https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/10659

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT SIAYA** **CIVI APPEAL NO. E059 OF 2025** **JUBILEE ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE (K) LIMITED…APPELLANT** **VERSUS** **KENNEDY OMONDI ODERO…………………………RESPONDENT** **AND** **JOSEPH OJWANG ODERO** *(Suing as the Legal Administrator to the Estate of MARIANA KENZIE)* **……………………………..1ST INTERESTED PARTY** **JOSEPH OJWANG ODERO** *(Suing as the father and next friend to MELVIN SYROSE OJWANG)* **………………………………2ND INTERESTED PARTY** **JOSEPH OJWANG ODERO…………………3RD INTERESTED PARTY** **HAZELOMANGA AOKO……………………4TH INTERESTED PARTY** **JOSEPH OJWANG ODERO** *(Suing as the father and next friend to ALFRED MARK OJWANG)* **………………………………5TH INTERESTED PARTY** **(Being an appeal against the Judgment and Decree of the Honourable Senior Principal Magistrate, Eric Malesi, delivered on the 30th July 2025 in Madiany Magistrate's Court Civil Case No. E009 of 2025)** **BETWEEN** **KENNEDY OMONDI ODERO………………………………PLAINTIFF** **VERSUS** **JUBILEE ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE (K) LIMITED.DEFENDANT** **AND** **JOSEPH OJWANG ODERO** *(Suing as the Legal Administrator to the Estate of MARIANA KENZIE)* ………………………**……………………………..1ST INTERESTED PARTY** **JOSEPH OJWANG ODERO** *(Suing as the father and next friend to MELVIN SYROSE OJWANG)* ………………………**………………………………2ND INTERESTED PARTY** **JOSEPH OJWANG ODERO…………………3RD INTERESTED PARTY** **HAZELOMANGA AOKO……………………4TH INTERESTED PARTY** **JOSEPH OJWANG ODERO** *(Suing as the father and next friend to ALFRED MARK OJWANG)* …………………….**………………………………5TH INTERESTED PARTY** **JUDGEMENT** 1. This is an appeal against the Judgment of the Senior Principal Magistrate at Madiany Law Courts, Hon. Eric Malesi delivered on 30th July, 2025. The trial court entered judgment in favour of the Respondent declaring that a valid insurance contract existed between the parties and ordered the Appellant to satisfy the third-party judgments entered against the Respondent in Madiany CMCC Nos. E008, E009, E010, E011 and E012 of 2024. 2. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, the Appellant moved this Court via a Memorandum of Appeal dated 22nd August 2025 wherein it raised the following grounds of appeal; 3. That the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in making a finding that the Respondent had proved his case against the Appellant on a balance of probabilities without any supportive evidence thereby arriving at the wrong finding. 4. That the learned trial Magistrate grossly misdirected himself in holding that there existed a valid insurance contract while the evidence on record did not support the finding. 5. The learned trial Magistrate misdirected himself by purporting to rely on oral evidence by the Respondent over documentary evidence presented by the Appellant. 6. The learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in by raising the standard of proof in civil cases. 7. That the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in making a finding that the Appellant had an obligation under section 10 of the Insurance (Motor Vehicles Third Party Risks) Act, Cap 405 to satisfy the Judgment in MADIANY CMCC NO. E008, E009, E010, E011 and E012 of 2024 and/or indemnify the Respondent against any claim whatsoever involving the Respondent's motor vehicle registration No. KCD 817X. 8. That the learned trial Magistrate erred and misdirected himself in law and in fact by making its holding and finding on un-pleaded issues and facts that were not in issue. Effectively, the court amended the parties pleadings and determined a new suit (cause of action on fraud) different from the one presented by the Respondent to the detriment of the Appellant. 9. That the learned trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in wholly disregarding the pleadings, submissions and evidence adduced on behalf of the Appellant and placed on record thereby arriving at an erroneous decision. 10. This being the first Appellate court, its duty is to re-evaluate the record of the lower court and subject it to an independent analysis so as to reach its own conclusion as to whether or not to uphold the decision of the trial court. See **Selle vs Associated Motor boat Co. Ltd [1968] EA 123.** 11. The Respondent (then the Plaintiff) moved the trial court in Madiany Law Courts Civil Case No. E009 of 2025 seeking a declaratory order. He sought a declaration that a valid comprehensive insurance policy existed between himself and the Appellant and an order compelling the Appellant to satisfy third-party judgments entered against him in Madiany CMCC Nos. E008, E009, E010, E011 and E012 of 2024. These third-party claims arose from a road traffic accident on 8th October 2023 involving motor vehicle registration No. KCD 817X which resulted in injuries and fatalities to the Interested Parties. 12. The Respondent (PW1) testified that he took out a comprehensive insurance policy with the Appellant for his vehicle KCD 817X and paid a premium of Kshs. 68,000. He produced and relied upon Certificate of Insurance No. C26848051 under Policy No. P/105/1002/2023/000001 indicating a validity period running from 1st March 2023 to 31st December 2023. He also produced a copy of the vehicle's logbook and email correspondence. He presented the official police abstract from the accident noting that the investigating officers retrieved and recorded the details of this specific certificate from the vehicle at the scene. He testified that after reporting the accident, the Appellant initially accepted the claim and instructed its panel of advocates, *M/s Ochieng’ Opiyo & Company Advocates* to come on record and defend him in the third-party suits. He stated that these advocates actively handled the cases for months during which time several judgments were entered against him before abruptly withdrawing on 31st October 2024 on instructions that no active cover existed. On cross examination, the Respondent was hard-pressed by the Appellant's counsel regarding the origin of the certificate and the lack of a formal receipt for the KES 68,000 premium. The Respondent maintained that he transacted with an agent at the Appellant’s office along Oginga Odinga Road and was issued the physical certificate which he placed on his windscreen in total good faith. He insisted that he had no reason to suspect any administrative anomaly as the certificate clearly bore the Appellant's corporate name and logo and the Appellant had treated the policy as active by taking up his defense when the accident occurred. 1. The Appellant responded through its Legal Claims Officer, Patience Wangui Mirara (**DW1**) who testified that the company had only issued a brief one-month token insurance cover to the Respondent running from 1st January 2023 to 31st January 2023 under Certificate No. C26719073. It was the Appellant's evidence that because the Respondent failed to extend or fully pay for the comprehensive cover, an internal cancellation endorsement and corresponding credit note were generated on 9th March 2023 citing a "change of insurance". The Appellant categorically disowned Certificate No. C26848051 presented by the Respondent. To prove it was a fabrication, the Appellant produced a letter from the Association of Kenya Insurers (AKI) dated 22nd May 2025 which explicitly stated that Certificate No. C26848051 was never allocated to the Appellant but was instead allocated to *Trident Insurance Company Limited* for an entirely different vehicle (Registration No. KCC 822B). Under cross-examination, DW1 admitted a glaring disconnect: the "cancellation" generated on 9th March 2023 was purely a back-office electronic adjustment and was never formally communicated to the Respondent. DW1 further conceded under cross-examination that despite the alleged policy cancellation in early 2023, the Appellant still went ahead to receive the accident claim in October 2023 and appointed *M/s Ochieng’ Opiyo & Company Advocates* to defend the Respondent. DW1 admitted that the appointed advocates remained on record and actively managed the litigation for a prolonged period only pulling out on 31st October 2024 after several third-party judgments had already been entered against the Respondent. 1. The learned trial magistrate considered the matter and found no merit in the Appellant’s assertions and thus entered judgement in favour of the Respondent thus precipitating into the present appeal. 2. The Appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions. Both parties filed their respective submissions. 3. The Appellant argued that the trial magistrate grossly misdirected himself by establishing the existence of a valid insurance contract. It contended that an insurance policy lapses automatically upon the expiration of its agreed duration if it is not renewed, thereby absolving the insurer of subsequent liabilities. 4. The Appellant stated that its obligations had ceased because it had only insured the Respondent's vehicle for a single month from 1st January, 2023 to 31st January, 2023 under policy number P/105/1002/2023/000001.The policy subsequently lapsed by effluxion of time and the Respondent failed to remit additional premiums or renew the contract. Consequently, the Appellant acted within its legal rights when it repudiated the claim as falling outside the policy's pendency. 5. To reinforce this position, the Appellant cited Section 156(1) of the Insurance Act (Cap 487) which mandates that no insurer shall assume a risk in Kenya unless the payable premium has been received. The Appellant averred that premium payment serves as the indispensable consideration for an insurer's promise to indemnify. This statutory principle was backed by the High Court decision in **Britam General Insurance Co (Kenya) Ltd v Kimani (Civil Case E008B of 2023) [2024] KEHC 9106 (KLR)** where the court held that an insurer bears no obligation to assume risk if no premium is received and that a failure to pay constitutes a fundamental breach that renders a policy invalid. 6. The Appellant noted that its witness, Patience Mirara (DW1) gave uncontroverted testimony that the active cover expired on 31st January, 2023. Conversely, while the Respondent claimed during cross-examination to have paid KES 68,000/=, he failed to produce any documentary receipts, bank statements or confirmation letters to prove that any payment was made to extend coverage to the date of the accident. The Appellant concluded that since no consideration was provided for the material period, the trial court erred by failing to recognize that the policy had lapsed. 7. The Appellant further contended that the trial magistrate improperly assumed an adversarial role on behalf of the Respondent by challenging the Appellant’s verified evidence from the Association of Kenya Insurers (AKI). In the impugned judgment, the trial magistrate had expressed skepticism over why a policy that allegedly expired in January 2023 was internally logged as "cancelled" on 9th March, 2023 labeling the timeline a "glaring disconnect." The magistrate had also pointed out that the Appellant initially took active steps to defend the Respondent in the third-party suits before withdrawing. 8. In response to those findings, the Appellant explained that the internal cancellation log and subsequent withdrawal of legal instructions occurred precisely when it discovered that the policy had never been legally consummated through premium payments. Citing**Insurance Company of East Africa v Marwa Distributors Limited (Civil Appeal No. 51 of 2015) [2015] KEHC 4512 (KLR**) the Appellant argued that an insurer cannot be bound by standard cancellation notice clauses if the underlying policy itself was already invalid for want of consideration. 9. Furthermore, the Appellant pointed out that while the Respondent attempted to rely on Insurance Certificate No. C26848051, an official verification letter from the AKI dated 22nd May, 2025 explicitly confirmed that the Appellant never issued that certificate. The Appellant argued that the trial magistrate misdirected himself by casually dismissing this uncontradicted AKI correspondence and demanding further oral corroboration from an AKI official. The Appellant maintained that by requiring strict corroboration for unchallenged documentary evidence, the trial court had erroneously applied a criminal standard of proof (beyond reasonable doubt) to a civil matter. 10. Finally, the Appellant objected to the trial magistrate’s assertions that the case carried "nuances of fraud." The Appellant submitted that fraud must be explicitly pleaded and strictly proved. Because neither party had pleaded fraud in their statements of case, the Appellant argued that the trial court committed a serious procedural error by modifying the controversy into an unpleaded trial of fraud thereby violating the established principle that parties are strictly bound by their pleadings. 11. The Appellant concluded by reiterating that an insured must pay the required premium to trigger an insurer's duty of indemnity. Citing **Ominde v Jubilee Insurance Company (Civil Appeal E024 of 2023) [2024] KEHC 408(KLR) (25 January 2024) (Judgement),** the Appellant noted that the burden of proof rests entirely on the party asserting a legal right. Because the Respondent failed to prove premium payment or valid policy pendency on a balance of probabilities, the Appellant prayed that this Court find the trial magistrate erred in applying section 10 of Cap 405 and requested that the lower court's judgment be overturned. 12. The Respondent noted that as a first appellate court, the High Court is legally obligated to reappraise and re-evaluate the evidence on record to arrive at its own independent findings while remaining mindful that it did not have the opportunity to see or hear the witnesses firsthand. To support this legal position, the Respondent relied on the classic precedent of **Selle v. Associated Motor Boat Co. [1968] EA 123**, which establishes that a first appeal is a retrial where the court must independently reconsider and evaluate the evidence. The Respondent further cited **Jabane v. Olenja [1986] KLR 664**, which underscores that an appellate court will not lightly disturb the factual findings of a trial judge unless those findings are completely unsupported by evidence or based on wrong principles. The Respondent further prayed that its trial court written submissions dated 15th July 2025 be fully adopted by the appellate court. 13. The Respondent addressed the statutory framework governing the burden of proof under Section 107 of the Evidence Act (Cap 80) stating that while the legal burden remains fixed on the plaintiff from the outset, the evidential burden shifts to the defendant once a *prima facie* case is established. The Respondent supported this point by citing **Milka Akinyi Ouma v. Kenya Power and Lighting Co. Ltd & Another [2020] KEHC 7689 (KLR)**, where the court detailed the mechanics of how the evidential burden of proof shifts between parties during a trial. 14. The Respondent pointed out that at paragraph 18 of the impugned judgment, the trial magistrate explicitly found that the Respondent had successfully discharged his evidential burden by proving the existence of an insurance cover for motor vehicle KCD 817X. The Respondent argued that the Appellant subsequently failed to discharge its shifted evidential burden due to several glaring deficiencies and contradiction. The Appellant failed to produce copies of the underlying proposal form or policy document which were within its custody and would have clarified the exact duration, terms and conditions of the contract. The Appellant's witness (DW1) produced an internal policy cancellation credit note dated 9th March 2023 (Dexb. 1). This document indicated a coverage period from 1st January 2023 to 9th March 2023 directly contradicting the Appellant's primary trial argument that the cover had expired on 31st January 2023. 15. The credit note was purportedly effective from 9th March 2023 merely nine days after the alleged commencement of a policy on 1st March 2023 yet no notice of cancellation was ever served upon the Respondent. Furthermore, the document was only executed by one individual (David Origa) instead of the three mandatory internal signatories required for institutional validity. 16. The Respondent argued that the purported cancellation was an illegal afterthought designed to escape liability as it violated section 10(4) of the Insurance (Motor Vehicles Third Party Risks) Act. The cancellation was communicated more than three months after the third-party claims were filed on 6th April 2024. The Respondent cited **Fidelity Shield Insurance Company Limited v Musembi [2024] KEHC 5825 (KLR)** to reinforce the principle that insurers must file a declaratory suit within the strict statutory three-month window to successfully escape third-party liability. As observed by the trial court at paragraph 19 of its judgment, the Appellant had actively entertained the accident claim when it was lodged in October 2023. The Appellant had gone as far as instructing defense counsel to step into the shoes of the Respondent under the doctrine of subrogation acting with full knowledge of its own internal logs. The Respondent therefore urged the court to find that the trial magistrate did not misinterpret or ignore the evidence, but rather arrived at the correct factual and legal determination. 17. The Respondent strongly denied that the trial magistrate acted as counsel for the Respondent. Instead, the Respondent argued that the magistrate made rational, judicial observations at paragraphs 20 to 22 of the judgment regarding the Appellant's casual introduction of evidence that carried serious "nuances of fraud." 18. The Respondent submitted that fraud is a severe allegation that must be distinctly pleaded and strictly proved to a standard higher than a regular balance of probabilities. To anchor this principle, the Respondent referenced Bullen & Leake & Jacobs Precedents of Pleadings (13th Edition) which states that general allegations are insufficient and that clear full particulars of fraud must be stated explicitly on the face of the pleadings. **Mbuthia Macharia v. Annah Mutua Ndwiga Mutua & Another [2015]**. **Land Mark Holdings Limited v. Devcon Group Limited [2014]**, where a defense failed because the asserting party did not call material witnesses to substantiate fraud claims. **Sammy Ngugi Mugo v. Mombasa Salt Lakes Ltd & Another [2014]**. **Grace Wanjiru Macharia v. James Dancun Mwarangu Gikonyo [2018]** which adopted the *Black’s Law Dictionary* definition of fraud as an intentional, positive device or concealment designed to deprive another of a right or secure an unjust advantage. 19. The Respondent argued that while the Appellant failed to plead fraud in its Statement of Defense, it attempted to insinuate fraudulent conduct by producing an email from the Association of Kenya Insurers (AKI) dated 22nd May 2025. The email asserted that the insurance sticker held by the Respondent (No. C26848051) was actually issued by Trident Insurance for an entirely different vehicle and was already cancelled. 20. The Respondent maintained that the trial magistrate was entirely justified in raising judicial eyebrows at this evidence. The Respondent had been issued a physical sticker bearing the Appellant’s name as the issuer and he reasonably believed himself to be covered. The Respondent had never received any timely notice of cancellation during the term of the policy nor within 14 days of the third-party claims being filed nor did the Appellant file a declaratory suit within three months as required under the *Fidelity Shield* precedent. 21. Furthermore, the Respondent noted that the AKI email produced by the Appellant did not even refer to the Respondent's vehicle. The Respondent argued that because information flows from the primary insurer (the Appellant) to the AKI and not vice versa, it was the Appellant's duty to call an official from the AKI or Trident Insurance to testify and clear up the anomaly. In the absence of such witnesses, the trial court properly refused to allow the Appellant to casually cast aside an insurance certificate that explicitly bore its own name as the issuer. 22. The Respondent concluded by submitting that the instant appeal is entirely devoid of merit. The Respondent prayed that the High Court dismiss the appeal with costs, uphold the trial court's judgment and decree dated 30th July 2025 and direct the Appellant to settle the third-party claims. 23. Having carefully considered the Memorandum of Appeal, the lower court record and the rival written submissions, i find that the singular, overarching issue for determination is whether this appeal has merit. 24. The Appellant argued that the trial court ignored the foundational principle of insurance law codified under Section 156(1) of the Insurance Act (Cap 487) which stipulates that an insurer assumes no risk until the premium is received. The Appellant relied on the High Court decision in **Britam General Insurance Co (Kenya) Ltd v. Kimani [2024] KEHC 9106 (KLR)** to advance the position that a policy automatically lapses upon the expiration of its term if no renewal premium is paid. The Appellant asserted that the Respondent's cover was strictly confined to the month of January 2023 and since the accident occurred in October 2023 no coverage existed. 25. Conversely, the Respondent submitted that while the legal burden of proof remains static under Section 107 of the Evidence Act (Cap 80), he successfully discharged his evidential burden by presenting a valid physical insurance certificate (No. C26848051) bearing the Appellant's name as the issuer. The Respondent contended that the evidential burden then shifted to the Appellant to demonstrate how and when this policy ceased to be active a burden the Appellant failed to discharge (see **Milka Akinyi Ouma v. Kenya Power and Lighting Co Ltd & Another [2020] KEHC 7689 (KLR)** 26. This Court has re-examined the Appellant's evidence and finds profound self-defeating contradictions that completely validate the trial magistrate's skepticism. First, while the Appellant claimed at trial that the policy was valid only for the month of January 2023, its sole witness (DW1) produced an internal document labeled "Policy Cancellation Credit Note" dated 9th March, 2023 (Dexb. 1). A casual analysis of this credit note indicates that the cover period ran from 1st January, 2023 to 9th March, 2023. This directly invalidates the Appellant's core submission that the cover abruptly ended on 31st January, 2023. 27. Second, the credit note shows it took effect from 9th March, 2023 which was nine days *after* the purported commencement of a renewed policy cycle on 1st March, 2023. Yet, the Appellant admitted it never served any statutory notice of cancellation upon the Respondent at that time. 28. Furthermore, a glaring procedural and anachronistic mismatch completely erodes the credibility of the Appellant's defense. The Appellant formally informed the Respondent that his policy was cancelled via an email dated 5th November, 2024. Astoundingly, the Appellant's own documentary evidence (Dexb. 3) reveals that it did not actually investigate the validity of this policy until 21st November, 2025. This Court is left to wonder: on what factual or legal basis did the Appellant cancel and repudiate the policy in November 2024 if the official investigation into the policy's status was only conducted a year later in November 2025? 29. Most fundamentally, the Appellant's conduct creates an insurmountable hurdle of estoppel. When the accident occurred in October 2023, the Appellant entertained the third-party claims, stepped into the shoes of the Respondent under the principle of subrogation and instructed counsel to defend the suits. It cannot after exercising its rights of subrogation and holding out to the world and to innocent third parties that it was the insurer, retroactively turn around and claim that the policy was non-existent. 30. Under section 10(1) of the Insurance (Motor Vehicles Third Party Risks) Act (Cap 405), an insurer has a statutory obligation to satisfy judgments obtained against persons insured against third-party risks. If an insurer wishes to escape this heavy statutory duty on the grounds of non-disclosure, misrepresentation or policy invalidity, it must strictly comply with Section 10(4) of the Act. Section 10(4) mandates that the insurer must obtain a declaration from a court of competent jurisdiction *within three months of the commencement of the third-party action.* 31. As properly held by the High Court in **Fidelity Shield Insurance Company Limited v Musembi [2024] KEHC 5825 (KLR)** any failure by an insurer to secure a declaratory judgment within this strict three-month statutory window completely shuts the door on its capacity to repudiate third-party liability. The Appellant in this case did not file any declaratory suit within three months of April 2024. Its attempts to unilaterally walk away from its statutory obligations via a casual email cannot be sanctioned by this Court. It is also instructive that the Appellant had authorized its agents out there to sell insurance policies on its behalf and that certificates of insurance were duly issued to the insured. The Appellant was expected to engage with their said agents over the issuance of the insurance policies. There is no evidence presented in that regard by the Appellant to the trial court so as to back up its claim that the cover issued to the Respondent was not in existence. 32. The Appellant heavily faulted the trial magistrate for observing at paragraphs 20 to 22 of the judgment that the Appellant’s case carried "nuances of fraud" and that it "required to do more" by calling an official from the Association of Kenya Insurers (AKI). The Appellant contended that since fraud was never pleaded, the trial court erred by raising it *sua sponte*. 33. To resolve this issue, this Court must examine how the issue of fraud sneaked into the trial. The record shows that the Appellant produced a letter from the AKI dated 22nd May, 2025 which claimed that Insurance Certificate No. C26848051 was not issued by the Appellant but belonged to Trident Insurance for an entirely different vehicle. By presenting this document, it was the *Appellant* who heavily insinuated that the Respondent was operating with a fraudulent, forged or invalid certificate. 34. It is a long-settled principle of law that fraud is a severe and quasi-criminal accusation that cannot be left to mere speculation or inference. As stated in the leading text Bullen & Leake & Jacobs, Precedents of Pleadings (13th Edition) at page 427, where fraud is intended to be charged, there must be a clear, distinct and precise allegation of fraud within the pleadings. General allegations, no matter how strong are insufficient. This principle has been strictly enforced across Kenyan jurisprudence including in **Macharia v Ndwiga & another (Civil Appeal 297 of 2015) [2017] KECA 290 (KLR) (29 September 2017) (Judgment**) and **Landmark Holdings Limited v Devcon Group Limited [2014] KEHC 853 (KLR)** 35. In **Grace Wanjiru Macharia (suing as the legal representative of the estate of Gachonde Gikonyo Kagechu) v James Duncan Mwarangu Gikonyo (suing as the legal representative of the estate of Danson Gikonyo Gichonde) [2018] KEELC 3506 (KLR**) the court emphasized that fraud requires positive, intentional artifice or deceit designed to secure an unjust advantage. If the Appellant genuinely believed that the insurance sticker held by the Respondent was a product of fraud, it was legally bound to explicitly plead those particulars in its Statement of Defense. It did not do so. 36. Furthermore, as the trial magistrate correctly noted the Appellant merely threw a piece of paper from the AKI at the face of the court without calling its maker or summoning an officer from Trident Insurance to corroborate the claims. The document produced did not even match the Respondent's vehicle particulars. Since information flows from primary insurers (like the Appellant) to the AKI repository, any discrepancy or anomaly was entirely within the Appellant’s domain to untangle. 37. By pointing out that uncorroborated, unpleaded documentary hearsay was insufficient to defeat a physical certificate bearing the Appellant's own name, the trial magistrate was not "tendering a defense" for the Respondent. Rather, the learned magistrate was properly enforcing the strict standards of proof and pleading required under the Evidence Act and the Civil Procedure Rules. An insurer cannot use unpleaded surprises to escape a third-party statutory claim. 38. Having fully re-appraised the facts, statutory law and judicial precedents governing this matter, this Court finds that the Appellant failed to demonstrate any misdirection on the part of the trial court. The learned trial magistrate’s findings are unassailable, legally sound and perfectly anchored on the evidence. 39. In view of the foregoing observations, it is my finding that the Appellant’s appeal lacks merit. The same is dismissed with costs. **Dated and delivered at Siaya, this 16th day of July 2026** **D.KEMEI** **JUDGE** **In the presence of:** **Ochieng Opiyo…………………………..for the Appellant** **N/A Odero Okoyo……………………......for the Respondent** **Maurine………………………………..Court Assistant**