In re Estate of Ashford Kang'ethe King'ang'i (Deceased) (Succession Cause 241 of 1980) [2026] KEHC 7543 (KLR) (Family) (4 June 2026) (Ruling)

In re Estate of Ashford Kang'ethe King'ang'i (Deceased) (Succession Cause 241 of 1980) [2026] KEHC 7543 (KLR) (Family) (4 June 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 7543 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts) Family Succession Cause 241 of 1980 HK Chemitei, J June 4, 2026 IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ASHFORD KANG’ETHE KING’ANG’I (DECEASED) Ruling 1.This ruling relates to the application dated 11th April, 2024 filed by the Applicant, Judy Mumbi, seeking for orders that:1.Pending the hearing and determination of this application inter-partes or until further orders of this Honourable Court, Peris Nyiha Kang’ethe and Jane Wanjiku Kang’ethe be restrained by an order of injunction from dealing in any manner whatsoever with the Estate of Ashford King’ang’i Kang’ethe on the basis that that the grant was obtained through the concealment from the Court of the existence of the Applicant who is a beneficiary to the estate of the deceased.2.This Honourable Court be pleased to order that an inhibition and or restriction be registered on Land title Number Nairobi/Thiboro Township/25 to preserve the property pending hearing and determination of this Application.3.The Grant issued to the Petitioner and confirmed on 4th August, 2015 be revoked and/or annulled for the reason of being defective and the same having been obtained unprocedurally.4.In the alternative, this Honourable Court be pleased to declare the Applicant as a dependant of the deceased under Section 26 of the Law of Succession Act and is entitled to reasonable provision from the estate.5.In the alternative, the Administrators of the estate of the deceased, the late Ashford Kang’ethe King’ang’i, are hereby directed to take all necessary and reasonable steps to make adequate and reasonable provision from the assets of the deceased's estate.6.The Administrators be and are hereby directed to file and serve fresh summons for confirmation of grant in which a reasonable provision for the Applicant is captured within thirty (30) days from the date the order is made.7.This Honourable Court be pleased to grant any other or further order it may deem fit and expedient in the circumstances.8.The costs of this application be provided for. 2.The application is based on the grounds thereof and supported by affidavit sworn by Judy Mumbi on 30th May, 2024. 3.She avers inter alia that the deceased died intestate on 23rd September, 1977. Following his death, a Grant of Letters of Administration Intestate was issued to Peris Nyiha Kang’ethe and Jane Wanjiku Kang’ethe on 15th January, 1981 and was subsequently confirmed on 10th November, 1986. She annexes copies of the grant and the certificate of confirmation of grant, which indicate that the estate comprised, among other assets, Dagoretti/Riruta/142 and Nairobi/Thiboro Township/25. 4.She states that she is the daughter of the late Lawrence Kiarie Kang’ethe, who was a son of the deceased, and therefore a beneficiary of the estate by virtue of her lineage. She explains that her father died on 7th May, 1996. According to her, the Administrators obtained and confirmed the grant without disclosing her existence to the Court despite her status as a beneficiary. She contends that this omission amounted to a material concealment of significant facts and violated the duty of full and frank disclosure required in succession proceedings. 5.She further avers that the concealment of her existence prejudiced her legal rights and interests in the estate because, had she been disclosed and included as a beneficiary, she would have been entitled to a share of the estate assets. 6.She argues that the Administrators misrepresented the true composition of the deceased’s beneficiaries, resulting in an improper distribution of the estate and a distortion of the deceased’s intentions. In her view, the omission was not merely a procedural defect but also a breach of the Administrators’ legal duties and obligations to administer the estate fairly and honestly. 7.She maintains that the failure to include her as a beneficiary occasioned an inequitable distribution of the estate contrary to the principles of fairness and justice. She reiterates that her father, Lawrence Kiarie Kang’ethe, had been a dependant of the deceased and that she, as his daughter, was also entitled to consideration. She states that despite this relationship, no adequate provision was made for her from the estate. 8.She adds that her father passed away before the succession proceedings were commenced, thereby complicating her ability to secure provision from the estate. She further depones that she is presently residing in the United States of America and is unable to return due to the lack of a home. She asserts that her predicament can only be remedied through reasonable provision from the estate in accordance with Section 26 of the Law of Succession Act. 9.She contends that she qualifies as a dependant under Section 29 (b) of the Act and that the estate possesses sufficient assets to cater for her interests without prejudicing the rights of the other beneficiaries. 10.On the basis of the foregoing, she avers that the proceedings leading to the issuance and confirmation of the grant were fundamentally defective because they were founded upon the concealment of material facts. She therefore urges the Court to revoke or annul the grant and, in the alternative, to make adequate and reasonable provision for her as a dependant and beneficiary of the deceased’s estate pursuant to section 26 of the Law of Succession Act. 11.The application is opposed vide replying affidavits sworn by Paul Mbugua Kang’ethe and Peninah Semiti on 15th July, 2024 and 10th April, 2026, respectively. 12.In his replying affidavit sworn on 15th July 2024, Paul Mbugua Kang’ethe, a beneficiary of the deceased’s estate, opposes the Applicant’s summons for revocation of grant. He acknowledges that the Applicant, Judy Mumbi, is the daughter of his late brother, Lawrence Kang’ethe, but contends that her application is brought after an inordinate and unexplained delay. He points out that the grant was confirmed in 1986 and argues that the Applicant has waited approximately forty-three years before raising any objection to the distribution of the estate. 13.He states that most of the estate properties were distributed long ago and beneficiaries took possession of their respective shares, with the exception of Nairobi/Thiboro Township/25. 14.He avers that dispute concerning that property are already pending before the Court, particularly regarding the release of the original title deed to him. In his view, the Applicant’s application is not a genuine attempt to secure her inheritance but is instead intended to frustrate and delay the resolution of the dispute relating to Nairobi/Thiboro Township/25. 15.He further contends that if the Applicant were acting in good faith, she would seek a redistribution of the entire estate rather than targeting a specific property that has already been allocated to him. He argues that the application exposes an ulterior motive and alleges that the Applicant has colluded with the Administrators, against whom he is engaged in litigation over the same property. 16.According to him, the Administrators are using the Applicant as a proxy in an attempt to deprive him of his inheritance and prevent him from obtaining the title deed that the Court appears inclined to release in his favour. He also invokes the equitable doctrine that equity does not aid the indolent, asserting that even if the Applicant had a valid claim, she slept on her rights for over four decades. 17.He maintains that as a grandchild of the deceased, the Applicant should pursue whatever entitlement may have accrued through her late father’s share of the estate rather than seek to interfere with property that was allocated to him under the confirmed grant. 18.He further states that the Applicant was aware that he had been awarded Nairobi/Thiboro Township/25 for more than six years and had never raised any objection until now. In support of his position, Paul Mbugua annexes a rectified Certificate of Confirmation of Grant dated 14th March, 2018, which he says demonstrates the extent of the estate and confirms his entitlement to Nairobi/Thiboro Township/25. 19.He characterizes the Applicant’s attempt to claim the property after more than forty years as unfair, discriminatory and suspicious. Consequently, he urges the Court to dismiss the application, arguing that it is a mischievous effort designed to undermine his lawful inheritance and to derail the conclusion of the long-standing dispute over the property. 20.In her replying affidavit sworn on 10th April, 2026, Peninah Semiti, a daughter of the deceased, opposes the Applicant’s summons for revocation of grant and contends that the application is legally untenable. She states that she has carefully reviewed the application and, upon legal advice, believes that it is time-barred, fatally defective and incompetent because it was brought decades after the grant was confirmed. 21.She maintains that the application offends the provisions of the Law of Succession Act and seeks to reopen matters that were conclusively determined when the grant was confirmed in 1986. She disputes the Applicant’s assertion that she was a dependant of the deceased. She avers that the Applicant has not produced any evidence showing that the deceased maintained her through the provision of food, shelter, education, medical care or any other support during his lifetime. 22.According to her, the Applicant has failed to demonstrate that she was being maintained by the deceased immediately prior to his death, which is a prerequisite for establishing dependency under the Law of Succession Act. She therefore contends that the Applicant does not meet the legal threshold for recognition as a dependant. 23.She further points out that the deceased died in September 1977 while the Applicant’s father, Lawrence Kang’ethe, remained alive until 1996. She argues that because the Applicant’s father was alive at the time of the deceased’s death, the Applicant could not have been under the deceased’s maintenance. 24.She also states that the Applicant was born in August 1978, almost a year after the deceased had died, making it impossible for the deceased to have maintained or even met her. In her view, these facts completely undermine the Applicant’s claim to dependency and expose the weakness of the case advanced before the Court. 25.She also challenges the allegation that the Administrators concealed the Applicant’s existence when the grant was confirmed. She explains that at the time of confirmation in 1986, the Applicant’s father was alive and therefore the Applicant herself was neither a direct beneficiary nor entitled to inherit independently from the estate. 26.Consequently, she contends that the Applicant’s exclusion from the confirmation proceedings cannot amount to concealment of a material fact. 27.She further dismisses the Applicant’s claim that her father was wholly dependent on the deceased, noting that no evidence has been produced to support that assertion. 28.She also takes issue with the Applicant’s explanation that she is stranded in the United States because she lacks a home to return to in Kenya. She asserts that the Applicant only relocated to the United States two years earlier and had resided in Kenya for many years before then. According to the her, this explanation is misleading and is intended to persuade the Court to grant the reliefs sought. She maintains that the application is founded on misrepresentations and unsupported allegations. 29.Finally, she argues that once the grant was confirmed on 10th November, 1986, the Court became functus officio in relation to the confirmation proceedings and cannot revisit the matter except through the appropriate avenues of review or appeal. On that basis, and relying on legal advice, she contends that the application is incurably defective and should be dismissed with costs 30.The Applicant has filed written submissions dated 17th July, 2025. 31.In her submissions, the Applicant contends that she is the biological daughter of the late Lawrence Kang’ethe, a son of the deceased, Ashford Kang’ethe King’ang’i. She argues that she was unlawfully excluded from the administration and distribution of the deceased’s estate despite being entitled to inherit through her late father. 32.According to the Applicant, the Administrators deliberately concealed her existence from the Court during the succession proceedings, thereby rendering the grant liable to revocation under Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act on account of material concealment and defects in the process of obtaining the grant. 33.The Applicant submits that the principal issue for determination is whether, as a grandchild of the deceased whose father had died, she was entitled to participate in the distribution of the estate and whether her exclusion constitutes sufficient grounds for revocation of the grant. 34.Relying on Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act and various judicial authorities, she argues that a grant may be revoked where it is obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, concealment of material facts or defective proceedings. She places particular emphasis on decisions holding that the non-disclosure of survivors or beneficiaries amounts to a fundamental defect warranting intervention by the Court. 35.The Applicant further submits that the law recognises the right of grandchildren to inherit directly from a grandparent’s estate where their parent, who was a child of the deceased, is deceased and therefore unable to take his or her share. Citing authorities such as Re Estate of Veronica Njoki Wakagoto, Re Estate of Imoli Luhatse Paul and Re Estate of Florence Mukami Kinyua, she argues that grandchildren step into the shoes of their deceased parent and inherit by representation under Section 41 of the Law of Succession Act. 36.She maintains that her exclusion from the succession proceedings was therefore unlawful because she was entitled to inherit her late father’s share of the estate. 37.The Applicant also relies on decisions recognizing the locus standi of grandchildren to pursue claims relating to their deceased parent’s entitlement in a grandparent’s estate. She submits that her interest arises not merely from dependency but from her beneficial entitlement through her late father’s lineage. 38.Consequently, she contends that she has the legal standing to challenge the administration and distribution of the estate and to seek protection of her inheritance rights before the Court. 39.Addressing the replying affidavit of Paul Mbugua Kang’ethe, the Applicant argues that his acknowledgment of her relationship to the deceased effectively confirms her status as a beneficiary. She criticizes his assertion that the estate has already been distributed and that the only outstanding issue concerns Nairobi/Thiboro Township/25, contending that such a position disregards her legitimate entitlement and the legal requirement that all beneficiaries be considered before distribution. 40.The Applicant further invokes Section 26 of the Law of Succession Act, arguing that the provision exists to protect dependants and beneficiaries who have been excluded from inheritance through concealment or other improper conduct by Administrators. 41.The Applicant additionally relies on Section 47 of the Law of Succession Act and Rule 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules, submitting that the Court possesses broad jurisdiction and inherent powers to make orders necessary for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the succession process. She argues that where a grant has been obtained through concealment of a legitimate heir, the Court has both the authority and obligation to intervene, notwithstanding claims that distribution has already occurred. 42.She cites authorities in which Court’s have reopened succession matters, altered confirmed grants and appointed additional Administrators where material omissions or injustices were established. 43.In conclusion, the Applicant submits that the evidence and authorities demonstrate that a grandchild whose parent died before distribution is entitled to inherit by representation and that her exclusion from the estate was a material concealment that rendered the grant defective. She therefore urges the Court to revoke the grant, appoint her as a co-administrator or otherwise make appropriate orders for redistribution, and grant such further relief as may be necessary to secure her rightful share in the estate. Analysis And Determination 44.I have gone through the application, the responses thereto and the filed submissions. 45.The issues that arise for determination are:i.Whether the Applicant has locus standi to bring the present application;ii.Whether the grant was obtained through concealment of a material fact or by proceedings that were defective in substance;iii.Whether the Applicant is entitled to inherit the share of her late father in the deceased’s estate; andiv.Whether the grant should be revoked or appropriate consequential orders issued. 46.In re Estate of Harjit Singh Brah alias Harjit Singh Nihal (Deceased) (Succession Cause 3 of 2019) [2023] KEHC 25531 (KLR) (20 November 2023) (Ruling), the Court stated as follows:“ 21.Revocation of grant is provided for under section 76 of the Law of Succession Act. The grounds upon which the grant may be revoked are well provided therein. The said section provides that revocation can either be at the instance of an Applicant or can be by the Court suo moto. However, it is a prerequisite that the conditions for revocation as set out under section 76 must be proved. In the case of Jamleck Maina Njoroge v Mary Wanjiru Mwangi [2015] eKLR, the Court discussed circumstances when a grant can be revoked. The Court observed that:“11.The circumstances that can lead to the revocation of grant have been set out in section 76 Law of Succession. For a grant to be revoked either on the Application of an interested party or on the Court ’s own motion there must be evidence that the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance, or that the grant was obtained fraudulently by making of false statement, or by concealment of something material to the case, or that the grant was obtained by means of untrue allegations of facts essential in point of law.” 22.The power to revoke a grant is a discretionary power that must be exercised judiciously and only on sound grounds. It is not discretion to be exercised whimsically or capriciously. There must be evidence of wrong doing for the Court to invoke section 76 of the Law of Succession Act and order for revocation of or annulment of a grant. Besides, when a Court is called upon to exercise this discretion, it must take into account interests of all beneficiaries entitled to the deceased’s estate and ensure that the action taken will be for the interest of justice. Generally, the trial Court has jurisdiction to revoke a grant if the conditions under section 76 are satisfied. 23.For avoidance of doubt, section 76 of the Law of Succession Act provides as follows:“76.Revocation or annulment of grant. A grant of representation, whether or not confirmed, may at any time be revoked or annulled if the Court decides, either on application by any Interested Party or of its own motion— (a)that the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance; (b)that the grant was obtained fraudulently by the making of a false statement or by the concealment from the Court of something material to the case;(c)that the grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant notwithstanding that the allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently; (d)that the person to whom the grant was made has failed, after due notice and without reasonable cause either—(i)to apply for confirmation of the grant within one year from the date thereof, or such longer period as the Court order or allow; or(ii)to proceed diligently with the administration of the estate; or(iii)to produce to the Court , within the time prescribed, any such inventory or account of administration as is required by the provisions of paragraphs (e) and (g) of section 83 or has produced any such inventory or account which is false in any material particular; or (e) that the grant has become useless and inoperative through subsequent circumstances.” 24.The above section 76 was interpreted In re Estate of Prisca Ong’ayo Nande (Deased) [2020] eKLR where it was stated that: “Under section 76, a Court may revoke a grant so long as the grounds listed above are disclosed, either on its own motion or on the application of a party. A grant of letters of administration may be revoked on three general grounds. The first is where the process of obtaining the grant was attended by problems. The first would be where the process was defective, either because some mandatory procedural step was omitted, or the persons applying for representation was not competent or suitable for appointment, or the deceased died testate having made a valid will and then a grant or letters of administration intestate was made instead of a grant of probate, or vice versa. It could also be that the process was marred by fraud and misrepresentation or concealment of matter, such as where some survivors are not disclosed or the Applicant lies that he is a survivor when he is not, among other reasons. The second general ground is where the grant was obtained procedurally, but the administrator, thereafter, got into problems with the exercise of administration, such as where he fails to apply for confirmation of grant within the time allowed, or he fails to proceed diligently with administration, or fails to render accounts as and when required. The third general ground is where the grant has become useless and inoperative following subsequent circumstances, such as where a sole administrator dies leaving behind no administrator to carry on the exercise, or where the sole administrator loses the soundness of his mind for whatever reason or even becomes physically infirm to an extent of being unable to carry out his duties as administrator, or the sole administrator is adjudged bankrupt and, therefore, becomes unqualified to hold any office of trust.” 47.In Obiero v Ogola (Environment and Land Appeal 18 of 2022) [2022] KEELC 14765 (KLR) (15 November 2022) (Judgment) the Court pronounced itself as follows:“… 16. Locus standi is the right to appear or be heard in Court or other proceedings as noted in Chudasama case (infra). Thus, if one alleges the lack of the same in certain Court proceedings, he means that party cannot be heard. 17.In Rajesh Pranjivan Chudasama vs Sailesh Pranjivan Chudasama (2014) eKLR, the Court of Appeal addressed itself on the issue of locus standi in succession matters as follows:-“... But in our view the position in law as regards locus standi in succession matter is well settled. A litigant is clothed with locus standi upon obtaining a limited grant or a full grant of Letters of Administration in cases of Intestate succession. In Otieno v Ougo (supra) this Court differently constituted rendered itself thus;'.......an administrator is not entitled to bring any action as administrator before he has taken out Letters of Administration. If he does, the action is incompetent as of the date of inception." (Emphasis added)…” 48.In Kosgei v Cherono (Family Appeal E002 of 2023) [2024] KEHC 1337 (KLR) (16 February 2024) (Judgment) where the Court pronounced itself as follows: “…23. On the issue of inheritance by grandchildren, although the Learned Magistrate did not make a determination thereof, the issue was in contention before him and has also again featured in this Appeal. 24. On that issue, my first port of call will be Section 41 of the Law of Succession Act, which provides as follows:“ 41.Property devolving upon child to be held in trust Where reference is made in this Act to the "net intestate estate", or the residue thereof, devolving upon a child or children, the property comprised therein shall be held in trust, in equal shares in the case of more than one child, for all or any of the children of the intestate who attain the age of eighteen years or who, being female, marry under that age, and for all or any of the issue of any child of the intestate who predecease him and who attain that age or so marry, in which case the issue shall take through degrees, in equal shares, the share which their parent would have taken had he not predeceased the intestate.” (emphasis added) 25. In short therefore, Section 41 provides that where one of the children of the deceased is himself/herself deceased, and such deceased child is survived by a child or children of his/her own, then the share due to him/her ought to devolve upon his/her said child, and where more than one, the children would take equally. This question was addressed in the case of Re Estate of Wahome Njoki Wakagoto (2013) eKLR where W. Musyoka J held as follows: “Under Part V, grandchildren have no right to inherit their grandparents who die intestate after 1st July 1981. The argument is that such grandchildren should inherit from their own parents. This means that the grandchildren can only inherit their grandparents’ indirectly through their own parents, the children of the deceased. The children inherit first and thereafter grandchildren inherit from the children. The only time grandchildren inherit directly from their grandparents is when the grandchildren’s own parents are dead. The grandchildren step into the shoes of their parents and take directly the share that ought to have gone to the said parents.” 26. Further, the Court of Appeal in Christine Wangari Gachege v Elizabeth Wanjiru Evans & 11 Others [2014] eKLR held as follows: “Although Section 35 and 38 of the Law of Succession Act is silent on the fate of surviving grand children whose parents predeceased the deceased, the rate of substitution of a grandchild for his/her parent in all cases of intestate known as the principle of representation is applicable. The Law is section 41. If a child of the intestate has pre- deceased, the intestate then that child’s issue alive or in centre as mere on that date of the intestate’s death will take in equal shares per stirpes contingent on attaining the age of majority. Per stirpes means that the issue of a deceased child of the intestate take between them the share their parents would have taken had the parent been alive at the intestate’s death”. 49.In re Estate of Hellen Wangari Wathiai (Deceased) [2021] eKLR the Court pronounced itself as follows: “…52. The evidence on record suggest that the Applicant herein brought these proceedings on behalf of his father; Abdi Ibrahim Hassan (deceased) who was the beneficiary to his father’s estate. The Applicant’s interest emanates from the fact that his father was a beneficiary to the suit property, thus the Applicant being dependent to his father Abdi Ibrahim Ibrahim’s estate within the provisions of Section 29 of the Law of succession Act, he acquires an interest in his grandfather’s estate; the suit property by virtue of his father’s share. Therefore, in the Court’s view, the instant Application is properly before this Court. 53. In my humble view, therefore, it is clear that the Applicant had the locus standi and he was rightfully before the Court to fight for the interests of the estate of his late father with regard to the deceased grandmother’s estate. The fact that he was a grandchild of the deceased taken care of by his deceased grandmother prior to her death and a dependant of his father’s estate has not been disputed. 54. This therefore supports the fact that he and his sister acquired interest over the deceased’s grandmother’s estate and thus he had the necessary locus standi. Consequently, his deceased father’s name should have been disclosed in the grant and also he should have been involved in the proceedings for confirmation of grant and more specifically in giving consent to the mode of distribution. 55. Reliance is placed on the case of RE: ESTATE OF PHILIP KIPRONO BETT (DECEASED,) (2005) eKLR where it was held that consent of all adult survivors for both the grant of administration as well as the confirmation and mode of distribution ought to be given. Non-disclosure of all beneficiaries is therefore a defect that goes to the root of the administration cause. Rules 7(e) of the Probate and Administration Rules requires that all survivors of the deceased ought to be disclosed. 56. The Applicant submitted that the Administrators had full knowledge of the relationship between the Applicant and the deceased as they bequeathed them in an unfair and unequal manner but nevertheless failed to disclose to this to Court and/or include the Applicant, his sister and/or his deceased father in the succession cause as beneficiary. 57. With the above reasoning therefore this Court is not persuaded that the preliminary objection is meritorious and the same is hereby dismissed with no orders as to costs…” 50.In re Estate of Joshua Githiari Kibui (Deceased) [2021] eKLR the Court stated as follows:“ 18.For avoidance of doubt, Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act states as follows:a.“76. Revocation or annulment of Grantb.A Grant of representation, whether or not confirmed, may at any time be revoked or annulled if the Court decides, either on application by any interested party or of its own motion—(a)that the proceedings to obtain the Grant were defective in substance;(b)that the Grant was obtained fraudulently by the making of a false statement or by the concealment from the Court of something material to the case;(c)that the Grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the Grant notwithstanding that the allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently;(d)that the person to whom the Grant was made has failed, after due notice and without reasonable cause either— 20.Further, In the Matter of the Estate of L A K – (Deceased) [2014] eKLR the Court held that;(a)Revocation of grants in governed by Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act. The relevant portions of Section 76 are paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) since the issues raised relate to the process of the making of a grant. A grant may be revoked where the proceedings leading up to its making were defective, or were attended by fraud and concealment of important matter, or was obtained by an untrue allegation of a fact essential to the point. 32.The Court in the case of Jamleck Maina Njoroge v Mary Wanjiru Mwangi (2015) eKLR at paragraph 11 of its ruling in revoking a grant reiterated the grounds upon which a grant can be revoked. It stated as follows:-a.“11. The circumstances that can lead to the revocation of grant have been set out in Section 76 Law of Succession. For a grant to be revoked either on the Application of an interested party or on the Court ’s own motion there must be evidence that the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance, or that the grant was obtained fraudulently by making of false statement, or by concealment of something material to the case, or that the grant was obtained by means of untrue allegations of facts essential in point of law.” 33.In the case of Matheka and Another vs Matheka [2005] 2KLR 455 the Court of Appeal laid down the following guiding principles as to revocation of grants.(a)“i. A grant may be revoked either by application by an interested party or by the Court on its own motion.(b)ii. Even when revocation is by the Court upon its own motion, there must be evidence that the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance, or that the grant was obtained fraudulently by the making of a false statement or by concealment of something material to the case or that the grant was obtained by means of untrue allegation of facts essential in point of law or that the person named in the grant has failed to apply for confirmation or to proceed diligently with the administration of the estate.” 51.There is no dispute that the Applicant, Judy Mumbi, is the daughter of the late Lawrence Kiarie Kang’ethe, who was a son of the deceased, Ashford Kang’ethe King’ang’i. The Respondents themselves acknowledge that relationship. Equally undisputed is the fact that Lawrence Kiarie Kang’ethe died on 7th May 1996. The Applicant therefore approaches the Court not as a stranger to the estate, but as a descendant of one of the deceased's children and as a person claiming through her late father’s estate. 52.The Respondents have argued that the Applicant was born after the deceased’s death and could not therefore have been a dependant of the deceased. While that argument may be relevant to a claim under Sections 26 and 29 of the Law of Succession Act, it does not conclusively determine the Applicant’s right to inherit by representation. The Applicant's claim is not founded solely on dependency. Rather, it is founded upon the principle that the descendants of a deceased child of an intestate are entitled to step into the shoes of that child and inherit the share that would otherwise have devolved upon him. 53.Section 41 of the Law of Succession Act embodies the principle of representation. The provision has consistently been interpreted by the Courts to mean that where a child of the deceased dies before receiving his or her entitlement, that child's issue (s) are entitled to inherit the share due to that child. Therefore, grandchildren acquire a beneficial interest through their deceased parent and may pursue that entitlement before the Court. 54.The evidence before the Court demonstrates that the Applicant’s father was a son of the deceased and therefore a beneficiary of the estate. As a matter of fact, in the grant confirmed by this Court on 10th November 1986 Lawrence Kiarie Kang’ethe has been bequeathed Plot number 712. 55.The amended certificate of confirmation of grant dated 10th March 2010 still showed that Lawrence Kiarie Kang’ethe owned or having inherited plot number 712 of Dagoretti/Riruta/142. By this time of course he was deceased. 56.For some reasons which the Administrators ought to explain the last certificate of confirmation of grant amended on 14th March 2022 did not have the name of Lawrence. It appears that his portion had dissipated and the rest of the beneficiaries ought to have explained this to the Court. 57.The Court has demonstrated based on the facts herein that the Applicant, as one of his children, acquires an interest in the estate through her late father and has sufficient locus standi to challenge any distribution that excluded or defeated that entitlement. 58.The Respondents further contend that the application is defeated by delay. While the Court acknowledges that the grant was confirmed many years ago, Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act expressly provides that a grant may be revoked at any time where it is shown that the proceedings were defective in substance or that material facts were concealed from the Court. Delay alone cannot sanitize a distribution that excluded a lawful beneficiary or extinguish a beneficial interest created by statute. The Court 's primary obligation remains the achievement of a lawful and equitable distribution of the estate. 59.I am satisfied that the Applicant has demonstrated a prima facie beneficial interest in the estate through her late father. Her late father was bequeathed plot number 712 and that is the portion which must be transmitted to the Applicant herein. Whoever transmitted it to himself must as a matter of right surrender it to the Applicant regardless of whether or not descriptions have changed. 60.The Administrators herein must ensure compliance as indicated in the original grant dated 10th November 1986 and the subsequent amendment dated 10th march 2010. 61.Accordingly, I find that the Applicant has established sufficient grounds under Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act to warrant intervention by the Court. However, given the age of the succession cause and the possibility that portions of the estate may already have been transferred to third parties, the interests of justice would be better served by reopening the question of distribution rather than nullifying every step taken in the administration of the estate. 62.In light of the foregoing, the application dated 11th April, 2024 is allowed as hereunder:(a)The Applicant is a dependant of the deceased herein by virtue of being a granddaughter.(b)The Applicant is entitled to Plot Number Dagoretti/Riruta/142 (plot 712) or any new registration arising from the new subdivision and subsequent registration.(c)The Administrators should transfer the same to the Applicant as a matter of priority and not less than 45 days from the date herein.(d)Each party shall bear his or her own costs. DATED SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI VIA VIDEO LINK THIS 4TH DAY OF JUNE 2026.H K CHEMITEIJUDGE, FCIArb.