https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/6379

JIA v MAA (Family Originating Summons E008 of 2024) [2026] KEHC 6379 (KLR) (8 May 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 6379 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Eldoret Family Originating Summons E008 of 2024 JRA Wananda, J May 8, 2026 IN THE MATTER OF SECTIONS 7, 12, & 17 OF THE MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY ACT, NO. 49 OF 2013 AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR DIVISION OF MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY Between JIA Applicant and MAA Respondent Ruling 1.This Ruling is on an Application seeking basically seeking an interlocutory injunction pending the hearing and determination of this Cause. I delivered an earlier Ruling in this matter on 20/06/2025, in which I dismissed a Preliminary Objection, and in which Ruling I set out the background of the instant Application, including its prayers and grounds, as follows:“ 2.The background of the matter is that the Applicant, vide the Originating Summons dated 6/12/2024 filed through Messrs Kesse & Kesse Advocates, sought orders that several parcels of land and a motor vehicle be declared to be matrimonial property, that the Court declares that the Applicant made contribution, financial or otherwise, to the acquisition of the said properties and that he is therefore entitled to a share thereof, and that the properties be registered in the joint names of the Applicant and the Respondent. 3.The grounds of the Application are that the parties are a married couple and acquired the said properties during the subsistence of the marriage, that although the agreements of sale and title documents are in the name of the Respondent, the Applicant contributed to the acquisition of the properties in purchase and in development. It was also alleged that despite the above, the Respondent wants to evict the Applicant from the properties, and that the Respondent has filed a Divorce Cause seeking dissolution of the marriage. 4.Together with the Originating Summons, the Applicant also filed a Chamber Summons seeking, pending the hearing and determination of this matter, temporary injunction restraining the Respondent from disposing of the properties, an order directing the Respondent to furnish a true account of all income collected from two of the properties, and also an order that the income therefrom be deposited in a joint bank account. 5.In response to the Application for temporary injunction, the Respondent, through Messrs Betty Mwenesi & Co. Associates Advocates, filed the Preliminary Objection date 9/01/2025. It was then agreed that the Preliminary Objection be heard and determined first.” 2.To put the matter in full context, I will reproduce, verbatim, the prayers sought, in the Application as follows:i.That the instant Application be certified urgent and the same be heard ex parte in the first instance.ii.That pending the inter-partes hearing of this Application, this Court be pleased to issue an order of temporary injunction restraining the Respondent whether by herself, her servants, employees, agents, assigns or any other person whoever directed by her, from selling, transferring, mortgaging, disposing and otherwise alienating all those properties known as;a)Eldoret Municipality Block 19(Sambo)/202 measuring 0.09 Ha (inclusive of all the developments thereon)b)Mavoko Town Block 3/37785 measuring 0.0447 Ha.c)Mavoko Town Block 3/37786 measuring 0.045 Ha.d)Mavoko Town Block 3/37787 measuring 0.045 Ha (inclusive of all the developments thereon).e)Mavoko Town Block 3/35490 measuring 0.0287 Haf)Mavoko Town Block 3/80144 measuring 0.2 Ha.g)Motor Vehicle Registration number KCQ 451Q Mitsubishi Pajero Mini S. Wagon.h)Land at Webuye (developed).iii.Pending inter-partes hearing of this Application, this Court be pleased to issue an order directing the Respondent to furnish a true account of all the income collected from the family residential premises built on Eldoret Municipality Block 19/(Sambo)/202 and Mavoko Town Block 3/37787, and an order that the income from all these properties be deposited in a joint account to be opened by the parties herein.iv.That pending hearing of the main suit herein, this Court be pleased to issue an order of temporary injunction restraining the Respondent whether by herself, her servants, employees, agents, assigns or any other person whoever directed by her, from selling, transferring, mortgaging, disposing and otherwise alienating all those properties known as Eldoret Municipality Block 19/(Sambo)/202, Mavoko Town Block 3/37785, Mavoko Town Block 3/37786, Mavoko Town Block 3/37787, Mavoko Town Block 3/35490, Mavoko Town Block 3/80144, parcel of land at Webuye (developed) and Motor Vehicle Registration number KCQ 451Q.v.That costs be in the Cause. 3.The other relevant matter deponed by the Applicant in his Supporting Affidavit is that the couple officially got married on 29/04/2018 and the marriage was blessed with 2 children, and that it is during the subsistence of the marriage that they acquired the properties referred to above. He further deponed that the parties established their matrimonial home on the parcel of land Mavoko Town Block 3/37787 where they have also constructed 5 bed-sitter rental rooms. He contended further that in the parcel of land Eldoret Municipality Block 19(Sambo)/202, they have also constructed a rental apartment which contains eight-2 bed room units each for a monthly rent of Kshs 15,000/-, and 5 bed-sitter units each for a monthly rent of Kshs 5,000/-. He also deponed that the plot in Webuye is still under construction and the rest of the properties are yet to be developed. The Applicant urged further that although all the properties are registered in the name of the Respondent, he contributed substantially to their purchase and development through his salary as a Kenya Defence Force Officer, and loan facilities he secured from banks. 4.The Preliminary Objection was framed on the grounds that the Court’s jurisdiction has not been invoked by the Applicant, that the Application is incompetent and the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the same, that the Application offends the provisions for grant of injunctive orders, and that the Application is bad in law and ought to be struck out. It is therefore this Preliminary Objection that I dismissed by the Ruling rendered on 20/06/2025 as aforesaid. 5.With the Preliminary Objection now disposed of, I will now recount the contents of the Affidavit sworn by the Respondent on 3/07/2025 in response to the Application. 6.In summary, the Respondent confirmed that she and the Applicant got officially married on 29/04/2018 but clarified that their two children were born prior to solemnization of the marriage. She denied that the couple jointly acquired the above properties during subsistence of the marriage, and deponed that most of the properties, including the matrimonial home, and also the motor vehicle registration number, were solely purchased by herself prior to the marriage, and also developed by herself through loans, and that the Applicant has not produced anything to demonstrate that he contributed thereto. She pointed out that the Applicant has referred to some alleged properties as “the parcel of land in Webuye under construction and others which have not been developed”, and deponed that, as such, she is unable to comment on such anonymous alleged properties. She also pointed out that although she is the one who filed the Petition for Divorce in Milimani Commercial Law Magistrate’s Court Family Division Divorce Cause No. 1054 of 2024, the Applicant Cross-Petitioned, in the same matter, for divorce as well. She urged that it beats logic as to why all the properties were registered in her name rather than the couple’s joint names if indeed the Applicant made any contributions, and that, in any event, the Applicant has not produced any evidence to demonstrate that she has any intentions of transferring the properties. 7.With leave of the Court, the Applicant filed the Further Affidavit he swore on 25/06/2025. He deponed that he and the Respondent actually got married in the year 2007 because, before the marriage was subsequently solemnized in 2018, they had earlier got married under Luhya customary law in the year 2007, and that they lived as husband and wife until the year 2024 when the Respondent decided to divorce him. He then reiterated that he contributed to acquisition of the properties and pointed out that the Applicant had admitted in her Affidavit that the parcel of land Mavoko Town Block 3/37787 constituted their matrimonial home. 8.Also with leave of the Court, the Respondent filed the Supplementary Affidavit filed on 27/10/2025, in which she deponed that the Divorce Cause had since been concluded and to which she attached copies of the Judgment delivered therein on 9/07/2025, and the Certificate of Making Decree Absolute given on 11/08/2025. 9.The parties then filed written Submissions. The Applicant’s Submissions is dated 30/10/2025, while the Respondent’s is dated 6/11/2025. I however notice that subsequently, a Notice of Change of Advocates was filed appointing Messrs Bwonwonga & Co. Advocates to take over representation of the Applicant in place of Messrs Kesse & Kesse Advocates. Petitioner’s Submissions 10.Mr. Kesse, formerly Counsel for the Applicant, in his brief Submissions, basically reiterated the matters already set out above, including that although all the properties were registered solely in the name of the Respondent, they constitute matrimonial property as the Applicant contributed in acquisition and/or development thereof. He also reiterated that the Respondent has been solely enjoying the rental income from the premises on plots Eldoret Municipality Block 19/(Sambo)/202 and Mavoko Town Block 3/37787. He then cited Section 9 of the Matrimonial Property Act on acquisition of interest in matrimonial property, and also the case of Giellla v Cassman Brown [1973] E.A. 348 on grant of injunctions. Respondents’ Submissions 11.Ms. Mwenesi, Counsel for the Respondent, raised the issue that an interlocutory injunction cannot be granted in this matter as sought because the Applicant’s pleadings do not include a declaratory prayer that the properties constitute “matrimonial property”, and there is therefore no foundation for the prayer for injunction. I have struggled to understand this line of submissions since a look at the Originating Summons filed herein reveals that at prayer 1 thereof, it seeks exactly that, an order that the Court “do declare” the properties in question “to be matrimonial property”. Is it possible that perhaps, the Respondent’s Advocates were never served with the Originating Summons and may therefore be unaware of its existence? I leave that to speculation. 12.In any event, the above challenge does not seem to have been among those expressly raised in the Respondent’s Preliminary Objection that I already dealt with. I will not therefore deal with that issue as doing so will be encouraging parties to litigate their cases in instalments. That issue will now have to perhaps await determination of the full case, if at all such a window will still exist by then. 13.For the rest of her Submissions, Counsel submitted that the Divorce Court already determined that the marriage between the parties was solemnized on 18/04/2018 as the alleged earlier customary marriage portion was never registered, which determination the Applicant never appealed against. According to her therefore, no proprietary rights arise in the properties. She also reiterated that the properties were solely acquired by the Respondent with no contribution from the Applicant, and that the Applicant has not produced any evidence of his contribution. She pointed out some of the alleged evidence produced by the Applicant, such as a loan statement refers to a loan advanced in 2021-2023 long after the properties had been acquired. She also pointed out that an Mpesa Statement produced ranges for a period of up to 9 years and only adds to an aggregate amount sent of only about Kshs 536,692/-. She also submitted that if, as alleged by the Applicant, the parties mutually agreed to register the properties in the name of the Respondent, there was nothing difficult to reduce that agreement into writing. She referred to the provisions of Section 6(3) and (4) of the Matrimonial Property Act, and also the case of Federation of Women Lawyers Kenya (FIDA) vs. Attorney General & Another [2018] eKLR on pre-nuptial agreements. Counsel then urged that the provision in Article 45(3) of the Constitution that grants equal rights before, during, and at the dissolution of a marriage, must be read together with Section 7 of the Matrimonial Property Act, which qualifies that such equality of rights does not mean automatic equal division, but rather division according to proven contribution. She cited the case of ENK vs. JMK [2018] eKLR, and also the case of TMW vs. FMC [2018] eKLR. She asserted further that the Divorce Court having already determined that the marriage commenced in 2018, any claim based on the alleged cohabitation from 2010 to 2018 has no legal foundation and that a presumption of marriage must be specifically pleaded and proved, which the Applicant has not done in this case. Counsel therefore, in the end, submitted that no prima facie case has been established to justify grant of an injunction. Determination 14.The issue that calls for determination in this matter is “whether, pending hearing and determination of this Cause, a temporary injunction should be issued to restrain the Respondent from disposing, transferring or in any other way alienating the properties the subject of this matter”. 15.Although the Applicant has approached the Court under the provisions of Order 40 of the Civil Procedure Rules, this being a division of matrimonial property case, Rule 20(2) of the Matrimonial Property Rules, 2022 enacted under the Matrimonial Property Act No. 49 of 2013 ought to have also been invoked as the primary provision. The Rule provides as follows:“A party to the proceedings may, before or after commencement of the proceedings under these Rules, but before the final determination of the respective claims, apply for temporary injunctions or other interlocutory orders in accordance with Order 40 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, and the court may grant the orders sought on such terms or conditions as may be just in the circumstances.” 16.On its part, Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules provides that;Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise —(a)that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged, or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree; or(b)that the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property in circumstances affording reasonable probability that the plaintiff will or may be obstructed or delayed in the execution of any decree that may be passed against the defendant in the suit, the court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal, or disposition of the property as the court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. 17.The principles that guide a Court in dealing with applications for injunctions were well settled in the celebrated case of Giella –vs-Cassman Brown and Company Limited, Civil appeal No. 51 of 1972, in which it was held as follows;i.The Applicant must establish a prima facie case with a probability of success.ii.Applicant has to demonstrate that it will suffer irreparable injury which cannot be compensated by damages.iii.Applicant has to demonstrate that balance of convenience tilts in its favour. 18.In Nguruman Limited v Jane Bonde Nielsen and 2 Others, NRB CA Civil Appeal No. 77 of 2012 [2014] eKLR, the Court of Appeal reiterated the above principles by giving the following guidelines:“These are the three pillars on which rests the foundation of any order of injunction, interlocutory or permanent. It is established that all the above three conditions and stages are to be applied as separate, distinct and logical hurdles which the applicant is expected to surmount sequentially. (See Kenya Commercial Finance Co. Ltd V. Afraha Education Society [2001] Vol. 1 EA 86). If the applicant establishes a prima facie case that alone is not sufficient basis to grant an interlocutory injunction, the court must further be satisfied that the injury the respondent will suffer, in the event the injunction is not granted, will be irreparable. In other words, if damages recoverable in law is an adequate remedy and the respondent is capable of paying, no interlocutory order of injunction should normally be granted, however strong the applicant’s claim may appear at that stage. If prima facie case is not established, then irreparable injury and balance of convenience need no consideration. The existence of a prima facie case does not permit “leap-frogging” by the applicant to injunction directly without crossing the other hurdles in between.” 19.The first limb that I have to therefore determine is whether the Petitioner has established a prima facie case. What constitutes a prima facie case was discussed in the case of Mrao Ltd vs. First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2003] KLR 125, in which the Court of Appeal guided as follows:“It may not be easy to define what is meant by “prima facie case”, but at least it must mean one on which a reasonable tribunal, properly directing its mind to the law and the evidence could convict if no explanation is offered by the defence ...The terms “prima facie” case, and “genuine and arguable” case do not necessarily mean the same thing, for in using another term, namely a sustainable cause of action, the words “prima facie” are frequently used to refer to a case which shifts the evidential burden of proof, rather than as giving rise to a legal burden of proof in the manner of considering, which was in relation to the pleadings that had been put forward in the case. It would be in the appellant’s interest to adopt a genuine and arguable case standard rather than one of a prima facie case, the former being the lesser standard of the two ... In civil cases a prima facie case is a case in which on the material presented to the Court a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter. A prima facie case is more than an arguable case. It is not sufficient to raise issues but the evidence must show an infringement of a right, and the probability of success of the Applicant’s case upon trial. That is clearly a standard, which is higher than an arguable case.” 20.The Petitioner’s case is hinged on the fact that the property in question is “matrimonial property” and that the same may be sold or alienated before determination of the main Cause herein. On this point, Section 2 of the Matrimonial Property Act defines “matrimonial home” as follows:“Matrimonial home” means any property that is owned or leased by one or both spouses and occupied or utilized by the spouses as their family home, and includes any other attached property.” 21.Further Section 6 of the Matrimonial Property Act gives the meaning of “matrimonial home” to be as follows:(a)the matrimonial home or homes;(b)household goods and effects in the matrimonial home or home;(c)or any other immovable and movable property jointly owned and acquired during the subsistence of the marriage. 22.Section 7 then stipulates the manner in which “matrimonial property” is to be divided where a situation requiring such division arises. It provides that:“Subject to section 6(3), ownership of matrimonial property vests in the spouses according to the contribution of either spouse towards its acquisition, and shall be divided between the spouses if they divorce or their marriage is otherwise dissolved.” 23.Section 12(1) provides further protection to the matrimonial home in the following terms;“an estate or interest in any matrimonial property shall not, during the subsistence of a monogamous marriage and without the consent of both spouses, be alienated in any form, whether by way of sale, gift, lease, mortgage or otherwise.” 24.In this matter, there is no dispute that the parties were married but are now divorced with effect from 11/08/2025, the date of the Certificate of Making Decree Absolute issued. The Applicant has deponed that they cohabited since 2007 after contracting a Luhya customary law marriage, which marriage they subsequently solemnized in church in 2018 before the same was dissolved in 2018 as aforesaid. According to the Applicant therefore, the couple was married for about 18 years. According to the Respondent however, the Divorce Court having found that the alleged customary marriage was never registered, the only relevant period is from 2018 to 2025. This is an issue that will have to be determined after full trial of the case. 25.Be that as it may, it is not in dispute that the properties in contention in this matter are all registered in the sole name of the Respondent. It is also not in dispute that most, if not all, save for the motor vehicle, were acquired before 2018. However, the Applicant contends that the properties having been acquired after 2007 when they began cohabiting, they constitute “matrimonial property”, and he is therefore entitled to make a claim thereon, and also insists that he contributed to acquisition and development thereof. The Respondent, on her part, vehemently denies these allegations, and strongly asserts that she single-handedly acquired the properties before the marriage was solemnized in 2018. 26.As aforesaid, the issue whether the properties constitute “matrimonial property”, and/or whether the Applicant contributed to acquisition or development thereof, will be determined after full hearing of the suit. I cannot at this determine therefore speculate how the trial Court will rule. All I can say at this stage, however, is that the Applicant’s claims, although he will face a huge hurdle to surmount at the trial to prove the same, cannot be outrightly declared to be frivolous or devoid of any chances of success. Although therefore for the Applicant to successfully explain how and why he allowed all the properties to be registered solely in the name of the Respondent will not be an easy task, it cannot be outrightly stated that he cannot convince the Court over the same. At the moment, the Respondent, as compared to the Applicant, appears to have produced stronger evidence to demonstrate that she, alone, single-handedly, acquired the properties. This is because she has demonstrated that she secured hefty loans on different occasions, and has also produced Sale Agreements bearing only her name as the purchaser. On his part, the Applicant has barely produced any documentation to demonstrate his contribution. It is however true that contribution by a spouse or former spouse is not measured only in terms of financial basis but also on the basis of other non-monetary support. I cannot, at this stage, also tell whether, for purposes of the Matrimonial Property Act, the trial Court will deem the marriage to have commenced from the year 2007 when the Applicant alleges that the parties started cohabiting after contracting a customary marriage, or as from 2018 when the marriage was solemnized in church. I cannot tell whether the trial Court will therefore follow the determination made by the Divorce Court to that effect, or whether it will deem that finding to have been limited to the purposes of the Marriage Act and thus only on the issue of the divorce. What I cannot however ignore is the fact that the parties were in a marriage, and should the trial Court therefore agree with the Applicant that the properties constitute “matrimonial property”, then it follows that the Applicant shall be entitled to a share thereof, which share, if any, the trial Court will determine on the basis of proof of individual contribution. There are therefore, in my view, arguable rival contentions presented by both parties which deserve to be heard and determined after a full trial. 27.It is a fact that in Kenya or Africa in general, being paternalistic societies, we are used to the opposite situation, that is, properties registered in the sole name of the husband, even where jointly acquired with the wife. It is not therefore common to find cases such as this instant one, where all the properties in question are registered in the name of the wife and it is the husband who is claiming that he made contributions in their acquisition. It is therefore understandable that in a case such as this one, the ex-husband may find himself hard pressed to explain how it came to be that all the properties ended up being registered in the name of the wife. In fact, where such contribution is claimed by the husband at the time of divorce, the natural suspicion for many will be that the funds used to acquire the properties were illicitly received and registration in the wife’s name, was therefore most probably done, with the wife’s collusion, to conceal the “dirty” trail of funds. I make this comparison not in any way to infer or cast any aspersions on the propriety or bona fides of the couple in this matter, far from it, but simply to demonstrate why ex-husbands in these kind of situations, in Applications of this nature, may find themselves heavily disadvantaged, or in more difficult positions to explain the status, and why it is therefore easy to write their claims off, and to thus conclude that they have failed to establish a prima facie case. 28.Having found as above, what will therefore happen if suppose the Respondent today disposes all the properties? Where will that leave the Applicant should he succeed at the trial? To me, this is the bigger consideration having ruled as above, that the Applicant’s case, though heavily disadvantaged by the fact that all the properties are registered in the name of the Respondent, is not a hopelessly frivolous one and cannot thus be outrightly termed an effort in futility. 29.In this case therefore, with the above appreciation of real-life situations, and based on the material placed before me, I am persuaded that the Applicant, although he obviously faces a herculean task at the trial, has to an acceptable extent, established a prima facie case worthy of his being given his day in Court. Although a final determination of the issues arising must await the full hearing of the suit, it is my considered view the Applicant has, in the meantime, surmounted the first hurdle of establishing that he has a prima facie case. In my view, he has demonstrated, for purposes of the prayer for a temporary injunction, that there exists an arguable case with some probability of success. This obviously does not mean that the Applicant will necessarily succeed at the full trial, but rather, that there is some basis upon which this Court can restrain the Respondent from selling, disposing or in any other way alienating the properties pending full resolution of the dispute. 30.Although I have therefore found that the Applicant has demonstrated the existence of a prima facie case, as was guided in the case of Nguruman Limited (supra), the requirements in an interlocutory injunction application are the three pillars on which rest the foundation of any order of injunction and all the three and stages are to be applied as separate, distinct and logical hurdles which the applicant is expected to surmount sequentially. 31.The second ingredient that this Court has to therefore consider is whether the Petitioner will suffer irreparable injury which will not be compensated by damages. On this, I again allude to Nguruman Limited case (supra) where the following was expressed:“On the second factor, that the applicant must establish that he “might otherwise” suffer irreparable injury which cannot be adequately remedied by damages in the absence of an injunction, is a threshold requirement and the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate, prima face, the nature and extent of the injury. Speculative injury will not do; there must be more than an unfounded fear or apprehension on the part of the applicant. The equitable remedy of temporary injunction is issued solely to prevent grave and irreparable injury; that is injury that is actual, substantial and demonstrable; injury that cannot “adequately” be compensated by an award of damages. An injury is irreparable where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy or the injury or harm is such a nature that monetary compensation, of whatever amount, will never be adequate remedy.” 32.I appreciate that the Respondent has deponed that he has no intention of alienating or disposing the properties. I have no reason to disbelieve her and I agree that no evidence has been presented to demonstrate that she has put in place any plans to do so. However, in the absence of an injunction, what stops the Respondent from putting the properties on sale, or even mortgaging the same to financial institutions, or offering the same as security?. There is therefore a real threat that the properties may be placed beyond the reach of the Applicant, or even the Court before the main Cause is heard and determined. I am therefore satisfied that there is possibility that the eventualities stated under Order 40 of the Civil Procedure Rules may indeed arise to the disadvantage of the Applicant before the live issues herein are determined. Given the nature of the Cause, the Applicant would obviously suffer irreparably if the properties were to be so disposed of, or alienated before his claims are determined on merits, and his suit may well be rendered nugatory. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the Applicant may suffer irreparable injury, which injury may not be adequately compensated by an award of damages. 33.As regards the third limb, balance of convenience, I associate myself with the decision in Pius Kipchirchir Kogo vs. Frank Kimeli Tenai [2018] eKLR where it was held as follows:“The meaning of balance of convenience in favor of the plaintiff is that if an injunction is not granted and the suit is ultimately decided in favor of the plaintiffs, the inconvenience caused to the plaintiff would be greater than that which would be caused to the defendants if an injunction is granted but the suit is ultimately dismissed. Although it is called balance of convenience it is really the balance of inconvenience and it is for the plaintiffs to show that the inconvenience caused to them would be greater than that which may be caused to the defendants. Should the inconvenience be equal, it is the plaintiffs who suffer? In other words, the plaintiffs have to show that the comparative mischief from the inconvenience which is likely to arise from withholding the injunction will be greater than which is likely to arise from granting it.” 34.I am also guided by the case of Paul Gitonga Wanjau vs. Gathuthis Tea Factor Company Ltd & 2 others (2016) eKLR, where the Court expressed itself as follows:“Where any doubt exists as to the applicants’ right, or if the right is not disputed, but its violation is denied, the court, in determining whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted, takes into consideration the balance of convenience to the parties and the nature of the injury which the Respondent on the other hand, would suffer if the injunction was granted and he should ultimately turn out to be right and that which injury the applicant, on the other hand, might sustain if the injunction was refused and he should ultimately turn out to be right ……. Thus, the court makes a determination as to which party will suffer the greater harm with the outcome of the motion. If applicant has a strong case on the merits or there is significant irreparable harm, it may influence the balance in favour of granting an injunction. The court will seek to maintain the status quo in determining where the balance on convenience lies. " 35.Applying the above principles, it is my view that it is the Applicant who stands to suffer greater harm if the injunction is not granted. I find that he will suffer more if the injunction is denied, the property is disposed of as a result, and he ultimately turns out to be right after the trial than the suffering that the Respondent will undergo if the injunction is granted, the property preserved and the Respondent ultimately turns out to be right after the trial. 36.I however agree with the Respondent that the alleged property described as “parcel of land at Webuye (developed)”, being an ambiguous description, cannot be included in the list of properties to be injuncted. 37.There is also the prayer that the Respondent be ordered to furnish a true account of all the income collected from the residential premises built on Eldoret Municipality Block 19/(Sambo)/202 and Mavoko Town Block 3/37787, and an order that the income from those properties be deposited in a joint account to be opened by the parties. I am not convinced that the Applicant has justified this prayer in any way. He has not disclosed for how long the Respondent has been collecting the rent, and why he has never before taken any step to seek the orders that is now seeking. The question is why now? From his disclosure of the amount of rent received, I estimate the aggregate monthly rental income to amount to about Kshs 145,000/- if all the units are occupied. Assuming that it is the Respondent who lives with the 2 children since the Applicant has not claimed any such responsibility, I do not find this amount to be too high such that the Applicant can at this stage, be accused of misusing the funds noting that she has not been alleged to have any alternative or further income. I, in fact, find the amount to be barely sufficient to cater for the Respondent’s reasonable upkeep and that denying her access to that rental income is likely to render her destitute. I am not therefore persuaded that the Applicant has presented any justification as to why the Respondent should be compelled to account for the rental income at this stage, and how, in any case, such accounting of the income will assist his case before the trial. He has therefore not justified why the Respondent, who is the sole registered owner of the properties should be suddenly barred from receiving the income, or why the funds should be deposited in a joint account. I also note that the prayer was sought only “pending the hearing and determination of this Application”, not of the main suit or Cause. Since the said wording has not been amended, it means that the prayer is now technically “spent”. For these reasons, I decline this prayer. Final Orders 38.In the premises, the Applicant’s Notice of Motion dated 6/12/2025 only partially succeeds, and only to the extent stated hereinbelow:i.Accordingly, pending the hearing of the main suit herein, a temporary or interlocutory injunction is hereby issued restraining the Respondent, whether by herself, her servants, employees, agents, assigns or any other person whoever directed by her, from selling, transferring, mortgaging, disposing and otherwise alienating all those properties known as Eldoret Municipality Block 19/(Sambo)/202, Mavoko Town Block 3/37785, Mavoko Town Block 3/37786, Mavoko Town Block 3/37787, Mavoko Town Block 3/35490, Mavoko Town Block 3/80144, and Motor Vehicle Registration number KCQ 451Q Mitsubishi Pajero Mini S. Wagon.ii.Costs of the Application shall await the outcome of the main Cause. DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED AT NAIROBI THIS 8TH DAY OF MAY 2026………………..………..WANANDA JOHN R. ANUROJUDGEDelivered in the presence of:Mr. Bwonwonga for the ApplicantMr. Nyamweya, incoming Advocate for the RespondentMs. Mwenesi for the RespondentCourt Assistant: Brian Kimathi