John & 2 others v Odour (Civil Appeal 143 of 2017) [2026] KEHC 5621 (KLR) (27 April 2026) (Judgment)

John & 2 others v Odour (Civil Appeal 143 of 2017) [2026] KEHC 5621 (KLR) (27 April 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 5621 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nakuru Civil Appeal 143 of 2017 PN Gichohi, J April 27, 2026 Between Koskei John 1st Appellant Geoffrey Mwangi 2nd Appellant Mwihia Macharia 3rd Appellant and Nicholas Ochieng Odour Respondent (Being an Appeal against the Judgment by Honourable B. MARARO (Principal Magistrate) in Nakuru CMCC NO 1170 of 2014 read on the 5th October, 2017) Judgment 1.The background of this Appeal is that the Respondent herein had sued the Appellants vide the Plaint dated 18th November, 2014, Amended on 11th March, 2015 and Further Amended on 30th September, 2016, seeking the following reliefs:-a.General damages, damages for loss of earnings and earning capacity.b.Future medical expensesc.Special damagesd.Costs of this suite.Interest on (a),(b) and (c) above. 2.The factual basis of the suit is that on or about 29th June, 2014, while the Respondent was lawfully cycling a motorcycle registration number KMCW 331H along Flamingo stadium road near Gulf, the 3rd Appellant so negligently drove, managed and or controlled motor vehicle registration number KAU610B as a result of which it violently knocked and subsequently caused the Respondent serious injuries to wit; Compounded comminuted fracture of the right tibia and fibula in the distal one third, oblique fracture of the right fibula in the upper one third, deep lacerations on the right forearm, lacerations on the right knee and bruises on the face. 3.The particulars of negligence were that the 3rd Appellant failed to keep proper lookout or to have any sufficient regard for other road users, driving and managing the vehicle at excessive speed, failing to slow down, stop, or act in any way to avoid the collision, driving a defective motor vehicle in the circumstances and failing to apply brakes on time to avoid the accident and instead knocking off the motor cycle registration number KMCW 331H from its proper lane of travel. 4.The 1st Appellant was sued as the registered owner, while the 2nd Appellant was the beneficial and or insured owners, as such they are pleaded to be vicariously liable for the accident caused by their driver, 3rd Appellant. 5.The 2nd and 3rd Appellant herein filed their joint defence dated 26th January, 2015, denying the claim in its entirety. However, on a without prejudice basis, they alleged that the Respondent substantially contributed to the accident for his own negligence which they particularised to include; failing to take adequate precaution for his own safety, failing to wear any or sufficient protective apparel, overtaking dangerously and carelessly, dangerously and carelessly, riding without due regard to other road users, riding as excessive speed, changing lanes on a roundabout and generally failing to take proper look out for other road users. They therefore prayed for the suit to be dismissed with costs. 6.Upon hearing all the parties, the trial court found the Appellants 100% liable, jointly and severally, for the accident, arguing that, according to the Respondent’s evidence, the 3rd Appellant drove into the Respondent’s lane while overtaking another vehicle to avoid a pothole. Thus, since the defence did not tender any evidence or find any evidence to the contrary, the court concluded there was no proof of negligence on the part of the Respondent. 7.In respect to quantum, the trial court in determining the appropriate award for damages, considered the severity of the Respondent’s injuries, which included compound fractures of the right tibia and fibula, shortening of the limb, and a 30% permanent disability, as well as the impact of inflation. 8.Accordingly, the court awarded Kshs. 1,700,000 for pain and suffering. Additionally, the court awarded Kshs. 200,000 for future medical expenses, as recommended by medical testimony. 9.Regarding the loss of earning capacity, the court noted the Respondent was a boda operator but lacked proof of actual earnings. Consequently, the court applied the minimum wage of Kshs.10,107.10 and a multiplier based on the plaintiff’s age of 30, ultimately awarding a global sum of Kshs. 800,000. 10.Finally, the court awarded Kshs. 192,882 for special damages that were pleaded and proved, together with costs and interest at court rates. 11.Dissatisfied with that decision, the Appellants herein lodged this Appeal vide a Memorandum of Appeal dated 18th October, 2017 based on the following grounds:-1.The trial Magistrate erred in fact and in law in awarding excessive general damages of Kshs 1,700,000 for two fractures, the Plaintiff alleged sustained, which injuries were in dispute.2.The trial Magistrate erred in fact and in law in awarding future medical expenses without basis or proof of the same.3.The trial Magistrate erred in fact and in law in awarding loss of income and future earning capacity without basis or proof of the same.4.The Learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to accord due regard to the Appellants submissions on quantum on applicable principles for assessment of damages. 12.Accordingly, the Appellants urged the Court to grant the following Orders;-1.This Appeal be allowed with costs.2.The Judgment on quantum by the Honourable B. MARARO (Principal Magistrate) in Nakuru CMCC NO 1170 of 2014, delivered on the 5th October, 2017, be set aside, and this Honourable Court be pleased to assess damages afresh.3.The cost of the appeal be borne by the Respondents. 13.This Appeal was canvassed by written submissions. The Appellants submissions are dated 26th October, 2021, and 27th October, 2021, while the Respondent’s submissions are dated 15th May, 2025, and filed on the same date. Appellants’ Submissions 14.The Appellants concede that the record clearly shows the Respondent sustained the enumerated injuries. While acknowledging that assessing damages is discretionary, the Appellants argue this discretion must be exercised judicially and based on legal principles. In this, they rely on the case of Kemfro Africa Limited t/a Meru Express Services (1976) & Another v Lubia & Another (No. 2) [1985] eKLR, where the court held that;-“The principles to be observed by an appellate court in deciding whether it is justified in disturbing the quantum of damages awarded by a trial judge were held by the former Court of Appeal of East Africa to be that it must be satisfied that either the judge, in assessing the damages took into account an irrelevant factor, or disregarded a relevant one, or that short of this, the amount is so inordinately low or so inordinately high that it must be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage.” 15.In convincing this court to interfere with the trial court decision, they rely on the case of Kigaragari v Aya [1985] KLR 273 to argue for moderation and consistency in judicial awards to ensure insurance remains affordable and was held by the Court:-“It is also a matter of public policy that the awards should not be so high as to make the cost of insurance high and even unaffordable by the public. This is because at the end of the day, it is the members of the public who pay for the heavy awards through increased premiums.” 16.The Appellant also submit that the need to have consistency in awards ensures insurance remains affordable for the public. To support this case, reliance is placed on the case of Cecilia W. Mwangi & Another v Ruth W. Mwangi [1997] eKLR to reemphasise the need for awards to be reasonable and comparable to similar cases. The Appellants contend that the trial court's awards for general damages and loss of earning capacity are unfair, unjustified, and manifestly high. They argue that the best guide for quantum is to look at recent awards in comparable cases within local courts to maintain uniformity. 17.On that note, they cite the case of Biojoule Kenya Limited v John Njoroge Kiumu [2020] eKLR where an award of Kshs. 750,000 was made; John Mwangi Munyiri & Another v Paul Wachira Njuguna [2020] eKLR, where an award of Kshs 1,000,000 was made, and Francis Ndungu Wambui & 2 Others v VK [2019] eKLR, where the court awarded Kshs 800,000. 18.They therefore submit that based on the specific fractures sustained by the Respondent as the basis for their comparison, the comparative court awards range between Kshs. 750,000.00 and Kshs. 1,000,000.00 for similar tibia and fibula fractures. On that basis, the Appellants urge the Court to award the sum of Kshs. 800,000.00 as the trial court’s award of Kshs 1.7 million was excessive. 19.Citing Mumias Sugar Company Limited V Francis Wanalo[2007] eKLR, the Appellants distinguish between loss of future earnings as the actual proven loss and loss of earning capacity as the diminution of capacity compensated via general damages to show that loss of earning capacity has no fixed formula and depends on specific circumstances. 20.Consequently, they quote Dr. Kiamba's initial medical report, which stated the fractures would take three months to unite, followed by physiotherapy. They note the doctor’s oral testimony, which suggested potential complications like osteoarthritis and a 30% permanent disability. However, the trial magistrate awarded a global sum of Kshs 800,000.00 despite a lack of proof of actual earnings. 21.The Appellants argue there was no evidence of a permanent inability to earn, noting the doctor only anticipated incapacity for two years. They claim the Respondent failed to prove his future employment chances were diminished by the injuries. Citing Catherine Gatwiri v Peter Mwenda Karaai [2018] eKLR, they argue that such claims must be proved to a high standard, which the Respondent failed to meet. Consequently, the Appellants submit that the entire award for loss of earning capacity should be dismissed. 22.Regarding costs of Appeal, the Appellants rely on section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, to argue that costs should follow the event, meaning the successful party should be reimbursed. They thus urge this Court to set aside the trial judgment and reassess the quantum as proposed, and the Appeal be allowed with costs. Respondent’s Submissions 23.The Respondent begins by reminding the Court that, as a first appeal, the High Court has the duty to evaluate the evidence from the trial court afresh to reach its own independent conclusion. However, citing Section 78 of the Civil Procedure Act, the Respondent argues that the Court should not interfere with the trial court's findings of fact unless they were based on no evidence or a misapprehension of the evidence, given that the trial magistrate had the unique advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. In support of this position, they cited the case of Kiruga v Kiruga & Another [1988] KLR 348, which established that an appellate court should only substitute factual findings if the trial Court was plainly wrong. 24.The Respondent clarifies that the crux of the appeal is specifically about the quantum and questions whether the trial court erred in its assessment of these damages. Citing Power Lighting Comp. Ltd & Another vs. Zakayo Saitoti Naingola & Another [2008] eKLR, the Respondent outlines the principles of assessing damages, that they should be compensatory rather than enriching, commensurate with injuries, and adjusted for inflation and purchasing power. 25.The Respondent further cites Tridev Construction vs. Charles Wekesa Kasembeli Civil Appeal No. 121 of 2002 and Kemfro Africa Ltd t/a Meru Express Service Gathogo Kanini vs. A. M. Lubia and Olive Lubia (1982-88) 1 KAR 727, asserting that an appellate court should only disturb an award if the judge considered irrelevant factors, ignored relevant ones, or reached a wholly erroneous estimate. 26.Regarding specific injuries, the Respondent details that the claimant suffered a compound comminuted fracture of the right tibia and fibula, an oblique fracture of the right fibula, deep lacerations on the forearm and knee, and facial bruises. Medical testimony from PW1 (the doctor) confirmed these injuries, noting a 2cm shortening of the leg, bone infection (osteoarthritis), and a 30% permanent disability that prevents the Respondent from riding a motorcycle. Further, he testified as PW2 on his ongoing pain, the need for crutches, and constant oozing from his wounds. 27.The Respondent notes that the Appellants did not call any witnesses to controvert this evidence. Relying on Mwaura Muiruri v Suera Flowers Limited and another [2014] eKLR, where a judge awarded Kshs. 1,450,000 for similar injuries, the Respondent argues that the trial court's award of Kshs. 1,700,000 is reasonable, considering inflation and the severity of the 30% disability. 28.On the matter of Loss of Earning Capacity, the Respondent cites Mumias Sugar Company Limited vs. Francis Wanalo [2007] eKLR, which explains that such awards compensate for the risk of losing future employment or diminished chances in the labour market due to disability. The Respondent argued that he was a 30-year-old boda rider, earnings of Kshs. 15,000 per month, which earnings are now diminished when he would have worked for over a 40-of life. 29.Addressing the lack of formal records for these earnings, the Respondent relies on Chania Shuttle v Mary Mumbi [2017] eKLR and Jacob Ayiga Maruja & Another v. Simeon Obayo [2005] eKLR, and argues that documentary evidence is not the only way to prove income, as many Kenyans work in the informal sector without keeping records. He also cites Joseph Mwangi Wanyeki v Alex Muriithi Mucoki & another [2019] eKLR, where the court took judicial notice of financial illiteracy and accepted oral evidence of boda earnings. 30.Lastly, the Respondent submits that the trial court's award of Kshs. 800,000 for loss of earnings is reasonable and based on established legal principles. He urges this Court to dismiss the appeal with costs and uphold the original judgment. Analysis and Determination 31.This is an appeal on the quantum of damages only. The Appellants herein were found 100% liable for the accident. They equally have not appealed on the said liability. 32.This being an appeal on quantum damages, this court is guided by the legal principle enunciated in Butt –vs- Khan (1981) KLR 349, which was applied in Kemfro Africa Ltd t/a Meru Express Service & Gathongo Kanini –vs- A.M Lubia and Olive Lubia (1982 – 1988) I KAR 727 at page 730, wherein Kneller JA stated as follows;-“The principles to be observed by an appellate court in deciding whether it is justified in disturbing the quantum of damages awarded by a trial Judge were held by the former court of Appeal for East Africa to be that it must be satisfied that either the Judge in assessing damages, took into account an irrelevant factor, or left out of account a relevant one or that short of this the amount is so inordinately low or so inordinately high that it must be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage.” 33.Upon a careful consideration of the Memorandum of Appeal and the rival submissions filed herein, it is evident that the Appellants fundamentally challenge the heads of damages awarded by the trial court, specifically: general damages, future medical expenses, and loss of earning capacity. 34.The Court observes that while the Appellants originally cited a broader range of grievances, their substantive arguments are restricted to a prayer for the reduction of general damages to Kshs 800,000 and the setting aside of the award for loss of earning capacity. 35.Notably, the Appellants' submissions are silent regarding the award for future medical expenses. Furthermore, as regards the claim for loss of income, this Court notes that no such award was made by the trial court. Consequently, this Court shall confine its determination to the propriety of the awards for general damages, future medical expenses, and loss of earning capacity. 36.In respect to the award of general damages, the law is settled that an award of general damages is discretionary and that the Appellate court should be slow to interfere with such discretion. 37.The parameters under which an appellate court will interfere with an award of damages were stated by the Court of Appeal in Bashir Ahmed Butt v. Uwais Ahmed Khan (1982-88) KAR as follows:-“An appellate court will not disturb an award for general damages unless it is so inordinately high or low as to represent an entirely erroneous estimate. It must be shown that the Judge proceeded on wrong principles, or that he misapprehended the evidence in some material respect and so arrived at a figure which was either inordinately high or low...” 38.Further, the Court of Appeal in Gitobu Imanyara & 2 others v Attorney General [2016] KECA 557 (KLR) held:-“…it is firmly established that this Court will be disinclined to disturb the finding of a trial Judge as to the amount of damages merely because they think that if they had tried the case in the first instance they would have given a larger sum. In order to justify reversing the trial Judge on the question of the amount of damages it will generally be necessary that this Court should be convinced either that the Judge acted upon some wrong principle of law, or that the amount awarded was so extremely high or so very low as to make it, in the judgment of this Court, an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage to which the plaintiff is entitled. This is the principle enunciated in Rook v Rairrie [1941] 1 All ER 297. It was echoed with approval by this Court in Butt v. Khan [1981] KLR 349 when it held as per Law, J.A that: ‘An appellate court will not disturb an award of damages unless it is so inordinately high or low as to represent an entirely erroneous estimate. It must be shown that the Judge proceeded on wrong principles, or that he misapprehended the evidence in some material respect, and so arrived at a 1gure which was either inordinately high or low.” This is the principle enunciated in Rook Rairrie [1941] 1 ALL E.R. 297. It was echoed with approval by this Court in Butt v. Khan [1981] KLR 349 when it held as per Law, J.A that: “An appellate court will not disturb an award of damages unless it is so inordinately high or low as to represent an entirely erroneous estimate. It must be shown that the Judge proceeded on wrong principles, or that he misapprehended the evidence in some material respect, and so arrived at a figure which was either inordinately high or low.” 39.In this case, the injuries sustained by the Respondent are not disputed. These injuries include: Compounded comminuted fracture of the right tibia and fibula in the distal one third, oblique fracture of the right fibula in the upper one third, deep lacerations on the right forearm, lacerations on the right knee and bruises on the face. In the case of Ngare v Kiai (Civil Appeal 6 of 2020) [2023] KEHC 24212 (KLR), Muchemi J. reduced the award of General damages of Kshs 2,000,000 to Kshs. 1,600,000 for a Respondent who suffered:- Compound bilateral fracture of tibia/fibula, Compound fracture of the proximal end of the right tibia and Compound fracture of the left distal tibia. 40.Similarly, in the case of James Gathirwa Ngungi v Multiple Hauliers (EA) Limited & another [2015] KEHC 5586 (KLR), Ougo J. awarded Kshs. 1,500,000 to a plaintiff who suffered a compound comminuted fracture of the right tibia, compound comminuted fracture of the right fibula, fracture of the left proximal radius, fracture of the left ulna, head injury, deep cut wound of the parietal region about 4 cm, soft tissue injury and bruises of both hands, multiple facial cuts and lacerations and pathological fracturing of the right leg. 41.In determining the appropriate award for general damages, this Court takes into account that the Respondent sustained compound comminuted fractures of the right tibia and fibula, alongside an oblique fracture of the same limb. This medical position was fortified by the expert testimony of PW1, Dr. Wellington Kiamba, who confirmed that the Respondent was hospitalised for 39 days and underwent ORIF (plating) for the fractures. 42.This Court further notes the grave injuries, including a physical deformity of the right leg, bone infection (osteomyelitis), a 2cm limb-length discrepancy, and the high likelihood of developing traumatic osteoarthritis. These factors culminated in a permanent functional disability assessed at 30%. 43.Regarding the impact of these injuries on the Respondent's livelihood, PW2, the Respondent, testified that he was a boda boda operator, a vocation he is no longer able to pursue due to the nature of his injuries. This Court recognises that the operation of a motorcycle necessitates the full and robust use of one’s lower limbs; consequently, an injury of this magnitude significantly impairs his vocational capacity. Having regard to the specific circumstances of this case and the comparative jurisprudence cited, this Court is satisfied that the award of Kshs. 1,700,000 for pain and suffering was reasonable, proportionate, and remains undisturbed. 44.In challenging the award for loss of earning capacity, the Appellants posit that the medical evidence tendered by Dr. Wellington Kiamba failed to establish a total and permanent incapacity for labour. They contend that while the doctor projected a two-year treatment period for potential post-traumatic osteoarthritis and assessed a 30% permanent disability, this does not equate to a complete inability to generate income. 45.The Appellants further argue that the Respondent failed to adduce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his future prospects in the labour market were definitively diminished or that he is precluded from securing alternative employment. Consequently, the Appellants submit that the Respondent did not discharge the requisite burden of proof to justify such an award, and they pray that the same be set aside in its entirety. 46.The Court of Appeal in Tile & Carpet Center Warehouse v Okello (Civil Appeal 74 of 2019) [2022] KECA 5 (KLR),distinguished between loss of earning capacity and loss of earnings thus;-“Loss of earning capacity, as opposed to loss of earning which must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved, falls within the category of general damages but must also be proved on a balance of probabilities. See CECILIA W. MWANGI & another v RUTH W. MWANGI [1997] eKLR. In S J v Francesco Di Nello & another [2015] eKLR, this Court held that: Loss of earning capacity is compensated by an award in general damages, once proved. This was the position enunciated in FAIRLEY V JOHN THOMSON LTD [1973] 2 LLYOD’S LAW REPORTS 40 at pg. 14 wherein Lord Denning M.R. said as follows:“It is important to realize that there is a difference between an award for loss of earnings as distinct from compensation for loss of earning capacity. Compensation for loss of future earnings is awarded for real assessable loss proved by evidence. Compensation for diminution in earning capacity is awarded as part of general damages.” 47.Further the Court of Appeal in Mumias Sugar Company Ltd v Wanalo (Civil Appeal 91 of 2003) [2007] KECA 485 (KLR), clarified instances when such an award can be granted by the Court thus;-“From the above analysis of the English case law and the decision of this Court in Butler v Butler, the following principles, among others, emerge. The award for loss of earning capacity can be made both when the plaintiff is employed at the time of the trial and even when he is not so employed. The justification for the award when plaintiff is employed is to compensate the plaintiff for the risk that the disability has exposed him of either losing his job in future or in case he loses the job, his diminution of chances of getting an alternative job in the labour market while the justification for the award where the plaintiff is not employed at the date of trial, is to compensate the plaintiff for the risk that he will not get employment or suitable employment in future. Loss of earning capacity can be claimed and awarded as part of general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenities or as a separate head of damages. The award can be a token one, modest or substantial depending on the circumstances of each case. There is no formula for assessing loss of earning capacity. Nevertheless, the Judge has to apply the correct principles and take the relevant factors into account in order to ascertain the real or approximate financial loss that the plaintiff has suffered as a result of disability.” 48.In evaluating the propriety of the award for loss of earning capacity, this Court is guided by the established principle that such compensation is intended to protect a party against the real risk that their disability has diminished their competitiveness in the labour market. As emphasised by the Court of Appeal, this award is justifiable regardless of whether a party is employed at the time of trial, as it addresses the 'diminution of chances' of securing alternative employment. 49.While the Appellants argue that the Respondent failed to prove a total inability to work, the law does not require such a high threshold. Rather, it is sufficient to demonstrate that the 30% permanent disability and the resulting physical limitations, specifically the limb-length discrepancy and risk of osteoarthritis, have rendered the Respondent less 'saleable' to a future employer. 50.Applying these principles to the facts at hand, the Respondent was a boda boda operator, a vocation that is physically demanding and reliant on full lower-limb mobility. The expert medical evidence confirms a permanent functional impairment that directly impacts his ability to return to his previous line of work or to compete for similar manual labour roles. 51.In the present case, the trial court had this to say:- “ Loss of earning capacity, plaintiff was a boda boda operator and ... to be earning 15,000/= per month while pw3 claimed to be earning Kshs. 10,000/= per month. There is no proof of actual earning . I will use the minimum wages where .....Kshs. 10,107/10x12 x30 as boda boda business is unpredictable.. I will give him a global award of Kshs. 800,000/= . 52.From the above , it is clear that even though the trial court attempted to use a formula, he settled at a global award. Further, although the Appellants correctly point out that there is no fixed formula for this head of damages, the trial court is empowered to award a sum that is 'modest or substantial' depending on the specific circumstances. 53.Given the Respondent’s youth (33 years) and the long-term vocational risk posed by his injuries, this Court finds that the global award of Kshs 800,000 as general damages was a judicious exercise of discretion intended to mitigate the approximate financial loss and reduced earning potential occasioned by his disability. 54.In affirming this award, this Court relies on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Mumias Sugar Company Ltd v Wanalo (Civil Appeal 91 of 2003) [2007] KECA 485 (KLR). In that case, the court set aside a structured multiplier award of Kshs. 2,016,000/ and substituted it with a global sum of Kshs. 500,000/= for a claimant who was unemployed at the material time and had a disability assessment of 15%. 55.With respect to the award for future medical expenses, the Court notes that although the Appellants identified this as a ground in their Memorandum of Appeal, they failed to canvass the issue in their substantive written submissions. Notwithstanding this omission, the Court deems it prudent to address the head of damage for the sake of completeness. 56.It is a settled principle of law that a prayer for future medical expenses is not a discretionary relief that a court may grant at large; rather, it constitutes a claim for special damages which must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. In the case of Tracom Limited & another v Hassan Mohamed Adan [2016] KECA 150 (KLR), the Court of Appeal stated: -“…We readily agree that the claim for future medical expenses is a special claim though within general damages, and needs to be specifically pleaded and proved before a court of law can award it.” 57.In the present case, the Respondent specifically pleaded for future medical expenses in his Further Amended Plaint dated 30th September, 2016. The Claim is further supported with an expert medical testimony from PW1, Dr. Wellington Kiamba. The doctor provided a clear prognosis regarding the necessity for persistent treatment and the management of potential complications both in his testimony in Court and in the medical-legal report dated 26th April, 2016. 58.In the absence of any evidence to rebut these medical requirements, the trial court was correct to find that the Respondent had met the requisite standard of proof to justify the award of Kshs. 200,000. 59.In the final analysis, this Court is satisfied that the Appellants have failed to demonstrate any misdirection or erroneous exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court in its assessment of quantum under the various heads. The findings of the learned Trial Magistrate are well-grounded in both the evidence tendered and the applicable legal principles. 60.Consequently, this Appeal is devoid of merit and therefore dismissed in its entirety. Costs of the Appeal are awarded to the Respondent. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAKURU THIS 27TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026.PATRICIA GICHOHJUDGEIn the presence of:Mr. Kabata for the AppellantsMs. Sitati for RespondentErickson , Court Assistant