https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/7295

Kandie v Access Bank Kenya & another (Civil Suit E029 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 7295 (KLR) (25 May 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 7295 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nakuru Civil Suit E029 of 2025 PN Gichohi, J May 25, 2026 Between Michael Kipruto Kandie Plaintiff and Access Bank Kenya 1st Defendant Purple Royal Auctioneers 2nd Defendant Ruling 1.By a notice of Motion dated 10th June, 2025 and expressed under sections 1A, 3A & 80 (h) of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 8 Rule 3, Order 11, Rule 3 (1)(h), Order 51 Rule 1 Order 40 Rule 1(a) and (b), Rule 2(1) and (2), Rule 10(1)(a) of the Civil Procedure Rules 2010, the Applicant sought for the following Orders;-1.Spent.2.Spent.3.That pending hearing and determination of the suit, a temporary injunction be issued restraining the 2nd Defendant/Respondent by themselves, their agents, servants and/or employees from selling by public auction or completing any conveyance or transfer of any sale conducted by auction of the Plaintiff/Applicant's properties viz properties L.R. No.s Kajiado/Kitengela 76271, 76272 & 76273.4.That an order do issue consolidating the instant suit with Civil Suit No. E012 of 2024 Emining Quarry Limited -v- Access Bank Kenya PLC & Purple Royal Auctioneers and the same be heard and determined by Lady Justice Patricia Gichohi.5.That the Honourable Court do make such other and further orders as it may deem just, necessary and expedient.6.That the costs of this Application be in the cause. 2.The application is premised on the grounds on the face of the Notice of Motion and supported by the Affidavit of the Applicant, sworn on the same date. The Applicant states that he is a Director of Emining Quarry Limited (the Company), who was a customer of Access Bank Kenya (the 1st Defendant), with their relationship defined by various agreements. 3.He states that the company applied for a loan facility of Kshs. 32,649,616 from the bank, which loan was approved and disbursed, and a charge was secured to support the facility. 4.He details the specific charges registered over various properties, including:a.A Further charge, 2nd Further Charges and 3rd Further Charge over L.R. No. 12806/3.b.An existing Legal charge over L.R. Nos. Kajiado/Kitengela 76271, 76272 & 76273 in his name.c.A continuation of Specific debentures over his four motor vehicles Registration number No. KCB 307Y, KCM 306Y, KCM 305Y and KCM 951Y. 5.He asserts that the Company regularly serviced this term loan facility availed to it by the 1st Respondent. However, on 25th January, 2025, when he requested the loan statement, he was shocked to learn that the loan statement showed a debit balance of Kshs. 94,897,726. 6.He claims to have identified three suspicious debits from 19th January, 2023, noting a disparity between the actual disbursement and what was recorded. He specifies that the three flawed entries, each of approximately Kshs. 33 million, was categorised as a loan disbursement, related charges/fees, and excise duty, totalling Kshs. 99,516,029.56. 7.The Applicant states that interest was calculated based on these flawed entries, leading to the unsubstantiated debit sum of over 94 Million Kenya Shillings. He explains that due to the threat of property attachment based on these arrears, the Company filed Nakuru High Court Civil Suit No. E012 of 2024; Emining Quarry Limited Vs Access Bank Kenya PLC &Purple Royal Auctioneers, successfully obtaining an injunction on 14th May, 2025, to stop any sale of charged properties. In addition, that this Court ordered the 1st Respondent to provide a true and accurate statement of the Company’s loan account to show its exact indebtedness. 8.However, the Applicant states that the bank has failed to comply with this Court's Orders of providing an accurate statement and instead has instructed Purple Royal Auctioneers ( the 2nd Respondent) to advertise for sale by public auction the Kajiado/Kitengela properties to be sold on 19th June, 2025. 9.He states that the intended sale is a blatant disregard of court orders and legal principles, arguing that he received a notification on 9th April, 2025, regarding an intended auction for Kshs. 9,819,467.45 purportedly owed by him personally. 10.The Applicant reiterates that the intended sale is illegal and fraudulent as the properties are already subject to the ongoing dispute in Civil Suit No. E012 of 2024. Moreover, he denies ever taking a loan in the alleged sum or offering his properties as security for such a sum, claiming to be a stranger to the intended sale and characterises the threat to seize his assets as fraudulent, illegal, and a violation of the rule of law. 11.The Applicant urged this court to consolidate this suit with the earlier suit (E012 of 2024) to protect the court process. He notes the subject matter (the Kajiado/Kitengela properties) is identical in both causes. He also states that the Company already secured injunctions against the Respondents regarding these properties in the first suit. Therefore, that consolidation will prevent conflicting decisions and serve the administration of justice. 12.He points out that both cases involve common issues of law and fact arising from the same transaction. Also, that consolidation aligns with Article 159 of the Constitution of Kenya, promoting efficient and less costly justice. 13.The Respondents opposed the Application by their Replying Affidavit sworn by Moses Evayo, the 1st Respondent’s legal officer, on 23rd July, 2025. He states that it is undisputed that the Applicant applied for and was advanced a loan facility, which was secured by the properties now in question being land parcels Kajiado/Kitengela/76271, 76272, and 76273. 14.The deponent asserts that the borrower in this case, O-Asis Hillside School Limited, defaulted on loan instalments, leading to arrears of Kshs. 1,194,227.85 as of 10th July, 2024, and the subsequent issuance of a 90-day statutory notice. 15.In response to the allegations concerning requests for loan statements, purported irregularities, and the claim of ballooned arrears, the 1st Respondent maintains that it is a stranger to these assertions. Consequently, the 1st Respondent puts the Applicant to strict proof regarding each of these allegations 16.The deponent argues that the Applicant’s reference to another case (Civil Suit No. E012 of 2024) is misleading because that matter involves different parties and transactions, reiterating that the current loan was specifically to O-Asis Hillside School Limited. 17.He denies the allegation of violating court orders, stating no such order exists in this suit regarding the subject properties, and maintains the intended sale is a valid exercise of the bank's legal right. 18.On the prayer for consolidation, he states that an order for consolidation of suits does not apply here because the parties and borrowers in the referenced 2024 suit are entirely different from those in the current matter. He reiterates that consolidation is unavailable due to different parties and lacks substantive evidence, noting the Applicant failed to provide the alleged orders or pleadings from the other case to prove any similarity. 19.The deponent expresses his firm belief that the Applicant’s application is incompetent, meritless, and a delay tactic intended to abuse the court process, requesting its dismissal with costs. Applicant’s Submissions 20.The Applicant’s submissions support an application for a temporary injunction to restrain the Respondents from selling or transferring the Applicant’s properties (L.R Nos. Kajiado/Kitengela 76272 and 76273) by public auction. The Applicant notes that the application is opposed by the Respondents but maintains that the injunction sought is justified both on procedural and substantive grounds. 21.As a preliminary point, the Applicant argues that the subject properties are already the subject of an earlier suit (Nakuru Civil Suit No. E012 of 2024), in which the Court had issued restraining orders barring any sale or transfer of the same properties pending determination of that case. Those orders, it is contended, remain valid and have neither been set aside nor varied. 22.Consequently, the Respondents’ attempt to proceed with the sale is said to amount to disobedience and contempt of court. In this regard, reliance is placed on the principle in Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] 2 All ER 567, as approved in Peter Ng’ang’a Muiruri v F.M. Gikanga & Another (2012) eKLR, that a party who is aware of a court order must obey it unless and until it is set aside, and cannot arrogate to themselves the right to disregard it. It was argued that this principle underscores the Court’s jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Judicature Act to punish for contempt in order to safeguard the authority and dignity of the judicial process. 23.Flowing from this, the Applicant urges the Court to consolidate the present suit with the earlier one, citing the identity of subject matter, similarity of parties, and the interrelated nature of the transactions in issue. He draws the rationale for consolidation from Prem Lala Nahata & Another v Chandi Prasad Sikaria [2007] 2 SCC 551, as adopted in Family Bank Limited v Cheruiyot [022] eKLR, where it was held that consolidation serves to save time, costs, and effort, and is appropriate where suits raise common questions of law or fact or arise from the same transaction. 24.This position is further reinforced by Law Society of Kenya v Centre for Human Rights and Democracy & Others [2014] eKLR, which emphasized that consolidation facilitates efficient and expeditious disposal of disputes without conferring undue advantage on any party. The Applicant therefore contends that consolidation would advance the overriding objective of the Civil Procedure Act and ensure coherent adjudication. 25.On the substantive merits of the injunction Application, the Applicant relies on the classical principles for the grant of temporary injunctions as set out in Giella v Cassman Brown [1973] EA 358, and consistently reaffirmed in subsequent decisions, including Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR and Hezron Kamau Gichuru v Kianjoya Enterprises Ltd & Another [2022] eKLR. It was argued that these authorities establish the threefold test requiring an applicant to demonstrate a prima facie case, likelihood of irreparable harm, and, where doubt exists, that the balance of convenience tilts in their favour. 26.In addressing the first limb, the Applicant invokes the definition of a prima facie case as set out in Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd [2003] eKLR, namely a case which discloses an apparent infringement of a legal right calling for rebuttal. The Applicant contends that such a case is established by evidence of irregular and inflated loan account entries relied upon by the Respondents to justify the intended sale. The unexplained discrepancies, where charges and duties allegedly exceed the principal loan amount, are said to demonstrate bad faith and an unlawful attempt to exercise the statutory power of sale. Additionally, the Respondents’ reliance on a separate loan facility is dismissed as untenable in the absence of proof of disbursement. 27.On irreparable harm, the Applicant draws from the case of Pius Kipchirchir Kogo v Frank Kimeli Tenai [2018] eKLR, which defines irreparable injury as harm not compensable by damages. It is submitted that the threatened sale of the suit properties, particularly in the context of an allegedly unlawful process, would result in permanent loss and disruption that cannot be adequately remedied by monetary compensation. 28.Further reliance was placed on the case of Ubhi HSC v Mohamed [2024] eKLR, where the Court held that alteration or disposal of the subject matter of a suit may occasion irreparable injury by undermining the substratum of the dispute. 29.With respect to the balance of convenience, the Applicant relies on Mediheal Group Limited v Jomuki Auctioneers [2024] eKLR and Pius Kipchirchir Kogo v Frank Kimeli Tenai (supra), which explain that the Court should weigh the comparative inconvenience likely to be suffered by each party. Consequently, the Applicant argues that the inconvenience of losing property through sale far outweighs any prejudice the Respondents might suffer from a temporary restraint. 30.This approach is further guided by the principle in Amir Suleiman v Amboseli Resort Limited [2004] eKLR, that the Court should adopt the course that carries the lower risk of injustice. 31.In summary, the Applicant submits that he has demonstrated compliance with all the requisite conditions for the grant of a temporary injunction and, when viewed in conjunction with the existing restraining orders and the clear suitability for consolidating these related suits, maintains that the present application is highly meritorious and should be allowed with costs Respondents’ Submissions 32.They contend that the Applicant has failed to establish any basis for contempt, arguing that the Orders issued in the earlier suit do not automatically apply to the present proceedings and that no breach has been demonstrated. 33.According to the Respondents, the present dispute arises from a separate and distinct transaction, and the Applicant is improperly attempting to rely on Orders from another suit to restrain the Respondents’ lawful exercise of their statutory power of sale. They therefore term the application as procedurally defective and an abuse of the court process. 34.On the merits of the application, the Respondents identify four issues, beginning with whether the Applicant has met the threshold for the grant of an interlocutory injunction. They anchor their argument on Giella v Cassman Brown [1973] EA 358, submitting that the Applicant has failed to satisfy the well-established conditions for the grant of such relief. 35.They reinforce this position by relying on Board of Management of Uhuru Secondary School v City County Director of Education & 2 Others [2015] eKLR, where the High Court emphasised that at an interlocutory stage, an applicant must demonstrate a prima facie case with a likelihood of success and the likelihood of suffering prejudice if relief is not granted. 36.On the first limb, whether a prima facie case has been established, the Respondents submit that none has been demonstrated. They rely on Pius Kimaiyo Langat v Co-operative Bank of Kenya Ltd[2017] EKLR to argue that a dispute over accounts or the amount owing does not, by itself, justify the grant of an injunction to restrain a chargee from exercising its statutory power of sale. They further cited the case of John P.O. Mutere and another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd; HCCC No. 3125 of 1995 to reinforce the position that the mere existence of a dispute between the parties, particularly on financial accounts, does not amount to proof of a prima facie case. They contend that their power of sale has already crystallised and the Court has no mandate to interfere with their powers under the law, especially when proper procedure was followed. 37.On the second limb, whether the Applicant stands to suffer irreparable harm, the Respondents submit that no such harm has been demonstrated. They rely on Andrew Muriuki Wanjohi v Equity Building Society Ltd[2006] EKLR, where the Court held that once property is offered as security, it becomes a commodity for sale and any loss arising from its sale is quantifiable and compensable by damages. On that basis, the Respondents argue that the Applicant cannot claim irreparable injury 38.On the third limb, concerning the balance of convenience, the Respondents submit that it tilts in their favour. They rely on Andrew Muriuki Wanjohi v Equity Building Society Ltd (supra), where the Court held that the balance of convenience favours a chargee where default is not denied, as restraining the chargee would unjustly hinder the realisation of its security while the debt continues to accrue interest. The Respondents argue that they stand to suffer greater prejudice if restrained, whereas the Applicant can be compensated in damages if successful. 39.Having addressed the issue of the injunction, the Respondents have then turned to the question of consolidation. In opposition to the Applicant’s request, they rely on the case of Omoke v Kenyatta & 83 Others [2021] KESC 27 (KLR), where the Supreme Court held that consolidation is only appropriate where there are common questions of law or fact and where it is desirable for matters to be determined together. 40.Accordingly, the Respondents maintain that the application for consolidation fails to meet the requisite legal threshold due to a fundamental lack of similarity in parties and causes of action between the two suits. It is argued that the Applicant’s failure to produce the pleadings or the Plaint for Civil Suit No. E012 of 2024 is a calculated attempt to mislead the court, leaving it unable to discern any commonality between the matters. 41.Furthermore, the Respondents clarify that the transactions are distinct, as the current loan was advanced to O-Asis Hillside School Limited rather than the entity involved in the previous litigation. Ultimately, the Respondents urge this court to decline the request, characterising the plea for consolidation as speculative and devoid of the evidentiary support necessary for the court to exercise its discretion. 42.In conclusion, the Respondents submit that the Applicant has failed to establish contempt, has not satisfied the principles for the grant of an interlocutory injunction as set out in the cited authorities, and has not justified the consolidation of suits. They therefore urge the Court to dismiss the application with costsBottom of Form 43.... Analysis and Determination 44.From the pleadings, affidavits, and rival submissions, the following issues arise for determination:1.Whether this Court should order the consolidation of this suit with Nakuru HCCC No. E012 of 2024.2.Whether the Applicant has established a case warranting the grant of a temporary injunction.3.Whether the Respondents are in contempt of court orders allegedly issued in Nakuru HCCC No. E012 of 2024.4.Who bears the cost of this Application? 45.On the first issue, being the consolidation of suits, D.K Maraga J(As he then was) in Nyati Security Guards & Services Limited v Municipal Council of Mombasa [2004] KEHC 1896 (KLR) explained instances when consolidation of suits may be ordered, thus:-“Consolidation is a process by which two or more suits or matters are by order of court combined or united and treated as one suit or matter. The main purpose of consolidation is to save costs, time and effort and to make the conduct of several actions more convenient by treating them as one action. The situations in which consolidation can be ordered include where there are two or more suits or matters pending in the same court, where: some common question of law or fact arises in both or all of them; or the rights or relief claimed in them are in respect of, or arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions, or for some other reason it is desirable to make an order for consolidating them. The circumstances in which suits can be consolidated are broadly similar to those in which parties may be joined in one action. Accordingly, actions relating to the same subject matter between the same plaintiff and the same defendant, or between the same plaintiff and the same defendant, or between the same plaintiff and different defendants or between different plaintiffs and the same defendants may be consolidated. There are, however situations where consolidation is undesirable like where in two action a plaintiff in one is a defendant in the other unless the claim in one is to be treated as a counterclaim in the other. The other situation where consolidation is undesirable is where the plaintiffs in two or more actions are represented by different advocates. In such situation the hearing will be longer than take long and the purpose of saving time will be defeated.” 46.In this instance, the Applicant is the registered owner of the subject parcels of land over which the 1st Respondent intends to exercise its statutory power of sale. Given that the alleged arrears were purportedly incurred by a third party, O-Asis Hillside School Limited, and noting that the same properties and the same Respondent ( Access Bank Limited) are central to both the intended sale and the present proceedings, this court finds it prudent to order a consolidation of these matters. Such a course ensures that all issues regarding any loan facility secured by the subject properties are heard and determined together and prevent conflicting findings. 47.On the second issue, that is, whether Applicant has established a case warranting the grant of injunctive Orders, the principles for granting injunctive orders were laid out in the celebrated case of Giella V Cassman Brown & Co Ltd [1973] EA 358 and reiterated by the Court of Appeal in the case of Nguruman Limited V Jan Bonde Neilsen & 2 Others [2014] eklr, where the court listed the three principles as follows;a.Establish his case only at a prima facie level.b.Demonstrate irreparable injury if a temporary injunction is not granted.c.Allay any doubts as to(b) by showing that the balance of convenience is in his favour. 48.On whether the Applicant has established a prima facie case, the Court of Appeal in Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd [2003] eKLR, had this to say about the term “‘prima facie case”:-“A prima facie case in a civil application includes but is not confined to a genuine and arguable case.” It is a case which, on the material presented to the court, a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter. … a prima facie case is more than an arguable case. It is not sufficient to raise issues. The evidence must show an infringement of a right, and the probability of success of the applicant’s case upon trial. That is clearly a standard which is higher than an arguable case.” 49.The Applicant herein maintains that the current attempt to sell his properties, L.R. Nos. Kajiado/Kitengela 76271, 76272, and 76273, is a continuation of the dispute involving Emining Quarry Limited, a matter already stayed by this Court in Nakuru HCCC No. E012 of 2024. He argues that the Respondents are acting in disregard of the injunction issued on 14th May 2025, which protected these very assets. Central to his plea is the Notification of Sale dated 8th April 2025, which he said he was personally served with on 9th April 2025, on claims that he personally had an outstanding debt of Kshs. 9,869,967.45 as of 15th January 2025, a fact which he denies. 50.In response, the Bank asserts that it is exercising a fresh power of sale arising from an entirely distinct transaction. The Respondents rely on a facility letter dated 7th November 2023 for the sum of Kshs. 7,700,000 advanced to O-Asis Hillside School Limited. 51.They contend that this is a separate contractual obligation and that the school’s arrears, which stood at Kshs. 1,194,227.85 as of 10th July 2024, has allowed their statutory power of sale to crystallise. From the Bank's perspective, the cumulative debt of Kshs. 8,794, 535.84 identified in their 10th July 2024 notice justifies the current enforcement, and they maintain that the 14th May, 2025 injunction issued in HCCC No. E012 of 2024 does not shield the properties from this specific default. 52.From their argument, the Applicant is of the view that the Notification of Sale of 8th April 2025 is in regard to the alleged debt he owed personally. On their part, the Bank clarifies that the debt was owed by O-Asis Hillside School Limited, a company owned by the Applicant and that the said properties were used as security to secure the said loan. 53.This now calls for this court to determine whether the Banks’s statutory power of sale crystallised for them to exercise their statutory power of sale. Statutory power of sale is governed by the Land Act, No. 6 of 2012, which sets out clear steps a lender must follow before selling a charged property. First, a Rectification Notice under Section 90 must clearly define the default and allow at least three months(90 days) for the Chargor to rectify the default. Second, a Notice of Intention to Sell under Section 96 must be served on the borrower and all relevant stakeholders (including spouses and lessees), providing a further 40-day window; and finally, a 45-day Redemption Notice must be issued via a licensed auctioneer. 54.Indeed, Section 90 (1) of the Land Act provides that:-“if the chargor is in default of any obligation, fails to pay interest or any other periodic payment or any part thereof due under any charge or in performance or observation of any covenant, express or implied, in any charge, and continues to be in default for one month, the chargee may serve the chargor a notice, in writing, to pay the money owing or to perform and observe the agreement as the case may be. 55.Section 90(2) of the Land Act provides that the notice to be served shall adequately advise the chargor of:-a.The nature and extent of the default by the chargor;b.If the default consists of the non-payment of any money due under the charge, the amount that must be paid to rectify the default and the time, being not less than three (3) months, by the end of which the payment in default must have been completed.c.if the default consists of the failure to perform or observe any covenant, express or implied, in the charge, the thing the chargor must do or desist from doing so as to rectify the default and the time, being not less than two months, by the end of which the default must have been rectified;d.The consequence that if the default is not rectified within the time specified in the notice, the chargee will proceed to exercise any of the remedies referred to in this section in accordance with the procedures provided for in this sub-part; ande.The right of the chargor in respect of certain remedies to apply to the court for relief against those remedies. 56.Section 90 (3) provides that if the chargor does not comply within two (2) months after the date of service of the notices under subsection (1), the chargee may:-a.Sue the chargor for any money due under the charge,b.Appoint a receiver of the income of the charged land,c.Lease the charged land, or if the charge is of a lease, sublease the land,d.enter into possession of the charged land; ore.sell the charged land. 57.Rule 15 of the Auctioneers Rules further provides that a Notification of Sale must be served before a sale of immovable property. The Notification of Sale should give the Chargor forty-five (45) days upon which to redeem the property. The Notification ought to be served on the registered owner or an adult member of his family residing or working with him, and where the person refuses to sign the Notification, the auctioneer needs to sign a certificate to that effect. 58.Further, Section 96 of the Land Act provides that;“Before exercising the power to sell the charged land, the chargee shall serve on the chargor a notice to sell in the prescribed form and shall not proceed to complete any contract for sale of the charged land until at least forty days have lapsed from the date of the service of the notice to sell”. 59.Save for the Statutory Notice dated 10th July, 2024, the 1st Respondent did not tender any evidence to affirm that indeed they complied with the said provisions under Sections 91-96 of the Land Act. 60.Furthermore, the material before this Court is that the Applicant utilised the subject properties as security for multiple facilities with the Respondent. Given that this matter was previously before this court and a stay order was issued, it was incumbent upon the Respondent to clearly demarcate the specific facility and corresponding arrears for which the statutory power of sale was being exercised. That would ensure that the Respondent’s actions remain distinct from the issues which were subject of stay Orders by the court and to avoid the possibility of contempt of existing Court Orders. 61.In the circumstances, and having established that the parties were disputing arrears arising from entirely different loan facilities, and considering further that the Statutory Notice of Sale lacked requisite clarity, particularly because the Applicant contended it related to an alleged default on a personal loan, this court finds that the alleged Statutory power of sale has not crystallised. Accordingly, this Court is satisfied that the Applicant has demonstrated a prima facie case with a probability of success. 62.Regarding the element of irreparable harm, it is evident that the Respondents are on the verge of alienating the Applicant’s properties based on alleged outstanding debts. 63.However, given the ambiguity surrounding which loan facility is in arrears and the 1st Respondent’s failure to clearly demarcate the specific debt owed, this court finds that the sale of the subject parcels would unfairly prejudice the Applicant, particularly when the underlying debt is contested and the properties are currently protected by a subsisting injunction. 64.Consequently, having already found the prayer for consolidation to be merited, the Court finds it unnecessary to issue further injunctive Orders over the same properties. 65.On whether the Respondents are in contempt of Court Orders, the Applicant contends that the Respondents have acted in defiance of subsisting stay Orders. In response, the Respondent raises a two-fold defence: first, that the current enforcement pertains to a separate loan facility; and secondly, that any such application must be litigated within HCCC E012 of 2024, the suit where the orders were originally issued. 66.A contempt of court requires proof of wilful disobedience of a clear and unambiguous Order. While the Respondents’ actions involve the same properties, their argument regarding a different loan facility creates a factual complexity that challenges the clarity of the alleged breach. 67.Furthermore, the Respondent is correct that contempt proceedings should generally be anchored to the mother suit. That suit is HCCC E012 of 2024, where the specific terms and scope of the stay orders are defined. This court finds that where multiple facilities are secured by the same parcels of land, the distinction between lawful enforcement and contemptuous conduct may become blurred. 68.However, the law dictates that a party seeking to punish for contempt must do so within the record of the case where the Order was issued. Given that the stay Orders in question originate from a distinct matter, and noting that this application was filed before the suits were consolidated, the citation for contempt of court is premature and procedurally misdirected. 69.Lastly, costs follow the event as stated under Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act. 70.In conclusion, this Court makes the following Orders:-1.This Suit shall be consolidated with High Court Civil Suit No. E012 of 2024; Emining Quarry Limited vs Access Bank Kenya Limited PLC & Purple Royal Auctioneers.2.The injunctive orders sought herein cannot issue.3.Cost shall be in the cause. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAKURU THIS 25TH DAY OF MAY, 2026.PATRICIA GICHOHIJUDGEIn the presence ofN/A for Mr. Kisila for Plaintiff/ApplicantN/A for Mr. Kitila for Defendants/ RespondentsErickson, Court Assistant