Kashem v Kenya School of Law (Tribunal Appeal E005 of 2025) [2025] KELEAT 5 (KLR) (23 May 2025) (Judgment)

 REPUBLIC OF KENYA IN THE TRIBUNAL OF KENYA AT NAIROBI COUNTY COURT NAME: LEGAL EDUCATION APPEALS TRIBUNAL CASE NUMBER: LEAA/E005/2025 DANIEL VS KENYA SCHOOL OF LAW JUDGMENT **A. Introduction and Background** 1. Daniel Otieno Kashem filed an appeal before the Tribunal against the Kenya School ofLaw (KSL), with the Council of Legal Education (CLE) as an Interested Party, challenging the rejection of his application for admission to the Advocates Training Programme (ATP) for the 2025/2026 academic year. He seeks, among other remedies, the setting aside of KSL's rejection letters, a declaration validating his 2002 English bridging course, and an order compelling KSL to admit him. 2. The Appellant contends that the decision by the Kenya School of Law violates theprinciple of legitimate expectation, as it applies new admission standards retroactively to his case. He asserts that at the time he commenced his legal education, the applicable criteria were clearly outlined under Legal Notice No. 357 of 1997, under which his English bridging course completed in 2002 was valid and met the requisite standards. He further argues that the Kenya School of Law Act, 2012, was unfairly applied to his circumstances in a retroactive manner, thereby undermining the principles of legal certainty, fairness, and non-retroactivity which are fundamental to sound administrative decision-making. **B. Appellant’s submissions** 1. The Appellant argues that since he was admitted to the LL.B. program in 2003, prior tothe enactment of the Kenya School of Law Act, 2012, his eligibility for admission to the Advocates Training Programme (ATP) should be assessed under the Advocates (Admission) Regulations, 1997 (Legal Notice No. 357 of 1997). He cites Kevin K. Mwiti & Others v Kenya School of Law & 2 Others [2017] eKLR, which held that students admitted before 2013 are to be governed by the pre-existing legal framework. 2. He maintains that the Respondent improperly applied post-2013 laws retroactively,violating the principle of legality and legal certainty. Specifically, the requirement to sit for a Pre-Bar examination is not contained in Legal Notice No. 357 of 1997 and is therefore inapplicable to his case. 3. The Appellant further submits that he met the ATP entry requirements under the 1997 Regulations through his KCSE mean grade of B-(minus) and an English bridging course completed in 2002, which awarded him a KCSE-equivalent grade of B+(plus). He emphasizes that this bridging qualification satisfied both Section 8(b)(i) and 8(b)(ii) of the applicable Legal Notice and had been accepted by the University of Nairobi for LL.B. admission. 4. He argues that the Council of Legal Education (CLE) has only discretionary, notmandatory authority to require additional approvals or tests, as indicated by the use of the word "may" in the relevant law. He relies on the case of Kenya Wildlife Service v Joseph Musyoki Kalonzo [2017] eKLR to support the view that discretion must be exercised reasonably and fairly under Article 47 of the Constitution. Since CLE did not exercise this discretion in his case, the bridging course should stand as sufficient proof of English proficiency. 5. The Appellant concludes that the Respondent’s refusal to admit him to ATP violates thedoctrine of legitimate expectation, since he relied on the accepted qualifications to pursue his LL.B. degree. Citing Republic v Kenya Revenue Authority, ex parte Aberdare Freight Services Ltd [2004], he argues that public authorities cannot negate established expectations based on their own errors or shifting interpretations. **C. The Respondent’s and Interested Party’s Submissions** 1. The Respondent argued that it evaluated the Appellant’s application for admission to theAdvocates Training Programme (ATP) based on the legal provisions in force at the time of his admission. The Appellant was found ineligible for not meeting the minimum secondary school qualifications, particularly the required grade in English. The Respondent emphasized that unless the Appellant could provide a waiver from the Council of Legal Education (CLE) or prove completion of an approved English course, neither of which he did, he could not be admitted. 2. The Respondent relied on the Advocates (Admission) Regulations of 1997, the Council ofLegal Education Act (Cap 16A), and its subsidiary legislation, including the 2009 Regulations, arguing that these laws applied to those who commenced legal studies before the Kenya School of Law Act, 2012 came into effect. According to them, the Appellant’s qualifications did not meet the minimum requirements stipulated in the First Schedule of the applicable regulations. His B– in English was cited as a specific disqualification unless remedied through a CLE-approved English course. 3. Further, the Respondent contended that no legitimate expectation was created in theAppellant’s favour. It argued that fulfilling such an expectation would have required an unlawful act, admitting someone who did not meet the legal threshold. Citing several judicial precedents, the Respondent submitted that public institutions like itself must uphold the principles of legality, transparency, and accountability under Article 10 of the Constitution. Therefore, it could not breach legal standards to accommodate the Appellant's expectations. 4. On the issue of administrative justice, the Respondent maintained that its decision waslawful, rational, procedurally proper, and proportionate. It concluded that it had not acted outside its mandate or abused its discretion and that courts should not substitute their judgment for that of competent public agencies acting within the law. 5. The Interested Party (Council of Legal Education) emphasized that the legal notice theAppellant sought to rely on, Legal Notice No. 357 of 1997, had been revoked in 2007 and was therefore inapplicable to him since he graduated in 2024, long after its repeal. They cited statutory interpretation principles and case law to assert that laws are presumed not to have retrospective application unless expressly stated. 6. CLE submitted that no legitimate expectation could arise in favour of the Appellant sincehe had not graduated within the timeframe in which the 1997 regulations were applicable. By delaying his graduation, he forfeited any benefit that may have accrued under the earlier legal regime. The Interested party emphasized that legitimate expectations must be based on lawful, unambiguous representations by a competent authority, which was not the case here. 7. The Interested Party concluded that allowing the Appellant to rely on repealedregulations would amount to preferential and unlawful treatment. They reiterated that legal obligations must prevail over personal expectations and that public authorities cannot be compelled to violate the law to fulfill such expectations. They also submitted that the Appellant was not entitled to the reliefs or costs sought, noting that CLE had not been the original party to the suit and no specific relief was claimed against them. **D. Analysis and Determination** The Tribunal has considered the issues raised by both the Appellant and the Respondent and has narrowed them down to the following issues for determination: - 1. Whether the admission criteria under Legal Notice No. 357 of 1997 or those set out in theKenya School of Law Act, 2012 govern the Appellant’s case. 2. Whether the Appellant’s bridging course in English (graded B+ KCSE Equivalent)satisfies the ATP’s admission requirements under the Legal Notice No. 357 of 1997. 3. Whether the impugned Decision was Illegal, Irrational or Unreasonable or ProcedurallyUnfair iv. Whether the Appellant can rely on the legitimate expectation in this Appeal i) Whether the admission criteria under Legal Notice No. 357 of 1997 or those set out in the Kenya School of Law Act, 2012 govern the Appellant’s case. 1. The Tribunal has considered positions advanced by the parties regarding the eligibilitycriteria and the applicable law governing admission to the Advocate Training Programme. The Appellant contends that, having been admitted to the LL.B. program in 2003, a decade before the enactment of the Kenya School of Law Act 2012, is to be subjected to the admission criteria under Advocates (admission) regulations, 1997 (Legal Notice No. 357 of 1997). The Respondent does not deny that the Appellant falls under the qualifications set out in the Council of Legal Education (Advocates Admission Regulations), 1997. While the Interested party claims that the regulation the Appellant seeks refuge in only applied to students who graduated before the year 2007. In light of this, there is no contestation that the Appellant commenced his LLB studies prior to the enactment of the Kenya School of Law Act, 2012 but the issue here is based on the Appellant’s graduation period that is 2024. 2. In various decisions the tribunal has affirmed that those who joined LLB programs priorto the enactment of the 2012 pieces of legislation, the older regulations that were in place during the period they joined these programs shall be used to review their applications following the precedent established in Kevin K. Mwiti & Others v Kenya School of Law & 2 Others [2017] eKLR, where Justice Odunga stated: - “The long and short of this decision is that those who had joined the LLB Course prior to the effective date of the Amendment Act are to be subjected to the admission criteria prevailing before that date. Any other decision would amount to a violation of Article 27 of the Constitution.” 1. The appellant submits that the Respondent has applied Kenya School of Law Act 2012 retrospectively in his case. When it comes to repealed legislations, Section 23 (3) of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act provides as follows; “Where any written Law repeals in whole in part another written Law, then unless a contrary intention appears, the repeal shall not; a) Revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or b) Affects the previous operation of a written Law so repealed or anything duly done or suffered under a written law so repealed; or c) Affect a right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under a written Law so repealed; or ” 1. The general rule to the law of statutes is that “when a statute is enacted, it must applyprospectively, regulating future conduct”. This means that it only affects actions or events that occur after the date on which the law comes into effect. The doctrine of retrospective is defined by, Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition, Re-Issue Volume 44 (i) para 1433 states as follows on enactments: - “It is a principle of legal policy that an amending enactment should be generally presumed to change the relevant law only from the time of the enactment’s commencement.” 1. The Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edition), defines retrospective law as: “A law which looks backward or contemplates the past; one which is made to affect acts or facts occurring, or rights accruing, before it came into force. Every statute which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past. One that relates back to a previous transaction and gives it a different legal effect from that which it had under the new law when it occurred.” 1. It is important to note that, as is the case with retrospective laws, however, they are anoxymoron because a person cannot know and comply with a law that does not yet exist. The general common law approach to retrospective legislation was summarised by Lord Kerr in the Supreme Court case of Walker v Innospec Limited and others [2017] UKSC 47: “The general rule, applicable in most modern legal systems, is that legislative changes apply prospectively. Under English law, for example, unless a contrary intention appears, an enactment is presumed not to be intended to have retrospective effect. The logic behind this principle is explained in Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, 6th ed (2013), Comment on Code section 97: “If we do something today, we feel that the law applying to it should be the law in force today, not tomorrow’s backward adjustment of it.” 1. The Supreme Court has itself previously addressed the question of the retrospectiveeffect of statutes in the Samuel Kamau Macharia Case where they held: “As for non-criminal legislation, the general rule is that all statutes other than those which are merely declaratory or which relate only to matters of procedure or evidence are prima facie prospective, and retrospective effect is not to be given to them unless, by express words or necessary implication, it appears that this was the intention of the legislature.” 1. In Daniel Shumari Njiroine v Naliaka Maroro, SC Motion No. 5 of 2013; [2014] eKLRthat: “it is a general principle that laws, where enacted or promulgated, are progressive in nature. Where the Legislature intends a law to apply retrospectively, it will expressly say so. While the Constitution is not, in its essence, to be interpreted like a statute, if and where it intends a particular provision to apply retrospectively, the makers will expressly have stated so.” 1. We reiterate the above holdings and further note that the Appellant having beenadmitted to the LL.B. program in 2003, a decade before the enactment of the Kenya School of Law Act 2012, applying the 2012 would be violating his rights and prejudicial. Thus, the applicable law is Council of Legal Education, (the Advocates (Admission) Regulations) (L.N. 357 of 1997). In which the Respondents applied to determine the eligibility criteria of the appellant. On the issue raised by the interested party that the 1997 regulations only applied to those graduating prior to 2007, we reject this view because the fact is not on the graduation time rather on the admission time. ii) Whether the Appellant’s bridging course in English (graded B+ KCSE Equivalent) satisfies the ATP’s admission requirements under the Legal Notice No. 357 of 1997 1. The Appellant argues that his B+ KCSE equivalent grade in English, obtained through abridging course, fulfills the admission criteria under Legal Notice No. 357 of 1997, particularly Section 8. He contends that the Council of Legal Education's discretionary power, signified by the word "may" in the proviso to Section 8, allows it to waive additional English language tests, and that this discretion was not exercised in his case. 2. Section 8(1)(b)(ii) of Legal Notice No. 357 of 1997 requires a minimum of a grade Bplain in English Language in the KCSE or its equivalent. The proviso to this section states: "Provided that the Council may, at its discretion, require a person to pass an English Language test or any other test approved by the Council as a pre-condition to admission." 1. This Tribunal adopts a purposive approach to statutory interpretation, as established inGatirau Peter Munya vs. Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 others and County Government of Nyeri & Anor. Vs. Cecilia Wangechi Ndungu. The core objective of Section 8 is to ensure English language proficiency. 2. The term "may" generally denotes discretion or optional authority, not a mandatoryobligation. Kenyan and international jurisprudence, including Kenya Wildlife Service v Joseph Musyoki Kalonzo and Johnson's Tyne Foundry Pty Ltd v Maffra Shire Council, supports this interpretation. While "may" can be construed as "shall" in certain contexts where a public authority has a coupled obligation, no such compelling circumstances exist here. Therefore, the Council's power to require additional tests is discretionary. 3. The Appellant presented evidence of completing an English bridging course at theUniversity of Nairobi, Faculty of Arts, achieving a Grade B, which he equates to a KCSE B+. However, critical questions arise regarding the course's accreditation for legal education purposes and the validation process of the grade equivalency. 4. Section 8's proviso grants the CLE the mandate to approve "…any other test" as a precondition for admission. Despite being an Interested Party, the CLE failed to provide a definitive position on whether it formally recognized or approved the Appellant's bridging course within the applicable legal framework. 5. The Tribunal acknowledges that the Appellant's B+ grade in the bridging course, ifformally recognized as an equivalent to a KCSE B plain or higher, would satisfy the English language proficiency objective of the regulations. However, the Tribunal cannot definitively determine the sufficiency of the bridging course or its equivalency without the CLE's explicit recognition or approval. 6. The Tribunal therefore finds that the Council, as the statutory authority, has a duty toevaluate non-traditional or bridging qualifications. Its silence on the recognition of the Appellant's bridging course, despite having the opportunity to respond, constitutes a dereliction of its statutory mandate. The burden of assessing and approving such equivalencies rests with the Interested Party. iii. Whether the impugned Decision was Illegal, Irrational or Unreasonable or Procedurally Unfair 1. This tribunal has duly considered the arguments advanced by the parties concerning thefairness of the admission decision. The Appellant averred that the Respondent has unfairly applied the Kenya School of Law Act, 2012 retroactively to the Appellant’s case, despite the Appellant having commenced his studies under the prior legal framework. This retroactive application undermines legal certainty and violates the principles of fairness and nonretroactivity, contrary to established administrative law principles. 2. While the Respondent has urged this Tribunal to examine the impugned decision toostensibly “sniff” for presence of the three expectational circumstances that is illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. 3. The Tribunal will be relying on the case the Respondent has cited, The CountyGovernment of Nyeri & Ano vs John Wachri T/A Githakwa Gracekand & Wandumbi Bar & 50 Others. There are three categories of public law wrongs which are commonly used in cases of this nature. These are: - 4. Illegality- Decision makers must understand the law that regulates them. If they fail tofollow the law properly, their decision, action or failure to act will be "illegal". Thus, an action or decision may be illegal on the basis that the public body has no power to take that action or decision, or has acted beyond it powers. 5. Fairness- Fairness demands that a public body should never act so unfairly that itamounts to abuse of power. This means that if there are express procedures laid down by legislation that it must follow in order to reach a decision, it must follow them and it must not be in breach of the rules of natural justice. The body must act impartially, there must be fair hearing before a decision is reached. 6. Irrationality and proportionality- The courts must intervene to quash a decision if theyconsider it to be demonstrably unreasonable as to constitute 'irrationality" or 'perversity' on the part of the decision maker. 7. The learned judge in the above case cited the decision of Lord Green in AssociatedProvincial Picture Houses Ltd vs Wednesbury Corporation {1948} 1 K. B. 223, H.L.:- "If decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere...but to prove a case of that kind would require something overwhelming..." 1. From The County Government of Nyeri (supra), the court further stated that the onewho alleges that their administrative law right has been infringed has the burden of demonstrating that the decision is illegal, unfair and irrational as discussed above. The appellant must persuade the court that the application raises a serious issue. And further that a serious issue is demonstrated if the judge believes that the applicant has raised an arguable issue that can only be resolved by a full hearing of the judicial review application. If the court is not persuaded as aforesaid, leave will be denied and the matter proceeds no further. 2. In in the case of Pastoli vs Kabale District Local Government Council and Others (2008) 2EA 300 where it was held as follows:- “In order to succeed in an application for judicial review, the applicant has to show that the decision or act complained of is tainted …illegality is when the decision-making authority commits an error of law in the process of taking or making the act, the subject of the complaint. Acting without jurisdiction or ultra vires or contrary to the provisions of a law or its principles are instances of illegality. ………irrationality is when there is such gross unreasonableness in the decision taken or act done, that no reasonable authority, addressing itself to the facts and the law before it, would have made such a decision. Such decision is usually a defiance of logic and acceptable moral standards………. procedural impropriety is when there is a failure to act fairly on the part of the decision-making authority in the process of taking a decision. The unfairness may be in non-observance of the rules of natural justice……It may also involve failure to adhere and observe procedural rules expressly laid down in a statute or legislative instrument…..” 1. The tribunal, being under a statutory duty to scrutinize evidence presented in theapplication and consider the pleadings, has carefully examined every aspect of the Appellant's and Respondent's arguments. Upon thorough evaluation, the tribunal finds no evidence to support the Appellant’s assertion that the Respondent infringed upon his rights. Section 107 of the Evidence Act provides: “(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist. (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.” 1. The Appellant contends in one of his grounds of appeal that the Respondent’sretrospective application of the Kenya School of Law Act 2012 was unfair and unjust and violating legal certainty and the principles of fairness and non-retroactivity, contrary to established administrative law principles. This Tribunal has reviewed these allegations, as well as the surrounding circumstances, and finds that an applicant cannot claim constitutional infringement because the Respondent did not use the Kenya School of Law Act 2012 but in fact used Council of Legal Education, (the Advocates (Admission) Regulations) (L.N. 357 of 1997). iv)Whether the Appellant can rely on the legitimate expectation in this Appeal 1. This Tribunal notes that the principle of legitimate expectation is a cornerstone ofadministrative law, ensuring that public authorities act fairly and consistently in their dealings. The principle is protected under Article 47 of the Constitution of Kenya that is under the Fair administrative action and Section 7(2)(m) of the Fair Administrative Action Act, which explicitly recognizes legitimate expectation a ground for judicial review. 2. In this present case, the argument hinges on whether the appellant had legitimateexpectation. The appellant submits that he was admitted to the University of Nairobi for the LL.B. program based on his bridging course grade of B+(plus) KCSE equivalent, creating a legitimate expectation that the same qualification would suffice for ATP admission. 3. This Tribunal is guided by the case in In Paul Kipsang Kosgei vs National IndustrialTraining Authority & Another, Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Labour & Social Services (2nd Respondent (CLE)) [2020]eKLR where the court relied on a South African case of National Director of Public Prosecutions vs Philips 2002 (4) SA 60 (W) where the court stated that legitimate expectation only occurs where there is a representation which is clear unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification, it went further to state that; i. That there must be a representation which is clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualifications; ii. That the expectation must be reasonable, in the sense that a reasonable person would act upon it; iii. That the expectation must have been induced by the decision-maker and; iv. that it must have been lawful for the decision-maker to make such representation.' 1. Relying on H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth Administrative Law on the issue of legitimateexpectation, which was addressed as follows; It must be founded upon a promise or practice by the public authority that is said to be bound to fulfil the expectations. 2. Clear statutory words of course override an expectation howsoever founded. 3. The notification of a relevant change of policy destroys an expectation founded upon the earlier policy. 1. Another test is in adjudicating legitimate expectation claims, the court follows a twostep approach. First, it asks whether the administrator’s actions created a reasonable expectation in the mind of the aggrieved party. If the answer to this question is affirmative, the second question is whether that expectation is legitimate. If the answer to the second question is equally affirmative, then the court will hold the administrator to the representation that is enforce the legitimate expectation. The first step in the analysis has both an objective and a subjective dimension. It is first asked whether a reasonable expectation of a certain outcome was created. The representation itself must be precise and specific and importantly, lawful. Once a reasonable expectation exists, the administrator is required to act in accordance with that expectation, except if there are public interest considerations, which outweighs the individual’s expectation. 2. The Respondent in their submission claimed that an expectation whose fulfilmentrequires that a decision maker should make an unlawful decision cannot be a legitimate expectation. The expectation must be within the powers of the decision makers and that the Appellant disqualification would make it an unlawful decision. From the earlier issues, it has been found that the Appellant is qualified for admission thus the decision would not be unlawful. The Respondent claims that legitimate cannot subsist where there are clear contrary statutory provisions, as from the above we have seen that the Appellant’s admission is not contrary to statutory provisions and that the Respondent have erred in this. 3. On the issue raised by the Interested Party who claimed that the Appellant's failure tograduate from the University of Nairobi within the period when the regulations were in force, he waived his right, if any. Waiver as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, is the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right. Waiver is when a person intentionally and with full knowledge, gives away his right to exercise or chooses not to exercise that right which the person would otherwise possess. It means any person who is entitled to any right or privilege can waive off such a privilege, if he does so with his free will. forego the same rights having known of their existence. 4. The words waiver, estoppel and acquiescence have also been defined by the Halsbury'sLaws of England, 4th Edition, Volume 16. At page 992 waiver has been defined as follows: - “Waiver is the abandonment of a right in such a way that the other party is entitled to plead the abandonment by way of confession and avoidance if the right is thereafter asserted, and is either express or implied from conduct. It may sometimes resemble a form of election, and sometimes be based on ordinary principles of estoppel, although, unlike estoppel, waiver must always be an intentional act with knowledge. A person who is entitled to rely on a stipulation existing for his benefit alone, in a contract or of a statutory provision, may waive it, and allow the contract or transaction to proceed as though the stipulation or provision did not exist. Waiver of this kind depends upon consent, and the fact that the other party has acted on it is sufficient consideration. Where the waiver is not express it may be implied from conduct which is inconsistent with the continuance of the right... The waiver may be terminated by reasonable but not necessarily formal notice unless the party who benefits by the waiver cannot resume his position, or termination would cause injustice to him.” 1. In the case of Sita Steel Rolling Mills Ltd v Jubilee Insurance Company Ltd [2007] eKLR,Maraga, J. (as he then was) stated: - “A waiver may arise where a person has pursued such a course of conduct as to evince an intention to waive his right or where his conduct is inconsistent with any other intention than to waive it. It may be inferred from conduct or acts putting one off one's guard and leading one to believe that the other has waived his right.” 1. In the Court of Appeal case of Serah Njeri Mbobi vs John Kimani Njoroge [2013] eKLR, itheld; “In our understanding, the doctrine of waiver operates to deny a party his right on the basis that he had accepted to forego the same rights having known of their existence.” 1. From the above, in order for a waiver of a right by way of conduct to be valid, theconduct must be clear and unambiguous, leaving no doubt about the intent to waive the provision, there must be evidence that the party intended to relinquish their right to enforce the provision and the other party must have reasonably relied on the conduct, leading them to believe the right had been waived. In which in this case the above have not been shown. 2. In light of the said decisions, this Tribunal finds that Section 8 of the Council of LegalEducation, (the Advocates (Admission) Regulations) (L.N. 357 of 1997) creates a promise that whoever meets the qualifications given, is considered eligible for admission to the ATP. According to the section, a person is eligible for the admission for Kenya School of Law if they passed the relevant examinations of any recognized university in Kenya and holds a degree in law of that university, attained the minimum entry requirements for admission to a university in Kenya, obtained a minimum grade of B plain in English Language in the Kenya Certificate of Secondary Examination. The appellant sat for his KCSE and obtained a B-(minus) grade in English Language in the Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE). Having not met the English Language grade, he thereafter undertook an English bridging course in 2002, achieving a KCSE equivalent grade of B+ (plus). Having been admitted to the LL.B. program in 2003 and graduating in 2024 that is 21 years. First, a reasonable expectation was created by the Appellant’s admission into the LL.B. Secondly, this expectation was legitimate, as it was based on a clear, unambiguous representation, consistent with the law at the time particularly by Section 8. Thirdly, a reasonable person would expect to proceed from LL.B. admission to ATP admission without new disqualifications. 3. The Appellant has undergone a 21-year journey, being admitted to the LL.B. in 2003 andgraduating in 2024, clearly showing reliance on the University's earlier decision and the relying on the Council of Legal Education, (the Advocates (Admission) Regulations) (L.N. 357 of 1997). It would be grossly unfair, after such reliance and passage of time, for the Respondent to frustrate the Appellant’s expectation at the point of professional training. On whether the appellant has waived his right to legitimate expectation, this Tribunal finds that there is no waiver of such right. To this extent, we do concur with the Appellant that there was legitimate expectation. 4. The Tribunal agrees that procedural impropriety is when there is failure to act fairly onthe part of the decision-making authority in the process of taking a decision. The unfairness may be in non-observance of the Rules of Natural Justice or to act with procedural fairness towards one to be affected by the decision. It may also involve failure to adhere and observe procedural rules expressly laid down in a statute or legislative instrument by which such authority exercises jurisdiction to make a decision. For this reason, denying the Appellant his right to legitimate expectation would be unfair and against principles of natural justice. 5. For the above reasons, the Tribunal finds that there is legitimate expectation and that itshould aid the Appellant admission to the Kenya School of Law. The Tribunal also disagrees with the Respondent’s claims that the Appellant’s attempt to cherry pick favourable provisions of the law and thus benefit from both provisions the Council of Legal Education (Kenya School of Law) Regulations, 2009, and the Kenya School of Law Act 2012 in fragrant disregard of the law and the status as in the case of Kelvin Mwiti (supra), is mischievous, disingenuous, and an abuse of the court process. **E. Disposition** **Having regard to the findings made in this judgment, the Tribunal makes the following orders:** 1. **That the Interested Party is hereby directed to re-assess the eligibility of theAppellant for admission to the Advocates Training Programme in accordance with Section 8 of the Council of Legal Education (The Advocates (Admission) Regulations), Legal Notice No. 357 of 1997, and to advise the Respondent on the appropriate course of action without undue delay or prejudice to the Appellant.** 2. **Each party shall bear their own costs of the appeal.** 3. **Any party aggrieved by this decision is at liberty to appeal to the High Court on apoint of law, pursuant to Section 38(1) of the Legal Education Act, 2012.** It is so ordered by the Legal Education Appeals Tribunal. **HON. JULIANA NJIRIRI - CHAIR** **HON. JOSHUA NGULU- MEMBER** **HON. FELIX OKETCH - MEMBER** **HON. MOSES MUNOKO – MEMBER** **HON. GODANA YATANI – MEMBER** **DATED AT NAIROBI THIS 23rd DAY OF MAY 2025.** SIGNED BY/FOR: HON. JULIANA WAMAITHA NJIRIRI | | | --- | | **★ THE JUDICIARY OF KENYA ★** **HON. JULIANA WAMAITHA NJIRIRI** **VINCENT GODANA YATANI** **FELIX OTIENO OKETCH** **MOSES SITATI MUNOKO JOSHUA MBINDA NGULU** Legal Education Appeals Tribunal Legal Education Appeals Tribunal Date: 2025-05-26 10:22:08 |