protection:** To protect the community by removing the offender from the community thus avoiding the further perpetuation of the offender’s criminal acts. 6. **Denunciation:** To clearly communicate the community’s condemnation of the criminal conduct. 7. **Reconciliation:** To mend the relationship between the offender, the victim and the community. 8. **Reintegration:** To facilitate the re-entry of the offender into the society” 1. This appeal on sentence revolves solely around the complaint that the sentence imposed was excessive and that the appellant's mitigation was not considered. The trial court directed that a report be prepared in respect of the appellant. However, report was filed and referred by the court. The aspect relating to the appellant's previous conviction was addressed. Prior conviction has not been challenged in this appeal, the appellant indicates he is a first offender. According to him this was the first time he was in prison. However, it was over a series of cases, in which the appellant's main grievance is that the sentences imposed in the various cases ought to have been ordered to run concurrently. 2. The psychosocial report was filed before the trial court. It is not impressive. Secondly the appellant was afforded an opportunity to mitigate. He was not remorseful. The court appears to have considered all requisite aspects of the case, that is, the appellant's previous conviction, mitigating circumstances, and the facts of the case. Only two stools were recovered. 3. Majority of the goods stolen were not recovered. However, it must be noted that the appellant pleaded guilty and saved the court some time. The importance placed of mitigation in criminal jurisprudence was addressed in the locus classicus case of [**Muruatetu & another v Republic; Katiba Institute & 5 others (Amicus Curiae) [2017] KESC 2 (KLR)**](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kesc/2017/2/eng%402017-12-14)**,** where the supreme court [DK Maraga, PM Mwilu, JB Ojwang, SC Wanjala, N Ndungu, I Lenaola] posited as follows: 46. We are of the view that mitigation is an important congruent element of fair trial. The fact that mitigation is not expressly mentioned as a right in the Constitution does not deprive it of its necessity and essence in the fair trial process. In any case, the rights pertaining to fair trial of an accused pursuant to article 50(2) of the [Constitution](https://kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) are not exhaustive. 47.Indeed the right to fair trial is not just a fundamental right. It is one of the inalienable rights enshrined in article 10 of the [Universal Declaration of Human Rights](https://www.un.org/en/udhrbook/pdf/udhr_booklet_en_web.pdf), and in the same vein article 25(c) of the [Constitution](https://kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution) elevates it to a non-derogable right which cannot be limited or taken away from a litigant. The right to fair trial is one of the cornerstones of a just and democratic society, without which the Rule of Law and public faith in the justice system would inevitably collapse. 1. A fair trial had many facets, and included mitigation and the right to appeal or apply for review by a higher court as prescribed by law. The right of appeal on sentence has been exercised and it is not however clear if mitigation was considered. 2. The Appellant was convicted of breaking in and committing a felony contrary to section 306 of the Penal Code. He was sentenced to 7 years. He was sentenced to the maximum period given under the said section. 3. Further, maximum sentence was given despite the fact that this was a plea of guilty. The court is obligated to look at both mitigation and aggravating factors. Prior conviction only goes towards removing non-custodial sentence from the table. It does not of necessity enhance the sentence. Previous conviction and the effect thereof are set out in Section 37 of the Penal Code, as follows: Where a person after conviction for an offence is convicted of another offence, either before sentence is passed upon him under the first conviction or before the expiration of that sentence, any sentence, other than a sentence of death, which is passed upon him under the subsequent conviction shall be executed after the expiration of the former sentence, unless the court directs that it shall be executed concurrently with the former sentence or any part thereof: Provided that it shall not be lawful for a court to direct that a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of a fine shall be executed concurrently with a former sentence under subparagraph (i) of paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of section 28 or of any part thereof. 1. The court did not have regard to the sentencing guidelines. The court should at least peruse them and make one or two comments to enable the harm caused and culpability of the appellant. Sentencing guidelines provide the role of previous relevant conviction as follows: 5.1.13 Apart from factors that relate to the culpability of the offender in the execution of the offence or offences, the court will also be told of other factors that relate to the offenders’ personal circumstances, conduct after the offence, the role the offender played in the offence as a whole, and other matters raised by the defence (if represented), or elicited by the court directly from the offender through careful questioning. The prosecution may also have raised certain issues that are not directly relevant to the offence (such as assistance given to the investigation) or previous relevant convictions. This may raise or reduce the ‘moral culpability’ of the accused. 1. The court did not analyse how each of factors contributed to the conviction. Further, from the alternative count and evidence of PW1, it is clear that a substantial portion of goods stolen were recovered. The recovery should have added or subtracted from the moral culpability of the appellant. Unfortunately, both the psychosocial enquiry report and mitigation were not considered in addition to the plea of guilty. The sentence provided is that of “liable to”. There are two aspects of the punishment that should be dealt with. The first one is ‘shall’ and the second one is ‘liable to’ in one sentence, that is, “shall be liable’. The court of appeal in [**Caroline Auma Majabu v Republic [2014] KECA 269 (KLR**)](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2014/269/eng%402014-10-09) stated as follows: [13] In our view, the word “*shall*” is used in relation to the guilt of the offender and the word used in relation to the sentence is “*liable*”. The *Concise Oxford English Dictionary 12th Edition* defines the word “*liable”* as *“(i) Responsible by law, legally answerable, (liable to) subject by law to;* *(ii) (Liable to do something) likely to do something;* *(iii) (Liable to) likely to experience (something undesirable).* *Black’s* *Law Dictionary* defines “*liable*” as 1. *Responsible or answerable in law; legally obligated,* 2. *Subject to or likely to incur (a fine, penalty etc.)* 14] Applying the above definition, the use of the word “*liable”* in *section 4(a)* of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Control Act merely gives a likely maximum sentence thereby allowing a measure of discretion to the trial court in imposing sentence with the maximum limit being indicated. It should be noted that sentencing is an exercise of judicial discretion, and therefore provisions which provide for mandatory sentence compromise that discretion, and are the exception rather than the rule. Thus, where applicable the mandatory sentence must be expressed in clear and unambiguous terms. 1. Further in the case of [**Daniel Kyalo Muema V Republic [2009] KECA 431 (KLR)**](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2009/431/eng%402009-10-09)**,** the Court of Appeal [E. M. Githinji, D. K. S. Aganyanya and J. G. Nyamu], cited with approval the meaning ascribed to the term ‘shall be liable’ in the case of ***OPOYA – Vs- UGANDA [1967] E.A 752*** where it was held: The last observation we want to make is that the phrase as used in Penal statutes was judicially construed by the predecessor of this Court in Opoya vs. Uganda [1967] EA 752, where the Court said at page 754 paragraph B: “It seems to us beyond argument the words “shall be liable to” do not in their ordinary meaning require the imposition of the stated penalty but merely express the stated penalty which may be imposed at the discretion of the court. In other words they are not mandatory but provide a maximum sentence only and while the liability existed the court might not see fit to impose it” We have no doubt that the sentences of 10 years imprisonment and 20 years imprisonment prescribed in Section 3 (2) (a) of the Act for the possession of cannabis sativa are the maxima and that the court can lawfully impose any shorter term of imprisonment. Furthermore, although Section 3 (2) (a) of the Act does not expressly provide for a fine, the court can lawfully in accordance with Section 26 (3) of the Penal Code sentence the offender to pay a reasonable fine in substitution for imprisonment. From the foregoing, we conclude that the superior court misconstrued Section 3 (2) (a) of the Act and erred in enhancing the sentence of imprisonment. 1. Sentences expressed under the tenor of “liable to” are governed by section 26 of the Penal Code, which provides that where an offender is declared liable to imprisonment for life or any other period, the court retains discretion to impose a lesser sentence unless the law expressly prescribes a mandatory minimum or mandatory sentence. The said section provides as follows: * 1. A sentence of imprisonment for any offence shall be to imprisonment or to imprisonment with hard labour as may be required or permitted by the law under which the offence is punishable. 2. Save as may be expressly provided by the law under which the offence concerned is punishable, a person liable to imprisonment for life or any other period may be sentenced to any shorter term. 3. A person liable to imprisonment for an offence may be sentenced to pay a fine in addition to or in substitution for imprisonment: Provided that- * 1. where the law concerned provides for a minimum sentence of imprisonment, a fine shall not be substituted for imprisonment; 1. The use of the words “liable to” denotes the maximum sentence that may be imposed and does not, of itself, require the court to impose that sentence in every case. Accordingly, where a statute provides that an offender is “liable to” a specified term of imprisonment, the sentencing court is required to exercise its discretion judiciously, taking into account the circumstances of the offence, the offender's mitigation, any aggravating factors, and the objectives of sentencing. 2. It is understood that sentence is a matter that rests in the discretion of the trial court. The court should not lightly interfere with sentence unless the same is manifestly excessive, illegal, failed to take into account relevant circumstances or took into account irrelevant circumstances. The Court of Appeal, on its part, in **Gacheru v Republic (Criminal Appeal 188 of 2000) [2002] KECA 94 (KLR)** posited as follows: “It is now settled law, following several authorities by this Court and by the High Court, that sentence is a matter that rests in the discretion of the trial court. Similarly, sentence must depend on the facts of each case. On appeal, the appellate court will not easily interfere with sentence unless, that sentence is manifestly excessive in the circumstances of the case, or that the trial court overlooked some material factor, or took into account some wrong material, or acted on a wrong principle. Even if, the Appellate Court feels that the sentence is heavy and that the Appellate Court might itself not have passed that sentence, these alone are not sufficient grounds for interfering with the discretion of the trial court on sentence unless, anyone of the matters already states is shown to exist. 1. The superior courts have over time distilled the principles to be considered in setting aside sentence meted out by the trial court. In the case of **Shadrack Kipkoech Kogo - vs - R. Eldoret Criminal Appeal No.253 of 2003** the Court of Appeal stated thus:- ***“Sentence is essentially an exercise of discretion by the trial court and for this court to interfere it must be shown that in passing the sentence, the sentencing court took into account an irrelevant factor or that a wrong principle was applied or that short of these, the sentence itself is so excessive and therefore an error of principle must be interfered (see also Sayeka –vs- R. (1989 KLR 306)”.*** 1. The Court of Appeal for the former Eastern Africa, settled the principle that an appellate court will not ordinarily interfere with a sentence imposed by a trial court unless it is demonstrated that the trial court acted on wrong principles, overlooked material factors, considered irrelevant matters, or that the sentence is manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate in the circumstances of the case, when it addressed the same in the case of **Ogolla s/o Owuor vs. Republic, [1954] EACA 270**, and pronounced itself on this issue as follows:- *"The Court does not alter a sentence unless the trial Judge has acted upon wrong principles or overlooked some material factors.”* 1. As a first appellate court, this Court must exercise caution before interfering with the sentencing discretion of the trial court. Sentencing is primarily a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and an appellate court ought not to interfere merely because it would have imposed a different sentence. This Court must therefore be careful not to interfere with that discretion unless it is demonstrated that the trial court acted on a wrong principle, overlooked a material factor, considered an irrelevant factor, or imposed a sentence that is manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate in the circumstances. This was also addressed recently in the case of **Hillary Kipkirui Mutai v Republic [2022] KEHC 1179 (KLR)**, that: **9. Sentencing is an important aspect of the administration of justice. Noting that sentencing is based on a judicial officer’s discretion, this Court must be careful not to interfere with such a decision, unless it is demonstrated that the sentence was manifestly excessive, was illegal, improper or founded based on misrepresentation of material facts.** 1. In deciding on sentence, the court is bound by precedent and the applicable statute and sentencing guidelines. The offence the appellant was charged with is created under Burglary stealing contrary to section 304(2) of the Penal Code. The same provides as follows: *(1) Any person who-* * 1. *…* 2. *having entered any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling with intent to commit a felony therein, or having committed a felony in any such building, tent or vessel, breaks out thereof, is guilty of the felony termed housebreaking and is liable to imprisonment for seven years.* 1. The second count was the offence of section 279(b) of the Penal Code. The same provides as follows: *The theft is committed under any of the circumstances following, that is to say* *(a) …* *(b) if the thing is stolen in a dwelling-house, and its value exceeds one hundred shillings, or the offender at or immediately before or after the time of stealing uses or threatens to use violence to any person in the dwelling-house;* *The offender is liable to imprisonment for fourteen years.* 1. The question then is whether, count 1 attracts a maximum sentence of 7 years. A Sentence has to take into account the principles of proportionality and fairness. The sentencing guidelines in the situational analysis provides as follows: 4.3.4 An offender’s guilty plea rarely impacted on the decision of the courts in the past. This is because of underlying perceptions that such consideration would be tantamount to ‘rewarding’ an offender. However, today, the discounting of sentences on this basis is considered acceptable; this is because aside from the aforementioned benefits to the victims and the criminal justice system, it is a clear expression of the willingness on the part of the offender to take responsibility for their actions. In addition, an early plea of guilty increases the chances of positive outcomes of reconciliation and re-integration of the offender. 1. The policy directions are indicated as follows: 4.3.5 The court must remain guided by the overall objective, which is the conviction of the guilty. It, therefore, shall satisfy itself that the accused person fully understands what pleading guilty means and the effect of pleading guilty. 4.3.6 Where courts are satisfied that it is safe to accept a plea of guilty, they should grant a discount after considering the appropriate sentence based on culpability and harm specific to the offence alongside other aggravating and mitigating features. Once the court has arrived at that sentence, a discount of up to one third of the sentence should be applied where the offender has pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity. Thereafter, e.g., where an offender has pleaded guilty just before, or during trial, a lesser reduction may be afforded. 4.3.7 The reduction in sentence for a guilty plea can be taken into account by imposing one type of sentence rather than another – for example, by reducing a custodial sentence to one of community service or reducing community service to a fine. 4.3.8 Where an offender has indicated a plea to a lesser or different offence which is not accepted by the prosecution or the court, but is then later convicted of that lesser offence, the court should give a level of reduction that is appropriate to the stage at which that indication of plea was given. 4.3.9 In the case of a mandatory minimum sentence, the discount cannot go below that minimum term set by statute. 1. The appellant broke into a dwelling house and stole goods worth 68,850/=. Only two stools were recovered. The court is enjoined to agree with the decision in the case of **WANJEMA VS R. 1971 E.A 493**, more particularly, on page 494 letters (D) to (E). This is what that court said: A sentence must in the end, however, depend upon the facts of its own particular case. In the circumstances with which we are concerned, a custodial order was appropriately made. But that which was made cannot possibly be allowed to stand. An appellate court should not interfere with the discretion which a trial court has exercised as to sentence unless it is evident that it overlooked some material factor, took into account some immaterial factor, acted on a wrong principle or the sentence is manifestly excessive in the circumstances of the case. The instant sentence merits this court's interference with it on each of these grounds. No account was taken as it should have been, of the fact that the appellant pleaded guilty: Skone (1967), 51 Cr. App. R. 165 and Godfrey (1967), 51 Cr. App. R. 449 (This admits of no doubt because the magistrate awarded the maximum sentence to this first offender; which of itself is unusual.) Matter extraneous to the trial was acted upon for the magistrate bore in mind that he had "issued a warning only last week that dangerous drivers will be dealt with severely by the court." 1. The appellant pleaded guilty. He also indicted he had 2 children. In the circumstances, the sentence of 7 years' imprisonment for each count imposed, without the option of a fine, is manifestly excessive and wholly disproportionate to the offence committed. It omitted the benefits of pleading guilty. A period of 4 years will be proper and proportionate. For count two the maximum sentence is 14 years. However, some of the goods were recovered. A period of three years will have sufficed. 2. The appellant was arrested on 19.05.2023. However, he had been serving sentence in other matters from May 2023. Section 333(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides as follows: **(2) Subject to the provisions of section 38 of the Penal Code (Cap. 63) every sentence shall be deemed to commence from, and to include the whole of the day of, the date on which it was pronounced, except where otherwise provided in this Code.** **Provided that where the person sentenced under subsection (1) has, prior to such sentence, been held in custody, the sentence shall take account of the period spent in custody.** 1. The sentence cannot be ordered to run from the date of arrest given that he was serving other sentences. The court will not disturb the decision for sentences in the two counts to run concurrently. However, I decline to make an order relating to other offences committed in other files. ORDERS 1. Arising from the foregoing, the application is allowed. This appeal is partly allowed in the following terms: 2. Appeal on conviction is dismissed. 3. Appeal on sentence is allowed. Seven years sentence is set aside and in lieu thereof substituted with 4 years’ imprisonment for count 1 and 3 years for count 2. The two sentences to run concurrently. 4. I decline to make an order relating to other offences committed in other files. 5. 14 days right of appeal. 6. File is closed. **DELIVERED, DATED** and **SIGNED** at **NYERI** this **27th** day of **July,** the year of our Lord **Two Thousand and Twenty-Six**. Judgment delivered through Microsoft Teams Online Platform. **KIZITO MAGARE** **JUDGE** **In the presence of: -** Pro se Appellant Mr. Kihara and Ms. Akinyi for the State Court Assistant – Timothy