https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/11511

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT KIAMBU** **SUCCESSION APPEAL NO. E135 OF 2023** **GODFREY THUO KAMAU 1ST APPELLANT** **JULIUS NJUGUNA MWANGI 2ND APPELLANT** **INTERESTED PARTIES 3RD APPELLANTS** **-VERSUS-** **VIRGINIA WATHANA KAMAU 1ST RESPONDENT** **JUDGEMENT** ***(Being an appeal from the ruling of the Learned Principal Magistrate Hon A.W Kinyanjui, sitting at Kiambu Law Courts dated 24th April,2023)*** **Introduction and Background** 1. This is a first appeal arising from the ruling of the Principal Magistrate's Court in Succession Cause No. 111 of 2016 delivered on 24th April 2023. By the impugned ruling, the learned trial magistrate allowed the 1st respondent's summons for revocation of grant and revoked the grant of letters of administration intestate issued to the 1st appellant on 29th April 2016 and the certificate of confirmation of grant dated 5th May 2016. 2. The trial court further ordered the cancellation of the entries made in respect of Land Parcel No. **Ruiru East/Juja East Block 2/5113** pursuant to the impugned grant, cancellation of the resultant titles registered in the names of the subsequent purchasers, restoration of the original parcel to the estate of **Mary Njoki Kamau (deceased)**, and issued consequential injunctive orders. 3. Aggrieved by the entire ruling, the appellants lodged the present appeal through the Memorandum of Appeal dated 22nd May 2023. **Background** 1. The deceased, Mary Njoki Kamau, was the mother of the 1st appellant, Godfrey Thuo Kamau, and the 1st respondent, Virginia Wadana Kamau. The material placed before the trial court further disclosed the existence of another person beneficially interested in the family estate, namely Beth Njangi Kariuki. 2. The property at the centre of the dispute is Land Parcel No. Ruiru East/Juja East Block 2/5113. The material before the trial court indicated that the property originally belonged to the deceased's husband, Kamau Gaiti, whose estate had been the subject of earlier succession proceedings at Thika. Mary Njoki Kamau subsequently became registered as proprietor pursuant to the administration of her late husband's estate. 3. The 1st respondent conducted an official search on 23rd July 2015 which confirmed that Parcel No. 5113 remained registered in the name of the deceased. 4. The 1st appellant thereafter petitioned for letters of administration intestate to the estate of Mary Njoki Kamau. In the succession documents presented to the court, he represented himself as the sole surviving beneficiary. The chief's letter dated 18th March 2016 similarly identified him alone as the person surviving the deceased. 5. A grant of letters of administration intestate was issued to the 1st appellant on 29th April 2016. The grant was subsequently confirmed on 5th May 2016, six days after its issuance. In the application for confirmation, Parcel No. 5113 was proposed to devolve wholly upon the 2nd appellant, Julius Njuguna Mwangi, who was identified as a purchaser. 6. The land register subsequently reflected transmission of Parcel No. 5113 to the 1st appellant on 10th May 2016. On the same date, the property was transferred to the 2nd appellant. 7. The 2nd appellant subsequently subdivided the property and transferred the resultant parcels to various purchasers. 8. Upon discovering the succession proceedings and the subsequent dealings with the property, the 1st respondent challenged the grant. By the amended summons for revocation of grant dated 23rd August 2022, she sought, among other orders, revocation of the grant and certificate of confirmation, cancellation of the transfer and resultant titles, restoration of Parcel No. 5113 to the estate and consequential injunctive relief. 9. The 1st respondent maintained that she was a daughter of the deceased but had neither been disclosed as a beneficiary nor notified of the succession proceedings. Her consent had not been obtained either at the petition stage or during confirmation. 10. She relied, among other documents, upon a subsequent letter from the area chief dated 23rd January 2017 acknowledging that the earlier chief's letter had erroneously omitted other beneficiaries of the deceased. 11. The 1st appellant opposed the application. He contended that Parcel No. 5113 had been left to him by the deceased and that the 1st respondent had already received other substantial family properties. According to him, the property had, by family arrangement, been reserved for other members of the family and the 1st respondent was therefore seeking a double benefit. 12. The 2nd appellant maintained that he was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. He contended that he conducted due diligence, waited for the 1st appellant to complete the succession process and thereafter lawfully purchased the property. 13. The subsequent purchasers were joined to the proceedings following an application by the 1st respondent dated 24th January 2022, which was allowed by a ruling delivered on 25th July 2022. The record indicates that they were subsequently served through substituted service by way of advertisement in a newspaper but did not enter appearance or participate in the substantive determination of the summons for revocation. **The decision of the trial court** 1. The summons for revocation was determined upon affidavit evidence, documentary material and written submissions. No oral evidence was taken. 2. The learned trial magistrate found that the 1st respondent had been excluded from the succession proceedings despite being a child of the deceased and a person entitled to participate therein. 3. The court found that the failure to disclose her existence and obtain the requisite consent constituted material non-disclosure and rendered the proceedings leading to the grant defective. 4. The trial court further found that the transaction through which the 2nd appellant acquired Parcel No. 5113 was not entitled to protection under section 93 of the Law of Succession Act. 5. Consequently, the court revoked the grant, cancelled the transfer and resultant subdivisions, ordered restoration of Parcel No. 5113 to the estate and issued consequential injunctive orders. **Grounds of Appeal** 1. The appellants challenged the ruling on the grounds that the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact by: 2. *failing to appreciate evidence that the 1st respondent was aware of the succession proceedings;* 3. *failing to appreciate evidence that the 1st respondent had already acquired valuable properties from the estate;* 4. *revoking the grant instead of redistributing the estate afresh; and* 5. *failing to appreciate that the 2nd appellant acquired the estate property after confirmation of the grant and was protected under section 93 of the Law of Succession Act.* 6. The appellants prayed that the ruling delivered on 24th April 2023 be set aside and substituted with an order dismissing the amended summons for revocation, with costs. **Submissions on Appeal** 1. The appellants filed written submissions dated 18th August 2025. They maintained that the 1st respondent was aware of the succession proceedings but chose not to object until after confirmation of the grant. 2. They further submitted that she had already received valuable properties from the family estate and that Parcel No. 5113 had been reserved for the 1st appellant and other members of the family. 3. On the 2nd appellant's acquisition, the appellants submitted that the property was purchased after confirmation of the grant and that section 93 of the Law of Succession Act protected the transaction notwithstanding the subsequent revocation of the grant. 4. The 1st respondent opposed the appeal through written submissions dated 24th November 2025. 5. She submitted that no evidence had been presented demonstrating that she knew of or participated in the succession proceedings. She relied upon the original chief's letter, the succession documents which omitted her and the subsequent chief's letter acknowledging the omission of other beneficiaries. 6. She further submitted that no evidence established either that she had received her full entitlement from the deceased's estate or that Parcel No. 5113 had been validly gifted to the 1st appellant during the deceased's lifetime. 7. Regarding the 2nd appellant, the 1st respondent argued that his identification as purchaser in the confirmation proceedings demonstrated that the transaction had already been arranged before confirmation and could therefore not be protected under section 93 of the Act. **Duty of the First Appellate Court** 1. This being a first appeal, this Court is required to reconsider and independently evaluate the evidence and material that was before the trial court and arrive at its own conclusions. 2. The principle was stated in ***Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & Others* [1968] EA 123,** that a first appellate court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions, while bearing in mind that it did not see or hear the witnesses. 3. In the present case, however, the application was determined entirely upon affidavit and documentary evidence together with written submissions. No oral evidence was taken. This Court is therefore in as good a position as the trial court to reconsider the documentary material and draw appropriate conclusions therefrom. **Issues for Determination** 1. Having considered the record, grounds of appeal and rival submissions, the following issues arise for determination: 2. *Whether the trial court erred in revoking the grant under section 76 of the Law of Succession Act;* 3. *Whether the 1st respondent's alleged receipt of other family properties justified her exclusion from the succession proceedings;* 4. *Whether the trial court ought to have redistributed the estate instead of revoking the grant;* 5. *Whether the 2nd appellant's acquisition was protected under section 93 of the Law of Succession Act;* 6. *Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to make consequential orders cancelling the resultant titles and restoring the property to the estate; and* 7. *What orders should issue.* **Whether the Grant was Properly Revoked** 1. Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act empowers the court to revoke or annul a grant where, among other circumstances, the proceedings to obtain it were defective in substance; where the grant was obtained fraudulently by making a false statement or concealing something material from the court; or where it was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant. 2. The evidence is that the 1st respondent was a daughter of the deceased and a sibling of the 1st appellant. Nevertheless, the 1st appellant presented himself in the succession proceedings as the sole surviving beneficiary. 3. The original chief's letter dated 18th March 2016 similarly identified the 1st appellant alone. A subsequent letter dated 23rd January 2017 acknowledged that other beneficiaries had erroneously been omitted. 4. No consent executed by the 1st respondent was placed before the trial court. Neither was there evidence that she had renounced her entitlement to seek representation or that she participated in the confirmation proceedings. 5. Rule 26 of the Probate and Administration Rules is intended to ensure that persons with an equal or prior entitlement to representation are notified and, where applicable, give their consent or renounce their entitlement. 6. In ***Anthony Karukenya Njeru v Thomas M. Njeru* [2014] eKLR,** the court held, in substance, that where persons with equal priority have neither consented to nor renounced their right to petition, proceedings undertaken without compliance with Rule 26 may be rendered defective in substance for purposes of section 76 of the Act. 7. The appellants asserted that the 1st respondent knew of the proceedings but presented no cogent evidence demonstrating such knowledge. The mere fact that she did not object before confirmation cannot establish knowledge where her very case was that the proceedings were undertaken without her knowledge. 8. The omission of a surviving child from succession proceedings is not a peripheral matter. It deprives the succession court of material information necessary to determine the persons entitled to representation and ultimately to benefit from the estate. 9. The learned trial magistrate was therefore entitled to find that the failure to disclose the 1st respondent and obtain the requisite consent constituted a material defect within the contemplation of section 76 of the Act. **The accelerated confirmation of the grant** 1. There is a further aspect of the record that merits consideration. The grant was issued to the 1st appellant on 29th April 2016 and confirmed on 5th May 2016, a period of only six days. 2. Section 71(1) of the Law of Succession Act ordinarily contemplates an application for confirmation after the expiration of six months from the date of the grant. The proviso thereto nevertheless permits an application for confirmation before the expiration of that period where there is no dependant, as defined by section 29, or where the court considers that there is no purpose to be served by waiting for the expiration of six months. 3. Accordingly, the mere fact that a grant is confirmed before the expiry of six months does not, without more, render the confirmation unlawful. What is material is whether the circumstances justifying early confirmation were disclosed and whether the court was invited, upon a proper factual basis, to exercise the discretion conferred by the proviso to section 71(1). 4. In the present case, nothing in the record placed before this Court demonstrates that the 1st appellant sought early confirmation upon a disclosed and justified statutory basis. Of particular significance is that, in seeking confirmation, the 1st appellant represented that there was no other dependant of the deceased within the meaning of section 29 of the Act, yet the evidence subsequently established that other persons beneficially interested in the estate had not been disclosed. 5. The concern of this Court is therefore not merely that the grant was confirmed six days after its issuance. Rather, it is the circumstances in which that accelerated confirmation occurred. 6. The grant was issued on 29th April 2016, confirmed on 5th May 2016, the property transmitted to the 1st appellant on 10th May 2016 and, on the same day, transferred to the 2nd appellant, who had already been identified as purchaser in the confirmation proceedings. 7. Speed alone is neither unlawful nor evidence of fraud. However, where accelerated confirmation is founded upon incomplete or inaccurate disclosure concerning the persons interested in the estate, the resulting chronology becomes a relevant circumstance when considering whether the proceedings were affected by concealment or untrue allegations within the meaning of section 76. 8. Viewed cumulatively with the omission of the 1st respondent and other beneficiaries, the absence of their participation or consent, and the prior identification of the 2nd appellant as purchaser, the unusually compressed succession and transfer process reinforces, rather than independently establishes, the conclusion that the grant was properly liable to revocation. 9. I therefore find no basis for interfering with the trial court's decision to revoke the grant. **Whether Previous Benefits Justified the 1st Respondent's Exclusion** 1. The appellants maintained that the 1st respondent had already received substantial family properties and was therefore seeking a double benefit. 2. That argument conflates two distinct questions: identification of persons beneficially interested in an estate and the eventual distribution of that estate. 3. Even where a beneficiary has received property from a deceased person during the deceased's lifetime, that circumstance does not entitle an administrator to conceal the existence of that beneficiary from the succession court. 4. Previous benefits may, where proved, become relevant to the eventual distribution of the estate, including in appropriate circumstances under section 42 of the Law of Succession Act. They do not extinguish the obligation of full disclosure. 5. Further, no cogent evidence was placed before the trial court establishing that Parcel No. 5113 had been perfected as a gift inter vivos to the 1st appellant. 6. The 1st appellant's position was also inconsistent. He maintained that the property had been left to him, while elsewhere it was contended that it had been reserved for him together with Beth Kariuki. Yet, in the confirmation proceedings, the entire property was allocated to the 2nd appellant as purchaser. 7. The learned trial magistrate cannot therefore be faulted for rejecting the contention that alleged previous benefits justified the 1st respondent's exclusion. **Whether the Estate Should Have Been Redistributed Instead** 1. The appellants further contend that the trial court ought to have redistributed the estate rather than revoke the grant. 2. I am unable to accept that argument. 3. The defect established before the trial court went to the root of the grant itself. This was not merely a dispute concerning the proportions allocated under an otherwise properly obtained grant. 4. Further, before undertaking redistribution, the court would have been required to identify the complete estate, ascertain all persons beneficially entitled, consider the legal effect of any alleged previous gifts and determine the capacity in which the deceased held Parcel No. 5113 following the earlier administration of her husband's estate. 5. Those matters were not sufficiently before the trial court for final distribution. 6. Once the statutory grounds under section 76 had been established, the trial court was entitled to revoke the defective grant and allow the estate to be administered afresh through a lawful process involving all persons entitled to participate. **Whether the 2nd Appellant's Acquisition was Protected Under Section 93** 1. The fourth ground of appeal challenges the trial court's finding that the 2nd appellant was not entitled to the protection afforded to purchasers under section 93 of the Law of Succession Act. 2. The appellants contend that the 2nd appellant acquired Parcel No. 5113 after confirmation of the grant, having conducted due diligence and purchased the property for value without notice of any defect. They therefore argue that the subsequent revocation of the grant could not invalidate the transfer. 3. The 1st respondent maintains that the 2nd appellant was not an innocent purchaser removed from the circumstances surrounding the succession proceedings. She points to the application for confirmation of grant in which the 2nd appellant had already been identified as purchaser and as the person to whom the entire parcel was to devolve. 4. Section 93(1) of the Law of Succession Act provides, in substance, that a transfer of an interest in movable or immovable property made to a purchaser by a person to whom representation has been granted shall be valid notwithstanding the subsequent revocation or variation of the grant. 5. The purpose of the provision is to protect the security of transactions undertaken with personal representatives and to prevent the mere subsequent revocation or variation of a grant from automatically unsettling every transaction undertaken during its currency. 6. The crucial question, however, is not simply whether the 1st appellant held a grant when the transfer was eventually registered. The Court must determine whether the transaction through which the 2nd appellant acquired the property was one capable of attracting the protection of section 93 in the first place. 7. That inquiry must be undertaken alongside section 82(b)(ii), which expressly restricts the power of a personal representative to sell immovable property before confirmation of the grant. 8. In ***Jacinta Wanjiku Mwongera v Rosemary Wanjiru Wanyoike & Another*,** the Court of Appeal emphasized that before a party can invoke the protection afforded to a purchaser under section 93, that party must first establish that he or she was indeed a purchaser within the contemplation of the provision. 9. Similarly, in ***Jane Gachoki Gathecha v Priscilla Nyawira Gitungu & Another*,** the Court of Appeal cautioned against invoking section 93 where the person purporting to transfer the property had no transferable interest capable of passing to the alleged purchaser. 10. Applying those principles, the documentary chronology is significant. 11. The grant was issued to the 1st appellant on 29th April 2016. Before its confirmation, the 2nd appellant had already been identified in the summons for confirmation as purchaser and as the person to whom the entirety of Parcel No. 5113 was to be transferred. 12. The grant was confirmed on 5th May 2016. On 10th May 2016, the property was transmitted from the deceased's name to the 1st appellant and, on that very same date, transferred from the 1st appellant to the 2nd appellant. 13. That documentary record is difficult to reconcile with the appellants' contention that the 2nd appellant waited for the succession process to be completed and only thereafter made an offer to purchase. 14. If the purchase arose only after confirmation and transmission, there would have been no basis for identifying him as purchaser/beneficiary in the application for confirmation. 15. The more probable inference from the contemporaneous documents is that the sale or arrangement for disposal of the property had already been concluded, or at the very least substantially arranged, before confirmation of the grant and even filing of the petition as he is indicated on form 5 beside the assets being the suit property. The subsequent registration effected on 10th May 2016 merely implemented that pre-existing arrangement. 16. The Court is mindful that section 93 expressly protects certain transfers notwithstanding subsequent revocation of the grant. Consequently, the 2nd appellant's title cannot be defeated merely because the grant was later revoked. That is not the basis upon which his claim to statutory protection fails. 17. Rather, his difficulty lies in the fact that the underlying disposition appears to have been arranged at a time when the 1st appellant was prohibited by **section 82(b)(ii)** from selling the immovable estate property. Subsequent formal registration after confirmation cannot, without more, retrospectively validate an antecedent disposition undertaken contrary to an express statutory restriction. 18. The circumstances of the 2nd appellant's involvement further distinguish him from an innocent purchaser who encounters estate property only after the administration process has been completed. He was expressly identified within the succession proceedings themselves as purchaser before confirmation of the grant. 19. Further, although the 2nd appellant asserted that he conducted due diligence and paid valuable consideration, the material before the trial court did not sufficiently demonstrate the precise date upon which the alleged sale agreement was concluded, no sale agreement was provided to confirm when it was allegedly entered into, the terms upon which the property was purchased or other evidence capable of displacing the inference arising from his identification as purchaser before confirmation. 20. The burden of establishing the factual foundation necessary to invoke section 93 rested upon the party seeking its protection. On the material placed before the trial court, that burden was not discharged. 21. I therefore agree with the learned trial magistrate that the 2nd appellant did not establish an acquisition entitled to protection under section 93 of the Law of Succession Act. 22. For clarity, this finding does not establish a general proposition that every transfer undertaken pursuant to a grant subsequently revoked for non-disclosure is automatically invalid. Such a conclusion would be inconsistent with section 93 itself. 23. The determination in the present case turns upon its particular facts: the evidence of an apparent pre-confirmation arrangement for disposal of immovable estate property; the statutory restriction under section 82(b)(ii); the 2nd appellant's prior identification as purchaser in the confirmation proceedings; and the absence of sufficient evidence establishing an independent post-confirmation purchase capable of attracting statutory protection. 24. Accordingly, the fourth ground of appeal fails. **Whether the Trial Court had Jurisdiction to Cancel the Resultant Titles** 1. The final substantive question is whether the succession court had jurisdiction, upon revoking the grant, to make consequential orders cancelling the transfers and subdivisions flowing from the impugned administration. 2. This Court is alive to the constitutional and statutory jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court over independent disputes concerning ownership and title to land. A succession court cannot assume jurisdiction over every dispute concerning registered land merely because an estate is involved. 3. A distinction must, however, be drawn between an independent dispute over ownership of land and consequential orders intended to restore estate property that left the estate directly through dealings founded upon an impugned grant. 4. **Section 47 of the Law of Succession Act** confers jurisdiction upon the court to entertain applications and determine disputes under the Act and to pronounce such decrees and make such orders as may be expedient. 5. **Rule 73 of the Probate and Administration Rules** further preserves the inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. 6. In ***Munyasya Mulili & 3 Others v Sammy Muteti Mulili* [2017] KEHC 6180 (KLR),** the Court invoked section 47 and Rule 73 in nullifying registrations, transfers, dispositions and subdivisions arising from unlawful dealings with estate property. 7. A similar approach was adopted in ***Omollo v Ongoro* [2023] KEHC 18999 (KLR),** where the Court recognized the power of a succession court to make consequential orders necessary to restore and protect estate property. 8. More recently, in ***In Re Estate of the Late Francis Muhiga Ndori (Deceased)* [2025] KEHC 9708 (KLR),** the High Court reiterated the broad jurisdiction conferred by section 47, read together with Rule 73, to make orders necessary to safeguard an estate and meet the ends of justice. 9. I am persuaded by that line of authority. 10. The present proceedings were not an independent contest between the estate and persons claiming an unrelated competing root of title. The impugned titles were direct products of subdivisions undertaken by the 2nd appellant following his acquisition of the estate property through the succession process under challenge. 11. Further, the subsequent purchasers were not condemned unheard. Upon the 1st respondent's application dated 24th January 2022, the 3rd to 43rd respondents/interested parties were joined to the proceedings by a ruling delivered on 25th July 2022. 12. The record indicates that they were thereafter served by substituted service through advertisement in a newspaper. Despite such service, they did not enter appearance or participate in the proceedings to defend their respective titles. 13. Procedural fairness requires that an affected person be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. It does not require the court to compel a duly served party to participate. 14. The 3rd to 43rd respondents therefore had an opportunity to place before the trial court evidence concerning their respective purchases, the consideration paid, the due diligence undertaken and any statutory or equitable protection upon which they sought to rely. They did not do so. 15. The evidential chain before the trial court consequently demonstrated that their titles emanated from subdivisions undertaken by the 2nd appellant whose own acquisition had been successfully impeached. 16. To revoke the grant, invalidate the foundational transaction and yet leave intact every subdivision and transfer flowing directly from that transaction would, in the circumstances of this case, render the revocation substantially ineffectual and leave the estate without the very property whose unlawful administration necessitated the proceedings. 17. I therefore find that the trial court possessed jurisdiction to make consequential restorative orders necessary to return Parcel No. 5113 to the estate. 18. This conclusion does not mean that every revocation of a grant automatically invalidates every subsequent transfer. Each case must turn upon its own circumstances, including the nature and timing of the transaction, the application of section 93, the participation or notice of affected parties and the evidence presented before the court. 19. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, however, I find no basis for interfering with the trial court's orders cancelling the resultant titles. 20. Any purchaser who may have paid valuable consideration remains at liberty to pursue whatever personal, restitutionary or other remedies may be available against the person from whom he or she purchased. Likewise, the 2nd appellant may pursue any legally available remedy arising from his transaction with the 1st appellant before a court of competent jurisdiction. **Disposition** 1. Upon independently reconsidering the entire record, I find that the appellants have not demonstrated any basis upon which this Court should interfere with the substantive findings of the learned trial magistrate. 2. The 1st appellant obtained the grant through proceedings in which known persons beneficially interested in the estate were not disclosed. The assertion that the 1st respondent had previously received other family property did not justify her exclusion from the succession process. 3. The unusually accelerated confirmation, transmission and transfer did not, standing alone, establish fraud. When considered together with the material non-disclosure, absence of consent and the prior identification of the 2nd appellant as purchaser, however, that chronology reinforced the conclusion that the grant was properly liable to revocation. 4. The trial court was equally entitled to reject the invitation to preserve the defective grant and redistribute the estate, since the defect went to the foundation upon which the grant had been obtained. 5. Regarding the 2nd appellant, the contemporaneous documentary record demonstrates that he had already been identified as purchaser before confirmation of the grant. On the material presented, he failed to establish an independent post-confirmation acquisition entitled to protection under section 93 of the Law of Succession Act. 6. Finally, the trial court was entitled, in the particular circumstances of this case, to make consequential orders restoring the property to the estate. The 3rd to 43rd respondents had been formally joined, served and afforded an opportunity to defend their respective interests but did not participate. 7. The estate ought therefore to be restored to the position obtaining before the impugned administration so that it may be subjected to a fresh, transparent and lawful succession process involving all persons beneficially entitled. **Orders** 1. Accordingly, I make the following orders: 2. *The appeal is hereby dismissed.* 3. *The ruling of the trial court delivered on 24th April 2023 is hereby upheld.* 4. *The revocation of the grant of letters of administration intestate issued on 29th April 2016 and the certificate of confirmation of grant dated 5th May 2016 is upheld.* 5. *The orders cancelling the transfer of Land Parcel No. Ruiru East/Juja East Block 2/5113 and the resultant subdivisions are upheld.* 6. *The Land Registrar shall give effect to the consequential restorative orders made by the trial court so as to restore the property to the estate for lawful administration in accordance with the Law of Succession Act.* 7. *The estate shall thereafter be subjected to fresh administration proceedings in which all persons beneficially entitled shall be disclosed and afforded an opportunity to participate, and the succession court shall determine the assets properly comprising the estate and the lawful entitlements of the beneficiaries.* 8. *For avoidance of doubt, nothing in this judgment shall preclude any affected purchaser from pursuing such remedies as may be available in law against his or her respective vendor before a court of competent jurisdiction.* 9. *The appellants shall bear the costs of the appeal.* *It is so ordered.* **DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED AT ON 24th DAY OF JULY, 2026. JUDGMENT DELIVERED THROUGH MICROSOFT TEAMS ONLINE PLATFORM.** **MARTHA MUTUKU.** **JUDGE** In the presence of: - N/A Appellant N/Afor the Respondent Court Assistant – Mr. Zadock