https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1094

Sawa v Bakary (Civil Appeal E135 of 2023) [2026] KECA 1094 (KLR) (12 June 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KECA 1094 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Court of Appeal at Mombasa Civil Appeal E135 of 2023 AK Murgor, KI Laibuta & GW Ngenye-Macharia, JJA June 12, 2026 Between Kassim Ali Sawa Appellant and Riziq Fundi Bakary Respondent (An appeal against the Ruling/Order of the Environment and Land Court of Kenya at Mombasa (Sila Munyao, J.) dated 11th October,2022 in ELCA No. 13 of 2021) Judgment 1.This appeal arises from a dispute between the Appellant, Kassim Ali Sawa, and the Respondent, Riziq Fundi Bakari, relating to an alleged unlawful eviction from commercial premises situate on Land Parcel No. 8844 (Original No. 4826/2) MN, (the business premises) where the Respondent operated the business of a hotel. 2.By way of a plaint filed on 23rd October 2009 and subsequently amended on 18th June 2012, the Respondent claimed that the Appellant had represented himself as the lawful owner of the premises, and induced the Respondent to enter into a tenancy agreement. In 2008, the Respondent was confronted by a representative of Asmuhar Developers Limited, who informed him that the Appellant was not the owner of the property and that ownership vested in the company. Upon confronting the Appellant with this information, the Respondent alleged that the Appellant threatened him with eviction. 3.On 17th October 2009, the Appellant forcefully evicted the Respondent from the business premises without a court order. The Respondent contended that the eviction was unlawful and resulted in the destruction of the business premises and the forcible removal of his tools of trade and stock. He itemized the goods allegedly destroyed, stolen, or lost, including refrigerators, cookers, electronic appliances, furniture, shop fittings, stocks of flour, and other business equipment, with an alleged total value of Kshs. 404,930. The Respondent further claimed that, as a result of the eviction, his business was completely destroyed, causing him to loss of income at the rate of Kshs. 3,000 per day. 4.In the amended plaint, the Respondent sought, inter alia: a declaration that the Appellant’s actions were illegal, null and void; special damages of Kshs. 404,930; general damages for trespass and loss of business; and costs of the suit. 5.The Appellant filed a defence admitting the existence of the tenancy but asserted that the Respondent had denied his status as landlord, contrary to Section 121 of the Evidence Act. The Appellant admitted evicting the Respondent as he had become a tenant at sufferance and was therefore eligible to be lawfully evicted without notice. He denied confiscating the Respondent’s tools of trade or unlawfully evicting him and denied liability for damages. 6.At trial, the Respondent testified that the Appellant broke into the hotel with several people, claiming to have a court order; that he later discovered that there was no eviction order, only a proclamation issued by an auctioneer alleging rent arrears, which arrears the Respondent denied owing. The Respondent produced photographs of the damage, receipts for the lost items, and a P3 form showing injury to his cashier during the eviction. He also produced business records to support his claim of daily income. 7.For his part, the Appellant stated that the Respondent had stopped paying rent, and had also denied his (the appellant) landlord status. He admitted evicting the Respondent without a court order and renovating and partitioning the business premises thereafter. A witness called by the Appellant conceded that items were removed from the business premises and left by the roadside without an inventory being taken. 8.In a judgment delivered on 15th July 2016, the trial magistrate found that rent arrears were not proved and that the eviction was unlawful due to the absence of a court order. However, the trial court held that the Respondent had not proved demolition of the business premises or damages suffered and, consequently, dismissed the suit with each party bearing its own costs. 9.Aggrieved by that decision, the Respondent lodged an appeal to the Environment and Land Court, challenging the dismissal of the suit and contending that the trial court was in error in failing to properly evaluate the evidence on record and in declining to award damages despite having found that the eviction was unlawful. 10.Upon reconsidering the record of appeal, the pleadings, the evidence adduced and the submissions by counsel, the learned Judge held that the eviction was indeed unlawful, and that the Respondent had proved his claim to the required standard. The learned Judge affirmed that the Respondent was a lawful tenant of the Appellant, and that the tenancy was a controlled tenancy within the meaning of the Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act, Cap. 301. The court further held that the Appellant had no legal right to evict the Respondent without issuing the requisite statutory notice and without obtaining a court order; that the eviction carried out on 17th October 2009 was unlawful, forceful, and carried out in blatant disregard of the law, particularly since that the Appellant admitted to evicting the Respondent without any court order. The court rejected the Appellant’s reliance on Section 121 of the Evidence Act, holding that the provision merely operates as a rule of estoppel in evidence and does not authorize self-help eviction or confer a right to evict a tenant without due process. 11.On the issue of demolition and loss of goods, the court found that the trial magistrate erroneously held that no loss was proved; that the evidence clearly demonstrated that the business premises had been substantially altered after the eviction, rendering them incapable of being used as a hotel, which amounted in substance to demolition; that the Respondent had specifically pleaded, particularized, and strictly proved the loss of his tools of trade and stock through documentary evidence and witness testimony; that although the Respondent’s records were not elaborate, they were sufficient to establish a reasonable daily income. The Court therefore awarded the Respondent the amount claimed for the loss of income limited only to the statutory notice period under the Act. 12.The court went on to hold that once the trial court had found the eviction to be unlawful, it was erroneous for it to decline to award general damages. In so finding, the learned Judge exercised his discretion and awarded general damages for unlawful eviction, having regard to the distress, disruption ofbusiness, and violation of the Respondent’s rights occasioned by the Appellant’s actions. 13.Additionally, the court found that the Appellant’s conduct was oppressive, arbitrary, and calculated to benefit from the unlawful eviction. In view of the blatant disregard of the law and the profit subsequently derived by the Appellant after partitioning and re-letting the premises, the Court found this to be a proper case for the award of exemplary damages, holding that such damages were necessary to deter similar conduct and to demonstrate that unlawful eviction does not pay. 14.Consequently, the learned Judge set aside the Judgment of the trial court and substituted it therefor with Judgment in favour of the Respondent, and awarded the following:i)Special damages of Kshs 403,000; ii)Loss of income Kshs 36,000;iii.General damages, Kahs 250,000;iv.Exemplary damages, Kshs 840,000; and 15.The total amount of Kshs 1,529,000 together with interest from the date the suit was filed and costs. 16.Aggrieved, the Appellant has filed an appeal to this Court on the grounds that the learned Judge was in error: in failing to properly exercise its mandate as a first appellate court in analyzing the evidence on record and failing to appreciate that the evidence in support of the claim for special damages had not been adequately established; in awarding exemplary damages over and above the award of general damages without taking into account the Respondent’s own egregious conduct in unlawfully repudiating the Appellant’s status as his erstwhile landlord; in awarding exemplary damages that were manifestly excessive; in awarding interest on general and exemplary damages from the date of filing the claim rather than from the date of Judgment; and in failing to appreciate that the claim for special damages having been introduced by amendment several years after inception of the suit, any interest thereon lay for computation only from the effective date of the amendment. 17.When the appeal came up for hearing on a virtual platform, learned counsel Mr. Mwakisha appeared for the Appellant while learned counsel Mr. Mutubia appeared for the Respondent. In their written submissions, counsel for the Appellant submitted that this being a second appeal, the learned Judge of the Environment and Land Court, sitting as a first appellate court, failed to properly discharge the mandate of re-evaluating and reanalyzing the evidence on record as required by law. It was contended that, had the learned Judge properly exercised this mandate, he would have appreciated that the Respondent did not strictly prove the claim for special damages, which by law must not only be specifically pleaded, but strictly proved. Counsel argued that the claim for loss of goods was introduced several years after the inception of the suit through an amendment, with no contemporaneous report to the police or other authority, thereby rendering the claim doubtful and possibly contrived. 18.Counsel further submitted that the learned Judge was wrong to award exemplary damages in addition to general damages without taking into account the Respondent’s own conduct; that the Respondent unlawfully repudiated the Appellant’s status as landlord, contrary to Section 121 of the Evidence Act, and refused to pay rent, conduct which disentitled him to a punitive award; and that the quantum of exemplary damages awarded was manifestly excessive and unwarranted in the circumstances of the case. 19.On the question of interest, counsel submitted that the learned Judge erroneously awarded interest on general and exemplary damages from the date of filing suit, rather than from the date of Judgment, contrary to settled legal principles. The case of Shariff Salim & Another vs Malundu Kikava [1989] KLR, was relied upon for the proposition that interest on general damages accrues from the date of judgment; that since the claim for special damages was introduced by way of amendment several years after the suit was filed, interest ought to have been computed from the effective date of the amendment and not from the date of filing the suit. 20.On their part, counsel for the Respondent submitted that this being a second appeal, the jurisdiction of this Court is confined strictly to matters of law, unless it is demonstrated that the courts below considered matters, they ought not to have considered, failed to consider relevant matters, or that the decision reached was plainly perverse. The case of Tile & Carpet Centre Warehouse vs David Odhiambo Okello [2019] eKLR was cited for the proposition that, in a second appeal, the Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless such exceptional circumstances are shown. It was submitted that the learned Judge properly exercised his mandate as a first appellate court by re-evaluating and re-analyzing the evidence on record and arriving at correct conclusions; that the Respondent had specifically pleaded and strictly proved the claim for special damages; and that the learned Judge was entitled to interfere with the trial court’s findings after appreciating that material evidence had been overlooked. Counsel further submitted that the Appellant failed to demonstrate that the learned Judge misapprehended the evidence or applied wrong principles of law. 21.With regard to the award of damages, counsel submitted that the award of general and exemplary damages was justified in light of the unlawful eviction and the Appellant’s conduct; and that the Appellant has not met the threshold for interference with an award of damages. 22.On interest, counsel submitted that the award was lawful, and that the Appellant has failed to demonstrate any error in principle warranting interference by this Court. 23.This being a second appeal, our jurisdiction is confined to matters of law only. This Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the two courts below unless it is demonstrated that the courts acted on wrong principles of law, misapprehended the evidence, or arrived at a decision that no reasonable tribunal properly directing itself would have reached. 24.In the case of Kenya Breweries Ltd vs. Godfrey Odoyo [2010] 1 KLR176, while citing the case of Stephen Muriungi and Another vs. Republic [1982-88] 1 KAR 360, this Court expressed:“In a second appeal, the court has to resist the temptation of delving into matters of facts. The court, on second appeal, confines itself to matters of law unless it is shown that the two courts below considered matters, they should not have considered or looking at the entire decision, it is perverse. Where a right of appeal is confined to matters of law only, an appellate court has loyalty to accept the findings of fact of the lower court(s) and resist the temptation to treat findings of fact as holdings of law or mixed findings of fact and law, and, it should not interfere with the decisions of the trial or first appellate court unless it is apparent that, on the evidence, no reasonable tribunal could have reached that conclusion, which would be the same as holding the decision is bad in law.” 24We have considered the Record of Appeal, and the parties submissions after which we find that the issues arising for determination are; i) whether thefirst appellate court failed in its duty to properly re-analyze and re-evaluate the evidence on record and erroneously found that special damages had been proved; ii) whether the learned Judge rightly awarded exemplary damages in addition to general damages; iii) whether the award of exemplary damages was manifestly excessive; iv) whether the awards of interest on general and exemplary damages should accrue from the date of filing suit rather than from the date of Judgment; v) whether interest on special damages should accrue from the date of filing suit notwithstanding that the claim for special damages was introduced by amendment several years after the suit was filed. 25At the outset, we begin by observing that the Appellant’s appeal does not challenge the finding of liability by the two courts below, but is confined to the award of damages, in particular special damages, exemplary damages and the award of interest by the first appellate court. The appeal therefore largely turns on the principles applicable to the assessment of damages and interest, and whether the learned Judge applied the correct principles in making the awards. 26The assessment and award of damages are an exercise of discretion of the trial court and the appellate court should be slow to interfere with such award where that discretion is properly exercised. This was aptly expressed by this Court in the case of Hellen Waruguru Waweru (Suing as the legal representative ofPeter Waweru Mwenya) vs. Kiarie Shore Stores Limited [2015] eKLR thus:“As a general principle, assessment of damages lies in the discretion of the trial court and an appellate court will not disturb an award of damages unless it is so inordinately high or law as to represent an erroneous estimate. It must be shown that the Judge proceeded on wrong principles or that he misapprehended the evidence in some material respect and so arrived at a figure, which was either inordinately high or low. The Court must be satisfied that either the Judge, in assessing the damages, took into account an irrelevant factor or left out of account a relevant one or that, short of this, the amount is so inordinately high that it must be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damages.” 27Bearing this in mind, we turn to the issue of whether the first appellate court failed in its duty to properly analyze and re-evaluate the evidence when it found that special damages were proved. The Respondent claimed special damages arising from eviction and the ensuing demolition of the business premises which resulted in the destruction of his restaurant equipment, furniture, utensils and stock in trade. In the Amended Plaint dated 18th June 2012, the Respondent specifically pleaded special damages totaling Kshs.404,930 and provided a breakdown of the items allegedly destroyed or lost and their respective values. 28At the trial, the Respondent produced documentary evidence which included receipts for the purchase of various items used in the restaurant business in support of this claim. He also produced a list of the items that were allegedly destroyed during the demolition. In addition to the documentary evidence, the Respondent explained that the items were inside the premises and were destroyed when the structure was demolished. He also called witnesses who testified that the premises were demolished with the Respondent’s business items inside the premises at the time. 29The trial Magistrate dismissed the claim for special damages for the reason that, though they were pleaded, there was no evidence demonstrating the extent of the damages suffered, or that the goods were taken by the Appellant or his agents as alleged. 30.On appeal, the High Court re-evaluated this evidence and came to a different conclusion. The learned Judge considered the receipts produced, the list of items and the oral testimony of the Respondent and his witnesses and concluded that the Respondent had proved that he was operating a restaurant, and that the items listed were tools of trade utilised in the business; that when the business premises were demolished, the Respondent lost the items rendering the claim for special damages effectively proved. The learned Judge accordingly awarded Kshs 403,000 for the lost goods and Kshs 36,000 for loss of income. 31.The law on special damages is well settled. The claim must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. A claim for each particular type of special damage must be pleaded and each must be proved. In the case of Sande vs Kenya Co- operative Creameries Ltd [1992] LLR 314, this Court held that:“As we pointed out at the beginning of this judgment, Mr. Lakha readily agreed that these sums constituting the total amount were in the nature of special damages. They were not pleaded. It is now trite law that special damages must not only be pleaded but must also be specifically proved. We do not think we need to cite any authority for this simple and hackneyed proposition of the law.” 32.In the case of Ouma vs Nairobi City Council [1976] KLR 207, Chesoni, J. (as he then was) held:“Thus, for a plaintiff to succeed on a claim for special damages he must plead it with sufficient particularity and must also prove it by evidence.” 33.Similarly, in the case of Banque Indosuez vs. D J. Lowe & Co. Ltd [2006] 2 KLR 208, this Court held that:“It is simply not enough for the respondent to pluck figures from the air and throw them in the face of the court and expect them to be awarded. It is trite that special damages must not only be claimed specially but proved strictly for they are not the direct and natural or probable consequences of the act complained of and may not be inferred from the act.” 34.The authors of McGregor on Damages (10th Edition), Para. 1498 explain why special damages must be specially pleaded, as follows:“Where the precise amount of particular item of damages has become clear before the trial, either because it has already occurred and so become crystallised, or because it can be measured with complete accuracy, the exact loss must be pleaded as special damages.” 35.Contrary to the trial magistrate’s findings, the record is explicit that the Respondent specifically pleaded the lost or damaged items and produced receipts in support of the claim. In exercising its duty, the first appellate court re-evaluated the evidence and accepted it as sufficient proof. The court was entitled to reconsider the evidence and arrive at its own independent conclusions. The issue before this Court is whether receipts and oral evidence, coupled with proof that the business premises were demolished, are sufficient to satisfy the legal requirement of strict proof of special damages. 36.Our reevaluation of the record would lead us to conclude, as did the first appellate court, that since the Respondent operated a hotel, on a balance of probabilities, it is expected that the utensils and other equipment listed in the plaint are items that would be found in a hotel. Following the eviction and demolition of the business premises in the manner depicted by the eye witnesses, the equipment would have been destroyed, lost or stolen. The evidence that was lead, which was not controverted did in fact point to such the eviction and subsequent demolition of the business premises. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the first appellate court rightly concluded that the Respondent’s property was destroyed, and in so finding rightly awarded special damages on the basis that the Respondent sufficiently proved the loss that he suffered following eviction from the business premises. And, since it was not demonstrated that the first appellate court applied the wrong legal principles and reached the wrong conclusion, this Court has no basis on which to interfere with that decision. 37.The next issue for consideration is whether the learned Judge wrongly awarded exemplary damages, in addition to general damages and whether the same were manifestly excessive in the circumstances of the case. 38.The principle upon which the court awards exemplary damages was addressed by this Court in the case of Godfrey Julius Ndumba Mbogori & Another vs Nairobi City County NRB CA Civil Appeal No. 55 of 2012 [2018] eKLR thus:“(32)…..Exemplary damages are essentially different from ordinary damages. The object of damages in the usual sense of the term is to compensate. The object of exemplary damages is to punish and deter. We are guided by the case of Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 where Lord Devlin set out the categories of case in which exemplary damages may be awarded which are: i) in cases of oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants of the government, ii) cases in which the defendant’s conduct has been calculated to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff and iii) where exemplary damages are expressly authorized by statute.” 39.In the case of Board of Trustees National Social Security Fund vs Judy Wambui Muigai [2017] KECA 276 (KLR), this Court held;“It is our understanding that exemplary damages are damages awarded to punish a defendant and seek retribution, as well as being aimed at deterring the defendant from repeating the outrageously wrongful conduct and others from acting similarly, and to convey the disapproval of the court, mostly in tort and constitutional cases. (See “The Law Commission, Item 2 of the sixth programme of Law Reform, Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages, page 53.)Such damages are in our view called for in situations of oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional actions by servants of the Government; or wrongful conduct which has been calculated by the defendant to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff; and finally, where such an award is expressly authorised by the statute. See the case of John Vs MG Ltd (1966) 1 ALL E.R. 35 where the court held that exemplary damages go beyond compensation and are meant to punish the defendant. They will be ordered against a defendant who acts out of improper motive or where he is actuated by malice. This court in the case of Ken Omondi Odondi & 2 others v James Okoth Omburah T/A Okoth Omburah & Company Advocates (2013) eKLR adopted a similar approach. In the circumstances of this case, none of the above is easily discernible. Thus in our view the trial court acted on wrong principle in making the award.” 40.In considering the award, the first appellate Judge had this to say:“In our case, I am further persuaded that the intention of the respondent was to remove the appellant from the premises so that he can make more money from it. He indeed proceeded to renovate the premises by creating more rooms which he let out to multiple tenants. He charged these tenants Kshs. 6,000/= per month from the documents that he provided. In his affidavit in reply to the application for injunction that the appellant had filed, the respondent did depose that he has put up four shops. His income therefore jumped from the sum of Kshs. 10,000/= that the appellant used to pay, to Kshs. 24,000/=, an increment of Kshs. 14,000/=. The respondent must be taught the lesson that a tort does not pay. I will obliterate this extra income for 5 years thus Kshs. 14,000/= X 12 X 5 = Kshs. 840,000/=. I will make an award of Kshs. 840,000/= as exemplary damages to the appellant.” 41.During the hearing, the Respondent testified that he was called to the business premises where he found assailants stealing his property. He stated that during the incident, one of his employees was injured. PW2 also testified that he was beaten by the assailants and his hotel equipment thrown out of the premises. The Appellant and DW2 also admit having gone to the Respondent’s business premises where they evicted him, and carried away his utensils and equipment. 42.It is not disputed that the Appellant’s actions in evicting the Respondent from the demised premises without notice and due process were unlawful. It was not also disputed that following eviction the business premises was demolished to pave way for renovation into new shops which were then rented out to other tenants. No doubt, the conduct of forcible eviction of the Respondent, the violence with which his goods were thrown out and destroyed, and the assault on his workers was high-handed, oppressive and unlawful and calculated to enable him earn more rent from the business premises. We find that this was a proper case for an award of exemplary damages, and we cannot fault the learned Judge for so concluding. 43.On whether the award of exemplary damages was manifestly excessive in the circumstances of the case, it is a well settled principle that an appellate court will not interfere with an award of damages unless it is shown that the court acted on wrong principles, took into account irrelevant factors, failed to take into account relevant factors, or that the award is so inordinately high or low that it must be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage. 44.In the present case, the learned Judge awarded a sum of Kshs. 840,000 as exemplary damages. The basis for this award was the finding that the Appellant unlawfully evicted the Respondent from the business premises, renovated it into several shops, which were rented out to new tenants at a higher rent, thereby increasing his rental income. To arrive at the exemplary damages payable of Kshs. 840,000, the learned Judge multiplied the additional rental income earned over a period of five years. The amount when paid to the Respondent, would deprive the Appellant of the profit obtained from his wrongful act and deter similar conduct. But that said, a consideration of the award does not disclose the rationale for having based the computation on five years or, if the period of computation should have been lesser or greater, for that matter. 45.Exemplary damages, though aimed at being punitive in nature, must nevertheless remain proportionate to the wrongful conduct proved and should not result in unjust enrichment. See D K Njagi Marete vs Teachers Service Commission [2020] eKLR. So that, while the conduct of the Appellant was undoubtedly oppressive, high-handed and deserving of condemnation, the award of Kshs. 840,000 exceeded what was necessary to achieve the objectives of punishment and deterrence. Considering the manner in which the eviction was carried out, the removal and destruction of goods from the business premises, the disruption occasioned to the Appellant’s business, and the need to deter similar unlawful conduct by landlords, and having regard to the nature of the hotel business conducted, as well as the Respondent’s monthly rent, we take the view that a moderate global award would sufficiently meet the ends of justice. See Godfrey Julius Ndumba Mbogori & another vs Nairobi City County [2018] eKLR. Accordingly, we would interfere with the award of exemplary damages and substitute the sum of Kshs. 840,000 with an award of Kshs. 200,000, which is fair, reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances of this case. 46.Next, the Appellant challenged the award of interest on general and exemplary damages from the date of filing suit. Interest on special damages is ordinarily awarded from the date of filing suit, while interest on general damages is awarded from the date of judgment because general damages are at the discretion of the court and are only ascertained at the time of judgment. See Haria & another vs Shah (Civil Appeal 362 of 2018) [2024] KECA 527 (KLR). 47.The same principle applies to exemplary damages, which are also discretionary and are assessed by the court at the time of judgment. 48.Section 26(1) of the Civil Procedure Act empowers courts with the ability to award interest. It stipulates:“Where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged from the date of the suit to the date of the decree in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period before the institution of the suit, with further interest at such rate as the court deems reasonable on the aggregate sum so adjudged from the date of the decree to the date of payment or to such earlier date as the court thinks fit.” 49.The discretion to award interest must be exercised judicially. As stated by this Court in the case of Shariff Salim & another vs Malundu Kikava [1989] eKLR that:“There is no gainsaying the fact under Section 26 of the Civil Procedure Act, the award of interest on a decree for the payment of money for the period from the date of the suit to the date of the decree is a matter entirely within the discretion of the court. But this discretion being a judicial one must be exercised judicially. The whole idea at the end of the day is to do justice to both parties. In the case of Prem Lata v Peter Musa Mbiyu [1965] EA 592, the appellant, in a suit for damages for personal injuries, was awarded Ksh.24,000/=, as general damages and Ksh.1,742.80 as special damages but the judge refused an application to award interest on these two sums from the date of filing suit until judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeal for East Africa held that in personal injury cases, interest on general damages should not be awarded for the period between the date of filing suit and judgment but that interest should normally be awarded on special damages if the amount claimed has been actually expended or incurred at the date of filing the suit.”(See also Lei Masaku vs Kalpma Builders Ltd [2014] eKLR; and Oluoch Eric Goga vs Unicersal Corporation Ltd [2015] eKLR. 50.In the present case, the learned Judge awarded interest on the entire sum from the date of filing suit. Interest on the award of special damages was to accrue from the date of filing suit, and not from the date of filing of the amended plaint as suggested by the Appellant, while interest on general and exemplary damages was to run from the date of Judgment of the High Court. The learned Judge fell into error in so far as he awarded interest on general damages and exemplary damages from the date of filing suit instead of from the date of Judgment. We therefore find it necessary to interfere with the decision on the award of interest on exemplary and general damages. 51.In sum, the appeal fails in substantial part, but succeeds on the award of interest on special damages which should accrue from the date of filing suit, while interest on general and exemplary damages shall run from the date of Judgment of the High Court.And we make the following orders:i.Special damages of Kshs 403,000 are hereby upheld;ii.Loss of income of Kshs 36,000 is hereby upheld;iii.General damage of Kshs 250,000 are hereby upheld;iv.Exemplary damages of Kshs 840,000 hereby set aside and substituted therefor with an award of Kshs 200,000;v.Interest on special damages and loss of income to accrue from the date of filing the suit is uheld; andvi.Interest on general and exemplary to accrue from the date of the Judgment of the Environment and Land Court delivered on 11th October 2022.vii.Since the appeal fails in substantial part, costs to the Respondent.It is so ordered. DATED AND DELIVERED AT MOMBASA THIS 12TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026.A. K. MURGOR……………………….. JUDGE OF APPEALDR. K. I. LAIBUTA CArb, FCIArb.…………………………JUDGE OF APPEALG. W. NGENYE-MACHARIA…………………………JUDGE OF APPEALI certify that this is the true copy of the originalsigned DEPUTY REGISTRAR