Mwau v Standard Ltd & 2 others (Civil Suit 114 of 2005) [2026] KEHC 8305 (KLR) (Civ) (5 June 2026) (Judgment)

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI** **MILIMANI LAW COURTS** **CIVIL SUIT NO. 114 OF 2005** **JOHN HARUN MWAU……..……………………………………PLAINTIFF** **VERSUS** **THE STANDARD LIMITED…………………..…………1ST DEFENDANT** **TOM MSHINDI…………………………………………….2ND DEFENDANT** **MUTUMA MATHIU………………………………………3RD DEFENDANT** **JUDGEMENT** 1. **THE PLEADINGS** 2. The Plaintiff herein, by an amended plaint dated 5th June, 2006, brought this suit against the Defendants jointly and severally seeking damages for defamation arising from the publication of an article in the online edition of the *Standard Newspaper.* 1. The Plaintiff pleaded that he is an adult businessman of local and international repute residing and working for gain in Nairobi within the Republic of Kenya. The Plaintiff described the 1st Defendant as a limited liability company and publisher of *The Standard* and *Sunday Standard* newspapers with national and international circulation including online editions, while the 2nd Defendant was pleaded to be the Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of the 1st Defendant responsible for the managerial and administrative affairs of the company. The 3rd Defendant was described as the Managing Editor of the 1st Defendant responsible for the collection, collation, editing and publication of material on behalf of the 1st Defendant. 2. The Plaintiff averred that on 21st January, 2005, the Defendants falsely and maliciously published in the online edition of the *Standard Newspaper* words concerning him under the heading *“Cocaine: Mwau bid to gag media”* and further described him as *“Businessman John Harun Mwau – a shareholder in a container depot through which the Ksh.6 billion cocaine haul was cleared – yesterday spent more than three hours…”.* 3. The Plaintiff pleaded that the publication referred to and concerned him and that the same was defamatory in its natural and ordinary meaning. 4. The Plaintiff particularized the defamatory meanings allegedly conveyed by the impugned publication as being that he was linked to a Ksh.6 billion cocaine haul; that he was involved in crime and corruption; that he was a shareholder in a depot through which cocaine was smuggled; that he was a criminal, drug peddler and drug-haul suspect; that he was guilty of offences under the *Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1994;* that he was involved in dubious drug deals; and that he was untrustworthy and lacked integrity. 5. The Plaintiff further pleaded that the publication was false and actuated by malice, ill will and spite and that the Defendants intended thereby to injure his reputation and character in the estimation of right-thinking members of the public. 6. In support of the allegation of malice, the Plaintiff pleaded, *inter alia,* that the Defendants knew that the online edition of the publication had worldwide circulation and that portraying him as a drug trafficker and criminal would have grave consequences, including denial of visas and restriction of entry into foreign countries. 7. The Plaintiff further averred that the Defendants knew or ought to have known that he was not a shareholder in the alleged depot through which cocaine was said to have been smuggled; that no drugs were discovered at the said depot; and that the containers cleared through the depot never contained any drugs at all. 8. He also pleaded that the Defendants persistently repeated the defamatory publication online and prominently juxtaposed his name with the offending words. 9. By reason of the said publication, the Plaintiff averred that he suffered loss of reputation, business reputation and business profits and had been greatly injured in his standing before reasonable members of the public. 10. The Plaintiff further contended that the Defendants would continue publishing defamatory material concerning him unless restrained by the Court and that despite demand and notice of intention to sue, the Defendants had continued with the publication to his detriment. 11. On the basis of the foregoing, the Plaintiff sought against the Defendants jointly and severally exemplary and aggravated damages for defamation, general damages for defamation, special damages, a permanent injunction restraining further publication of defamatory statements concerning him, costs of the suit together with interest and such further relief as the Court would deem just and expedient. 12. The Defendants entered appearance and filed a joint statement of defence dated 10th March, 2005 wherein they denied the Plaintiff’s claim in its entirety save for admitting the descriptive averments relating to the identities of the parties and the jurisdiction of the Court. The Defendants specifically denied publishing the words complained of in the plaint on the 1st Defendant’s website on 21st January, 2005 and denied that the words complained of were defamatory or capable of bearing the meanings attributed to them by the Plaintiff. 13. The Defendants further denied allegations of malice, ill will, spite and falsity and denied that the Plaintiff suffered the loss and damage alleged in the plaint. The Defendants, however, pleaded that on 5th January, 2005, the 1st Defendant published an article under the heading *“Cocaine: Mwau bid to gag Media”* and averred that the said words constituted only the heading of a much longer article, the full context and true meaning of which had not been reproduced in the plaint. 14. The Defendants contended that the impugned words, when read in their proper context, were not capable of bearing the defamatory meanings alleged by the Plaintiff. In addition, the Defendants pleaded that the publication was absolutely privileged under the *Defamation Act* as it constituted a fair and accurate contemporaneous report of proceedings held publicly before the High Court at Nairobi. 15. In the alternative and without prejudice to the foregoing, the Defendants pleaded the defence of fair comment on matters of public interest and further invoked the defence of responsible public journalism and qualified privilege. They averred that the subject matter of the publication concerned matters of genuine public concern and interest and that the journalism employed was responsible, relying on the principles set out in ***Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127.*** 16. The Defendants further denied any intention to continue publishing the impugned words and averred that the Plaintiff was not entitled to the injunctive relief sought. They also contended that the plaint disclosed no reasonable cause of action against them and constituted an abuse of the process of the Court. 17. **THE PLAINTIFF’S CASE.** 18. The Plaintiff testified as PW1 and adopted the contents of his statement dated 19th March, 2005. In his statement, the Plaintiff described himself as a businessman, trained fraud specialist and politician. He stated that he was a former Member of Parliament for Kilome Constituency, the founding chairman of the Party of Independent Candidates of Kenya (PICK), a former Director of the defunct Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority and a presidential candidate in the 1992 general elections. He further stated that he vied for the senatorial position for Makueni County during the 2013 general elections. 19. PW1 testified that he was an honest, hardworking and law-abiding businessman of both local and international repute who had never knowingly been involved in criminal activities either directly or indirectly. He described himself as a person of high moral character and good conduct. He further testified that he had received several national honours and awards including the Head of State Commendation (HSC), Order of the Grand Warrior (OGW), Member of the Burning Spear (MBS) and Chief of the Burning Spear (CBS), as well as medals in respect of service in the Police Force. He also stated that he was a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (FCIArb), a Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE), an Environmental Lead Expert and consultant and an ISO 27001 Information Security Lead Auditor and Implementer. 20. In addition, he testified that he was an internationally recognized sportsman who had represented Kenya in the Olympic Games, Commonwealth Games and other international competitions. 21. The Plaintiff described the 1st Defendant as a media house engaged in publishing newspapers and disseminating news for gain. He stated that the 2nd Defendant was at the material time the Managing Director of the 1st Defendant and responsible for the publication of the impugned article, while the 3rd Defendant was the Managing Editor responsible for editing the newspaper and its online publications. 22. PW1 testified that around 14th December, 2004, the Kenya Police seized approximately one ton of cocaine from two locations, namely Rocky House in Malindi and a go-down in Embakasi, Nairobi, belonging to Rakshap Holdings Limited. He stated that the Defendants were aware of the said seizure and of the fact that persons suspected to have been involved had been arrested, interrogated and some charged in *Criminal Case No. 3165 of 2004.* 23. The Plaintiff stated that following the seizure, the Defendants embarked on what he termed as a propaganda campaign aimed at linking him with the cocaine haul and criminal activities relating thereto. He testified that the Defendants falsely connected Pepe Inland Port with the cocaine seizure and falsely portrayed him as the owner of the said facility despite allegedly knowing that the information was untrue. He further testified that being aggrieved by the publications, he reported the matter to the Criminal Investigations Department by a letter dated 30th December, 2004, but that the Defendants subsequently portrayed the complaint as an attempt to threaten or gag the media. 24. PW1 maintained that the Defendants knew at all material times that he was not involved in any criminal activity connected with the cocaine seizure but nevertheless continued publishing defamatory material concerning him. He further testified that in subsequent proceedings involving the 1st Defendant and another party in *Civil Case No. 511 of 2011,* the Defendants themselves filed evidence which, according to him, confirmed the facts surrounding the seizure and demonstrated that the allegations against him were false. 25. The Plaintiff further testified that despite assurances allegedly given by the Defendants to the Court that they would cease publication of defamatory material concerning him, the publications continued to remain accessible online through *The Standard* Digital Website and continued to portray him internationally as a drug trafficker. He stated that such continued online publication exposed him to injury and the risk of adverse treatment by foreign governments and law enforcement agencies. 26. PW1 testified that on 21st January, 2005, the Defendants published in the online edition of *The Standard* Newspaper the words *“Cocaine: Mwau bid to gag media”* and further described him as *“a shareholder in a container depot through which Ksh.6 billion cocaine haul was cleared.”* He stated that the words referred to and concerned him and were intended to injure his reputation. 27. The Plaintiff testified that the publication was understood by ordinary members of the public to mean that he was linked to the Ksh.6 billion cocaine haul; that he was involved in crime and corruption; that he was a shareholder in a depot through which cocaine was smuggled; that he was a criminal, drug peddler and drug-haul suspect; that he was guilty of offences under the *Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act;* that he was involved in dubious drug dealings; that he lacked integrity and trustworthiness; and that he was hostile to press freedom and employed improper means in dealing with legitimate issues. 28. PW1 further testified that the publication was actuated by malice, ill will and spite. He stated that the Defendants were aware of the wide global circulation of the online publication and appreciated the grave consequences of portraying him internationally as a drug trafficker. According to him, the Defendants knew or ought to have known that he was not a shareholder in the alleged depot through which drugs were purportedly smuggled, that no drugs had been discovered at the depot and that the containers cleared through the depot did not contain narcotic drugs. He also testified that the Defendants prominently juxtaposed his name with the impugned words and repeatedly posted the defamatory material online. 29. The Plaintiff testified that the Defendants knowingly and maliciously published false statements intended to scandalize, humiliate and expose him to public ridicule, contempt and hatred. He stated that the Defendants manufactured false facts and used strong and emphatic language calculated to cause injury to his reputation. According to PW1, the Defendants’ conduct amounted to irresponsible journalism and was motivated by malice and profit. 30. PW1 further testified that as a result of the publications, he suffered injury to his reputation and standing in society and was greatly lowered in the estimation of right-thinking members of the public. He stated that the publications adversely affected his businesses both locally and internationally and caused him loss of business, loss of profits and injury to his personal reputation. He further testified that he suffered considerable distress, humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish and public scandal as a consequence of the publications. 31. The Plaintiff also testified that the Defendants failed to seek his comments or clarification before publishing the impugned articles and that despite demands and notice of intention to sue, they continued to publish defamatory material concerning him. He expressed the view that the Defendants acted recklessly as to the truthfulness and consequences of the allegations made against him. 32. PW1 concluded by stating that unless restrained by a permanent injunction, the Defendants would continue publishing false statements linking him to criminal activities for profit and in bad faith. He urged the Court to grant him exemplary and aggravated damages, special damages, a permanent injunction restraining further defamatory publication and such other reliefs as sought in the amended plaint. 33. The Plaintiff produced, as PEXh1, the results of a Google search conducted in relation to the matter. The search results indicate that the first item appearing on the results page is titled: **The Standard | Online Edition** **Cocaine: Mwau bid to gag media Mr John Harun Mwau wants the High Court to permanently bar the media from publishing reports linking him to drug trafficking. …..** [**www.eastandard.net/archives/**](http://www.eastandard.net/archives/) **cl/default.php?date=5/1/2005 – 52k – Cached – Similar pages** 1. The Plaintiff further produced a total of fifty (50) additional documents, contained in the list of documents dated 18th March, 2014, as PExh2 to PExh51. These documents primarily related to the Plaintiff’s personal achievements, professional accomplishments, qualifications, career progression and standing within his profession. The Plaintiff relied on these documents in support of his case and to demonstrate his reputation, credibility and stature both professionally and publicly. 2. Upon being cross examined by **Mr. Wepoh,** learned Counsel for the Defendants, the Plaintiff stated that there were only three documents listed in his initial bundle of documents in support of his case. He stated that the impugned publication was contained in the documents, being *The Standard* online edition, together with several related items. 3. The Plaintiff further clarified that the defamatory words complained of were also set out in the amended plaint. He stated that although the online publication was attributed to *The Standard,* one of the referenced sources, *AllAfrica.com,* was not *The Standard* itself but had indicated that it had picked the article from *The Standard.* 4. The Plaintiff stated that *“E.A. Standard”* referred to the *East African Standard,* as pleaded in the amended plaint, and reiterated that the plaint specifically referred to the online edition of *The Standard* newspaper. 5. He further stated that the Defence contained an admission by the Defendants regarding publication of the article where reference was made to the publication. He also stated that the *Africa Online* classification of the article placed it under “crime and corruption.” 6. The Plaintiff acknowledged that he had not produced a certificate of electronic evidence in support of the online publication. 7. In relation to the subject matter of the publication, the Plaintiff stated that he was the chairman of Pepe Container Depot and that the article referred to him as being associated with Pepe. He maintained that Pepe Container Depot had never received any drugs and that no drugs had ever been found or recovered at the facility. He further stated that Pepe had only been under investigation and that no container with drugs had been seized from the depot. 8. The Plaintiff also stated that the investigations did not involve drug trafficking at Pepe Container Depot, which he described as a customs area where operations involved officers from the Kenya Revenue Authority, Anti-Narcotics Unit, Kenya Bureau of Standards, Directorate of Criminal Investigations, Port Health and KEPHIS. 9. The Plaintiff further stated that containers passing through Pepe had serial numbers and identifiable ownership, and that the containers referred to in the investigations contained only furniture. According to the Plaintiff, the containers only passed through Pepe for customs clearance purposes. 10. The Plaintiff called **George Masila Katio,** who testified as PW2 and adopted the contents of his witness statement dated 23rd February, 2024. In his testimony, PW2 stated that he that he had known the Plaintiff, since the 1990s after being introduced to him by his father, who had known the Plaintiff for a long time. 11. PW2 testified that he admired the Plaintiff for his hard work and dedication and recalled that the Plaintiff would report to his office as early as 5.00 a.m. daily. He further stated that from the time he came to know the Plaintiff, he regarded him as a law-abiding citizen. According to PW2, during visits to the Plaintiff’s office in the company of his father, the Plaintiff would advise him to work hard and obey the law. He also testified that his father informed him that the Plaintiff was a law-abiding citizen who regularly resorted to the courts in challenging impunity and unlawful acts by the government. PW2 further described the Plaintiff as a person who hated injustice and was generous. 12. PW2 testified that on 5th January, 2005, while in the office, he saw a headline in *The Standard* newspaper *titled “Cocaine: Mwau bid to gag media.”* He further stated that on or about 21st January, 2005, while browsing the internet, he came across an online publication by the Standard newspaper containing the words: *“Cocaine: Mwau bid to gag media Crime and corruption Businessman John Harun Mwau – a shareholder in a container depot through which the Ksh.6 billion cocaine haul was cleared – yesterday spent more than three hours…”.* 13. PW2 testified that upon reading the article, it became immediately apparent to him that the publication referred to the Plaintiff, whom he had always admired, respected and held in high esteem as a law-abiding person. He stated that the article conveyed that the Plaintiff was a shareholder in a container depot through which the Ksh.6 billion cocaine haul had passed. 14. PW2 further testified that he understood the publication to mean that the Plaintiff was connected to the Ksh.6 billion cocaine haul and that the Plaintiff was seeking to gag the media from publishing information linking him to the drugs. According to PW2, the publication caused him to lower the esteem and respect with which he had previously regarded the Plaintiff, as he now viewed him as a person lacking integrity. He stated that he found it contradictory that the Plaintiff, who had always advised him to obey the law and work hard, was allegedly connected to a major drug haul. 15. PW2 testified that following the publication, he began avoiding and shunning the Plaintiff because he feared that being associated with him would negatively affect his own business interests. He further testified that at a later stage, a mutual acquaintance known as **Mr. Muli** contacted him and inquired why he had not been visiting the Plaintiff’s office. PW2 stated that he informed **Mr. Muli** that he had chosen to distance himself from the Plaintiff because of the media reports connecting the Plaintiff to the cocaine haul. 16. PW2 further testified that in November 2013, he received a call from **Mr. Muli,** who informed him that the Plaintiff had requested him to contact PW2 and request him to testify in the present matter. PW2 stated that it was only after persistent requests that he agreed to record and adopt his witness statement. 17. Upon being cross examined by **Mr. Wepoh,** PW2 stated that he only knew about the present case brought against *The Standard* by the Plaintiff. He further stated that he did not know one **Gilford Muli Kenyatta** and was not aware whether his witness statement was similar to his. 18. PW2 confirmed that he had known the Plaintiff since the 1990s and stated that he was 49 years old at the time of testifying, having been approximately 29 to 30 years old in 2005. He reiterated that the Plaintiff was a long-standing friend of his father. 19. PW2 testified that on 5th January, 2005, he was in his office at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) when he saw a newspaper headline which attracted his attention because it contained the words *“Mwau”* and *“Cocaine”.* He further stated that on 21st January, 2005, while browsing the internet, he came across the words *“Mwau bid to gag media”* and connected the same to the earlier headline he had seen. 20. PW2 stated that he could not recall the specific website where the words were published. He further stated that he knew the Plaintiff as a law-abiding and hardworking individual and that upon reading the publications, he associated the Plaintiff with cocaine-related activities. 21. PW2 testified that his perception of the Plaintiff changed after reading the publications and that the publications influenced how he viewed the Plaintiff. He further stated that his perception had not changed thereafter. 22. The Plaintiff called **Peter Njeru Nthigah,** who testified as PW3 and adopted the contents of his witness statement dated 7th May, 2024. PW3 testified that he was an officer employed by the National Police Service and was at the time serving as a Commissioner of Police and Regional Head of the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) for Nairobi City County. He stated that he had been summoned to testify and produce documents concerning investigations into the seizure of cocaine in Kenya in December, 2004. 23. PW3 testified that he had served in the Police Service as an investigator for approximately 35 years, of which over 18 years had been spent in the Anti-Narcotics Department between 1989 and 2006. He stated that he possessed extensive training and experience in anti-narcotics investigations, including training in narcotics investigations and operations both locally and internationally, among them specialized training in Germany at the Bundes Kriminal Arms Academy (BKA Academy). 24. PW3 further testified that in the year 2004, he held the rank of Chief Inspector under the Directorate of Criminal Investigations and was the officer in charge of the Kenya Anti-Narcotics Unit based at CID Headquarters. He stated that he was aware that the dispute before the Court concerned an online publication by the Defendants dated 21st January, 2005 bearing the headline *“Cocaine: Mwau bid to gag media”* and referring to the Plaintiff as *“a shareholder in a container depot through which the Ksh.6 billion cocaine haul was cleared.”* 25. According to PW3, the publication by the Defendants alleging that the Ksh.6 billion cocaine haul had been cleared through Pepe Inland Container Depot was false and untrue. He categorically stated that the Ksh.6.392 billion worth of cocaine was never cleared through Pepe Limited. 26. PW3 testified that he was the lead investigator in respect of the seizure of a total of 1.1415 tonnes of cocaine on 14th December, 2004 and that he conducted investigations both in Kenya and in the Netherlands. He stated that he had personal knowledge of the matters in issue and relied on documentary evidence gathered during the investigations. 27. He testified that on 14th December, 2004, the Kenya Police seized a total of 1.1415 tonnes of cocaine valued at approximately Ksh.6.392 billion in Nairobi and Malindi. He stated that 304 kilograms of cocaine with a street value of Ksh.1.702 billion were seized at Godown No. 20 along Old North Airport Road in Embakasi, Nairobi, concealed in a false bottom of container number MAEU 5650860. He further testified that simultaneously, police officers seized 837.5 kilograms of cocaine valued at Ksh.4.69 billion at Rocky House situated on Plot No. 1883 in Casuarina Area, Malindi, where the drugs were concealed beneath the deck plate of a motor boat. 28. PW3 stated that following the investigations and seizures, several suspects including **David Mugo Kiragu, Railton Muthungu, James Nderitu, Ricci Angelo, Estella Duminga Furuli, Tansukhal Jivanal Thanki, George Stanley Wango** alias **George Njoya Wango, David Alexander Gachago** and Central Valley Supplies Co. Ltd were arrested and charged in *Criminal Case No. 3165 of 2004* before the Chief Magistrate’s Court at Nairobi. He testified that judgement in the said criminal case was delivered on 28th June, 2006. 29. PW3 further testified that apart from the seizures in Embakasi, Malindi and a separate seizure of 1.295 kilograms from a Tanzanian national, no other cocaine was seized in Kenya in the year 2004. He therefore maintained that it was false for the Defendants to allege that another tonne of cocaine or any quantity of drugs had been seized at Pepe Inland Container Depot. He explained that the Anti-Narcotics Department maintained comprehensive records of all narcotics seizures in Kenya. 30. PW3 testified that investigations also extended to the Netherlands after authorities there informed Kenyan investigators that 295 kilograms of cocaine had been discovered in two containers at the Port of Antwerp in Belgium. The containers had allegedly originated from Mombasa, Kenya. Following a controlled delivery operation in the Netherlands, several Dutch suspects together with one Kenyan, **George Kiragu,** were arrested in connection with the seizure. 31. He testified that investigations established that the containers in question had originally been imported into Kenya through the Port of Mombasa in January, 2004 and contained assorted second-hand furniture consigned to Central Valley Supplies Limited. PW3 stated that the cargo was subjected to scrutiny by customs authorities and anti-smuggling teams because of identified irregularities and that the containers underwent 100% verification at the Port of Mombasa. According to PW3, the containers were found to contain only assorted household furniture and no narcotic drugs or contraband. 32. PW3 further testified that after examination at the Port of Mombasa, the containers were forwarded under customs seal and police escort to Pepe Inland Container Depot where they remained under customs control. He explained that the importer subsequently entered the goods for home use and that the containers were again examined and verified at Pepe Inland Container Depot by customs officers together with officers from various government agencies, including Anti-Narcotics officers, Public Health officials, Kenya Bureau of Standards officers and the police. PW3 stated that the containers were again found to contain only used furniture and that customs duties and warehouse charges were duly paid before the goods were released. 33. According to PW3, the staff of Pepe Inland Container Depot played no role in the examination or verification of the containers as such functions were performed exclusively by customs and government officials. He emphasized that the allegation by the Defendants that the containers were cleared with drugs at Pepe Inland Container Depot was therefore false and without basis. 34. PW3 further testified that investigations established that after the containers were released from Pepe Inland Container Depot, they were later transported by **George Kiragu** and his associates back to Mombasa for onward shipment to Antwerp. He stated that Pepe Inland Container Depot did not receive cargo for export and therefore had no further contact with the containers after they were released to the importer. 35. He testified that investigations traced the movement of the containers from Pepe Inland Container Depot to Mombasa through various transporters and established that **George Kiragu** coordinated the transportation and shipment of the containers. PW3 further testified that investigations linked **George Kiragu** and several Dutch nationals to activities at Godown No. 20 in Embakasi and Rocky House in Malindi where the narcotics were eventually discovered. According to PW3, evidence gathered during the investigations showed that false bottoms had been created in the containers and that specialized welding equipment had been used in the concealment of the drugs. 36. PW3 also testified that **George Kiragu** had leased both Rocky House in Malindi and Godown No. 20 in Embakasi together with Dutch associates. He further stated that investigations established that **George Kiragu,** through Central Valley Supplies Limited, had imported the motor boat from which the cocaine in Malindi was recovered. 37. PW3 testified that investigations by Kenyan and international agencies, including the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Attorney General’s office and the Government Chemist, confirmed the commission of narcotics offences leading to the prosecution of the suspects in *Criminal Case No. 3165 of 2004.* He further testified that the seized cocaine was eventually destroyed pursuant to a destruction order issued by the Chief Magistrate’s Court. 38. PW3 reiterated that investigations conclusively established that when the containers arrived in Kenya and while they remained at Pepe Inland Container Depot, they contained only assorted second-hand furniture and no narcotic drugs. He maintained that Pepe Inland Container Depot neither handled nor facilitated the export of the containers when they were later shipped back to Antwerp where cocaine was discovered. 39. In conclusion, PW3 maintained that the allegations published by the Defendants linking Pepe Inland Container Depot to the clearance of the Ksh.6 billion cocaine haul were false and unsupported by the investigations carried out by the Anti-Narcotics Unit. 40. PW3 produced a bundle of 19 documents (contained in the list of documents dated 18th June, 2024) as PExh52 to PExh71 pertaining to the investigations into the cocaine seizure and the investigations that subsequently followed. 41. PW3, upon being cross examined by **Mr. Wepoh** stated that his witness statement set out the investigations carried out in respect of the Kenyan seizure and that the investigations did not involve Pepe Inland Container Depot as a subject of wrongdoing. He stated that Pepe was not directly investigated for any narcotics-related offences but was only considered in the context of the movement of containers linked to the seizure of drugs in the Netherlands. 42. PW3 testified that the investigation did not reveal any incriminating material against Pepe Inland Container Depot and that nothing uncovered during investigations implicated Pepe in drug trafficking activities. He stated that Pepe was only brought into the investigations because of the traced movement of containers that had originated from or passed through Kenya. 43. PW3 further stated that the containers in question, namely PLCU 433452-4 and PLCU 433452-5, were found to have contained drugs in the Netherlands, but that when they were at Pepe Inland Container Depot they contained only personal or declared goods. He clarified that investigating the movement of containers did not amount to linking the depot or its operators to criminal activity. 44. PW3 testified that the focus of the investigation was the movement of the containers and their logistical chain, including their movement through Mombasa Port and Pepe Inland Container Depot. 45. On re-examination by **Mr. Ouma,** learned Counsel for the Plaintiff, PW3 stated that the containers had left Belgium and were received at Mombasa Port where they were examined before being taken to Pepe Inland Container Depot. He stated that they were later cleared and that the owner of the containers was an accused person in the criminal proceedings. 46. PW3 further testified that the containers were not shipped to the Netherlands through Pepe Inland Container Depot. He stated that after clearance, the accused persons transported the containers by road to Mombasa and deposited them at Hakika Transporters, from where they were later shipped to the Netherlands through Belgium. 47. PW3 maintained that investigations were conducted in Belgium and the Netherlands and confirmed that the containers were not reshipped through Pepe Inland Container Depot. 48. **THE DEFENDANTS’ CASE.** 49. The Defendants did not call any witnesses despite having filed a witness statement. The effect of this omission is that the defence version of events remained at the level of pleadings and written assertions, without evidential amplification through viva voce testimony. 50. **THE PLAINTIFF’S SUBMISSIONS.** 51. In his submissions, the Plaintiff contended that the Defendants published a defamatory online article on 21st January, 2005 titled *“Cocaine: Mwau bid to gag media,”* which falsely and maliciously imputed that the Plaintiff was a shareholder in a container depot through which a Ksh.6 billion cocaine haul was allegedly cleared, thereby linking him to drug trafficking and crime and lowering his reputation in the estimation of right-thinking members of society. 52. The Plaintiff submitted that the pleadings established a clear cause of action in defamation. The amended plaint dated 23rd October, 2007 sought general damages, exemplary/aggravated damages, special damages and a permanent injunction restraining further publication of defamatory material. It was argued that the Defendants filed a statement of defence dated 10th March, 2005 but did not file any amended defence or call any evidence, leaving the Plaintiff’s case uncontroverted. 53. On publication, the Plaintiff submitted that the article was published online and widely circulated and that PW2 confirmed reading it and understanding it to refer to the Plaintiff and that the Defendants’ admission in the defence further supported publication to third parties. 54. On identification, the Plaintiff relied on ***Newstead v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1940] 1 KB 377,*** where it was held that words are actionable if reasonable readers with knowledge of the circumstances would understand them to refer to the claimant, even if others might also fit the description. The Plaintiff argued that the express naming of **“John Harun Mwau”** removed any doubt as to identity. 55. The Plaintiff further relied on the case of ***Elisha Ochieng Odhiambo v Booker Ngesa Omole [2021] eKLR,*** where the High Court adopted the principle that identification may be by name or implication, provided reasonable readers would understand the words to refer to the claimant. 56. On defamatory meaning, the Plaintiff relied on *Halsbury’s Laws of England*, *4th Edition, Vol. 28 (2010 Reissue),* which defines defamation as words tending to lower a person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society, expose them to hatred, ridicule or contempt or cause them to be shunned or avoided. 57. The Plaintiff also relied on *Gatley on Libel and Slander*, *10th Edition (2007),* which states that determining defamation involves two stages: first, establishing the meaning of the words as understood by ordinary reasonable readers, and second, determining whether that meaning is defamatory. 58. The Plaintiff submitted that the sting of the publication was that he was linked to a Ksh.6 billion cocaine haul and was attempting to gag the media to conceal that connection, thereby imputing criminal involvement in drug trafficking. 59. The Plaintiff relied on ***Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 (HL),*** where the House of Lords held that a report stating a company was under police investigation for fraud could be understood by readers as imputing suspicion of fraud, which is defamatory. The Plaintiff argued that similarly, linking him to a cocaine investigation necessarily implied criminal involvement. 60. On imputations of crime, the Plaintiff relied on *Gatley on Libel and Slander*, *10th Edition (2007), p.105,* which states that imputations of criminal conduct are inherently defamatory and must be justified by proof of truth, not mere repetition of allegations or rumours. 61. On falsity, the Plaintiff submitted that the defamatory sting was untrue. PW3, **Peter Njeru Nthigah,** a senior anti-narcotics investigator, testified that no cocaine was ever cleared or seized at Pepe Inland Container Depot, and that all containers associated with Pepe had been inspected and found to contain only furniture. 62. PW3 further testified that the actual cocaine seizures occurred at Godown No. 20, Embakasi, and Rocky House, Malindi and not at Pepe, and that the containers in question had been fully verified at the Port of Mombasa before being released. 63. On malice, the Plaintiff relied on the decision of ***Joseph Njogu Kamunge v Charles Muriuki Gachari [2016] eKLR,*** where the Court held that malice may be inferred where a defendant publishes statements knowing they are false or without caring whether they are true or false, or where there is failure to verify information before publication. 64. The Plaintiff also relied on the case of ***Richard Otieno Kwach v Standard Limited & Another [2007] eKLR,*** where the High Court held that reckless publication of sensational material without due verification, particularly by a media house, may amount to malice, especially where the publication foreseeably causes reputational harm. 65. The Plaintiff submitted that the Defendants failed to seek comment, clarification, or verification before publication, and that the sensational framing of the article demonstrated reckless disregard for truth and reputational harm. 66. On publication and liability, the Plaintiff relied on the authority of ***Nation Media Group Ltd & Another v Hon. Chirau Ali Mwakwere Civil Appeal No. 224 of 2010 (Court of Appeal, Kenya),*** where the Court reiterated that publication in defamation is established once the material is communicated to at least one third party. 67. On fair comment and privilege, the Plaintiff submitted that the Defendants failed to discharge the burden of proof. Reliance was placed on the case of ***Spiller & Another v Joseph & Others [2010] UKSC 53 (UK Supreme Court),*** where the Court set out five requirements for fair comment: (i) public interest, (ii) recognizable comment, (iii) basis in true facts, (iv) indication of underlying facts, and (v) honesty of opinion. 68. The Plaintiff further relied on ***Mong’are t/a Gekong’a & Momanyi Advocates v Standard Limited [2012] eKLR*** where the High Court held that a comment cannot be fair if it is based on false facts, and that truth is the foundation of the defence of fair comment. 69. On damages, the Plaintiff relied on ***Elisha Ochieng Odhiambo v Booker Ngesa Omole*** (supra) where the Court held that damages in defamation compensate for injury to reputation and are assessed based on gravity of the libel, extent of publication and conduct of the Defendant. 70. The Plaintiff further relied on ***Nation Media Group Ltd & Another v Hon. Chirau Ali Mwakwere*** (supra) which adopted the principles in ***Jones v Pollard [1997] EMLR 233,*** including gravity of the libel, extent of publication, subjective impact and conduct of the Defendant. 71. The Plaintiff also relied on ***Johnson Evan Gicheru v Andrew Morton & Another [2005] eKLR,*** where the Court of Appeal held that damages in libel must take into account the entire conduct of the Defendant from publication to trial, including aggravating and mitigating factors. 72. Further reliance was placed on ***Wangethi Mwangi & Another v J.P. Machira t/a Machira & Co. Advocates [2012] eKLR,*** where the Court of Appeal held that damages in defamation should also serve a deterrent purpose and balance freedom of expression with protection of dignity. 73. The Plaintiff also cited the case of ***William Kabogo Gitau v The Standard Group Limited Civil Appeal No. 74 of 2011*,** where the Court of Appeal awarded general damages of Ksh.12 million and exemplary damages of Ksh.1 million for defamation involving serious reputational harm. 74. The Plaintiff further relied on the authority of ***Samuel Ndung’u Mukunya v Nation Media Group Limited & Another [2015] eKLR,*** where the High Court awarded Ksh.15 million in general damages and Ksh.3.5 million in aggravated damages, emphasizing the seriousness of defamatory imputations in the media. 75. The Plaintiff also cited ***Kipyator Nicholas Kiprono Biwott v Clays Limited & 5 Others [2000] eKLR*,** where the High Court awarded Ksh.10 million in general damages and Ksh.15 million in exemplary damages for serious defamatory allegations. 76. Finally, reliance was placed on the case of ***Hon. Christopher M. Obure v Tom Alwaka & Others HCCC No. 956 of 2003)*,** where the High Court awarded Ksh.15 million in general damages and Ksh.2 million in exemplary damages for defamation involving serious reputational harm. 77. In conclusion, the Plaintiff submitted that the publication was false, defamatory, and malicious; that the Defendants failed to prove any defence of truth, fair comment, or privilege; and therefore urged the Court to enter judgement in favour of the Plaintiff and award costs of the suit and interest. 78. **THE DEFENDANTS’ SUBMISSIONS.** 79. In their submissions, the Defendants asserted that the Plaintiff had failed to discharge the burden of proof in a defamation claim, principally because he did not properly produce the allegedly defamatory publication, and that in any event the suit lacked merit as the publication was true, constituted fair comment on a matter of public interest and was made without malice. 80. The Defendants submitted at the outset that the Plaintiff’s case was fatally defective because he failed to produce the impugned publication in admissible form. They argued that although the Plaintiff referred to the article contained in his bundle, the document was a printout from the internet (allafrica.com) and not *The Standard* newspaper as pleaded, thereby raising a fundamental discrepancy in proof. 81. The Defendants contended that since the Plaintiff pleaded publication in the *“online edition of the Standard newspaper,”* he was bound to strictly prove that specific publication. They argued that the document produced did not originate from the Defendant’s platform and therefore could not be relied upon as proof of the defamatory words complained of. 82. It was further submitted that the Plaintiff failed to produce a certificate of electronic evidence to authenticate the online printout, rendering the document inadmissible. The Defendants therefore argued that the Court could not rely on it to establish publication, content or context. 83. The Defendants emphasized that in defamation law, the burden lies squarely on the Plaintiff to prove the exact words complained of, their publication, and their defamatory meaning. They argued that without production of the actual publication, the Court could not evaluate the claim. 84. Reliance was placed on ***John v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [1996] 2 All ER 35,*** where the House of Lords held that a statement is defamatory only if it tends to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society and that the claimant bears the burden of proving the defamatory meaning and its effect. 85. The Defendants further relied on the case of ***Nation Media Group Ltd v John Joseph Kamotho [2010] eKLR,*** where the Court of Appeal emphasized that a claimant must produce the impugned publication to enable the Court to assess its meaning, context and whether it is defamatory. 86. The Defendants also cited the authority of ***Ochieng & Others v Standard Ltd [2004] eKLR,*** for the proposition that failure to produce the alleged defamatory material is fatal because the Court cannot speculate on content or meaning not properly before it. 87. The Defendants submitted that without the publication, the Court is deprived of the foundational evidence required to evaluate not only defamation but also any pleaded defences such as truth or fair comment, thereby rendering the claim unproven and defective. 88. On the issue of defamation, the Defendants submitted that the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the publication lowered his reputation in the estimation of right-thinking members of society or caused him any reputational harm. They relied on ***John v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [1996] 2 All ER 35,*** reiterating that a defamatory statement must be shown to have the tendency to lower a person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society. 89. The Defendants also cited ***S M W v Z W M [2015] eKLR,*** where the Court of Appeal stated that defamation requires proof of publication, reference to the Plaintiff, falsity, defamatory meaning and injury to reputation. They argued that PW2’s testimony did not establish reputational harm, as he merely stated that he believed the article but did not clearly demonstrate a lowering of his estimation of the Plaintiff in a legally cognizable way. 90. On falsity and harm, the Defendants submitted that the Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence showing that the statements were false or that his reputation was injured, and that no independent witness demonstrated reputational damage. 91. On malice, the Defendants denied that the publication was actuated by malice. They submitted that there was no evidence of ill will or improper motive directed at the Plaintiff. Reliance was placed on ***Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135***, where it was held that malice cannot be inferred where the defendant honestly believes in the truth of the statement, even if the belief is mistaken and that honest belief negates malice. 92. The Defendants submitted that the publication was made in good faith, in the public interest and in accordance with responsible journalism, particularly given the global concern surrounding drug trafficking. 93. On the defence of truth and fair comment, the Defendants relied on *Section 15* of the *Defamation Act* which provides that fair comment is available where statements are expressions of opinion based on true facts and made in the public interest. The Defendants argued that the publication was grounded on factual matters, including investigations by police and the Plaintiff’s association with Pepe Limited, which they claimed was confirmed by the Plaintiff in evidence and pleadings. 94. The Defendants further submitted that the Plaintiff himself had acknowledged being a director of Pepe Limited through a verifying affidavit and therefore there existed a factual basis for linking him to matters involving the container depot. They relied on ***Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127,***where it was held that truth is a complete defence to defamation and that publication of information on matters of public concern may be protected where responsibly made. 95. The Defendants also relied on the authority of ***Joseph Njogu Kamunge v Standard Limited [2006] eKLR,*** where the Court recognized that fair comment is a valid defence where statements are based on facts and relate to matters of public interest, provided they are honest opinions rather than assertions of fact. 96. The Defendants argued that drug trafficking is a matter of significant public interest, and therefore commentary or reporting on investigations involving suspected drug activity falls within the scope of protected speech and fair comment. 97. The Defendants further submitted that for the defence of justification (truth), it is sufficient if the substance of the allegation is true, and not necessary that every detail be proven with exact precision, particularly in matters involving investigative journalism. 98. The Defendants also argued more broadly that journalists are entitled to a degree of reasonable exaggeration when reporting matters of public concern and that defamation law should not unduly inhibit reporting on criminal investigations. 99. On fair comment, the Defendants submitted that the matter concerned public interest, including drug trafficking and its societal impact, and that the Plaintiff, being a public figure, was subject to legitimate scrutiny. They contended that public interest extends to the conduct of public officers and prominent individuals, and therefore reporting on allegations or investigations involving such persons is protected. 100. In conclusion, the Defendants prayed that the Court finds that the Plaintiff failed to prove defamation, failed to establish falsity or malice and failed to properly produce the impugned publication, and therefore urged dismissal of the suit with costs. 101. **ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION.** 102. Having considered the pleadings, the evidence adduced by the parties and the respective submissions of Counsel, the Court is of the view that the following issues arise for determination: 1. Whether the Plaintiff proved, on a balance of probabilities, that the Defendants published or were responsible for the publication of the words complained of concerning the Plaintiff. 2. Whether the words complained of were defamatory of the Plaintiff in their natural and ordinary meaning and were understood to refer to him. 3. Whether the Plaintiff proved that the impugned publication was false and was published maliciously. 4. Whether the Defendants have established any of the pleaded defences, namely absolute privilege, qualified privilege, fair comment on a matter of public interest, responsible journalism or justification (truth). 5. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs sought in the amended plaint, and if so, the nature and quantum of such reliefs. 103. **ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS.** 104. The first issue for determination is whether the Plaintiff proved, on a balance of probabilities, that the Defendants published or were responsible for the publication of the words complained of concerning the Plaintiff. 105. The Defendants’ principal objection to the Plaintiff’s case was that the impugned publication was not properly proved because the full online article was not produced and because no certificate of electronic evidence was tendered. 106. The Plaintiff’s claim was founded upon specific words which were pleaded in the amended plaint and attributed to the online edition of *The Standard* newspaper. During the trial, the Plaintiff produced PExh1, being Google search results showing an online publication titled *“The Standard | Online Edition”* and bearing the *headline “Cocaine: Mwau bid to gag media.”* The search result further contained a preview of the article referring to the Plaintiff by name. Notably, PExh1 was admitted into evidence without objection and remained unchallenged throughout the proceedings. 107. Although the full article was not produced, the Court must consider the totality of the evidence and the pleadings. The issue is not merely whether the complete article was placed before the Court, but whether the Plaintiff proved, on a balance of probabilities, that the publication complained of existed and was published by the Defendants. 108. In that regard, the pleadings assume considerable importance. The amended plaint specifically set out the words complained of and attributed them to the Defendants. Following the amendment of the plaint, the Defendants did not file an amended defence traversing those allegations. 109. Further, in paragraph 7 of their statement of defence, the Defendants expressly pleaded that on 5th January, 2005 the 1st Defendant published an article under the heading *“Cocaine: Mwau bid to gag media.”* Their position was not that no such article existed. Rather, their contention was that the words relied upon by the Plaintiff constituted only the heading of a longer article and that, when read in its entirety, the publication was not defamatory. 110. In my view, that pleading amounted to an acknowledgement that an article bearing the impugned headline was indeed published by the 1st Defendant. The dispute raised by the Defendants concerned the context and effect of the publication rather than its existence. 111. If the Defendants intended to rely on the wider context of the article, it was incumbent upon them to place that material before the Court through evidence. However, despite having filed a defence, the Defendants elected not to call any witness at the trial. 112. The legal position regarding the evidential value of pleadings is settled. In ***CMC Aviation Ltd v Crusair Ltd (No. 1) [1987] KLR 103*,** the Court of Appeal held that pleadings contain only the parties’ respective averments. Such averments do not amount to evidence unless they are admitted by the opposing parties or proven through the evidentiary process. Consequently, no determination or finding can be founded solely upon them. Similarly, in ***Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi v Mwangi Stephen Muriithi & Another [2014] eKLR,*** the Court of Appeal reiterated submissions cannot serve as a substitute for evidence. 113. In the present case, the Defendants’ assertion that the complete article would convey a different meaning remained unsupported by evidence. No witness testified to that effect, and the alleged complete article was not produced. Consequently, the Court was left only with the Plaintiff's evidence, PExh1, and the admissions contained in the pleadings. 114. The Plaintiff, on the other hand, testified regarding the publication and its contents. PW2 also testified that he read the publication online and understood it to refer to the Plaintiff. That evidence was not displaced by any contrary testimony. 115. Taking the evidence as a whole, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff established, on a balance of probabilities, that the Defendants published the words complained of in the online edition of *The Standard* newspaper and that the publication referred to him. 116. On the second issue, namely whether the words complained of were defamatory of the Plaintiff in their natural and ordinary meaning and were understood to refer to him, the Court is guided by the well settled principle in that the meaning of words is to be determined as understood by ordinary reasonable readers and not by the subjective intention of the publisher. This position was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in ***Johnson Evan Gicheru v Andrew Morton & another [2005] eKLR,*** where the Court held that in libel, the natural and ordinary meaning of words is that which would be understood by ordinary reasonable persons. 117. In the present case, the publication expressly referred to the Plaintiff by name, describing him as *“Businessman John Harun Mwau”* and linking him to a *“Ksh.6 billion cocaine haul”* allegedly cleared through a container depot in which he was said to be a shareholder. There can therefore be no serious dispute as to identification. The principle in ***Johnson Evan Gicheru v Andrew Morton & another*** (supra) applies with full force, as the words complained of required no innuendo or extrinsic facts to establish reference to the Plaintiff. 118. In considering whether the natural and ordinary meaning of the words was gravely defamatory, I am of the view that an allegation linking a person to the trafficking or clearance of narcotic drugs – particularly cocaine valued at billions of shillings – would be understood by the ordinary reader to mean that such person is engaged in serious criminal conduct. Words which impute criminality or involvement in serious wrongdoing are inherently defamatory because they expose a person to public odium, contempt and hatred. 119. A defamatory meaning arises where the published words have the effect of lowering a person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the impugned publication imputed criminal conduct, dishonesty and a lack of integrity to the Plaintiff. 120. The assertion that the Plaintiff was a shareholder in a depot through which cocaine was allegedly cleared necessarily conveyed participation in drug trafficking or at the very least knowledge and facilitation of criminal activity. In ***Nation Media Group Ltd & Another v Hon. Chirau Ali Mwakwere [2010] eKLR,*** the Court of Appeal held that even indirect or suggestive imputations that expose a person to suspicion of criminal conduct are defamatory if they would lead reasonable readers to form a lowered opinion of the claimant. The present case meets that threshold. 121. Accordingly, the Court finds that the words complained of were defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning and were understood by reasonable readers to refer to the Plaintiff. 122. On the third issue, whether the Plaintiff proved that the impugned publication was false and was published maliciously, the Court is guided by the principle that falsity and malice may be inferred from the circumstances of publication, including failure to verify facts, sensationalism and persistence in publishing unverified allegations. 123. The Plaintiff led uncontroverted evidence through PW3, a senior and highly experienced anti-narcotics investigator, who testified that no cocaine was ever cleared through Pepe Inland Container Depot and that all containers associated with the depot contained only declared goods. This evidence directly disproved the central sting of the publication. The Defendants did not call any witness to challenge this testimony, nor did they produce any investigative material to support the allegation. 124. In ***Joseph Njogu Kamunge v Standard Limited [2016] eKLR,*** the High Court held that malice may be inferred where a Defendant publishes defamatory material without verifying its truth or where the publication is made recklessly without regard to its accuracy. The Court finds that principle directly applicable here, given the absence of any evidentiary basis for the Defendants’ assertions. 125. The Defendants also failed to seek comment from the Plaintiff prior to publication. Failure to inquire or verify information before publication, especially where grave allegations are made, is a factor that may support an inference of malice. The publication in the present case involved extremely serious allegations of involvement in international drug trafficking, yet no effort was made to verify the Plaintiff’s alleged involvement. 126. Further, the continued online availability of the impugned article, as shown by PExh1, despite complaint and demand, supports an inference of malice. In ***Nation Media Group Ltd & Another v Hon. Chirau Ali Mwakwere*** (supra), the Court of Appeal emphasized that conduct after publication, including refusal to retract or correct false statements, is relevant in assessing malice and aggravation. 127. The Court therefore finds that the Plaintiff has proved that the publication was false in material respects and that it was made maliciously, or at the very least with reckless disregard for the truth. 128. On the fourth issue, whether the Defendants have established any of the pleaded defences, the Court begins with justification (truth). The burden of proving truth lies on the Defendants once defamation is established. In ***S M W v Z W M [2015] eKLR,*** the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that truth is a complete defence but must be strictly proved by the Defendant. 129. In the present case, the Defendants led no evidence whatsoever. The pleaded defence of truth therefore remains unsupported. The testimony of PW3 directly negates the factual foundation of the alleged justification. Accordingly, the defence of justification fails. 130. On fair comment and responsible journalism, the Court is guided by ***Joseph Njogu Kamunge v Standard Limited [2016] eKLR,*** where the High Court held that fair comment must be based on true facts and must represent an honestly held opinion. Where the underlying facts are false, the defence collapses. 131. The Defendants’ reliance on alleged public interest in drug trafficking investigations cannot assist them in the absence of a factual foundation. A defence of fair comment cannot stand where the factual substratum of the publication is not proved to be true or is not established at all. 132. The defence of qualified privilege also fails. Qualified privilege protects publication made on occasions where there is a duty to communicate information and a corresponding interest in receiving it. However, such protection is defeated by malice. Having already found malice, the defence of qualified privilege is unavailable to the Defendants. 133. The defence of absolute privilege is equally inapplicable. There is no evidence that the publication arose from parliamentary proceedings, judicial proceedings or any other occasion attracting absolute immunity. The pleaded defence is therefore without legal foundation. 134. On responsible journalism and public interest, the Court recognizes that media houses play a critical role in informing the public. However, freedom of expression does not extend to publishing false and defamatory material without verification. Responsible journalism requires diligence, accuracy and fairness, none of which were demonstrated in this case. 135. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Defendants have failed to establish any of the pleaded defences of justification, fair comment, qualified privilege, absolute privilege or responsible journalism. 136. On the fifth issue, which is whether the Plaintiff is entitled to reliefs sought and the appropriate quantum of damages, the Court is guided by the principles governing assessment of damages in defamation as articulated by the Court of Appeal in ***Johnson Evan Gicheru v Andrew Morton & Another*** (supra) where the Court held that damages are at large and must be assessed based on the gravity of the libel, extent of publication and conduct of the Defendant. 137. The Court also relies on ***Nation Media Group Ltd & Another v Hon. Chirau Ali Mwakwere*** (supra), where the Court of Appeal affirmed that damages in defamation serve both compensatory and vindicatory purposes, aimed at restoring the Plaintiff’s reputation as far as money can achieve. 138. In the present case, the allegations made against the Plaintiff were extremely grave, imputing involvement in international narcotics trafficking involving billions of shillings. The publication was disseminated online, giving it global reach and increasing its potential harm. The Plaintiff also demonstrated through PW2 that his reputation was in fact lowered among members of the public. 139. The Court further considers the conduct of the Defendants, who maintained the publication online and offered no apology or correction, and who failed to participate in the evidentiary hearing. Such conduct aggravates damages. 140. In light of comparable awards in our jurisprudence, including ***Kipyator Nicholas Kiprono Biwott v Clays Limited & 5 Others [2000] eKLR*** and ***Samuel Ndung’u Mukunya v Nation Media Group Limited & Another [2015] eKLR,*** the Court is satisfied that this is a case warranting substantial general and aggravated damages. 141. The Court therefore finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to general damages for defamation, aggravated damages due to the malicious and reckless conduct of the Defendants. The Plaintiff is further entitled to costs of the suit and interest on the damages awarded, as costs ordinarily follow the event and there is no reason to depart from that principle in this case. 142. **DISPOSITION.** 143. In the final analysis, having regard to the Plaintiff’s status as a national leader and holder of prominent public positions, as established by the uncontroverted evidence presented before the Court, judgement is entered in favour of the Plaintiff on the issue of liability. The defences are dismissed in their entirety and the Court proceeds to grant the appropriate damages sought in the amended plaint. 144. Accordingly, guided by the comparative awards made in ***Kipyator Nicholas Kiprono Biwott v Clays Limited & 5 Others*** and ***Samuel Ndung’u Mukunya v Nation Media Group Limited & Another,*** judgement is entered for the Plaintiff against the Defendants jointly and severally, and the Court awards the Plaintiff general damages for defamation in the sum of Kenya Shillings Ten Million (Ksh.10,000,000/-) and exemplary damages in the sum of Kenya Shillings Two Million (Ksh.2,000,000/-), together with costs of the suit and interest thereon at court rates from the date of judgement until payment in full. The claim for injunctive relief was not pursued or addressed during the trial, and I therefore decline to grant the same. 145. This file is hereby closed. DELIVERED (virtually), DATED & SIGNED this 5th day of June, 2026. **JOE M. OMIDO.** **JUDGE** FOR PLAINTIFF: **Mr. Ouma.** FOR DEFENDANTS: **Mr. Ndegwa** for **Mr. Wepoh.** COURT ASSISTANTS: **Mr. Ngoge** & **Mr. Juma.** **Mr. Ndegwa:** I seek copies of judgement and proceedings. I seek stay of execution. **Mr. Ouma:** No objection to stay for 21 days. **Court:** Copies of proceedings and judgement to be supplied to the parties upon payment of court charges. Stay of execution for 30 days. **JOE M. OMIDO** **JUDGE**